THE 5+5 DIALOGUE AS A

MECHANISM **of integration** and regional cooperation

For a common reflection on the Western Mediterranean

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MECHANISM **of integration** and regional cooperation

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PRESENTATION: Dialogue 5+5, from its genesis to the present

Contents

1. Genesis, historical evolution and operation

Dialogue 5+5 is an informal sub-regional forum for the Western Mediterranean that since 1990 has brought together five countries from the north (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal) with five countries from the south (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia).

Although on France's initiative the proposal to establish a format of reduced cooperation between the big four European Mediterranean states and the five of the Maghreb had already emerged strongly in 1988, it picked up momentum after the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 and the launch of the Renewed Mediterranean Policy in 1990. The personal involvement of prime ministers of the time, in particular of Italy and Spain, Bettino Craxi and Felipe González, was also decisive. Thus, a few months later, on 10 October 1990, the first official ministerial meeting of the new format took place in Rome. Malta participated in this first meeting as an observer country, to later become a full member the following year, resulting in five countries in each of the two parts.

There was no major stumbling block to strengthening cooperation between the two groups. Therefore, eight work groups were set up to foster regional cooperation and address specific issues such as debt, cultural dialogue, technology and scientific research, among others. Following the tradition established in Rome, a year later a second ministerial meeting was held in Algiers (26-27 October 1991) to discuss the repercussions of the First Gulf War.

As this group had a reduced and intergovernmental format it seemed that it would focus on specific issues and establish dynamic cooperation, but after the first two ministerial meetings the dialogue reached an impasse of almost ten years due to the Algerian crisis that began in 1992 and the international isolation of Libya because of its involvement in the Lockerbie attack.

After the end of the Algerian crisis and the West's reconciliation with Libya, the process resumed in Lisbon in January 2001, and since then there have been regular Dialogue 5+5 meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers.

In this way, alongside the aforementioned meetings (Rome in 1990, Algiers in 1991 and Lisbon in 2001) there have been the following meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers: Tripoli (30 May 2002), Sainte-Maxime (9 and 10 April 2003), Oran (23 and 24 April 2004), La Valetta (June 2005), Rabat (20 and 21 January 2008), Córdoba (20 and 21 April 2009), Tunis (15 and 16 April 2010), Rome (20 February 2012), Nouakchott (16 April 2013), Lisbon (22 May 2014) and Tangiers (7 October 2015).

In the ministerial meeting in Sainte-Maxime, France, it was decided to promote, for the first time, a Summit of Heads of State and Government that took place on 5 and 6 December 2003 to lend visibility and solidity to this Western Mediterranean cooperation process. Previously, on 29 and 30 October that year in Saint-Symphorien-le-Château, an extraordinary ministerial meeting was held with the objective of commenting on the recent regional developments and in particular prepare the Summit of Heads of State and Government, an event that would consolidate the continuity of the initiative with the aim of encouraging peace, stability and development in the region.

Later, in the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers held in Rome in 2012, in a fully reformed political landscape at the height of political evolution in some countries of the region, it was formally decided to hold a second Summit of Heads of State and Government that would take place in La Valetta on 5 and 6 October 2012 with the participation of representatives of European and regional institutions.

Consequently, 5+5 Dialogue strictly speaking concerns the Heads of State and Government, who so far have only met twice, and the Foreign Affairs Ministers, whose last meeting (the twelfth after the reactivation of dialogue in 2001) was held in Tangiers on 7 October 2015. Until 2008, the presidency of the Dialogue was held in rotation by the country hosting the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers. In the meeting held in Rabat in 2008 it was decided that from the following year a co-presidency would be set up held by the outgoing presidency together with the presidency of the country hosting the ministerial meeting, both representatives of the group of northern and southern countries. Thus, the meeting in Córdoba in 2009 was co-presided by Morocco and Spain, and in 2016, the co-presidency is held by Morocco and France.

The ten countries also organise periodical sectoral ministerial conferences. Some of them, such as Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence and Transport, began with a more reduced format and then expanded to the 5+5. The spheres in which initiatives have gradually crystallised are: interior (since 1995), migration (2002), parliamentary relations (2003), defence (2004), tourism (2006), transport (2007), education (2009) and the environment and renewable energies (2010).

It should be noted that 5+5 Dialogue does not have a permanent Secretariat, or its own financial instruments or mechanisms.

2. Ministerial dynamics and formations

Summit of Heads of State and Government

On 5-6 October 2012 the Heads of State and Government of the 5+5 countries met in La Valetta, almost ten years after the first meeting (Tunis, 5-6 December 2003). The ministers explored several issues, such

as political dialogue, regional security and stability, economic and social affairs, the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, education and youth, migration and development and global issues. The participants accepted the proposal of the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) to develop a sub-regional network of groups of reflection in the 5+5 countries and further explore the research to promote regional integration and cooperation. The representatives of the ten states also agreed to open the dialogue to civil society representatives of the member countries. This new direction was reaffirmed by the organisation of the 1st Western Mediterranean Economic Forum held at the headquarters of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, in Barcelona, on 23 October 2013. This first meeting of the forum of economic representatives resulted in a second forum in Lisbon in 2014.

Meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers

These meetings are expected to be held once a year in the country holding the 5+5 Dialogue presidency, in alphabetical order. The twelfth meeting was held on 7 October 2015 in Tangiers under the co-presidency of Morocco and Portugal. In the approved declaration, the ministers stress the 5+5 Dialogue's role as a political platform for cooperation and agreement, and express their support for the democratic transition in Tunisia, regardless of the country's stabilisation challenges. The declaration also refers to the serious situation in Libya and Syria, as well as the Sahel region, and the Middle East peace process. In terms of economic cooperation, the countries demand a greater involvement of the private sector in 5+5 Dialogue initiatives and the implementation of initiatives that encourage the creation of youth employment. The dynamics in the 5+5 Dialogue, in particular the political and sectoral initiatives, should be strengthened.

Conference of Interior Ministers of the Western Mediterranean (CIMO)

It has been held since 1995 informally, with the initial participation of nine of the ten members of the Dialogue. The first meeting of the 5+5 format was held in 2004, with the official admission of the Mauritania Ministry of the Interior, which until then had participated as an observer. Since then, there have been working groups on terrorism, organised crime, circulation of people and the fight against illegal migration, training of police officers, civil protection and local administration. In the 16th meeting (18 and 19 May 2015, in Lisbon) the ministers agreed to intensify the common strategy for fighting against terrorism and organised crime, as well as the issues concerning civil protection and the fight against mafias that exploit illegal migration. Mauritania proposed hosting the next sectoral ministerial conference in 2017.

Conference of the Group of Transport Ministers of the Western Mediterranean (GTMO)

It promotes cooperation in the sphere of transport and was constituted in 1995 in Paris. The Centre for Transportation Studies for the Western Mediterranean (CETMO) acts as GTMO Technical Secretariat in Barcelona. The last ministerial conference (the eighth) was held on 22 October 2014 in Lisbon. The participants debated the importance of strengthening cooperation in transport for economic development and regional integration; they approved a multimodal network of transport in the Maghreb countries and the biannual work programme for the period 2015-2016. Mauritania has proposed hosting the next sectoral ministerial conference in 2016.

Ministerial Conference on Migration in the Western Mediterranean

Training in migration policies has taken on growing importance because of the crisis situation affecting the Mediterranean in recent years. Thus, different complementary initiatives to 5+5 Dialogue have

emerged in recent months, such as the Euro-African Summit in Malta in November 2015 or the 4th Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development in Rome in November 2014. In this respect, the seventh and last meeting of this ministerial conference was held in 2010 in Tripoli. In the previous event (Évora, 26-27 May 2008), the main lines of debate were: the integration of immigrants in destination countries, circular immigration and the use of new technologies to manage immigration flows. The participants approved the creation of a website to exchange good practices and strengthen bilateral and multilateral contacts and the organisation of two thematic seminars, but none of these actions has been put into practice to date.

The next 5+5 Dialogue ministerial migration meeting is planned for 2016 in Rabat.

Meeting of Defence Ministers of the 5+5 Initiative on security in the Western Mediterranean

France launched this initiative in 2004 in the 4+3 format, expanded to 5+5 with the successive admissions of Malta, Libya and Mauritania. The objective was to explore the issues of security and defence in the Western Mediterranean from a military point of view. The three spheres of action included in the Statement of Intentions were: maritime security, civil protection and air security, although maritime search and rescue and the environment were added later. The 5+5 Defence Initiative maintains its own unique rotating presidency system, its ministerial conference normally held every year in the country holding the presidency, and the General Staff meeting and Managing Committee meeting. The last ministerial meeting was held in Tunis on 9 and 10 December 2015.

Other formats of sectoral meetings

Over recent years there has been a political commitment expressed both in the last Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 5+5 Dialogue, and in different meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to gradually extend the fields of sectorial cooperation. In this respect, driven by the different co-presidencies and the ministries of Foreign Affairs different sectoral ministerial meetings have been organised, with the aim of expanding the spheres of regional cooperation:

· **Meeting of Tourism Ministers:** the 1st meeting was held in 2006 in Tunis (5 May). The last (third) was held in Lisbon on 3 December 2014 with the creation of a Follow-up Committee that will implement its decisions. The next will be held in Morocco in 2016.

· **Meeting of Health Ministers:** there have been two meetings of a Technical Work Group on Health in the Western Mediterranean, the last in November 2014, as well as themed seminar groups. The first ministerial meeting of this group is expected to take place in 2016 in Morocco.

· **Meetings of Ministers on Water, Renewable Energies and the Environment:** the first ministerial meeting on water was held in Algiers on 31 March 2015 and the second ministerial meeting on Energy and the Environment in Lisbon on 3 March 2015 under the Portuguese-Moroccan co-presidency. The third ministerial meeting is planned for 2016 in Morocco.

· **Meetings of Ministers of Education and Higher Education and Research:** the ministerial meeting of Ministers of National Education was held in Marseilles on 27 and 28 October 2014, and the second

Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Research in Madrid, on 23 and 24 March 2015. The third ministerial meeting is expected to take place in Tunis in the second half of 2016.

· **Meeting of Ministers of Culture:** it was agreed to foster cooperation in the cultural field of 5+5 Dialogue with the aim of facilitating dialogue between societies of the region, protecting their intangible heritage and sustaining cultural creativity. To this end, the holding of a first meeting of 5+5 Dialogue Ministers of Culture and closer collaboration with the Anna Lindh Foundation has been agreed.

· **Meeting of Ministers of Trade and Investment:** it was agreed to foster structured regional cooperation to facilitate the conditions that favour trade and the promotion of investment. To this end, France, under its co-presidency, has committed to organise the first Ministerial Meeting in 2016.

Other initiatives

Although 5+5 Dialogue is an eminently intergovernmental initiative, with over time areas of collaboration have been launched that go beyond the governmental executive structures, such as the following:

Meeting of Parliamentary Presidents of the Western Mediterranean

The first meeting of the parliamentary presidents of the 5+5 Dialogue countries was held in Tripoli in 2003. The different parties agreed to work on an ongoing basis, but only two other meetings were held (Paris, 7-8 December 2004, and Rabat, 22-24 November 2006). Italy offered to host the meeting in 2007 and Tunis in 2008, but neither took place. However, on 15 April 2013 in Nouakchott the 4th Meeting of Parliamentary Presidents of Western Mediterranean countries took place with the participation of other inter-parliamentary forums, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, the Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM or the Maghreb Consultative Council. Morocco is expected to host the next meeting of this group whose aim is to contribute to strengthening cooperation.

Economic and Business Forum

On a mandate of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 5+5 Dialogue, the first forum that brought together public decision-makers with representatives of the economic and business world of the region was held on 23 October 2013 at the headquarters of the Secretariat of the UfM in Barcelona. The second was held on 21 May 2014 in Lisbon and preceded the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 5+5 Dialogue.

Civil Society forum

The first forum on youth was held in Tangiers on 6 October 2015 with the collaboration of the national networks of the Anna Lindh Foundation, and preceded the 5+5 Dialogue meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers.

3. Regional cooperation perspectives

The 5+5 Dialogue emerges as an informal sub-regional initiative at a time when the European Community is expanding its Mediterranean policy with the launch in the European Council summit in December 1990 of the Renewed Mediterranean Policy. This was a consequence of the shortages of the Global Mediterranean Policy (1972-1990) that did not come up to expectations as it was aimed only at fostering bilateral trade, without encouraging the growth of investment in the countries of the south or regional integration.

The international political situation was marked by the disintegration of the USSR and the crisis unleashed by the first Gulf War. In this context, the European Union adopted a new focus to approach the growing challenges shared with the neighbouring countries of the south, distancing itself from the American stance based on preventive war, and embracing the thesis that it was necessary to support its southern neighbours sharing its model for development based on democracy and the market economy. This thesis was precisely what marked the emergence of sub-regional initiatives such as 5+5 Dialogue, or regional initiatives such as the Barcelona Process launched at the first Ministerial meeting of Foreign Affairs in November 1995, with the subsequent creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995-2008), and later the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and the Union for the Mediterranean (2008).

Therefore, the relation between 5+5 Dialogue and the different regional integration and cooperation organisations is relevant and has been growing closer, although the former has a more clearly intergovernmental character. In particular, the relation is fruitful with three of these institutions: the European Union, especially with the European Commission and the European External Action Service, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Arab Maghreb Union.

A few years ago a debate emerged over the ministerial meetings to expand the 5+5 Dialogue with another member on the northern side (Greece) and one on the southern (Egypt). Negotiations advanced but were frustrated by the French initiative to create a Union for the Mediterranean in the Paris summit of 13 July 2008, just as in 1994 when Egypt, feeling excluded from the 5+5 Dialogue, convinced France to create the Mediterranean Forum, an intergovernmental regional cooperation body, which was overshadowed by the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995.

With the invigoration of the Union for the Mediterranean that has a diligent and efficient secretariat in Barcelona and that since 2015 once again has held meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs alongside the usual sectorial ministerial meetings, the creation of synergies with the 5+5 Dialogue has become a pressing need. Some specific examples of this occasional and growing collaboration between the multilateral partnerships are seen in the UfM's mandate to play a catalysing role, or in the sectoral sphere of higher education and scientific research in which it has been decided that the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean will be the technical secretariat in this field.

Moreover, the synergies with the Anna Lindh Foundation, associated with the Union for the Mediterranean, have been growing since the 5+5 Dialogue decided to organise its first Civil Society Forum in 2015 and widen its cooperation in the cultural sphere with the holding of the 1st Conference of Ministers of Culture in 2016.

4. Annexes

Malta official declaration (October 2012)
Tunis official declaration (December 2003)
Conclusions of the Tangiers Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting (2015)
Conclusions of the Lisbon Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting (2014)
Conclusions of the Nouakchott Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting (2013)
Conclusions of the Rome Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting (2012)
Conclusions of the Tunis Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting (2010)
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The Maghreb: Common Challenges and Diverging Approaches to Transition

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The Maghreb in the Face of the Terrorist Threat

Three years after the events that shook the Arab world, the Maghreb region is still experiencing an unprecedented terrorist threat. In Tunisia, this threat weighs heavily on the country's politics and threatens to upset the fragile balance of its new political configuration. After the assassination of two emblematic figures of the Tunisian left, Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Ibrahimi, the country suffered an attack at Mount Chaambi, near the Algerian border. The outcome of this attack was judged by the Tunisian authorities as the worst to be recorded by the military since independence. After a six-month 'ceasefire,' the country was again the target of a terrorist attack, the bloodiest since the fall of the Ben Ali regime. The assailants, who were targeting the seat of the Tunisian Parliament, entered the Bardo National Museum and opened fire on tourists, causing no less than 23 casualties and 47 wounded.

In contrast to Tunisia, Morocco remains the most stable country in the region. No attacks have been registered since the one in Marrakech in 2011. This notwithstanding, the country remains a prime target for terrorist organisations, as indicated by the number of terrorist cells dismantled by the Moroccan authorities in 2014. Indeed, the preventive approach adopted by Morocco seems to be paying off and ensuring the country a certain immunity. According to official sources, the security services managed to foil numerous terrorist plans that, if we are to believe the official Ministry of the Interior communiqués, would have destabilised the country had they not been thwarted. The tracking of terrorism that allowed a number of terrorist cells to be dismantled in 2014 has continued in 2015. Thus, according to a Ministry of the Interior communiqué from 13 April 2015, at least six members of a terrorist cell preparing attacks on behalf of the Islamic State were arrested in Selouane, in northern Morocco. According to the same source, the suspects are followers of jihadi thought who were planning the assassination of individuals with religious convictions contrary to those of the Islamic State organisation.

A Difficult Economic Climate

The second common denominator of the Maghreb countries in 2014 resides in the persistence of economic imbalances that weigh down their restart capabilities. This notwithstanding, although the three countries have experienced the effects of a difficult regional and international economic climate, the fact remains that how the crisis presents varies significantly from one state to another according to each of the three Maghreb countries' structural makeup. Hence, Algeria is the country experiencing the worst effects from the international economic climate. This is particularly due to the plummeting oil prices and their repercussions on the country's macroeconomic balance. In June, only two months after the re-election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as President for a fourth term, the price of oil began a sharp fall, reaching its lowest level since 2009 in early January 2015, at 47.25 dollars per barrel. Following that came a fall in oil revenue, leading to a major increase in the balance of payments deficit. In fact, according to the IMF, the current account should register a deficit of 26 billion dollars in 2015. This colossal figure is un-

precedented since Bouteflika took up the presidency 16 years ago.[1] To remedy this situation, Algeria does not seem to have any alternatives other than dipping into the country's savings, the Revenue Regulation Fund (Fonds de régulation des recettes, FRR), to fill the gaping hole in the government's accounts. But at this rate of expenditure, the FRR will be exhausted quite quickly.

In Morocco, 2014 was the year of the most difficult choices and the most unpopular decisions. The Benkirane Administration undertook reform of the Compensation Fund, eliminating subsidies of all liquid petroleum products, a painful and risky measure in various regards. Moreover, 2014 was one of the worst years in terms of growth in a decade, with the rate not surpassing 2.5%. In any case, the Benkirane Administration managed to reduce the budgetary deficit, which was 4.9% of the GDP in 2014. This progress was possible primarily due to a good agricultural yield and an improvement in the economic health of the eurozone, Morocco's main trade partner. These factors had a positive impact on Morocco's exports, though structurally, it registered a trade deficit on the order of 20% of the GDP.

Another indicator of the economic crisis in which the three Maghreb countries are immersed is the unemployment affecting a large portion of the workforce. Tunisia, which is still suffering the after-effects of its rupture with its authoritarian past, has the highest unemployment rate in the Maghreb. The figures published by the National Statistics Institute show that the unemployment rate reached 15% during the last quarter of 2014, whereas it was only 14.8% over the course of the second quarter of that year.[2] Morocco and Algeria experienced nearly identical unemployment rates, relatively lower than Tunisia's. In Algeria, according to two employment surveys conducted among households by the National Statistics Office in April and September 2014, the unemployment rate stood at 10.6%, meaning an increase of 0.6% over the preceding years, remaining at 10% from 2009 to 2013. Note in this regard that unemployment affects 25% of Algerian youth, including young graduates. With regard to Morocco, despite the context of crisis, the Kingdom was the only Maghreb country where the unemployment rate returned to under 10%. According to the country's High Commission for Planning (Commissariat au Plan, HCP), the unemployment rate is now 9.9%, having decreased by 0.3 points between the first quarter of 2014 and that of 2015.[3]

The Price of Maghreb Non-Integration

Intra-Maghreb trade continues to feel the effects of the Morocco-Algeria rupture. The closing of the border between the two countries not only handicaps the two countries' economies, but also prevents the establishment of an authentic Maghreb integration that would allow them to save over 2 billion dollars per year, according to IMF estimates.

Intra-Maghreb trade continues to feel the effects of the Morocco-Algeria rupture. The closing of the border between the two countries not only handicaps the two countries' economies, but also prevents the establishment of an authentic Maghreb integration

Trade continues to be affected by the closure of the border in 1994 and the project for regional economic integration is still blocked. "In a world where goods circulate much more freely than people, the Algerian-Moroccan standoff seems like a sacrilege, making it impossible to imagine a large-scale economic project," states an Algerian journalist before substantiating his remarks with the example of Renault, whose Moroccan and Algerian factories cannot be connected by land.[4]

[1] Tewfik Abdelbari, "L'année économique du 4e mandat : des difficultés et des défis," *Tout sur l'Algérie*, 16 April 2015, www.tsa-algerie.com/20150416/lannee-economique-du-4e-mandat-des-difficultes-et-des-defis/

[2] The rate went from 14.1% in 2004 to 14.8% in 2014, the Tunisian National Statistics Institute stated. According to Saiidi, the decreased unemployment rate, which stood at 14.8% over the course of the second quarter of last year, can be attributed to the hiring of over 23,000 higher education graduates to work on the population census carried out in that quarter (April and May 2014).

[3] See the informative note on the state of the labour market published by the Moroccan High Commission for Planning.

[4] Further information available here: Maïna F., "Rivalité politique entre Alger et Rabat, la tragédie économique", *Algérie-Focus.com*, 21 May 2013, www.algerie-focus.com/blog/2013/05/rivalite-politique-entre-alger-et-rabat-la-tragedie-economique/

The negative effects of the political tension between Algeria and Morocco are not limited to the economies of the rival countries. These tensions continued to make the Maghreb lose time, a Maghreb that, according to various observers, is today a 'non-region' on the economic level. Although Morocco is Algeria's number one client thanks to Algerian exports to Morocco primarily consisting of hydrocarbons, there is no denying what some qualify as an 'economic tragedy' caused by the political rivalry between the two countries. In his work entitled "Algérie et Maroc : Quelles convergences économiques," economist Camille Sari rightly notes that: "The absence of a Maghrebi economic union hinders the development of trade in goods and services and foreign exchange, as well as the circulation of human resources"; before concluding that "the Maghreb is the only region in the world without regional construction and where intra-[regional] trade is insignificant."[5]

Tunisia: The Hope of Democratic Transition

With the election of a new President of the Republic in 2014, Tunisian completed the last electoral stage of its transition process. The cradle of the so-called Arab Spring, Tunisia aspires to prove the emergence of a democracy is always possible in the Arab World. In fact, the success of the Tunisian model can not only be attributed to endogenous factors linked particularly to the Tunisian society's dynamism, the maturity of the political class and the quality of its leadership, as well as the military's neutral position, but also to exogenous factors associated with the country's regional context. It is from this perspective that one can understand the Ennahdha party's difficult yet historic and decisive decision to step down in order to spare Tunisian Islamists the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
There is no doubt the Tunisian transition process has great chances of making Tunisia a model of democratisation in Northern Africa. In any case, this model remains dependent on the operation of the new system, which will, among other things, have to handle two challenges associated with the current transitional context. The first challenge would be for the country's new leaders to eliminate Ben Ali's authoritarian legacy and attempt to forge a new democratic legitimacy for themselves beyond the polls. This challenge is all the more serious and urgent, given that a large part of Tunisian youth perceives the elites having marked the transition process (drafting of the constitution and national dialogue) as belonging to the Ben Ali regime.[6] Indeed, newly elected President Beji Caid Essebsi, Prime Minister Habib Essid and other members of the government occupied key posts in the Bourguiba or Ben Ali regimes and do not have revolutionary legitimacy. The second challenge of the new Tunisian regime would be to find adequate solutions to the economic dysfunctions adversely affecting the country's efforts at economic recovery. The growth estimates advanced by the IMF (3.7%) or the Tunisian government (3%) will most likely be affected by the terrorist attacks shaking the country in early 2015. In this regard, of course, tourism, one of the Tunisian economy's mainstays, is particularly sensitive to security hazards.

Morocco: The Year of the Vagaries of the Third Track

The third year of cohabitation of the monarchy and the Islamists of the Justice and Development Party (PJD) seemed to confirm the hypothesis according to which change always occurs within the framework of continuity in Morocco. Some believe the new constitution has given rise to a diarchy.[7] Now the Moroccan political system, they believe, functions with an executive branch shared by two institutions whose powers more or less balance out. In addition to the institution of the monarchy, conventionally the main actor of the Moroccan Executive Branch, the new text is considered to have raised the government to an authentic second point of impetus for policymaking in Morocco. That said, this hypothesis/aspiration based on a parliamentary reading of the Moroccan Constitution does not seem to hold up to the facts and the way the new institutional system operates. Apart

[5] Camille Sari, *Algérie et Maroc : Quelles convergences économiques ?*, Éditions Cabrera in partnership with Gnôsis - Éditions de France, Paris, 2011.
[6] Maha Yahya, *Beyond Tunisia's Constitution: The Devil in the Details*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Beirut, April 2015.
[7] By way of example, see the study by Mohamed Amine Benabdellah: "L'institution gouvernementale dans la constitution marocaine." REMALD, double issue 112-113, September-December 2013.

from a few urgent, highly problematic and very politically risky issues (reform of the Compensation Fund and pension plans), the government remains nearly incapable of truly taking the political initiative, in the sense of defining the country's general political choices and orientation. These remain the prerogative of the monarchy, whose means of action are far from being challenged by the new institutional system established by the 2011 Constitution.

The Barakat movement assembled civil society, which organised and mobilised via the Facebook and Twitter social media to call for a protest against a fourth term for Bouteflika

Three years after the establishment of the new institutional system, there is no denying that the decision-making process has remained marked by certain dysfunctions of the 'old system.' The disconnection between decision and responsibility that had always marked the political system continues to adversely affect the regime's efforts at democratisation. Turning to the High Council for Education to prepare a reform project for the education system is one of the expressions of this disconnection. Another form this phenomenon takes consists in the strong presence of technocrat ministers, who controlled over 51% of the state budget in 2014. The ministers belonging to the government coalition parties controlled less than 49%, including the PJD ministers, with only 7.46% of the budget.

The year 2014 was also marked by an unprecedented level of tension in relations between the Head of Government and opposition party leaders. The latter continually reproach Mr. Benkirane for having deliberately abandoned his constitutional prerogatives. For his part, the Head of Government repeatedly states that his administration is a simple collaborator of the King, who remains the true holder of power according to the provisions of the 2011 Constitution.

Algeria: The Status Quo of Bouteflika's Fourth Term

Politics in Algeria have been marked primarily by the presidential elections leading President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to his fourth term. After having survived the so-called Arab Spring events, the Algerian regime was facing a difficult test in the presidential elections on 17 April 2014. Although it was initially assumed that incumbent President Bouteflika, suffering from health problems, would not run for office, this scenario became increasingly uncertain as the elections approached. On 22 February 2014, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal made the incumbent President's candidacy official. After the deadline for new candidacies had passed, 10 candidacies were registered with the Constitutional Council, which validated six through its 14 March 2014 decision.[8]

These elections were marked by a wave of protests after the official announcement of the incumbent's candidacy. Numerous protests against President Bouteflika's fourth term were held throughout the electoral campaign as well as the day after the results were announced. The Barakat movement assembled civil society, which organised and mobilised via the Facebook and Twitter social media to call for a protest against a fourth term for Bouteflika. The movement began with protests in Algiers, which resulted in many Barakat members and other citizens participating in the protests being detained for questioning by the police. In Aurès, the B'zayed association, which is the local branch of Barakat, organised a protest on 20 March in which it attempted to bring together the greatest number of protesters.

In any event, the voices raised against the fourth term and calls for boycotting the election expressed by a considerable number of Algerian civil society actors and political parties did not prevent the elections from being held on 17 April 2014. Nevertheless, the success of these elections was only possible at the price of a sharp nosedive in the participation rate, which only reached 51.7%, as compared to 74% in 2009.

[8] These were, namely, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Louisa Hanoune, Ali Benflis, Ali Fawzi Rebaïne, Moussa Touati and Abdelaziz Belaïd.

Jihadism in Northern Africa and the Sahel

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Even in Northern Africa, though thousands of kilometres from Iraq and Syria, the aftershock can be felt of the actions and discourse of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), whose military victories and the capacity to create an Islamic state from scratch has given the Maghrebi and Sahel jihadists a second wind after their decline following French intervention in Mali and the pressure of security forces in Algiers, Tunis, Cairo and Rabat. In Northern Africa as in the Sahel, jihadists are split between the two movements – al-Qaeda and the Islamic State – which, though they share the perspective of considering violent action the only tool for social change, have different or even opposing agendas and operational logic. The challenge for these two organisations struggling for leadership in the sphere of jihad is to maintain or rally structural allegiances in order to multiply the jihadi firepower in Northern Africa and the Sahel. If emissaries are sent to ensure support from a specific regional organisation for the parent organisation, allegiances are above all determined by the strategic choices made by the local jihadi leaders. Whereas some continue to proclaim their loyalty to Ayman al-Zawahiri, others prefer to join the Islamic State (IS), which has the wind in its sails despite its recent military setbacks in Syria and Iraq. In Tunisia, Abu Ayadh, the underground leader of Ansar al-Sharia (not the same group as its Libyan namesake), has made appeals to join the jihad in Syria and rally to the ranks of al-Baghdadi in Iraq. For its part, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has rejected the caliphate and renewed its allegiance to al-Qaeda and its leader, al-Zawahiri. Since then, it seems that rifts are appearing within AQIM (its leaders being primarily in Algeria), with some wishing to join ISIL. These rivalries can certainly divide and thus weaken the jihadists (who are still very weak), but they can also encourage some of them to carry out actions demonstrating their firepower over that of their rivals and attracting new members.

The Persistence of Jihadism in the Sahel

Although the intervention of France, Chad and other African countries participating in the African-led International Support Mission in Mali Mission (AFISMA, later MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) has allowed the capacity for action of armed jihadi groups in the North Mali region to be broken, the March 2015 attack, which killed five people in Bamako, demonstrates that jihadism has not entirely disappeared from Mali. Groups such as al-Mourabitoun or the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) remain active in a region that is part of the al-Qaeda network. Combining various jihadi groups, it distinguished itself through a significant feat of arms: the In Amenas hostage crisis in Algeria in January 2013. The different operations carried out by the authorities can provide an idea of the persistence of the jihadi threat in Mali. On 10 September 2015, a truck bomb was intercepted in southern Gao and four days later, soldiers were attacked by four men south of Almoustarat, for instance.
Despite French intervention, jihadists are returning to an area they know perfectly well and where they still have numerous hideouts: in the Menaka region; north of Timbuktu in the Wagadou woodlands, on the border between Mali and Mauritania; or in the

Adrar des Ifoghas massif. It is more or less from these areas that attacks have been organised against MINUSMA members for over a year. The jihadists enjoy broad support among the local population. Moreover, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), a participant in the inter-Malian dialogue process, has never cut off relations with Iyad Ag Ghaly. By the same token, the boundaries between the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) are porous.

The resilience of Malian jihadists has alarmed the authorities of Niger since the attacks on a barracks and the Areva plant in Arlit on 23 May 2013. The main element of concern for the Niger government is the presence on its territory of Niger nationals having formed part of AQIM and MOJWA and militarily trained by these organisations. Niamey's concern is all the greater, considering that the country is practically 'surrounded': to the north, by the jihadists of southern Libya; to the south, by Boko Haram; and to the west, by members of AQIM and MOJWA. In any case, Niger is not the only country to grow alarmed at the jihadism in its region. Chad is likewise affected by the security imbalance in southern Libya. In the first place, the country has become a potential target since it sent a contingent of 2,000 soldiers to Mali. In the second place, N'Djamena must contend with the destabilisation risks on its eastern and southern borders due to the Darfur conflict and the security and political instability in Central Africa. In any case, the jihadi threat must not be overestimated and Mali is far from the situation prevailing in the months preceding the conflict there.

A Polymorphous Jihadi Threat in Northern Africa

Though jihadism continues to exist in Mali and to threaten Niger and Chad, it is no longer limited to this area. By 'stirring up the hornet's nest,' French forces have in effect nurtured a logic of dispersion. Many combatants have fled from Mali to southern Libya. Thus, after the Sahel, Libya is becoming the new epicentre of jihadism in the region. Indeed, four years after the beginning of the uprising against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime, who ruled the country with an iron fist, the wealthy oil-producing country has been given over to rival militias, namely the Libyan branch of the Islamic State, well-established in several cities, from Derna in the east to Sabratha in the west, as well as Sirte in the centre, and another jihadi group, Ansar al-Sharia, which is entrenched in Benghazi, the country's second most important city. Taking advantage of the absence of a central power, the jihadists are benefiting from the great number of Ansar al-Sharia members from Tunisia hounded by the authorities, and are beginning to develop ties to those based in northern Mali and with Boko Haram in Nigeria. Hence, southern Libya has become a genuine safe haven, with its vast expanses escaping the control of a Libyan state in the process of disintegration. The region has become a 'place of regeneration,' where the jihadists reorganise and get fresh supplies of weapons originating from the former Gaddafi regime, without being disturbed by the French forces deployed next to the area (in Mali, Niger and Chad). The risk is such that Western diplomats are concerned about an area controlled by jihadists so close to Europe, jihadists who could project their threat to the other side of the Mediterranean.

Southern Libya has become a genuine safe haven, with its vast expanses escaping the control of a Libyan state in the process of disintegration

Tunisia is certainly the country most exposed to the 'Libyan chaos.' Recently emerging from a democratic transition still in the process of consolidating itself, Tunis is having difficulties stemming the development of violent Islam on its territory, despite a security policy that has been stepped up as attacks increase. In any case, the security forces lack experience and though they have managed to dismantle numerous jihadi cells, have been unable to prevent attacks such as the one taking place at the Bardo National Museum in March. The security forces have not managed to dislodge the jihadists present on the Algeria-Morocco border for nearly two years now (Mount Chaambi), where the forces of order are regularly assassinated. They can, however, rely on the Algerian security forces, who are better trained and more experienced in the struggle

against jihadism, since Algiers has had to contend with a civil war opposing it to armed Islamist groups throughout the 1990s.

In this country, the authorities pride themselves on their success in stemming the jihadi threat on their territory, to the point where it has become only residual. Nonetheless, Algiers has experienced certain 'blitz' operations jeopardising the image of a country gradually returning to stability. For many Western diplomats, Algeria remains a country with a high jihadi risk. The Algerian desert and Kabylia are areas where jihadi groups remain active. A case in point is the assassination of Hervé Gourdel, a French hiker, in September 2014 by the Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria, a group claiming allegiance to the Islamic State.

The Algerian situation is a matter of concern for neighbouring Morocco, which nonetheless states it is free from attacks on its territory. In any case, the terrorist alert is at maximum and Moroccan authorities established a surveillance plan ('*hadara*') in October 2014, mobilising nearly 80,000 people, demonstrating that the Kingdom has realized it could be the victim of actions such as the attacks in Casablanca in 2003 and in Marrakesh in 2011. This decision followed declarations by AQIM, which, in its project to extend throughout the Maghreb, threatened King Mohammed VI on video. This concern has increased since the Moroccan embassy in Tripoli was subject to an attack whose authorship was claimed by the Islamic State.

While General al-Sissi represses Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood, he must also contend with the rising power of jihadi groups in Egypt. In January 2015, the Egyptian branch of ISIL, *Ansar al-Bayt al-Maqdiss*, committed an attack resulting in 30 casualties. Highly active in the Sinai, this group – which has claimed authorship for the vast majority of attacks perpetrated since the military coup ousted President Mohammed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, in July 2013 – has stated that it wishes to retaliate against the regime's political repression of pro-Morsi factions. Hundreds of security force members have been killed in a period of over a year in these attacks, which have mainly targeted the northern part of the arid peninsula, but also the Nile Delta and the Egyptian capital. Until 2012, *Ansar al-Bayt al-Maqdiss* operations only targeted Israeli interests in the Sinai in attacks (gas pipeline explosions) without bloodshed.

The Departure of Combatants to Syria, a New Challenge to the Region's Security Problem

According to figures provided by the Moroccan Centre for Strategic Studies (Centre marocain d'études stratégiques), 8,000 Maghrebi (3,000 Tunisians, 2,500 Libyans, 1,200 Moroccans, less than a thousand Algerians and a handful of Mauritanians, whereas the number of Sahelians is insignificant) have joined the jihad in Syria. Never had another conflict, from Afghanistan in 2001 to Iraq in 2003, attracted as many North African jihadists. Recruitment cells are regularly dismantled in Morocco or in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. In contrast to Morocco or Algeria, which seems to be the only country to escape this wave of jihadi vocation, Tunisia continues to supply numerous combatants to ISIL. Abu Ayadh, the leader of Ansar al-Sharia, has invited Tunisians to rally to the aid of al-Baghdadi's organisation, renewing its call to jihad in Syria. Many of them make a stop at the training camps in the Ghadames area and Cyrenaica region of Libya, where they learn to handle weapons and guerrilla warfare tactics under the guidance of Libyan Ansar al-Sharia jihadists who have been leaders of the regular army for two years now, are highly experienced and have access to the military arsenal of their country's former leader.

In the face of the jihadi threat, the authorities are aware that a solely repressive response is not enough and that it is imperative to establish de-radicalisation programmes

Although these departures allow a certain number of combatants to be diverted to Syria, the authorities are concerned about the consequences of their participation in this war once they return to Northern Africa. How many will return? How many will be tempted to take action in their countries of origin? Already some of those who have returned have launched insurrectional diatribes on internet. The countries in the region (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Niger, etc.) also fear bearing the brunt of the rise of jihadi power. Hence security cooperation has been undertaken among the different countries, in-

cluding between Morocco and Algeria, for once in agreement in the face of this emergency. Each country's government is cooperating to track down jihadists and dismantle their cells. Thus, on 8 September 2014, a vehicle filled with explosives was discovered in a forest west of Anefis, a town between Gao and Kidal, by French, Senegalese and Nigerien soldiers and Malian police officers. Nonetheless, the security policy of the different countries in the region has been unable to prevent all attacks. Indeed, the Bardo attack in Tunis, confrontations with the security forces on the Algeria-Tunisia border or the Bamako attack killing five people are paroxysmal illustrations of the jihadi damage and strike capacity in the region. In response to these threats, certain countries, including Morocco, have stepped up their legal arsenal by condemning jihadi apologists with prison sentences of five to 15 years and fines of 5,000 to 50,000 euros.

The security policy of the different countries in the region has been unable to prevent all attacks

The persistence of attacks in the region is above all proof of the limitations of the security strategy undertaken by the different countries concerned. In the face of the jihadi threat, the authorities are aware that a solely repressive response is not enough and that it is imperative to establish de-radicalisation programmes. In fact, no programme has yet been undertaken in the region, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, which is a notable exception in the sphere: a royal decree established a programme for aid and reintegration for nearly 300 jihadists having returned from Syria. In Northern Africa and the Sahel, for the time being, systematic incarceration prevails. In Morocco, the majority of jihadists returning from jihad are directly apprehended at the airport and sentenced to four years of prison on the basis of an anti-terrorist law. One thing is certain, however: there is an intention to slow down or prevent jihadism through the development of a counter-discourse, a soft religious power emanating from religious figures, particularly Salafist ones. Hence the Imam of Tangiers, Omar Haddouchi, has condemned the actions of the Islamic State and other Tunisian imams railed against the perpetrators of the Bardo attack in their Friday sermons.

A Fragmented Maghreb Facing a Security Challenge

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Security Threat

On 18 March 2015, authorship for the Bardo Museum attack in Tunis that caused the death of 24 people and wounded 45 was claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This attack constitutes the first major terrorist operation to strike in the heart of the capital of Tunisia since the January 2011 revolution.

In this country, which continues to spark hope for real political change, security is the primary challenge to the success of the political transition. Although terrorism is not new to Tunisia,[1] terrorist violence has gained a new impetus since the revolution. This violence is partly due to regional disorganisation. The assault on the American embassy by Salafists on 14 September 2012 and the assassinations of two leftist political figures (Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi) in 2013 demonstrate that the capital is just as vulnerable as the hinterland. These acts of violence occurring in the very heart of the capital confirm the fear of Tunisian government officials regarding the jihadi threat and the chaos ravaging Libya, as well as the persistence of terrorist hotbeds in the Mount Chambi area along the Algerian border.

In any case, in contrast to other attacks, the Bardo attack occurred when Tunisia seemed to have stabilised on the political and institutional levels. Beji Caid Essebsi, the head of the coalition that had just won the legislative elections of November 2014, was elected president of the Republic.

This security issue demonstrates that the fragile Tunisian transition is feeling the effects of the new regional order and the destabilisation of Libya. After the fall of Colonel Gaddafi, the chaotic situation in Libya has affected the entire region. The porosity of its borders and the weakness of certain states in the region are the source of significant arms circulation that benefits the members of both Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State (IS), two rival organisations.

The security threat emerging from the Arab Spring combines with older factors. Well before the Arab uprisings of 2011, Maghreb and Sahel countries were already suffering from state weakness, perceptible in their inability to control their territory and protect their citizens. Hence, illegal activities developed, such as contraband (fuel, cigarettes, sugar, stolen automobiles) or criminal activities. These undertakings, which escape state control, are associated with a tradition of irredentism among certain populations, in particular the Tuaregs, who have always had difficult relations with states.

More recently, the presence of AQIM has constituted a source of insecurity in the region.[2] To fund its activities, AQIM has not hesitated to take Europeans hostage, and states have negotiated their release by paying substantial ransoms. But the organisation

[1] On 11 April 2002, a 25-year-old French Tunisian blew himself up in a tank truck he was driving that was packed with explosives. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack, which took place in front of the *Ghriba* synagogue in Djerba and caused 21 casualties and 30 wounded. On 3 January 2007, a shootout took place between the police and an armed group calling itself the *Asad ibn al-Furat Army* in the area of Soliman, southeast of Tunis. At first the press presented the attack as a case of banditry, but the inquiry revealed it was a Salafist group. The emergence of violent Islamism marked a rupture with Tunisian political Islamism led by Ennahdha.

[2] Emerging in September 2006 as a splinter group from the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), AQIM has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda.

also controls contraband networks. Thanks to this type of funding, AQIM has managed to build up a significant arsenal. The attack on the Algerian In Amenas gas facilities in January 2013 revealed the sophistication of the weapons the al-Qaeda-allied organisation has on hand. Today, a large part of its arms cache comes from the dispersion of Libya's weapon stock after the downfall of Colonel Gaddafi. Many of Gaddafi's auxiliary troops returned to their countries of origin (Mali, Niger) equipped with arms they then sold or exchanged.

The terrorist organisations striving to defy states and their institutions recruit throughout the region. The terrorist attack against the In Amenas gas complex, which showed the limitations of Algerian security strategy, also revealed the transnational nature of the group of assailants. Of the 37 terrorists, 11 were Tunisian, allegedly recruited by AQIM during the Arab Spring.[3]

The Weight of Algerian-Moroccan Disputes

Maghreb countries are not organised to handle this alarming security situation. Maghreb integration has never really worked, despite the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1989. The disputes between Algiers and Rabat have constituted a sizable obstacle to AMU operation.

The conflict between the two major Maghreb countries initially involved border disputes. Independent Algeria did in fact renege on the agreement made by Farhat Abbas on the restitution of certain territories claimed by Morocco. Tensions continued between the two countries until 1988, when Hassan II admitted on a visit to Algiers that his country's territorial claims on Mauritania and certain parts of Algeria were utopian and constituted an obstacle to possible cooperation with the new Algerian military government. A period of detente between the two countries followed, with Algiers at first refusing to come to the aid of the Polisario Front, which had been fighting for the independence of Western Sahara since 1973. But in 1975, after the announcement of the Green March to 'recover' what Rabat considered 'its Saharan provinces amputated from Morocco,' the Algerian government's attitude changed radically. Indeed, the Moroccan initiative of the 350,000-strong march on Western Sahara allowed the old demons of 'Greater Morocco'[4] to resurface, a concept that Algiers thought definitively buried after Rabat's recognition of Mauritania and the Ifrane Agreement, which recognised Algeria's possession of Tindouf. As of 1975, the two states accused one another of wishing to destabilise the neighbouring regime. This attitude was put forth as defensive by Algiers, indicating the protection of its revolution, whereas for Morocco, the aim was to recover territories in the name of its 'historic rights.' But beyond the official arguments, Algiers and Rabat were clearly engaged in a struggle for regional hegemony that was to be extended through different channels, in particular the Western Sahara conflict, which regularly experiences convulsions and would become the focal point of the recurrent tension between the two countries.

These tensions are all the more difficult to dispel for the Algerian political class since Rabat has still not officially recognised the inviolability of the border between the two countries, the 1972 convention not having been definitively ratified by the Moroccan Parliament. In Rabat, on the other hand, the issue of the border is never dissociated from the issue of Western Sahara.

These reasons do not suffice to explain Algeria's obstinacy regarding the Western Sahara issue. Algerian political players continue to accuse their Moroccan counterparts of coming to the aid of Algerian Islamists during the 1990s with the aim of destabilising the regime.[5]

This rivalry between Algiers and Rabat was likewise perceptible in their handling of the Mali crisis. Algiers, which always wished to keep both France and Morocco out of the management of affairs regarding

[3] Aomar Baghzouz; "Le Maghreb et l'Europe face à la crise du Sahel : Coopération ou rivalités ?", in *Année du Maghreb* IX, 2013, p. 179.

[4] The concept of Greater Morocco was developed in the mid-1950s by Allal al-Fassi, the leader of the Istiqlal party. According to this concept developed by nationalists, Morocco should legitimately recover all territories that were "amputated" before and during the French protectorate. Based on a map drawn by a party member, Moroccan nationalists believe their country, which should extend to Saint Louis in Senegal, should also include Mauritania, part of Mali, part of the Algerian Sahara and all of Western Sahara.

[5] Akram Belkaïd; "Pourquoi l'Algérie défend le statu quo au Sahara occidental," in *Orient XXI*, 23 April 2015, http://orientxxi.info/magazine/pourquoi-l-algerie-defend-le-statu-quo-au-sahara-occidental,0884

the Sahel area, put forth two factors it considered essential: its expertise in combating Islamist terrorism and its ability to conduct negotiations between Tuaregs and the governments of Mali and Niger. Since 2001, it is as an experienced victim that Algeria has offered its services to participate in the international struggle against Islamist terrorism established by President Bush. Washington felt that this country, which had fought against armed Islamism on its own soil during the civil war (1992-1998), could be but an invaluable ally.

Algeria also used its power of negotiation and mediation between the Tuaregs and the governments of Sahel countries. Algiers played this role in numerous conflicts, in particular between 1991 and 1995. In 2010, the government signed the Tamanrasset Accords with Niger, Mali and Mauritania, which marked the beginning of joint military cooperation that deliberately excluded Morocco. But in January 2013, when Operation Serval was launched in Mali, it signalled, to a certain extent, the failure of the Algerian strategy in the Sahel. Indeed, Algiers always attempted to lead the Sahel states to reject foreign military and security presence in the region. In 2012, after the military coup in Mali, Algeria found it very difficult to rely on its former allies, particularly the Tuaregs.[6]

The Malian army collapsed and a coalition of jihadists and Tuareg separatists embarked on the conquest of northern Mali.

The regional counterterrorist strategy implemented by France weakened the Algerian government's position while putting the country's political leaders in an awkward position with regard to the principles they had regularly been putting forth. The French army's return to Mali thwarted Algeria's policy, which consisted of stemming French and Western interference in the Sahel. It has thenceforth participated in the French-American strategy and the diplomatic and military alliance between France and the Sahel states. But this return of the French army to the region is likewise contrary to Algeria's ambition of becoming the major regional power controlling all security parameters.

Excluded from Sahelian negotiations, Morocco has taken action on another front to express its concern with terrorism, particularly displaying its desire to protect itself from the threat from the south.

Competition between the two major Maghreb states is also exercised through the countries' presence in Western Africa. Taking advantage of a lesser presence of Algeria in the African arena, the King of Morocco visited a number of African countries in March 2014, namely Mali, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Gabon. Moroccan presence and investments revolve around two focal points: the economy and religion.

The parallel involvement of Algeria and Morocco in Malian affairs reveals the lack of collaboration between the two countries. Their disputes have led them to establish alliances with actors outside the region. Having become structural, this contention is detrimental in more ways than one. First of all, it prevents the countries in the area from organising into a strategic subregion whose states cooperate to block the terrorist threat. Yet these national positions and the regional division considerably complicate action by NATO, which does not recognise a strategic Maghreb but rather has to deal with states, with whom it must negotiate separately. This configuration weakens the strategic scope of the Maghreb region, which appears, by force of circumstances, piecemeal and fragmented.[7]

The Maghreb's great weakness resides in its division. The countries in the area continue to appear disorganised before united partners, as, for instance, the European Union

Today, the Maghreb's great weakness resides in its division. The countries in the area continue to appear disorganised before united partners, as, for instance, the European Union. This division prevents it from building a collective security plan that could protect it from Islamic State or AQIM-led Islamist terrorism. The notion of collective security does not exist and each country is governed by its own security imperatives. By the same token, each country continues to follow its own logic, vying with the other at a time

[6] In April 2012, the personnel of the Algerian consulate in Gao were taken hostage by a Tuareg group that had long been friendly with Algiers.

[7] Abdenour Benantar; "(Re)penser le(s) relation(s) Otan-Maghreb : perspective et limites d'un dispositif régional de sécurité limité au Maghreb," in *L'Otan et le Maghreb*, FRS/ L'Harmattan p. 18-43.

when joint action is needed to neutralise the jihadi threat. It is imperative that the two major countries of the region relinquish their national approach.

Shedding National Mindsets

The advantages of an integrated region have been expressed more than once, whether they consist of economic synergy, the opportunity to sign agreements without uncoordinated negotiations that lend the parties less force, the importance for Maghreb societies of getting to know one another and combining efforts to handle issues common to all of these countries, such as religious fundamentalism, writing up history or arriving at full and comprehensive civic rights.

In addition to these advantages, repeatedly put forth, there are new factors introduced by the Arab Spring. Indeed, this time of rupture has marked a milestone in the history of Arab countries while radically changing regional geopolitics. The standards governing regional and international affairs have been modified. It is no longer only the imperatives of power dictating international policy, but also the social pressure contributed by public opinion. What effects can these different changes have on the organisation of regional affairs in the Maghreb, while the Algerian and Moroccan ruling classes desperately cling to a nationalism that seems obsolete?

With regard to the Western Sahara conflict, a veritable bone of contention between Algerians and Moroccans, the types of demands have radically changed. Sahrawi demands regarding human rights precede the Arab Spring, dating back to 2005. Since then, demands have gained a civic nature. In doing so, they have drawn on a new register – that of human rights, individual and political liberties and international legality.[8]

Such human rights demands originating pre-2011 have likewise been fuelled by the Arab Spring. The emulation effect was felt as much among the Sahrawi populations under Moroccan administration since 1975 as among the Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf. In March 2011, the appeal made in Tindouf by the Young Revolutionaries group demanded reform and change in the administration and judiciary of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the end of corruption, reform of the electoral code and entitlement of youth to greater participation in political life. This protest was supported by the *Khat al-Shahid* movement, comprised by dissidents of the Polisario Front based in Spain.

The civil disobedience movements burgeoning in Western Sahara demonstrate that the measures and institutions established to represent the Sahrawis are increasingly inadequate. Neither Morocco's nor the Polisario Front's political offers meet Sahrawi expectations. The latter do not identify with the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), established by Mohamed VI in 1992. They are also identifying less and less with the Polisario Front and are choosing more centreline options. As in Tunis, political action is now experienced and conceived in an entirely new manner by political activists and citizens, in a context where expression is slowly but surely growing freer. Wherever we may be, opinion now weighs upon decision-making. In the Western Sahara as everywhere, we are witnessing a new concept of politics that enshrines the emergence of the citizen. By mentioning the effects of the regional and international atmosphere, as well as the domestic evolution that would incite the parties to take 'the people of Western Sahara' into account, the UN Secretary-General's 2012 report already hinted at this new order.

These are new factors we absolutely must address in order to settle the Western Sahara issue. Its outcome seems, in fact, dictated by three factors. First of all, the regional security situation calls for an end to the conflict, thus precluding the Sahrawis from swelling the ranks of the jihadists plaguing the area. Secondly, the economic climate of the countries in the region calls for Maghreb integration and greater economic synergy. And finally and perhaps above all, there is a lack of prospects for the Sahrawis, who had expressed their anger well before the Arab Spring.[9]

[8] Khadija Mohsen-Finan; "Western Sahara: A conflict on the Fringes of New Regional Dynamics," in Anouar Boukhars and Jacques Rousselier (ed); *Perspectives on Western Sahara,* Rowman and Littlefield, 2014.

[9] See the special issue of *Orient XXI*: "Quarante ans de conflit au Sahara occidental," http://orientxxi.info/documents/dossiers/quarante-ans-de-conflit-au-sahara,0880

Lights and Shadows in the Democratic Transitions of the Southern Mediterranean Countries: The Role of Europe

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Looking back at history, those of us who have been modestly advocating a process of Euro-Mediterranean integration for more than 25 years now might be tempted to feel somewhat frustrated. Many of the dreams and goals we set for ourselves at the start – peace, prosperity and modernity for our 'common sea' – have yet to be realised. At the same time, however, we might feel satisfied that we had the necessary foresight to identify, even then, the risks and challenges this region could pose for Europe. We sounded the alarms and revealed that the true security risks for Europe's future would come from the South. We decried the lack of interest in Euro-Mediterranean policy shown by our partners in the East and North, and we called for greater attention to be given to this vital area for the strategic interests of the citizens of Europe.

Today, as I write these words, on the threshold of the twentieth anniversary of the Barcelona Conference, I believe it is more legitimate than ever to demand a genuine mobilisation of the European political class. The challenges we once foretold are now erupting before our eyes in the capitals and along the borders of Europe. The terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia, the ongoing wars in Libya and Syria, and the widespread instability in the Middle East should be reason enough for our political leaders to establish this border region as the 'priority of priorities.' The Mediterranean is coming apart, economic disparities are growing, and the 'Mare Nostrum' is becoming a burial ground for immigrants in search of a better life. Moreover, the clash of civilisations would seem to lend credence to the theories of Samuel Huntington, and Mediterranean cultural and civilisational history is becoming compartmentalised, isolated in mutually exclusive universes. Europe must respond to this state of affairs swiftly, effectively and with the necessary political will, although not before first understanding how we got to this point, which strains all conceivable limits.

A History of the Processes of Change

The year 2010 could have been the year of the consolidation of EU Mediterranean policy and, at the same time, of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). However, the timing was wrong. The Spanish government, which held the rotating Presidency of the EU, had to exercise the office under a new framework: the Treaty of Lisbon. Under the new European rules, the power to conduct European foreign policy fell to the President of the European Council and the High Representative. The rotating Presidency was responsible solely for supporting their efforts and lacked the capacity and tools of the past, although it sought a more important role for those areas it considered to be of greatest interest. Logically, Spain wanted to make the Mediterranean one of the priority areas of its Presidency. The year 2010 marked the fifteenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration; that fact, together with the situation in the region, called for greater European political commitment to addressing the region's challenges. However, the second UfM Summit, set to follow the first, which took place in Paris in 2008, could not be

held. The reasons were manifold. In addition to the jealousy and prominent role played by France, which sought to retain the Presidency of the UfM and hold an extraordinary summit in Paris on the Middle East peace process, the intransigence of certain Arab states made holding the summit extremely hard. They refused to sit at the same table as Israel and, in particular, as its Foreign Minister. Moreover, things were already starting to heat up in most of the countries on the southern shore, which likewise did little to foster the atmosphere needed to hold the high-level meeting.

I remember my final, somewhat desperate attempt, when I was no longer in the government, to convince the Arab leaders to attend the event in November 2010. I visited the main capitals of the South and managed to convince most of the Heads of State. It was the last time I saw Ben Ali in his palace in Carthage. However, Brussels had the final say on whether the meeting would be held, and it preferred not to force the issue of a summit that, at the time, had no guarantee of success. Aware of that fact, or perhaps unconsciously, Europeans and Arabs alike implicitly decided that the normal course of events would lead to a 'crisis foretold.'

Europe and the Arab Spring: from Enthusiasm to a Gradual Distancing

The self-immolation of the Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi and the fall of Ben Ali in early 2011, as well as the subsequent mobilisations and changes that took place in Egypt, Libya, Syria and virtually the entire Arab world, were initially met with great enthusiasm in the European capitals. The Muslim-Arab world seemed to have clearly come to understand European values and principles once and for all. The door to modernity opened for societies that sought to embrace and establish themselves along Western lines. The slogan 'Welcome to democracy' echoed incessantly in the halls of many a European chancellery. At last, 'the Arabs' had given up and would embrace the European-Western model. Everything was unfolding just as the somewhat naive predictions of the analysts in Brussels had said. However, the lack of serious analyses and the profound ignorance of the European pseudo-experts, who were unable to predict and understand the contradictions and situation on the ground in these countries, soon became apparent. Europe either did not understand, or did not want to understand, the depth and significance of the changes sweeping the region.

In the midst of this impasse came the 'revolutionary tsunami,' engulfing the entire Arab world. The events should have shaken from its stupor a European political class that had failed to react with the same energy and vision that González, Kohl and Mitterrand had shown in Europe's enlargement to the East or in the statement regarding the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 and early 1990. North Africa and the Muslim world were witnessing a stellar moment of their history. And yet, in my view, the European response was tepid and late, lacking the necessary political, economic and financial impetus and commitment.

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This attitude cannot be explained by the international and endogenous crises then rocking the countries of the EU. Some will argue that it was the actions of several European states that prevented another barbaric attack against the citizens of Benghazi and that the 'responsibility to protect' doctrine was first invoked to stop the bloody madness of the Libyan leader. That is all true, and the European reaction can no doubt be 'justified' on many other grounds, as well; however, one would be hard-pressed to explain that reaction to the Arab citizens who took to the streets of Tunis, Cairo and Benghazi, preaching principles and values that many Europeans had hitherto considered antithetical to Muslim-Arab culture and idiosyncrasy. How often have we heard, in political circles and milieus, that Arabs or Muslims do not go well with democracy and freedom, that the *umma* would not allow citizens to stand up for their rights and freedoms? Well, the Arab social movements were a model of

modernity, engagement (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) and civic-mindedness at the start. And they needed a more positive, committed reaction from their European neighbours.

The European Council took more than two months to take a position on the Arab Spring; that is, not until eight weeks after the fall of Ben Ali, in the lead-up to the military intervention in Libya. The response was ambiguous and lacking in suitable political, economic and financial proposals given the scale and urgency of the events. The EU's initial reaction was perhaps comprehensible and even appropriate, for it took place at the start of the process, although this process increasingly picked up in terms both of speed and geographical and strategic intensity. However, between the European Council meeting of 2011 until almost 2013, not a single meeting was held that included a line or remark on the events playing out throughout the entire southern Mediterranean. Not even in October, two days after the first democratic elections were held in Tunisia, and four days after the end of the war in Libya. The Heads of State and Government neither welcomed nor supported these processes. This distancing was also the dominant note at subsequent European Council meetings. It was not until the arrival of the new set of EU leaders that a gradual awakening of interest in the region could be seen. The current High Representative, Federica Mogherini, seems willing to give the necessary attention to this situation, to which her predecessor devoted neither the effort nor the attention that should be expected of Europe.

The Role of Europe in the Crisis

Each of the economic, social and political crises on the southern shore of the Mediterranean evidenced a lack of European involvement, as well as a halt in the political and diplomatic dialogue.

Tunisia

Initially, this country was an exception due to the efforts of the EU representative, Bernardino León, who personally and proactively helped to see the internal reconciliation process, with all its ups and downs and contradictions, through to the end. In Tunisia, the democratic aspirations of society, which sought to take a decisive step forward towards modernity, were met. For the countries rocked by internal crises, the assistance and commitment received from Europe were insufficient. Following the dramatic attack at the Bardo Museum, Tunisia urgently needed the European Union to approve a series of diplomatic, economic and social measures; however, given how things stand, I am not convinced this will happen any time soon.

Egypt and Libya

In the cases of Egypt and Libya, European policy towards North Africa has probably 'unconsciously' mimicked American approaches and policies.

For various reasons and calculations, Washington erroneously believed that the time had come for 'political Islam' in the countries of North Africa. Under such circumstances, it concluded, the most advisable path was to support and position itself 'at the front of the protest' to foster 'regime change.' To this end, it backed the Muslim Brotherhood, the most popular political force in the different Egyptian electoral processes and the one that irreversibly set in motion the 'Islamist tsunami.'

In the cases of Egypt and Libya, European policy towards North Africa has probably 'unconsciously' mimicked American approaches and policies

The Europeans adopted this view, which can be considered legitimate, if arguable, reflexively and without rigorous debate. They believed in the virtues of President Morsi, and a resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council authorising a military intervention in Libya to prevent the use of that country's air space. No one said a word when the Western powers overstepped their authority in implementing it. The tyrannical and arbitrary 'Colonel Gaddafi' fell, but, other than the 'photo opportunity' for President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron in Tripoli, no European mission was sent to the country. Neither the President of the European Council nor the High Representative travelled to Libya, and there was no

'post-conflict' follow-up. Today, the situation is explosive, a fact that can only be understood in the context of the country's tribal complexity and the inaction of the international community, in general, and of Europe, in particular.

Syria

This country may well be the paradigm of the West's analytical misguidedness and lack of a political and diplomatic strategy, resulting in one of the most serious conflicts of the century. For one thing, the Syrian political reality itself was misjudged; it was thought that, like Ben Ali and Mubarak before him, Bashar al-Assad would be the next domino to fall following peaceful civic uprisings. How many times have we heard, in European political and diplomatic circles, that al-Assad would not make it to the end of the year? It has been four years now since the conflict broke out, and the situation is catastrophic.

Syria may well be the paradigm of the West's analytical misguidedness and lack of a political and diplomatic strategy, resulting in one of the most serious conflicts of the century

The indifference and lack of mass mobilisations of the international community and segments of global public opinion, and, in particular, of European public opinion, have made it impossible to demand more of our political leaders and call for new types of actions. However, one must never stop trying when what is at stake is human life and halting the downward spiral of violence and destruction. When observing and attempting to determine how we came to this point, we must ask how it is that the international community has been unable to prevent this tragedy, a tragedy that some seem determined to forget or not to acknowledge at all and in which more than 200,000 people have already lost their lives as the country is torn apart. Indeed, it has splintered into various communities in conflict, leading to the displacement of nearly 12,000,000 people. Perhaps the easiest thing to do is to point the finger at the primary culprits or at those who claim that the only way to resolve or transcend the bloody crisis is to let the Syrian 'catharsis' play itself out. I disagree. As I have said before, what has been done from the start has been to clear the way for civil war rather than seek an agreement through a political and/or diplomatic solution.

Today, we could continue as we have so far, letting the clock tick down until the conflicts and desperation ultimately leave no option but to seek a negotiated solution. Alternatively, we could accelerate the process and firmly demand an urgent end to the crisis. Or do we simply plan to grow used to living with ongoing regional conflicts in which death and destruction are merely part of everyday life? How is it possible that we have not yet been able to impose a cease-fire in Syria? What are we waiting for? A glance at the many conflicts that have plagued the world since World War II shows that peace was always achieved following a relatively short cessation in the hostilities. This is what happened in Korea, Vietnam and the various wars in the Middle East, in 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. Why have we failed to achieve it in Syria? Some might argue, not without reason, that the Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council are to blame. Indeed, that is probably one of the main reasons, but it is also worth noting the lack of effective diplomacy to convince those players to put an end to the fighting.

With the war in Syria, we have witnessed what I call 'drone diplomacy,' that is, remote diplomacy with no envoys or accredited ambassadors. Today, the international community in Damascus consists only of intelligence operatives, news media and NGOs struggling to meet humanitarian needs. No longer is anyone negotiating an end to the conflict on the ground, except for Staffan de Mistura, the special envoy of the Secretary General of the UN, whose work is always difficult.

From here on, we must avoid the errors committed in the diplomatic management at the start of the Syrian crisis. In the very first weeks of the conflict, it was proclaimed, far and wide, that the goal was regime change and that Bashar al-Assad should immediately step down. Subsequently, red lines were drawn, which, should they be crossed, would lead the United States and its allies to engage in a military intervention; when they were crossed, a negotiated solution

was sought to dismantle Syria's chemical weapons cache instead, and the parties looked the other way so that the war could continue. The opposition militias were armed, thereby 'facilitating,' with the connivance of nearly all the players involved, the creation of the West's great enemy: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. It was armed and funded and was allowed to occupy the political and military ground of a moderate and modern opposition, despite the obvious flimsiness of such an approach. Rather than laying the groundwork for 'diplomacy, dialogue and politics,' a military option was chosen, in which the al-Nusra Front militias showed a greater capacity than the rationalist representatives of an opposition who felt more comfortable in the sitting rooms of Paris or Washington or the capitals of the Gulf.

The vast majority of analysts believe that Bashar al-Assad bears the brunt of the responsibility, and that may be true; however, what seems clear is that the President remains at the head of his government in Damascus. Why has he not sought, or does he not now seek, a political or diplomatic formula for a negotiated exit, one with a reasonable timeline, process and agreement the primary objective of which is to defend the Syrian people and safeguard the population from horror, chaos and violence? Just a few days ago, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, acknowledged that they 'will have to negotiate with Bashar al-Assad.' Could not this decision have been made much earlier?

It has been said that the Geneva I and Geneva II conferences were failures. Perhaps. But in diplomacy, when something fails, a solution must always be sought. Why not urgently hold a Geneva III conference under a different set of parameters and with different parties? How is it possible that, although everyone agrees that Iran is a key player in its support for the Syrian regime, with influence and capacity to act, it has never been invited to the negotiating table? If we can hold talks with Iran to curb its future nuclear capabilities, can we not also talk to Tehran to end the war in Syria?

A Few Exceptions: Morocco and Algeria

In contrast to the widespread and increasingly troublesome destabilisation in the eastern Mediterranean, which affects the future of what we call the Middle East, the Maghreb, with the exception of Libya, has proven itself better able to adapt to the emerging challenges of the future. As we have already seen, Tunisia has successfully completed multiple stages of its democratic construction, and it is expected to receive urgent and unconditional support from the international community. Like Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria have also risen to the challenge of changing Arab societies and taken measures to adapt to the new winds of political and social revision and reform.

Morocco

The Alawite Kingdom is the most significant case. The vision and strategy of King Mohamed VI, who has sought amendments to the Constitution, have satisfied the legitimate aspirations of the country's citizens by transferring some of his powers to democratically elected governments. He has proven able to effectively interpret the times and incorporate them into the country's reform process, always through the lens of the monarchy. Today, Morocco is undeniably a country that has suitably reconciled tradition and change and that, thanks to its good relations with Europe, is making gradual but steady progress in the process of modernisation.

Algeria

For different reasons, this country, too, has successfully managed to avoid the destabilising trends found in other Arab countries in recent years. With the memories of the difficult decades of terrorist violence and internal conflict still fresh, this country has chosen instead to pursue its own, controlled and peaceful process of reform.

Many attempts have been made to encapsulate the Israeli-Palestinian crisis within Mediterranean policy. Those who think that an alternative diplomatic architecture can be built by excluding this conflict are wrong

These two large countries, Morocco and Algeria, should become the key pillars in the region's process of change. We would moreover be quite pleased to

see a swift, bilateral reconciliation that puts an end to the historical conflict of the Western Sahara.

A Crisis Stalled: Peace in the Middle East

The negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians have always been a destabilising factor in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation process. Many attempts have been made to encapsulate the Israeli-Palestinian crisis within Mediterranean policy. Other European approaches have sought to emphasise the Western Mediterranean instead, and to resuscitate such undertakings as the 5+5 Initiative. Everything is just easier between the Maghreb and the countries of southern Europe, some analysts claim. And yet, inevitably, the Israeli-Palestinian question comes up and demands an urgent solution. It seems like the political leaders would rather close their eyes to an eternally thorny and intractable reality. The 'two state' solution of two countries living side by side in peace and security is a prerequisite for the true establishment of a framework for peace, security and prosperity in the Mediterranean. Those who think that an alternative diplomatic architecture can be built by excluding this conflict are wrong. Today more than ever, we must leverage the various Mediterranean fora to promote a definitive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Europe and the New Mediterranean Challenges

Today, there is no more time for excuses. The problems are unfolding before our eyes; they are no longer mere predictions or hypotheses. The European Union cannot adopt an 'ostrich policy' and hide behind inaction. A new vision, a new strategy and a new project for the Mediterranean are needed. We must understand that this region is not a marginal one. Europe must take the lead, together with the countries of the southern shore, to endow the Mediterranean with a new centrality.

In geopolitical understandings, in which security issues are interlinked, it is difficult to ignore the roots of the main risks and opportunities for Europe's future. Sustainable economic development, global terrorism, clandestine immigration, energy dependence, food security, epidemics, climate change and the peaceful co-existence or clash of cultures all have their origin and will play out within a single vertical space: Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa.

The Mediterranean is the centre of gravity from which policies can be set and institutions created to address this new reality. Consequently, Europe must not ignore its geopolitical centre: the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean is the nexus between the two continents and, thus, the centre of gravity from which policies can be set and institutions created to address this new reality. Consequently, Europe must not ignore its geopolitical centre: the Mediterranean.

Regional Integration in the Western Mediterranean: the AMU and 5+5

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The figures speak for themselves; there can be no doubt that the Maghreb has the lowest level of integration of all regional groups. In actual fact, it has all the necessary elements and conditions, albeit to differing degrees, for successful regional integration, namely: the same cultural space, a common understanding, complementary economies, geographic proximity and a high number of consumers. Economic agents are calling for it, the political discourse is also favourable, although on occasions contradictory, and the support offered from other areas, international bodies and regional groups is enthusiastic; but still there is no progress.

The Added Value of Regional Integration

We are also aware of what has come to be known as the cost of this situation, the cost of the non-Maghreb (others prefer to speak in more positive terms of the added value regional integration would have), to which numerous studies and seminars have been dedicated, as well as the benefits that would arise from greater integration.[1]

The fact is that the challenges and problems that are burdening the region require urgent solutions. It is not just a question of economic integration; desertification and climate change have meant, for example, that 80% of arable land is under threat of desertification. The countries of the region are unable to slow their imports. Imports of food products alone exceed €30 billion, hence the importance of cooperation in, among others, the area of food security, which is increasingly crucial to breaking away from this reliance on imports.

Once more, we will try to understand the reasons behind this situation, and what can be done to create a more stable and prosperous region, especially for its youth, who wish for a future of opportunities, and not the frustration and discontent they face today.

The reality is that the project for the unification of the Maghreb is one that is deeply rooted in the conscious of the region's peoples, through their myths and historical references, and re-emerged in the context of the struggles for independence.[2]

Since their inception, nationalist movements have always incorporated the Maghreb dimension into their ideologies and actions. This is the case for Tunisia's Destour and Neo-Destour, Messali Hadj's North African Star, originating from the Algerian FLN, and Morocco's Istiqlal, which in 1958 (FLN – Neo-Destour and Istiqlal) organised the Tangiers conference to support the Algerian cause during the Algerian War, reaffirming the common destiny of the Maghreb peoples. In a letter to the congress attendees, Mohammed V proposed the creation of a Maghreb federation.

During the struggle for independence, solidarity among the Maghreb nations created an entire generation committed to the Maghreb ideal, who, after independence, set to turning the dream of greater unification into a reality.

However, once the struggles for independence came to an end, the priority became that of strengthening their structures as independent states within

* This article was finalised in April 2014 (Editor's note).

[1] From the studies of the Moroccan GERM to the most recent seminars, Citpax-IEMed, Elcano Institute.

[2] Bichara Khader: *El Gran Magreb y Europa,* Ed-Quorum. 1992.

The reality is that the project for the unification of the Maghreb is one that is deeply rooted in the conscious of the region's peoples, through their myths and historical references

the colonial borders; nations which, some would argue, people had fought and died for. From here arose the initial problems, which had hitherto lain dormant, although were often insinuated in talks aimed at gaining mutual support and subsequently winning independence.

The history of the region is replete with examples: the dispute over Mauritania, whose recognition by Morocco was not forthcoming until 1969; the territorial dispute between Tunisia and Algeria that went unresolved until 1970; the so-called Sand War between Algeria and Morocco, which was resolved in different stages, as of 1973, through the treaty concerning the state border between the two countries (ratified in 1973 by Algeria and only in 1989 by Morocco),[3] or the comparable issue concerning the continental shelf in the Gulf of Gabès between Libya and Tunisia, which remained disputed until 1988.

Worthy of a separate mention is the conflict of the Western Sahara, and likewise Gaddafi's adopted stance, which was more pan-Arab and less Maghreb right from the beginning of his rule.

Furthermore, each state, protective of their sovereignty and independence, made decisions on economic policy without taking into account their neighbouring states, resulting in each following a different model.

All this explains why it took several attempts and changes on the international panorama (US-Russian dialogue, a fall in oil prices, accession perspectives of Spain and Portugal to the EEC) for the logic on economic integration to be put into practice. In June 1985, HM King Hassan II presented Morocco's candidature to the EC at the European Summit at Fontainebleau and in September of the same year the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declared that Algeria was ready to commit to economic integration and the union of the Maghreb in presenting a united front in the dialogue with Europe. The Saudi-brokered talks between Algeria and Morocco led to the Zeralda Summit in June 1988, which launched the process of the Arab Maghreb Union.

At the outset, five sub-committees were set up to study different aspects and problems arising from Maghreb unification: Finances and Customs, Economy, Education, Culture and Information, Social, Human and Security issues and Institutions.

Morocco and Algeria were to preside over the sub-committees related with the economy, Tunisia, security and Libya, institutions. Besides needing to keep some kind of balance in mind, this meant dealing with different standpoints, Libya's being more political and Morocco and Algeria's more economic, and the need to come to a compromise.

The Treaty of Marrakesh

The Marrakesh Summit in February 1989 adopted a declaration instituting the Arab Maghreb Union. Article 9 of this declaration refers, albeit without mentioning it, to the EEC as an example of a regional union that has progressed through carefully considered phases and which can be used as a model.

The Treaty of Marrakesh itself is structured in a Preamble of five points that reproduces some elements of the Declaration and 19 articles, ten of which refer to the organisation of the union, one to mutual defence, although in reality without a mechanism for applying it, two to security, four to final provisions and just two to real goals, articles 2 and 3.[4]

In summary, a union of states was set up (interpreted by some as a non-integration and thereby contradicting the economic goals it alleged to pursue), with the purpose of developing common practices in specific areas and working to achieve the free movement of people, services, goods and capital between them and without supranational institutions. Their supreme body and the only one established to take unanimous decisions is the Presidential Council.

[3] The 1972 Rabat Declaration, which refers to the conclusion and signing of this treaty and the treaty for the use of the Gara-Djebilet mine (a joint enterprise was established to allow iron ore located in Algeria to be exported from a Moroccan port located in the Atlantic), speaks of the will to begin a period of agreement and cooperation and thereby realise the people's greatest aspirations regarding unification.

[4] A detailed analysis of the Treaty, as well as its creation, can be found in the doctoral thesis of the then Crown Prince of Morocco Mohammed Ben El Hassan Alaoui: *La cooperation entre l'UE y les pays du Magreb*. ECL. Nathan 1994.

The first years of the AMU were characterised by an exuberance that led to the creation of numerous regulations. This initial impulse, however, would later be brought to an almost complete standstill.
Regarding the 38 agreements signed in the framework of the AMU, 21 are of an economic nature. However, the commercial transactions between the countries of the region continue to be marginal, less than 3%, while commercial trade with the EU has reached 65%.

Virtual Integration

After 25 years of existence, the achievements of the AMU can only be seen as disappointing; the mere mention of virtual integration confirms this. In reality, the progress registered has been more in the area of security than the economy.
The obstacles to its development have been practically the same ones that complicated its creation and launch.
Reoccurring political tensions have led to institutional paralysis. If the only decision-making body does not meet, then progress is not possible (it has not met since 1994). The intra-Maghreb relations have been subject to a process which, instead of generating confidence, has bred mistrust among its leaders. The policies aimed at reaffirming regional hegemony have separated more than they have united, as has the competition between the states to show their own successful economic and social model to be superior to that of their neighbour. Any consensus reached for the conflict of the Western Sahara not to influence the development of regional cooperation was but a fleeting one.[5]
At the same time, neither have economic conditions created the shared interests that could accelerate development and dampen political tensions. The convergence of economic policies towards a model of open economies has been insufficient and the structural adjustments implemented in the nineties did not lead to the desired progress in this sense. Although we are no longer dealing with different economic systems – Tunisia and Morocco on the one hand, and Algeria and Libya on the other – there is still a tendency towards protectionism. Likewise, there is insufficient complementarity, and this does not generate the desired trade flows.

Regional integration is led from above, but must also come from below, hence the importance of the role played by the respective civil societies

Such an ambitious initiative also requires a solid legal framework, a balance between means and ambitions and a change in both public opinion and economic agents towards valuing the benefits of a more open market, without the protection it previously enjoyed.
Regional integration is led from above, but must also come from below, hence the importance of the role played by the respective civil societies.
In this regard, at least, there is movement in the region. The Maghreb Entrepreneurs Forum, which has met for the third time this year in Marrakesh (the first two took place in Algeria and Tunisia) has launched the Maghreb Initiative on Trade and Investment with the aim of bringing fresh dynamics and relaunching the economic integration process, outlined in a series of measures to be carried out over a period of one to five years.
At this point, it is worth asking whether rather than revitalising the AMU, it should instead be re-established.

Revitalise or Re-establish the AMU?

The people have changed. None of the Heads of State present at the meetings in Zeralda in 1988 and Marrakech in 1989 are present on today's political scene. There have also been major changes in the political reality of the Maghreb, which means that the issue of regional integration is no longer the exclusive domain of the political elites.
The Tunisian President Marzouki has been the first to call for regional cooperation, touring the other four Maghreb countries to highlight this need and see how far the idea can be taken. In so doing, he has overcome Tunisia's historically muted stance on the

[5] On the Maghreb and the conflict in the Western Sahara see memoires of the Algerian MFA Ahmed-Taleb-Ibrahimi. *Memories d'un Algerien*. Volume 3. page 163-265. Ed. Casbah-Argel 2013.

subject, in favour of becoming a driving force behind the idea.

Consequently, the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the AMU met in Rabat and then travelled to Libya. Although the meeting should be interpreted more as a reaction to the situation in the Maghreb and the trip as a show of solidarity with Libya than as a moment of understanding and unity with regard to the AMU, they talked of the need to reform the organisation and proposed programmes to reinforce cooperation, related to the area of security.

Although this falls way short of organising a meeting at the Summit, it reveals a closer understanding that if the region does not move towards integration it will not have a future.

There are still elements, of a political nature, that obstruct the AMU's reactivation, with particular relevance to security. Above all, these affect Morocco and Algeria, which is why these two countries need to know how to handle and differentiate their security interests in a way that does not steer them away from their goal of greater integration.

This focus, as well as the clarification of political conditions, demanded to relaunch cooperation, could be a springboard to overcoming the difficulties that have delayed the process until now and opening the door to it being relaunched or re-established.

The Maghreb is an economic actor with little weight on the international economic stage and must respond to two frameworks, that of world globalisation and the European-focused Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, which occupies an intermediate space between the regional and the global.

This is why another framework, that of the Maghreb project, must be relaunched thus allowing the demands of the other frameworks to be more easily met.[6]

The EU and Regional Integration

The EU is the Maghreb's main trading partner, and although European cooperation, and even more so that of the Member States, is often focused more on the national panorama than the regional one, this dimension has taken on increasing importance.

The European Union constitutes an undeniable ally to the South-South cooperation in the Mediterranean and in particular to Maghreb integration**.** Above all, this is thanks to the Neighbourhood (and all the policies that implies) and the fact that, unlike other actors, it does not see the region as just a market place.

The European Union constitutes an undeniable ally to the South-South cooperation in the Mediterranean and in particular to Maghreb integration

There is no contradiction, as some claim, between a united Maghreb and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in the same way that there is not one between the processes of vertical and horizontal integration.

The perspectives for closer cooperation between the EU and countries of the Maghreb both on the bilateral and regional level are real, and in 2013 were evidenced by the Joint Communication Supporting closer cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia were discussed as countries of the Maghreb and a list of priorities for reinforcing cooperation was agreed.

The countries of the Maghreb should respond to the EU's offer to support regional cooperation on the basis of concrete ideas and proposals.

The 5+5

In this context of dialogue and support for regional integration is the so-called 5+5 dialogue. Established in 1990, this forum for informal dialogue has brought together the five countries from the northern shore (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal) and the five countries from the AMU.

Already in 1983, the French Foreign Affairs Minister Claude Cheysson had informed the southern countries of President Mitterrand's idea of the six countries of the Western Mediterranean (France, Spain, Italy, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) meeting regularly to bring up issues of common interest and as a show of solidarity in the Mediterranean region, which

[6] Oualalou, Fathallah. *Aprés Barcelone le Magreb est necessaire*. Ed. Toubkal Casablanca. 1st Edition 1996.

was not to replace the solidarity already existing between the different countries.

These meetings were to be considered as a step towards a global Mediterranean agreement, which was hard to imagine at the time because of issues with Cyprus and Palestine.

The reactions were not overly enthusiastic and Algeria in particular placed more importance in its relations with non-aligned Mediterranean countries and solutions to the problems, i.e. the right to self-determination, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity and a dialogue that was more focused on economic problems and North-South dialogue.

But the idea took shape and the French proposal, backed by Spain and Italy, would lead to the first Ministerial Conference in Rome in 1990, initially paving the way to an informal 4+5 dialogue, which almost immediately became the 5+5 Dialogue, through the addition of Malta.

The new regional context of the Western Mediterranean (creation of the AMU in 1989 and consolidation of the Mediterranean flank of the European community project in 1986 with the accession of Spain and Portugal) together with the ongoing problems in the Eastern Mediterranean, precluding a global Mediterranean focus, revealed the usefulness, indeed the need, for an informal framework of dialogue and cooperation built on solid foundations, which took into account the new globalised reality and the inevitable interdependence of crucial issues such as security in the Mediterranean.

More reticent at the outset than any other country, Algeria enthusiastically assumed the presidency in 1991 and hosted the second Ministerial Meeting in the same year.

What had been a promising start was hampered by sanctions imposed on Libya by the Security Council following the Lockerbie disaster, which paralysed the dialogue's activities.

Faced with this situation and Egypt's interest in being present in all Mediterranean fora, France and Egypt launched the Mediterranean Forum in 1994, which was not burdened by the presence of Libya and incorporated an Eastern Mediterranean dimension, thereby sidestepping the Palestinian conflict.

A year later, in 1995, the Barcelona Process was launched as a multi-lateral framework of relations between the EU and its Mediterranean members. This, the most ambitious initiative in the Euro-Mediterranean area, had a global and coordinated focus, and was based on two assumptions: first, that the southern and eastern borders of the EU had to be restabilised without drawing false parallels, and second, that changes were needed for the EU to maintain its relations with its Mediterranean neighbours, while Central and Eastern Europe were becoming progressively integrated.

This was also the beginning of a process that aimed to overcome the bilateralism vs multilateralism binomial through multi-bilateralism.

Apparently superfluous and unnecessary when compared with other Mediterranean initiatives, the 5+5 initiative seemed destined to disappear. However, it was reactivated

Apparently superfluous and unnecessary when compared with other Mediterranean initiatives, the 5+5 initiative seemed destined to disappear. However, when international sanctions against Libya were lifted, it was reactivated at the ministerial conference held in Lisbon in 2001, the first after a long hiatus of ten years. The meeting served to relaunch the 5+5 dialogue and, with regard to fostering integration in the Western Mediterranean, offered the added value that it both re-established Euro-Maghreb dialogue and included the presence of Libya (unlike the Mediterranean Forum).

In 2002, Libya held its first MFA meeting, also the first meeting since the attacks of 11 September 2001, which reinforced dialogue and tested Libya's readiness to normalise its position in the international community.

The next stage was the first Summit of Heads of State and Government, which took place in Tunisia (2003) and concluded with a Joint Declaration by all participants confirming the following axes of dialogue: Stability, Maghreb Economic Cooperation and Integration, Social and Human Cooperation (immigration), Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations, and Political Dialogue on major issues. Also in attendance at the meeting was the President of the European Commission.

From Reflection to Strengthened Cooperation

This agenda has been enriched by the inclusion of new issues and with the permanent participation of the European Commission in all sectors of the dialogue. The initiative has thereby been strengthened as a think tank for issues relevant to the Mediterranean architecture, transcending the merely governmental sphere and opening to other actors such as business associations, the media and youth organisations, as well as academic observatories, which would go on to develop their own networks.

The dialogue which began between MFAs has widened to include areas that are not just political, taking advantage of their informal and flexible character to promote strengthened cooperation of an eminently operative and practical nature, which can be translated into concrete actions.

It has developed in the areas of the Interior, Immigration, Transport, Defence, Tourism, Education and Research, the Environment and Energy, Agriculture and Food Security, as well as including representatives of national parliaments. There is an interest in widening these formats in the near future.

Likewise, some of these formations have already been given technical support structures, as is the case for transport with the CETMO (Centre for Transportation Studies for the Western Mediterranean), and formalised relations with other institutions in the Mediterranean sphere. Action plans have also been developed, including activities carried out by defence ministries with a greater reach.

The second Summit of Heads of State and Government met in Malta (October 2012) in the context of changes in the region, which were duly noted (the situation in Syria was given particular emphasis), and reiterated its support for Maghreb integration. Issues concerning the economy, education and youth, considered to be fundamental to the development of the Mediterranean, were central to the discussions.

Some of its initiatives have been considered as a model of regional cooperation as they tackle basic and widely shared aspects that are fundamental to Maghreb integration, such as investments, SMEs and immigration, but also strategic affairs like defence, transport, energy and water.

At no time has the forum weakened the globalising principle of Mediterranean cooperation. In fact, the opposite is the case: it contributes ideas and experiences, strengthens the Maghreb's position in Europe and gives a more relevant role to southern Europe. In recent years it has also shown that by creating connections with the EU it offers an added value that strengthens its operability, as well as that of the EU, in the region.

It is criticised at times for not discussing thorny bilateral issues (Western Sahara, closure of land borders between Algeria and Morocco) but sheds light on certain issues on the international agenda (Iraq, Syria, Terrorism), which rather than creating problems, opens interesting perspectives thanks to the importance given to formalising agreements, even when the positions involved are very different.

Today the 5+5 is the forum for dialogue and cooperation that creates the highest level of consensus among the Southern Partners. Its vitality responds to a flexible focus and participation based on shared interests, and, even without formal structures, it gives greater coherence to South-South integration strategies.

The forum has become an essential link in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and an example of how reinforced cooperation can contribute towards horizontal integration. The step from reflection to action is taken based on common interests and interaction with other mechanisms of regional cooperation.

The new dynamic initiated by the Union for the Mediterranean with the implementation of projects that respond to socio-economic challenges and the goal of regional integration, based on the concept of variable geometry, opens new perspectives for establishing complementarities and underlining the contribution of the 5+5 to regional integration.

European Union Policy towards Its Southern Neighbourhood

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Changes in the Arab world represent a historical milestone in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean. While the call for dignity, democracy, respect for human rights and more inclusive growth has permeated the entire region, each partner has undergone a different process of transition in the last three years.

Since 2011, progress was witnessed towards free and fair electoral processes in some countries of the region, often resulting in a change of government. The development of political parties and of civil society signals the emergence of a democratic culture, and in a few countries public debates have been initiated, in some cases around constitutional reform, on key societal issues such as the role of religion in the new democratic set up and the protection of human rights. However, the risk of crisis or set back is real in a context of polarisation of political forces and in the absence of an agreement among political actors on a joint vision for the political transformation process. In recent months, the unstable political situation and growing social unrest have strongly affected the performance of the Southern Mediterranean governments in implementing reforms. The continuing change revealed even greater differences between the transition trajectories of individual countries in the region.

Embedding deep democracy in the future will rely upon democratic institutions, in particular an independent, fair, accessible and efficient justice system and an accountable and democratic security sector. This will take time, while the respect for the rule of law and human rights, in particular gender equality, freedom of expression (including freedom of the media), of association, religion and belief will remain key challenges in the years ahead for Mediterranean partners and their successful cooperation with the EU. A thriving civil society supported by media that are both independent and professional, able to contribute to public debate and accountability will be essential to ensure the full participation of citizens in shaping their collective future, and authorities should favour its development rather than attempt to restrict it, as it is often the case. Similarly, accountable local authorities are key to providing services that respond to local needs.

Ensuring peace and stability in the region remains an objective that can only be addressed through renewed efforts at the peaceful resolution of protracted conflicts and crises. Events over the last twelve months have not been encouraging.

The Syrian conflict triggered a profound crisis causing further political, social and religious divisions as well as a worsening humanitarian catastrophe in the region. The political track pursued through the Geneva peace process has not moved forward. The opposition to Bashar al-Assad remains divided and internal fights have intensified. The civil war in Syria led millions of people to flee their homes. The Syrian refugee crisis is a humanitarian catastrophe on an unprecedented scale - with 6.5 million 'internally displaced persons' inside Syria and nearly 3 million refugees in neighbouring countries. By summer 2014, it was estimated that the death toll of the conflict had reached 170,000 people. The EU and its Member States are the major donors of assistance to Syria with €2.8 billion pledged so far.

In Libya, despite parliamentary elections held in June 2014, not only is the democratic transition under question, but conflicting interests among various armed groups over power-sharing, the role of religion

and oil revenues have driven the country towards the brink of collapse and have prevented the emergence of functioning state institutions. In addition, the lack of any control over vast areas of the Sahara has allowed illegal trafficking to flourish and much easier movement of criminal and terrorist groups.

EU Reaction

As a reaction to the developments of 2011, the EU decided to support a comprehensive reform and transformation agenda, as provided for in the two joint Communications on "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean" of March 2011 and "A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood" of May 2011.

The EU has aimed to play an important and positive role in supporting the transformation process in the region as a whole. Since 2011 this policy had to adapt to changing circumstances in the region. It has remained sufficiently flexible to adapt to the increasing differentiation and fragmentation evident in the region. It has pursued a policy of renewed engagement, bilaterally and at regional level, while recognising that ownership of the transition lies with its partners. While the overall cooperation with the region in 2013 was heavily influenced by its political developments, in some sectors joint work continued in the best possible way.

In the **political area**, the EU has remained actively involved in all international fora dealing with the situation in the region, notably the Geneva Process peace talks on the Syria crisis, the Friends of Libya group, the international talks on Iran and the Middle East Peace Process.

For the future, cooperation and support for further constitutional and institutional reform, transitional justice, strengthened role of civil society and securing human rights, as well as security reform will remain fundamental to the sustainable development of the southern neighbourhood countries. In this area, the EU intends to continue providing support to partners, including through facilitating the cooperation with such bodies as the Council of Europe.

The EU is the **leading donor** in the region, providing considerable financial resources (loans and grants) to support the process of transformation and reform in southern partner countries. In 2011-2013, the EU has provided nearly €5 billion in support to the region: this includes the response to the Syrian crisis, the resources provided under the country programmes and the special SPRING programme as well as the Civil Society Facility. In addition, through the EU's Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), the EU combined €200 million in grant funds with €2.2 billion in loans from international financial institutions.

For the 2014-2020 period, the adopted budget for the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) stands at €15.433 billion, comparable with the total funding allocated in years 2007-13. In addition to grants from the ENI, the EU will also mobilise its Macro-Financial Assistance (a €300 million operation has recently been decided for Tunisia after the €180 million operation for Jordan in 2013).

Regarding the **trade agenda**, the main EU medium to long-term objective with southern partners is to upgrade and strengthen trade and investment relations and pursue their economic integration with the EU internal market, in particular through the establishment of DCFTAs. Negotiations with Morocco were launched in March 2013. With Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt, the Commission continues preparatory work. In this context, the EU will have to further pursue its work of explaining the concrete benefits of its initiatives on trade and trade-related matters, notably for improving the business and investment climate. It will also need to give the matter the necessary attention and resources to ensure that the negotiations are conducted swiftly and that the agreements can enter into force as soon as is feasible.

Partners continue to have strong expectations of **easier mobility** to the EU and many of them have taken steps to establish national asylum systems as well as improved systems to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings and protect its victims. In recent months, cooperation on home affairs matters has been significantly strengthened: indeed, mobility partnerships have been signed with Morocco (June 2013) and Tunisia (March 2014); while negotiations are being finalised with Jordan. These agreements will serve the simplification of free movement of people. The EU is now considering launching dialogues on migration, mobility and security with more Southern Mediterranean countries, depending on their willingness and capacity to collaborate closer with the EU, as well as their legal and administrative frameworks.

The transformation of the political landscape that followed 2011 developments has been accompanied by a major upsurge in the number of civil society organisations in the region. At the same time, the EU policy put a strong focus on engaging with regional civil society. Support for civil society has increased and been made more systematic and coherent, with three main objectives: 1. Promotion of a conducive environment for civil society; 2. Better participation of civil society actors in policy processes and assistance programmes; and 3. Strengthening of civil society organisations' capacities.

The EU will pursue its engagement with the region on **all regional, sub-regional and bilateral tracks**. In this context, the need for more effective regional mechanisms and institutions able to prevent, manage and solve crises and foster regional integration has been highlighted by recent events.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was given a strong impetus in 2012 when the EU took over the function of the Northern Co-Presidency (Jordan is the 'Southern Presidency'). As Co-Presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the EU actively supports the effective functioning of this forum. In the second half of 2013 the UfM Ministerial Meetings were successfully re-launched and since then already five of them have taken place – addressing topics such as: women, transport, energy, industry and environment. More Ministerial meetings (digital economy and trade) are envisaged for September 2014.

The UfM has modernised itself and adapted its priorities, serving now as an important, unique forum grouping together all Mediterranean partner countries including Mauritania, Israel and Palestine, as well as EU Member States. The organisation became essential in debating political and economic problems of the region (through the regular Senior Officials meetings), supporting dialogue with civil society (including through the activities of the Anna Lindh Foundation) and local authorities as well as a catalyst for new regional projects. The EU intends to further support the UfM, both politically as well as financially under the next programming period (2014-2020).

There has also been an intensification of actions by the League of Arab States or under the '5+5 Dialogue.' The third meeting of the EU and the League of Arab States (LAS) Foreign Affairs Ministers took place on 10-11 June 2014 in Athens. The Joint Declaration signed by all participants established an unprecedented strategic dialogue between both organisations. In 2012 both organisations had adopted a joint work programme with concrete fields of cooperation (human rights, electoral observation, energy, business, etc.). The EU has also enhanced cooperation with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). A number of high level meetings between the EU and the OIC are envisaged for autumn 2014.

With its 2012 Communication on regional cooperation and integration in the Maghreb, the EU made suggestions for cooperative approaches in different fields. The EU remains determined to facilitate and catalyse efforts from the countries of the region assuming ownership in the spirit of partnership.

The events in the Southern Neighbourhood over recent years have dramatically altered the strategic landscape in the Southern Mediterranean, challenging the EU interests directly. They require the EU to rise to the challenge. In this context, our policy should not be rigid and should adapt to an evolving context. We are always ready to be more creative in order to fulfil the aspirations of a stronger and mutually-beneficial partnership between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

Euro-Mediterranean Commercial Integration: Unequal Distribution among the Countries

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The Logic of Trade Integration and Its Shortcomings

Regional integration has a major role to play in expanding trading capacities and facilitating competition and innovation. With the elimination of market-access barriers, the driving force is the increase in trade within regions rather than across them. The concern, in particular in relation to the European region (or bloc), is asymmetry in comparative advantages and disparity in the economic and social size of the two regions and within each region.

How important is trade among Mediterranean countries? How important are the disparities and asymmetries? How relevant is the level of openness within and across the region?

The Barcelona Process is the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations. Initially, 27 parties were involved: 15 European Members and 10 Southern and Eastern Mediterranean States (plus Cyprus and Malta before joining the EU). Launched in November 1995, the Process aimed to establish a common area of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean. It represented an innovative alliance based on the principles of "joint ownership, dialogue and cooperation" in several areas, including economic and social integration within a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area (EMFTA) by 2010.

With the enlargement of the EU in 2004, the logic and scope of the original institutional framework became unsustainable. One could say that the Process was derailed by a series of internal and external causes. The number of EU members grew to 27, and two new members joined the Mediterranean countries (Albania and Mauritania) to make a total of 39 parties involved following the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Other causes are more political and institutional. A parliamentary dimension was added in March 2004, while the Agadir Agreement of the same year was instrumental in reinforcing economic integration and supporting the gradual implementation of the EMFTA. In 2005, a migration chapter was added as a fourth key policy area of the partnership, which served more to raise expectations than create effective results. In July 2008, the agreements on the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with the extension to five southeast European non-member states and the creation of the Secretariat in Barcelona tried to relaunch the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Although the goal of EMFTA was not reached, the benefits for the SEM countries (southern and Eastern Mediterranean) were consistent, as was predicted by the economic literature: greater openness, growth in income and employment and growing expectations for a better future [Baldwin and Venables (2004), Sideri (2001); FEMISE (2010)].

The Outcomes: a Second-Best Solution

It is well known among economists that trade patterns and comparative advantages are influenced by many factors, including the endowment of resources, institutional factors related to commercial policies and incentives provided to economic agents and institutions. All these factors were part of joint and bilateral negotiations during the various stages of the Barcelona Process. As a 'second-best' solution, the outcomes were never going to be ideal for either

CHART 1 **MED 11: Export + Import to GDP**



side. Some partners retained a dominant position as oil and gas exporters, which protected them from competition. Other partners, however, have similar factor endowments and consequent comparative advantages, both for industrial and agricultural products, making the Partnership very sensitive, particularly in the short term, as it exposes the domestic producers to greater competition from each other.

Preferential Access

The Association Agreements and Action Plans covered a broad range of issues going well beyond trade, including not only commercial preferences, but more substantial and specific economic incentives and domestic reforms. The validity of this approach has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies that explore the effects of a tariff, or its non-tariff equivalent, reduction. First of all the agreements have offered more opportunities to a greater variety of products (extensive effect) and differentiation; secondly the reduction of transactional costs and tariffs allowed an increase of volume and value of products already traded among partners (intensive effect). The empirical results have confirmed both effects: a decrease in concentration of products and an increase in trading volumes, which fosters trade integration. [Cipollina, M., Pietrovito, F. (2010); Jarreau J. (2011); Femise (2011)].

The Larger Openness

The deep-integration approach was instrumental in raising trade openness. Using as an indicator the trade-to-GDP ratio of the 10 SEMs,[1] the index shows that these countries succeeded well in opening their economies to international trade, but the geographical structure may be cause for concern.
For the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership the outcome is mixed, in particular for exports from SEMs to the EU. For example, Péridy (2007) finds that EU preferences led to a 20-27% increase in exports from Mediterranean countries over the period 1995-2001, i.e. the period covering the first six years of the Barcelona Process. However, De Wulf and Maliszewska (2009) show that southern Mediterranean exports to the EU have increased by less than their

[1] Israel is not included, despite being a partner in the Barcelona Process, as it has economic, political and social features similar to those enjoyed by advanced countries.

exports to the rest of the world. Both patterns are reported in Chart 1, which shows the openness ratio during the three phases of the Barcelona Process.

Taking advantage of EU preferences, SEM partners have built up a more competitive and diversified export capacity. The overall trade openness ratio rose significantly from 18% in 1995 to 28% in 2013. However, it can be observed that the significant contributions to the openness created during the first phase of the EMP have not been sustained by the incentives offered within the ENP and UfM. Since 2004, higher growth rates were achieved with extra-regional partners offering more opportunities to diversify SEM trade flows, in particular in the Gulf area or outside. As of 2013, the share of total trade in GDP for SEM countries exposed to the EU 28 was significantly lower than the previous EMP period, where trade represented only 22% of the value of their GDP compared to more than 30% for the Rest of the World (RoW). (See Chart 1.)

Links through foreign investments typically played a prominent role on this performance, but not enough to explain what happened in the second decade of the Partnership. This review provides several factors: from higher integration through other preferential agreements between Arab countries, including the Agadir Agreement, which seems to have performed reasonably well[2], to narrower independent initiatives with large trading countries like India, China and also Turkey (a partner in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership).

Although an empirical literature has flourished on the technical issues of the agreements (preferences, length of negotiations) an important aspect cannot be neglected: the change of the competitive advantages of the region as a consequence of the fifth enlargement of the EU and the simultaneous accession of the former Eastern Bloc. The effects were significant, as the enlargement and the consequent set-up of the ENP gradually eroded the preferences designed to foster trade and investment integration. Still the UfM initiative has fallen short of expectations. Mostly because of the financial crises between 2008 and 2009, that shaped a significant drop in external trade, but ultimately due to the shortcomings of its scope based on bilateral incentives.

The evidence may suggest that EU preferences did have some success on the economic front, as trade and investments contributed to more openness and more diversification in their export flows. However the original design has shifted since 2004 to a more 'shallow' integration, due to the complexity of the problems confronting the EU and its partners and the new conflicts within the region that have hampered political and administrative reforms.

EMFTA remains a dream, an ideal aspiration challenged by other important international players, in particular the Arab Gulf countries, which need to invest and diversify their large financial surpluses

EMFTA remains a dream, an ideal aspiration challenged by other important international players, in particular the Arab Gulf countries, which need to invest and diversify their large financial surpluses. Ultimately, in this competitive geopolitical environment, the efficiency of the conditionality/preferential logic rests on a cost-benefit calculation of the governing elites of the SEM countries. Since there are costs associated to the structural reforms that comply with the implementation of the acquis communautaire, the elites of the region may choose to avoid them, preferring to redirect their trade flows to other more mercantilist partners. In the end, the strong export growth and FDI inflows have not been translated into similarly strong economic and social progress and the outcome has been disappointing.

Product Concentration

Product concentration is another aspect of the asymmetry and vulnerability of the Euro-Mediterranean integration. The concentration of SEM export flows[3] is

[2] Among developing countries, the MENA countries have the highest preferential margin (RPM), which facilitates intraregional trade, at almost 5%, higher than South Asia (4% RPM) or Central Asia (about 1.8%). NICITA (2011).

[3] Values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Concentration Index computed by UNCTAD as a measure of dispersion of trade value across the exporters' products.

CHART 2 **Concentration of Exports to EU27**



well known, especially regarding natural resources or labour-intensive manufacturing. Particularly high values indicate the exporters' dependency on few products or on few trading partners, but also the potentially high benefits from the reduction of trade barriers. Moreover, diversification helps to mitigate the effects of negative trade shocks especially when product varieties and foreign markets are not perfectly correlated and the negative shocks in some areas may be offset by positive shocks in others.

Measured over time, as in Chart 2 and 3, a fall in the index is an indication of greater diversification in the SEM's export structure. Two decades of Mediterranean cooperation reveals that product differentiation based on comparative advantages increased in most countries in the region. There are, however, some differences when we compare the concentration of SEM exports to both EU and Arab countries of the MENA region. The GAFTA preference system seems to be more generous than the EMFTA, as the level of concentration, although decreasing, remains higher for Tunisian, Egyptian or Jordanian exports to the EU, compared to a more diversified structure when trading with the MENA countries.

The economic transformations have gone in the right direction, reducing disparities and creating new opportunities. Additional benefits from this process are the result of the industrial relocation of European enterprises, creating new sectors that sustained the positive relationship between export growth and diversity. In addition, the evidence confirms that greater diversification stabilises export earnings and generates positive spillovers and externalities for competition and employment. [Alessandrini S. (2014)]. (See Chart 1 and Chart 2.)

Geographical Differences

The traditional division into four sub-regional groups has not changed. One could say that the 'hub-and-spoke' approach has reinforced this feature with new priorities and geopolitical preferences. Excluding Turkey and Israel for their specific policy aspirations and size, the southern-eastern divide of the Mediterranean region has been strengthened. Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon have promoted comprehensive reform programmes and have achieved more progress in integration with Arab countries and some Asian economies, while Morocco and Tunisia have made important steps toward greater trade integration with the EU.

The European Union remains the main trading partner for five of the 11 countries participating in the Barcelona initiative. Europe 28 receives more than

CHART 3 **Concentration of Exports to MENA 19**



40% of their total exports. Two of them are major oil exporters (Algeria and Libya) and three are traditional partners (Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey). Excluding the oil producers, the other partners indicate a gradual diversification to other industrial countries (benefitting from preferential treatment or FTA) or to the Gulf region. The most notable change here is the decrease in Egypt's export share. In 2013, the European Union accounted for just 29.3% of its exports compared to 54.5% in 1995 and 36.5% in 2008. This diversification is very significant and confirms the greater attraction for the Arab partners, which accounted for 32% of Egyptian exports in 2013, reflecting the overall extra-regional orientation of this country, despite the Agadir Agreement.

On a more disaggregated level one can also observe the change of the EU's perception and commitment to the Mediterranean Partnership. The direction of trade, in particular SEM exports to Europe, has changed over the course of the last 20 years due to new geopolitical priorities among the SEM partners, as well as changing interests among European importers. Chart 4 shows the share of MED 10 exports to the five major European partners (Italy, France, Germany, Great Britain and Spain).

From the beginning of the partnership, Italy and Germany were the two main export destinations for the region (more than 20% each), with France in an intermediate position and Spain and United Kingdom in a more secluded location (less than 10% each). The degree of concentration was thus very high, with an absorption of the other 23 European countries of only one fifth of the EU's imports.

The evidence is certainly consistent with the idea that, during the first decade of the partnership, Germany gradually fell into an intermediate position in MED 10 exports, despite its stronger integration with Turkey, which acts as a gateway for investors and exporters to reach parts of the Middle East and Mediterranean.

The second notable trend is the increased interest and orientation of Spain and the United Kingdom with growing market shares. The French position is partly aligned with German interests, before recovering positions and voice during the ENP and after proposing the creation of the UfM. Exports from SEM countries suffered after 2009 not only because of the drop in oil prices, but also due to the contraction of European domestic demand. Italy maintained its leading position as the main destination, although its market share declined almost 5 percentage points between 2009 and 2013, while the shares of Spain and the United Kingdom continued to perform more robustly.

Considering that the enlargement of the European market after 2004 did not create favourable condi-

CHART 4 **MED 10 to EU 28: Percentages**



tions for further integration between the two shores of the Mediterranean, it is worth noting the exception of Turkey: its share of total EU imports increased along with its role as a Euro-Asian and Mediterranean gateway that enjoyed growing bilateral exchanges with SEM countries.

The initial distribution of trade flows, among top importers and small niche countries, is now converging to a more diversified shape. These features underline an alternative interpretation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; despite the poor results in encouraging greater integration between the two regions and inability to prevent contrasts and tensions in Southern Europe, the ENP has offered the legitimisation for more (un-balanced) economic relations to the central and northern countries of Europe, so that their cumulated share of MED 11 exports absorbs a quarter of European imports (up from 20% at the end of the nineties). (See Chart 4.)

Weak Interregional Integration

If the ambitions are to stimulate sustainable development in SEM countries the 'hub-and-spoke' integration approach revealed quite controversial difficulties for the partners on the eastern shore.

Chart 5 shows the trade links among the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Basin. The degree of integration is measured by the share of exports, which is very low; well below its potential. The subregions are under-traded in particular for the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) and North Africa (which includes Egypt and Libya) with an export value of less than 5% of total exports. Some positive changes can be observed after 2004, including an increase in intra-regional exports, which is particularly promising for the AMU, and the doubling of the index value from 2004 and 2013. This is very different to the expansion of trade with the MENA 19: the integration index reached 20% of total exports in 2013 from 12% in 1995. (See Chart 5.)

The evidence is clear: integration forces and trade liberalisation are supported by an extra-regional model which is less ambitious. Several features are shared by most of these countries. Tariff barriers were gradually reduced over the two decades, while non-tariff barriers and rules of origins were eased with the application of the cumulative rules of origin specifically stated within the Agadir Agreement and GAFTA. The progress has been slow and the region remains economically divided, with the lowest level of intra-regional trade and economic integration

compared to other regional arrangements. Non-tariff barriers and rules of origin continue to distort relative prices and restrict trade within the SEM region, as emphasised by Augier et al. (2013) and Ghoneim (2012). The second impediment is the concentration of their exports and their substitutability, which restrict specialisation and further trade. Thirdly, the lack of integrative infrastructures and facilities, including poor and corrupt administrations, increases cross-border costs.

Growing Trade Imbalances

Among the risks introduced by the Euro-Mediterranean policies, the economic literature has reported the increased trade deficit caused by the dismantling of trade barriers. The ex-post evidence shows a quite different evolution, in part due to the dynamics of oil prices. The partner countries differ considerably: on the one hand, two countries are oil exporters that accumulated significant surpluses over the two decades; the other partners have been able to manage a bilateral deficit that has never exceeded the sustainability level, as the merchandise trade deficit has been compensated by non-trade elements of services and private transfers, specifically tourism and remittances.

Turkey is a special case, as it changed its focus from an import-substitution system to an outward-oriented growth one. The trade deficit was sustained for a long time with non-trade surplus flows. However, the multidimensional characters of the current global crises had a negative effect on its exports, so that since 2010 Turkey shows an average trade deficit with the EU of over $20 billion per year.

However, it is equally interesting to observe the changes in the EU's bilateral trade balances. The traditional trade deficit of SEM countries and the related dichotomy shaping Europe's external relations worsened from 2004 to 2008: Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom remained net importers of energy products and generated a growing deficit due to high oil prices and the growth of their economies. Soon after their economies went into recession in 2009, trade deficit fell sharply to lower levels. The exception is the UK that continued to run consistent deficits with the region.

Across the other European countries, exchanges generated a surplus that, for the large exporters, did not exceed $5 billion annually. What is interesting to observe is the growing neo-mercantilist propensity to accumulate trade surpluses from the Central European countries (over $14 billion in 2013), that led to a move away from the spirit of the initial agreement inspired by the principles of shared prosperity,

CHART 5 **Intra-Regional Integration***



* MENA-19 includes the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE and Yemen.

CHART 6 **MED 10 Regional Balance: Growing Disparities**



joint ownership (i.e. jointly-defined policy) and common development.

Not surprisingly, the outcome of the UfM was the increase of the bilateral trade surplus of Germany and 23 other countries (here aggregated in Chart 6), compensating the trade deficit of the three countries of the southern littoral. This may be justified by the export market diversification of the SEM countries underlined above, but it also reflects the diverging trends within EU countries. Of course, these patterns may not be interpreted as the sole consequence of the UfM partnership agreements, but certainly oppose the abstract concepts of integration and solidarity among countries, and contrast with the mercantilist approach of the economic agents when they enter the international markets. These recent patterns demand an explanation, since they reveal the nature of the market that has been established on the northern shore of the Euro-Mediterranean region: it strengthens the 'hub-and-spoke' logic and weakens the growth potential. This is a direct contrast with the original aims, namely, to use the bilateral and regional (South-South) trade to strengthen the potential for growth, differentiate production and create an integrated regional area.

Conclusions

SEM countries need to create millions of jobs in order to accommodate the rapid expansion of the labour force in the region. The problem today is the sense of frustration emerging from the results of 20 years of regional integration: low per-capita GDP growth, growing employment problems, undocumented migration and still higher tariffs that are twice those of the emerging economies. The Euro-Mediterranean project has changed its character and has become increasingly fragmented, while the South-South integration through GAFTA and the Agadir Process remains weighed down by a lack of political commitment and serious structural impediments. Despite its economic crisis, Europe should continue to open its own markets to products from the region. Europe should also realise that the initial proposal to create a free trade zone in the wider Mediterranean area has failed, but that the actual bilateral approach in negotiating with partner countries is not a win-win solution. It reinforces a core-periphery approach rather than sustaining a true and sustainable region-wide integration among the SEM countries. We may expect these initiatives to send the right signals to

encourage trade openness -the goal- and identify the measures which are needed to give these countries prospects for economic progress. The Arab springs of 2011 and today's migration flows have made it increasingly clear that the region has a potential of young and educated citizens; they are asking for opportunities, they need policies and perspectives of social and inclusive development. The resistance to modernisation, the timid reforms, often late in their enforcement, all contribute to reducing opportunities and sustaining instability.

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Towards a Resurgence of Government Concern Regarding the Informal Economy in South Shore Mediterranean Countries

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The Arab Spring marked the reminiscence of a certain interest of the authorities in South Shore Mediterranean countries and especially the Maghreb regarding the informal economy, an interest coinciding with the return of this issue to the International Labour Conference agenda in 2014.

Labour Market Tension

In recent times, the countries in the region have continued to experience high unemployment rates (approaching 10% or more, and even reaching 13% in the case of Egypt and 15% in Tunisia) particularly affecting the labour force with a higher education or specialised training (with rates at nearly 20% or more in Egypt and Morocco and over 30% in Tunisia). The situation is especially acute among youth aged 15 to 24, whose unemployment rate in 2014 was between 17.9% in Turkey and 31.4% in Tunisia, whereas the proportion of this age group that is not in employment, education or training (the NEET rate) is nearly one out of four (see Table 5).
The majority of countries are pursuing even more vigorous active employment policies particularly aimed at youth. In Algeria, thanks to the revenue from hydrocarbon rent, a great number of youth have benefited from workforce integration contracts and support for job creation, the country managing to stave off the rise in unemployment rates, whereas in Tunisia, the same type of programmes could not absorb the masses of youth impelled to declare themselves unemployed rather than informally employed, due to selection criteria inappropriate for gaining employment in the public sector (whether subsidised or not). Hence nearly one youth out of two declared they were seeking work in 2011 (42.3%), the proportion being around one out of three today (31.4%). (See Table 5)

Resilient Informal Economies in Which Micro-Enterprise Predominates but Where Informal Employment within the Formal Sector is Much More Widespread than in Other Regions

It is in such a context, and while in the majority of the developing regions in the world, employment in the informal economy has increased continually over a long period, that the South Mediterranean Countries have experienced fluctuations, illustrating the global counter-cyclical nature of a phenomenon whose definition and measure have been progressively refined over the course of the past four decades.
The informal economy is not the equivalent of the shadow economy, even if ties to the latter do exist and it can at times prevail over the former. Consisting of micro-enterprises on the one hand and unprotected workers in the formal sector on the other, the informal economy involves economic activities that are perfectly visible but poorly understood.[1]

[1] Without going into detail here on the definitions, recall that the informal sector was defined at the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS, 1993) based on the characteristics of the enterprises (legal status, size, non-registration of the company or its workers), whereas informal employment was defined at the 17th ICLS in 2003 based on the characteristics of the employment exercised (mainly the absence of social security). The informal economy to which the 2002 International Work Conference referred, as well as the following Conferences, was a combination of the two preceding concepts.

TABLE 5 **Various Labour Market Indicators in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries**

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Overall Unemployment Rate					
Algeria	10.0	10.0	11.0	9.8	10.6
Egypt	9.0	12.0	12.7	13.3	13.2
Morocco	9.1	8.9	9.0	9.2	9.8
Tunisia	14.8	18.6	17.3	15.8	15.2
Turkey	11.9	9.8	9.2	9.7	9.9
Unemployment Rate of Those with Training (or Higher Education)					
Algeria	20.3	15.2	14.6	14.0	
Egypt	18.9	20.1			
Morocco	18.2	19.4	18.9	19.0	20.4
Tunisia	23.3	33.4	31.8	32.6	31.4
Turkey	11.0	10.4	10.1	10.3	10.6
Unemployment Rate of Youth Aged 15-24					
Algeria	21.5	22.4	27.5	24.8	25.2
Egypt	24.8	29.7			
Morocco	17.6	17.8	18.7	19.2	20.0
Tunisia	29.4	42.3	37.6	32.6	31.4
Turkey	21.7	18.4	17.5	18.7	17.9
NEET Rate (Not in Employment, Education or Training)					
Algeria	25.3	26.0	22.7	21.5	22.8
Egypt	32.0				
Tunisia	25.4			17.9 (15-29)	
Turkey	27.0		24.0		

Sources: Rates taken from national data or extrapolated therefrom. Charmes and Remaoun (2014a) and Charmes (2015).

Table 6 (and Chart 8 below) shows the evolution of employment in the informal economy as a percentage of non-agricultural employment – a much more sensitive indicator and thus more pertinent than an indicator taking into account agricultural activities and thus subject to evolutions that have a tendency to balance out. Note the sharp rise in informality across the region in 2000-2004 and 2005-2009, followed by a decrease in the 2010-14 period. This decrease (occurring in all the countries in the region except Tunisia, which is experiencing the after-effects of the 2011 revolution) also reveals the results of a certain interventionism by states concerned at the sharp rise in unemployment among youth in general and young graduates in particular.

Over the recent 2010-14 period, employment in the informal economy thus represented an average of some 50% of overall non-agricultural employment in Northern Africa, with a maximum in Morocco (70%, in a downtrend) and a minimum of 40% in Algeria and Tunisia. The latter, which until the end of said period had the lowest informal economy employment rate, has now surpassed 40%.

Moreover, one of the characteristics of the informal economy in Northern Africa is that informal employ-

TABLE 6 **Evolution of Employment in the Informal Economy as a Percentage of Non-Agricultural Employment in Northern African Countries**

	1975-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010-2014
Northern Africa	39.6		34.1	-	47.5	47.3	53.0	50.2
Algeria	21.8	-	25.6	-	42.7	41.3	45.6	40.7
Morocco	-	56.9	-	-	*44.8*	67.1	78.5	70.1
Tunisia	38.4	35.0	39.3	-	47.1	35.0	36.8	40.2
Egypt	58.7	-	37.3	-	55.2	45.9	51.2	49.6
Turkey	11.9	9.8	9.2	9.7	9.9			

Source: Charmes (2012). Updated for the recent period based on Charmes and Remaoun (2014b) and Charmes and Ben Cheikh (2015).
Note: The figure in *italics* only refers to the informal sector (and not the entire informal economy) and is thus an underestimation.

CHART 8 **Evolution of Employment in the Non-Agricultural Informal Economy in Northern African Countries, 1995-2014**



Source: Table 6 above

ment outside of the formal sector (that is, essentially precarious employment in the formal sector) represents over 41% of total employment in the informal economy (the remaining 59% consisting of employment in informal micro-enterprises), which is the highest proportion observed in the world. Another defining feature, revealed by the Tunisian School to Work Transition Survey (SWTS) effected in 2013 by the Tunisian National Observatory of Employment and Training (ONEQ) in partnership with the International Labour Organization (ILO-ONEQ, 2014), is that over ¾ of employed youth are working in the informal economy. And this is most likely the case in the other countries in the region as well. Taken together, youth unemployment rates (between 1 out of 5 and 1 out of 4 unemployed), NEET rates (1 out of 4 youths neither employed nor in education or training) and the informal economy employment rates (3 youths out of 4) explain the sudden resurgence of government concern with the informal economy.

Origins of the Informal Economy: Its Recent Ties with the Contraband Economy and Islamism

The origins of the informal economy and its dynamics in Northern Africa are diverse. Although they draw their origins from formerly powerful trade guilds in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, informal manufacturing activities would experience a certain decline around 1980, with strong competition, first domestic (with the pressure of apprentices completing their training), then foreign (with the competition from Chinese products). Two phenomena, however, emerged to boost the growing orientation of informal activities towards distribution.

From the failed advent of an Islamic State over the course of the 1990s, the Algerian economy inherited established distribution channels that continue to function today while remaining impermeable to any form of tax payments, refusing to contribute to state funds. There is a connection between import and retail

distribution, thanks to complicities and large-scale operations with Middle Eastern and Far Eastern countries, with which it is easier to practice under-invoicing, as well as counterfeit products. Hence the transition from Marseilles tote bags to containers from Shanghai (Peraldi, 2001). This bazaar economy is one of the historic roots of the informal economy based on the absence of invoicing and payment in cash.

Another source, in the case of Algeria, is excess bureaucracy, above all for youth who are just starting off: access to a business space and credit is at times difficult, lengthy, expensive, complicated and marked by favouritism. This obliges them to adopt survival strategies that explain the lack of competitiveness of SMEs.

Against this historic backdrop of going against the rules and bureaucracy inherited from previous periods, the 1994 Structural Adjustment Programme greatly curtailed the population's purchasing power. The informal economy then adapted: by underestimating the value of imported products through under-invoicing and thus eliminating the tax burden, it has managed to keep consumer products affordable to the middle class.

This is a system difficult to eliminate because it has taken on a large scale and infected all the cogwheels necessary for its further development. However, it is this import system that hinders the development of national enterprise, for it follows its own dynamic, namely, if a certain product pleases consumers, that article is immediately sent to China, where it is counterfeited and returns to the Algerian market at a much lower price. Under such conditions, no manufacturing activity or even any legal import activities can survive.

To gain an idea of the strength of this informal sector and the lobby it represents, suffice it to recall that the obligation to settle any transactions over 50,000 Algerian dinars by cheque fizzled out in 2010, and it was not until June 2015 that it was reinstated by decree, but now for amounts of over 1,000,000 dinars. The surveillance of accounts with over 50 million dinars has had the perverse effect of deflecting people from their banks, with over 50% of funds remaining outside the banking system.

But although social partners seem to coincide in this analysis and although the Algerian National Economic and Social Pact seems to demonstrate the authorities' predisposition to endorse it and drawing the appropriate conclusions, there is no apparent unanimity on the solutions to implement. Shortly after the colloquium on "The Informal Economy in Algeria: Traces of a Transition towards Formalisation" (March 2013), organised under the patronage of the Algerian Ministry of Commerce, the commitment to draw up a White Paper seems to be at a standstill, and though the main institutional actors were parties to the Declaration of Tunis on 2 July 2013 (see below), there has not been any significant progress in this regard since then. Moreover, these actors witnessed a change in discourse on the informal economy, insisting on its job creation aspect and the consequent need to leave it in peace. And though the Pact discusses the 'struggle' against the informal economy, the social partners are more circumspect regarding the need for 'repression.'

Access to a business space and credit is at times difficult, lengthy, expensive, complicated and marked by favouritism. This obliges them to adopt survival strategies

In Tunisia, the development of contraband is a central phenomenon dating back to the mid-1990s, when the free trade regime with Europe and the prosperity of the Trabelsi Clan resulting therefrom were offset by a laisser-faire tolerance towards ordinary people, leading to the emergence of Libyan souks in nearly all cities. This recognised and tolerated social release valve entailed the mass destruction of the organised economy. Thus, for instance, and with the help of the tax rise, the home appliances sector became informal through contraband. A whole series of distribution chains were then established on an informal level with the lowest link in the chain (the retailers) perfectly visible and obtaining greater profit than those gained in the formal sector, whereas the top of the chain remained invisible. Ayadi et al. (2013), in their study for the World Bank, measured the magnitude and the tax gap along both Tunisian borders – the one with Libya and the one with Algeria. They found that the labour market was in crisis in all the governorates where contraband prevailed, for salaries had to be aligned with the contraband revenue, further reducing hiring. The risk is then that the entire organised economy become infected.

Contraband is a phenomenon that sustains arms trafficking and religious extremism. A symptomatic factor, moreover, is that it was during the same period in the 1990s that the contraband and distribution networks sustaining Islamism were established in Algeria.
Hence, besides a small private entrepreneurial sector seeking access to markets and sources of funding and which deserves support, the informal sector consists primarily of activities infected by contraband, themselves infected by the criminal economy involved in arms trafficking and terrorism.

The Influence of Peruvian Economist Hernando de Soto's Ideas

Tunisian and Algerian employers and their associations have adopted Hernando de Soto's analyses. This author has come to their defence in Tunisia and in the whole of the Maghreb within the framework of his Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), dedicated to studying and comprehending the legal causes of economic exclusion and advocating an inclusive State of Law: the informal economy arises from the difficulties encountered by the formal sector and the barriers to entering it, which should thus be removed. De Soto's theories have been known since 1986: in many countries, it takes months if not years to complete all the procedures required to set up a business – if indeed it is possible to achieve at all – while in other countries, it only takes a few minutes, several hours or several days. Reducing the number of procedures required and their length would thus be the first element of a policy of economic formalisation. But the main problem lies in the absence of recognition of the extralegal capital small, informal entrepreneurs have available. It is access to legality that is limited and that should be expanded, a much vaster and more complex problem than that of simple procedures for registering a business.
In his analysis of the situation in the MENA region and in Tunisia in particular during the post-Arab Spring period, De Soto (2013) poses the question: "Why are Arab entrepreneurs not meeting their potential for producing prosperity?" According to him, over 90% of the Tunisian population has extralegal real estate, with extralegal real estate and business assets in 2012 to the value of 115 billion US dollars (that is, four times the amount of cumulative Foreign Direct Investment since 1976), and 85% of Tunisian entrepreneurs operate extralegally, whereas it takes 62 procedures and 499 days to legalise property rights and 54 procedures and 142 days to set up a small business. He thus proposes a programme for economic inclusion based on hearing people's needs, reaching a consensus on acceptance of extralegal practices and documents, improving accessibility to property and business rights and evaluating public policies by their results insofar as inclusion.
An analysis of the forgotten origins of the Arab Spring and its economic solution was broadly disseminated in a brochure (ILD, 2012). The event triggering the Tunisian Revolution, 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Sidi Bouzid, was a protest by a small-time street vendor of fruit and vegetables whose little capital he possessed was confiscated by the authorities. Numerous other cases of self-immolation took place in the following weeks throughout the entire subregion for similar reasons. Interviewing the families of those immolated and survivors, De Soto saw in these actions the emergence of a social class of entrepreneurs wishing to accumulate capital, aware of being repressed and subject to the authorities' '*hogra*' (contempt), and rebelling against being deprived of their real estate and business rights. In losing his tangible assets, Bouazizi was also losing his extralegal rights and, naturally, his legal rights, to which all sorts of obstacles had prevented him access.

The recent evolution of the informal economy is threatening the wage-and-social-security model

At present, a number of political parties, among them Afek Tounes, have adopted these ideas as part of their agenda.

Relative Consensus among Social Partners on the Diagnosis and Solutions for Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy

Subsequently, these thoughts were discussed in Algeria, then were the subject of an official declaration in Tunis adopting recommendations on a Maghreb-wide scale. The Declaration of Tunis, made on 2 July

2013, expressed the wish of an inclusive Maghrebi Council for Entrepreneurship. Considering that "*over half of the entrepreneurs in the Maghreb are now, to some degree, outside of the formal sphere and therefore do not enjoy the advantages and protection of the law, nor the advantages of globalisation"* and that it is "*imperative to take action for economic and social inclusion and for Maghrebi economic integration by rendering normative and legal regulatory systems coherent and feasible, thus rendering recourse to informality needless,"* Maghrebi employers' organisations decided to combine efforts to achieve "*inclusive and sustainable solutions to the problem of the informal economy, which affects economic growth, social and regional integration, and peace and stability in the Maghreb."*

Symptomatically, labour unions are of the same opinion, for they find that the recent evolution of the informal economy is threatening the wage-and-social-security model (the welfare State) and we are thus witnessing a certain convergence between employers, employees and governments, perhaps partially brought on by discussions at the 103rd session of the International Labour Conference in 2014 (ILO, 2014) that resulted in recommendations for a transition from an informal to a formal economy, exceptionally adopted nearly unanimously at the 104th session in June 2015 (ILO, 2015).

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The New Emerging Energy Landscape: the European Union and North Africa

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In late 2014, oil prices dropped by approximately 50%. This sharp decline is particularly significant given political instability in a number of oil producing countries such as Libya and Iraq and the sanctions on the Iranian oil sector. Several years ago these geopolitical factors would have pushed prices higher. In 2014 they had little, if any, impact due to the steady improvement in energy efficiency, which leads to lower consumption and rising production, particularly in the United States.

Energy efficiency can be defined as the delivery of more services for the same energy input or the same services for less energy input. For a long time the contribution of energy efficiency to energy security was not fully appreciated and was identified as "the hidden fuel." In recent years, efficiency has attracted more attention and has been labelled by International Energy Agency (IEA) analysts as "the first fuel." A recent report by the IEA stated that investment in efficiency has helped to lower energy consumption in the 18 member states by 60%. Stated differently, efficiency helped to avoid over 1.7 billion tonnes of oil equivalent from being consumed.[1] Thus, in addition to improving energy security, efficiency offers high returns on investments, increases the sustainability of energy sources and reduces pollution.

To further appreciate the significance of improving efficiency and reducing consumption, it is important to note that the 2002-2012 decade recorded the largest ever growth of energy consumption in terms of volume over any 10-year period. Both the IEA and British Petroleum (BP), among others, project a steady increase in global energy consumption. However, this rise in consumption varies by region and by fuel. Energy demand in the most developed countries (mostly member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD) has peaked and in some countries has started a steady decline. The European Union's energy consumption in 2013 was the same as in 1990. On the other hand, global demand for energy is led by Asian emerging markets (China, India, South Korea, and Japan) and the Middle East. Indeed, these two regions account for nearly all of the net global increase in consumption. According to the IEA, for each barrel of oil no longer used in OECD countries, two barrels more are used in non-OECD countries.[2] China has already surpassed the United States as the world's largest oil importer and the Middle East is projected to overtake the US to become the largest per capita consumer of oil in 2033.

Similarly, there is a variation in the demand for different fuels. Fossil fuels maintain their dominance over the different forms of energy, while natural gas becomes the fastest growing. In addition, technological advances and lower costs regarding setting up liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities are slowly helping to reduce the risk of supply disruptions and lower export costs. Oil consumption will grow but its share will decline and coal will grow faster than oil but slower than gas.

Growing concern about greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly carbon dioxide from the com-

[1] International Energy Agency, *Energy Efficiency market Report 2014*, Paris, 2014, p. 18.
[2] International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook*, Paris, 2014, p. 2.

bustion of fossil fuels, has created renewed interest in, virtually carbon-free, nuclear power. For decades nuclear power has been seen as a non-intermittent and readily expandable source of energy. However, the industry continues to face daunting challenges and risks that need to be addressed. The list includes high construction costs, safety, waste, and the close connection between civilian nuclear power and military applications. Thus, despite the Fukushima disaster, nuclear power capacity is projected to substantially increase. This increase, however, adds little to its share of global electricity generation due to the impressive rise of renewable energy.

Despite intensive efforts, Europe is likely to remain dependent on oil and gas supplies from North Africa (and elsewhere). More work is needed to enhance political stability and economic development in the southern Mediterranean states

Like nuclear power, renewable energy sources have been the topic of continued interest in both developed and developing countries. This interest is driven mainly by concern over energy security and climate change. Renewable energy is any form of energy that is replenished by natural processes at a rate that equals or exceeds its rate of use. Some renewable energy resources such as hydropower are technically mature and are deployed on a significant scale. Others, such as wind, solar and geothermal, are in a nascent phase of technical maturity and commercial production and deployment. The strong interest in renewable energy in many countries is projected to raise its share in global power generation to one-third by 2040. Low natural gas prices (due to shale revolution), however, might reduce incentives to invest in and develop renewable energy. This variation in the current and projected consumption of fossil fuels, nuclear power and renewable energy has had a significant impact on trading relationships. Generally North America is emerging as a net exporter, rather than a net importer, while Europe and Asia's already heavy dependency on foreign supplies will further deepen. Against this background, this essay will examine the impact the political instability in the southern Mediterranean countries has had on their energy sectors and its implications on Europe's energy security. Despite intensive efforts, Europe is likely to remain dependent on oil and gas supplies from North Africa (and elsewhere). More work is needed to enhance political stability and economic development in the southern Mediterranean states.

Europe's Energy Outlook

With more than half a billion people and a mostly high standard of living, the European Union has one of the largest energy markets in the world. A large population and economic prosperity lead to high energy consumption, while the EU suffers from a severe shortage of indigenous deposits. Recent statistics show a large and, potentially growing, gap between production and demand, with imported supplies making up the difference.

The EU's share of global energy production is approximately 6.1%, while its share of consumption is 12.9%.[3] In other words, the bloc produces less than half of the energy it consumes. Accordingly, in 2012 the EU imported 53.4% of its energy needs. In 1995 the import dependency rate was 43%, meaning that despite tremendous efforts to lower vulnerability to foreign supplies, the EU is becoming more dependent on imported fuels. The EU's external energy bill accounts for more than one billion euros per day (around 400 billion euros in 2013) and more than a fifth of total EU imports. Certainly import dependency varies across the bloc, with countries such as Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg heavily dependent on foreign supplies and Estonia, Romania and the Czech Republic less so. This dependency also varies from one fuel to another. Russia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Qatar are the major energy exporters to the EU.

In the last few years, several emerging regional and global geopolitical trends have had a significant im-

[3] All figures in this section are from the European Commission, *EU Energy in Figures – Statistical Pocketbook 2014*, available at http://eu.Europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2014_pocketbook.pdf. Accessed December 28, 2014.

pact on the European energy outlook. These include the surge in unconventional oil and natural gas in Canada and the United States, the rising demand in Asian emerging markets, particularly China and India, political and security upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa, the sharp drop in oil prices and the nuclear accident in Fukushima Daiichi. It is too soon to fully assess the impact of these emerging dynamics. Still, the combination of these trends underscores the growing uncertainties in the global energy markets.

Within this context, the EU has set three targets: a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, a 20% share of renewable energy and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency, all to be attained by 2020. The European Commission has recently reported substantial progress towards these 20/20/20 targets. Building on this success, the European Council has set out new ambitious targets for the period leading up to 2030. These are: a 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels), a 27% share of renewable energies and a 27% improvement in energy efficiency, with no specific or binding objectives for individual Member States for the last two targets.

The inadequate investment in LNG facilities, turmoil in North Africa, high Asian demand and falling indigenous production all underscore Europe's vulnerability to interruptions in gas supplies

In addition to these broad targets and achievements it is important to highlight the EU's efforts to curb energy consumption and diversify the energy mix. The EU has taken several initiatives to improve efficiency and reduce consumption. These include enhancing the energy performance of buildings (both private and public) and energy labelling for domestic appliances. The European Commission considers that an additional 1% in energy savings can reduce EU gas imports by 2.6%.

The share of petroleum and petroleum products in the EU's overall energy consumption is 33.8%, natural gas 23.3%, solid fuels (mainly coal) 17.5%, nuclear power 13.5% and renewables 11%. The large (but declining) oil share underscores Europe's energy vulnerability. In 1995 the Union imported 74% of its oil needs, by 2012 this oil import dependency rate jumped to 84.6%. Three trends further contribute to this vulnerability: indigenous crude oil production has been rapidly falling, refining capacity has sharply declined and Russia provides about one third of imports.

The Union is also dangerously vulnerable to interruptions in gas supplies. In 1995, the EU imported 43.4% of its gas consumption and by 2012 the figure rose to 65.8%. This vulnerability has been particularly heightened in recent years due to the Russia-Ukraine crises, given that roughly 15% of EU gas imports transit Ukraine. The efforts made in the aftermath of the 2009 Ukraine crisis have proven helpful in reducing the impact of the recent crisis. These include new gas pipelines, reverse flows, higher LNG import and improved storage capacity. However, in the long run more work is needed. The inadequate investment in LNG facilities, turmoil in North Africa, high Asian demand and falling indigenous production all underscore Europe's vulnerability to interruptions in gas supplies. In order to counter these challenges and to reduce its heavy dependency on Russia the EU needs to boost its engagement with current and potential suppliers and transit countries. Political stability can make significant contributions to improving the Union's energy security.

The Southern Mediterranean States' Energy Outlook

The political and security upheavals that have swept the Arab world since early 2011 are unprecedented. It will take some time to fully assess the long-term implications. Still, given the crucial role oil revenues play in both providing a large share of the national income and in cementing strategic relations with European consuming countries, the energy sector has witnessed key changes.

Egypt

Egypt holds considerable oil and natural gas deposits. It is the largest oil producer in Africa outside of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-

tries (OPEC), and the second-largest gas producer in the continent, behind Algeria. Despite this huge production, Cairo is not an exporting country, due to its large population (approximately 90 million) and heavy energy consumption. Still, the country plays a significant role in energy markets as a major transit route for oil and gas shipments from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the United States through the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) Pipeline.

The current political situation in Egypt provides a mixture of opportunities and challenges. Following the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 the country has suffered from political, security and economic uncertainties. The long-term implications of the toppling of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood and the ascendancy of President Al-Sisi are yet to be assessed. Since 2013, domestic security has seen relative improvement and, accordingly, the prospects for economic recovery have also improved. Still, much work is needed to accommodate political opposition, encourage foreign investment and implement comprehensive economic reform. Medium-term economic prospects hinge on both political stability and sustained reform.

Egypt's oil production peaked in the mid-1990s and then started declining. Consumption, meanwhile, has been on the rise. This growing imbalance between rising consumption and declining production has left Egypt with little crude oil to export, most of which is sent to the European Union. Furthermore, in recent years the country's large refinery capacity has declined and, as a result, the volume of imported petroleum products has grown.

Egypt holds the third largest natural gas deposits in Africa (after Nigeria and Algeria). Despite these massive reserves, production has failed to keep pace with consumption. In recent years production has been falling by 3% annually while consumption has been rising by 7%. As a result, the volume of exports has substantially declined, and political instability and repeated attacks on gas pipelines and facilities have made a bad situation worse. In 2012, Egypt halted gas exports to Israel, and in late 2014 it started importing liquefied natural gas (LNG). Traditionally, Europe had been the leading importer of Egypt's LNG, but these imports have significantly dropped in the last few years.

On the positive side, political and security upheavals had little impact, if any, on oil and gas transit flows through the Suez Canal. The Canal connects the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea. In 2013, nearly 3.2 million barrels of oil a day (b/d) transited the Suez Canal, according to the Egyptian authorities. This is the largest amount ever shipped through the Suez Canal, with the majority of shipments destined for Europe and North America and the remainder going to Asian markets.

Libya

Unlike Egypt which has enjoyed relative stability in the last few years, Libya has descended into an unpredictable civil war. The country has never had a strong national identity. Following the toppling of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, tribal and regional rifts have taken a central stage in shaping the country's policies. A national government and parliament have obtained international recognition, but were forced to move to the eastern city of Tobruk and have appealed for external military intervention to restore order. Meanwhile an Islamist umbrella group known as Libya Dawn has taken charge of the capital Tripoli and another Islamist group, Ansar Al-Sharia has taken control of Benghazi. Regional powers like Egypt, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates have taken various steps, including military operations, to contain the Islamists. The United States and the European Union have been hesitant to intervene militarily and instead have called for mediation and dialogue. Several Western countries have evacuated their embassies and personnel from Libya. The ongoing political instability and lack of security have had a devastating impact on the country's energy sector and overall economy.

Libya enjoys three major advantages. First, the country holds the largest share of proven oil reserves in Africa and the fourth largest proven natural gas reserves (after Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt). Second, most of the oil is of high quality (light and sweet). Third, Libya enjoys a strategic location across the Mediterranean from the energy-hungry European markets. This geographical proximity means it is easy and cheap to export oil and gas from Libya to Southern Europe. Despite these geo-economic and geo-political advantages, Libya

has had a hard time fulfilling its significant hydrocarbon potential. Under the Gaddafi regime the country was subject to international sanctions for a prolonged period of time. The lack of stability and security since 2011 has dealt a heavy blow to the oil and gas industry.

In 2011, hydrocarbon exports suffered a near-total paralysis. In response, the International Energy Agency (IEA) coordinated a release of 60 million barrels of oil from the emergency stocks of its member countries – the first such release since 2005. Since then the volume of production has reflected the level of stability in the country. Oil production and exports, which had recovered in 2012, collapsed again after 2014 due to militia attacks on the main oil terminals. It is important to point out that before the recent security upheavals the authorities developed an ambitious plan to increase oil production to approximately two million b/d. However, the escalating violence has put these plans on hold. Indeed production has drastically fallen since 2012, leading to a substantial reduction in Libyan oil exports, which historically were mostly destined for Europe.

Libya's natural gas production and exports are far less significant than its oil production and exports. In recent decades, the authorities have paid more attention to the gas sector and production more than tripled in the 2000s. The Italian oil company Eni, in partnership with the National Oil Company (NOC), led the development of the gas sector, particularly the Western Libya Gas Project. Most of this gas is exported to Italy via the Green Stream Pipeline (operated jointly by Eni and NOC). In addition, Libya exported a small amount of LNG to Spain. In 2011, the LNG plant was damaged and LNG exports have since been suspended.

Algeria

Unlike Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the regime in Algiers has survived the key changes that have swept the Arab world since 2011. There were sporadic street demonstrations calling for political change, but they quickly petered out due to a lack of popular support. At least two forces have contributed to this relative stability. First, for most of the 1990s the country had experienced steady fighting between a largely Islamist opposition and the government. The relative stability in recent years has been seen as a welcome development by the majority of Algerians. Simply stated, people do not want to go back to street fighting and bloody confrontations between opposition groups and the authorities. Second, due to oil and gas revenues Algeria is wealthier than most of its neighbours and in a better position to respond to popular demands for jobs and higher standards of living. Finally, the Algerian authorities' ability to survive the regional political and security upheavals should not be taken for granted and does not rule out popular uprisings in the future. The economy remains highly dependent on the hydrocarbon sector which, despite declining production since 2006, still accounts for a large share of its GDP. In addition, President Bouteflika's fragile health casts a degree of uncertainty over the next few years.

Due to oil and gas revenues Algeria is wealthier than most of its neighbours and in a better position to respond to popular demands for jobs and higher standards of living

Algeria holds massive oil and natural gas deposits. It holds the fourth largest proven oil reserves in Africa (after Libya, Nigeria and Angola) and the second largest gas reserves (after Nigeria). Like other major oil and gas producers, the country is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon revenues. Furthermore, the energy sector suffers from three characteristics common to other countries. First, petroleum and gas products are heavily subsidised. These subsidies are a big burden on the state budget and encourage high consumption and waste. Second, the January 2013 militant attack on the In Amenas gas facility prompted security concerns about operating in Algeria's remote areas. The attack resulted in several causalities and a temporary suspension of gas production at the facility. In recent years, terrorism and cyber-attacks have been a major concern for oil and gas producers. Third, traditionally the Algerian authorities have not provided attractive incentives for foreign investment. As a result, production has stalled and the infrastructure needs major updates and modernisation. In

recent years, the Algerian government has enacted new contractual and fiscal provisions, which are particularly important in exploring and developing the country's reportedly massive shale gas and tight oil reserves.

Algeria has been producing and exporting oil and petroleum products for several decades. Some of the main fields are mature, raising concerns over production and export volumes and the authorities have utilised enhanced oil recovery techniques to keep the old fields producing. This suggests that production is likely to gradually decline in the coming years. This decline has raised serious concerns in Washington and Brussels – Algeria's main export markets. In recent years, the United States' oil production has substantially increased and, as a result, imports from Algeria and elsewhere have declined and Europe has emerged as a major importer.

For decades, geographical proximity and historical ties have consolidated energy interdependency between North African oil and gas producers and Europe. Political instability in recent years has raised concerns about this mutual energy security

Algeria holds both large proven conventional gas reserves and vast untapped shale gas resources. However, production from mature fields has declined. Efforts to increase production have achieved modest success mostly due to bureaucratic obstacles, difficulties attracting foreign investment, old infrastructure and technical problems. However, the country is still the second largest external gas exporter to the European Union after Russia, with exports reaching Europe either by pipelines or as LNG. The country is under pressure to boost gas output to meet growing domestic demand and to fulfil long-term contractual obligations.

Europe and North Africa – the Way Forward

Europe is projected to remain dependent on foreign energy supplies. Despite serious efforts to curb production, invest in alternative energy and diversify the energy mix, the EU lacks the necessary deposits to meet consumption. For decades, geographical proximity and historical ties have consolidated energy interdependency between North African oil and gas producers and Europe. Political instability in recent years has raised concerns about this mutual energy security. Political stability and economic prosperity serve the two sides' national interests. The experience of the last few years suggests that stability cannot be sustained without addressing popular (economic, political and social) grievances. Political and economic reforms are not silver bullets and can actually further destabilise the region in the short term. But in the long term, poor governance and dysfunctional economies breed religious extremism and violence. In order to enhance its energy security, Europe needs to maintain an active role in promoting the necessary reforms in the southern Mediterranean states.

Towards a Creative and Innovative Mediterranean: An Ambition for Youth

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In the face of the currently ferocious and generalised competition imposed by a globalised economy, countries have attempted to improve their standing in the new world order by two means: on the one hand, creating regional sub-ensembles intended to play the role of "antechambers of globalisation," and on the other hand, stepping up their competitive edge by developing innovation and entering the knowledge society.

The Lisbon Strategy adopted by the European Council in June 2000 is a good example of this evolution; announcing the ambition of making "the European Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world," this strategy was based on the three pillars needed for any knowledge society: support to innovation (which was to amount to 3% of the GDP); modernisation of the educational system (in order to sustain our collective capacity to innovate and adapt); and management of the continent's energy transition; a technological ambition that was to consolidate society's participation in reindustrialisation on the basis of new foundations.

Revised in March 2010 to take into account the severe effects of the crisis, this policy was called the "Europe 2020" strategy, then "Horizon 2020." The latter added two priorities to the Lisbon Strategy goals: social cohesion (job creation and the struggle against poverty) and decentralisation of decision-making (civil society participation). The aim was to attenuate, among the neediest sectors, the effects of opening up to international markets and internal modernisation. And thus emerged, for the first time in Europe, the start of a true structural policy on the scale of the 28 EU Member States; considerable progress, even if, to be fully effective, Horizon 2020 should be complemented by two other structural components: common industrial and energy policies.

A Profound Economic and Social Mutation

To further this ambition, the EIB Group[2] mobilised its entire financial "fire power" in the European Union: since the year 2000, the Group has invested nearly €130 billion to support technological innovation (R&D and RDI), over 45 billion to develop human capital and some 25 billion more to strengthen information network infrastructure (in particular to foster super-fast broadband connections). At the same time, the EIB Group dedicated over a quarter of its financing to accelerating energy transition: renewable energy, electric mobility, energy efficiency in cities and transport systems, etc.

In any case, there is no denying that the results have fallen short of the goals, in particular that of restoring the industrial component of the European Union's GDP to 20%. The main reasons are the difficulty for our economies of managing a head-on transformation towards a new industrial foundation and compensating for the effects of the world crisis, namely: preserving jobs despite relocation of average value-added pro-

[1] This article, completed in April 2014, is an expression of the author's personal opinions.
[2] The EIB Group consists of the European Investment Bank (www.bei.org), which is the bank of the European Union, and its subsidiary specialised in support to Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (SMEs): the European Investment Fund (www.eif.org).

duction; focalising priority investment on sectors with strong innovation and technology content; mobilising public finances for countercyclical response to the crisis; maintaining our social protection systems, etc.

I have taken this "European detour" to underscore two characteristics that affect European-Mediterranean relations.

The first has to do with the complexity of policies for transition to the knowledge society: even for highly developed countries, it is very difficult to ensure a type of transformation based not only on financial means and technology infrastructures, but above all on society's participation in a collective project.

Integrating South Mediterranean economies into the European value chain is both a challenge and an opportunity for success in a globalised economy

The second is that, to guarantee its global competitiveness, the European economy needs to involve operators in the South with the production of certain segments of European added value. This is what the German industry's experience with its Central European neighbours after the fall of the Wall demonstrates. Integrating South Mediterranean economies into the European value chain is thus both a challenge and an opportunity for success in a globalised economy.

The Knowledge Economy in Arab Countries: An Improvable Attempt

At the turn of the millennium, the South Mediterranean countries pursued, within their means, the same ambition of entering the world economy through regional integration and transition to the knowledge society. The results there likewise fell short for two reasons:

- First of all, the positive effects of opening to international markets were insufficiently compensated by structural policies aiming at a more equitable distribution of wealth. Indeed, authoritarian regimes fostered crony capitalism that left out many sectors, above all youth;
- Secondly, these same, pre-revolution autocratic regimes attempted to effect the transition to the knowledge society via centralised sectoral policies and the creation of innovation infrastructures. The component of society's participation was thus neglected because they believed that a national identity thus reinforced would move public opinion towards an ambition for modernity.

Although there are tangible results in various countries, such as Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco (where the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership – FEMIP has financed a number of science and technology parks), it is evident that these policies have had only a relative effect in relation to the significant public financial resources employed, and have brought about very little change in society. It is thus with very good reason that the study done by the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economics Institutes (FEMISE) at the request of the EIB-FEMIP[3] emphasises that it is above all through an organic approach and via the definition of societal goals that an innovation policy can have any chance of success, whether in the South or the North Mediterranean.

And paradoxically, the context of economic and political uncertainty currently prevailing on both shores of our common sea presents an opportunity to make innovation the core of the future "social contract" and place youth at the heart of the "new growth" for which the peoples of the Mediterranean are calling.

Making Innovation the Core of the Forthcoming "Social Contract"

When viewed from this innovative angle, the transition to a knowledge and innovation society seems like an eminently "living" process whose main component is the development of the "creativity function" on the scale of the whole of society. The success of the transition to the knowledge society thus resides more in the qualitative arrangement of the innovation

[3] A link to the study is given in the "References" section at the end of this article.

chain than in the construction of infrastructures in which innovation can develop (even if the latter remain fundamental).

The success of the transition to the knowledge society resides more in the qualitative arrangement of the innovation chain than in the construction of infrastructures in which innovation can develop

Without going into detail, note that the process should concern four priority sectors and should operate via two springboards.
The four priorities are, of course, the following:

- Modernising education and training in their main functions, which are developing people, their employability and their social inclusion;
- The function of research, its organisation and promotion in society;
- Participation of enterprise in the innovation chain and its link to higher education;
- Fostering networks of innovation actors, whether they be individuals or structures.

But even more important are the springboards:
The first is that of **individual development**, in the democratic and economic sense of the term; development that should allow individuals to liberate their creative faculties and boost their social and professional integration. Without significant progress in this sphere, there will be neither social response to the aspiration to democracy nor organic enrichment of the innovation chain. This is an essential point, because it conditions society's participation in the global vision consisting of the new social contract to be defined, which should aim to establish the conditions for more equitable growth, for both generations and regions.
Without freedom for the individual, there can be no research, no creation and no collective ambition!
The second springboard is that of **decentralisation**, one that consists of resituating individuals in their territory: decentralisation of decision-making, bringing it as close as possible to the local level, where civil society expresses itself and individuals are fulfilled; decentralisation of the decision to study, research, network, but also to undertake, finance, etc.
Such autonomy given to the different actors in the innovation chain is a formidable springboard for creation, but also for organisation: at schools and universities, in businesses, in networks, at banks. Is this to say that the State would lose all influence in defining the implementation of a policy for knowledge and innovation? Certainly not! It will be up to the State, on the basis of a democratically defined social contract, to establish a new growth strategy. A growth in which innovation will be one of the foremost pillars, together with territorial balance and decentralisation, and youth shall be the main actor and beneficiary.
In this perspective, three key factors seem to me to be decisive:

- **The autonomy of local authorities**, particularly in matters of economic intervention;
- **The autonomy of universities and public research structures**, resulting in the freedom to organise synergies with local enterprise and with their foreign counterparts;
- **The autonomy of public finance actors** to make the most appropriate decisions on the local level with regard to financing research programmes and innovation infrastructures.

It is thus up to the State to define the course of action and to organise and ensure the coherence of the new strategy's implementation; and also to accept that its action will not be solely top-down, that civil society is a voice to be heard and that it is pertinent to delegate forms of implementation to local actors.

Three implications to Consider for the Action of Development Finance Institutions

If countries in democratic transition gain a long-term vision placing creativity and youth at the core of their ambitions, then the international community should accompany this major evolution by finding ways of adapting their forms of development aid intervention.
In this regard, three conclusions can be reached.

1. If we are to pursue financing innovation infrastructures (as we have already done in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan), we should also implement financial instruments for the South Mediterranean countries allowing us to **finance immaterial R&D programmes**, as the EIB Group has done in Europe (with over 45 billion euros invested in five years in this sort of project). But this entails that, with the help of the European Neighbourhood Policy budget, we develop risk-bearing instruments, primarily for innovative SMEs, in the spheres of both loans and equity.
2. Along the lines of what we have already done in nearly all of our Mediterranean Partner Countries, we should **extend our technical assistance measures to the local banking sector** to allow them to better grasp the nature of risk associated with innovation, establish competencies on the local or regional level and develop hedging instruments, either with state aid or with that of regional authorities (similar to the French "loans for innovation," which have the support of the EIB Group).

   Also along these lines is the important programme for the promotion of innovation systems (Innovation Capacities),[4] directed by the EIB at the Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI) over the course of four years now, together with the European Commission's Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG Research), the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), the Tunisian and Moroccan Ministries of Innovation and FEMISE as partners.
3. Since we are taking the dual perspective of decentralising decision-making and fostering networking among actors, the results should be **cross-border cooperation between research structures and actors in various countries**, and hopefully in a South-South direction. This poses a problem for development funders insofar as their instruments are defined on a regional basis, but they are most often implemented on the national level. We should also, in due time, envisage extending the scope of application of the regional guarantee mechanism for SMEs that the EIB, Switzerland's State Secretariat for International Financial Matters (SFI) and the French Development Agency (AFD) have established within the framework of the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition for a volume of $400 million (190 million of which are subscribed by the EIB).

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[4] Consult the CMI website: http://beta.cmimarseille.org/page/innovation-capacities.

Strategic Sectors | **Economy and Territory**

The Economic Costs of Climate Change

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With the release of the April 2014 contribution of Working Group III (WGIII), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the international organisation responsible for collecting and synthesising the latest peer-reviewed scientific knowledge in the field of climate change, concluded its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).[1] The report periodically improves on past reports – the last was released in 2007 – describing new advances and findings in climate research. It is organised according to three main areas: the physical science basis for climate change, impacts and adaptation, and mitigation. The AR5 is the most important and comprehensive document to date to analyse the negative repercussions of climate change and offer insightful and evidence-based suggestions for policy-making.

Compared to earlier editions, one new feature of the contribution of Working Group II (WGII), that on impacts and adaptation, is a much more detailed regional analysis. Confirming and strengthening past evidence, variations in climatic conditions emerge as one of the most challenging of the many change drivers affecting the Mediterranean region. This article will briefly summarise these current and future trends.

Climate Change: The Problem

Climate change refers to a set of variations in climatic and environmental conditions, such as changes in maximum, minimum and average temperatures, the intensity and frequency of precipitations (rainfall and snowfall), wind speed, ice melting, and ecosystems, that will eventually affect human wellbeing.

Climate change has both natural and anthropogenic causes; nonetheless, the AR5 concludes that "It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century" (WGIII 2014). This human influence mainly takes the form of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to the combustion of fossil fuels for production and consumption activities and to changes in land use.

Once in the atmosphere, GHGs alter the energy balance, cause warming and lead to climatic changes. These, in turn, are already affecting, and will increasingly affect, through environmental changes (impacts), many human activities around the world, albeit with important regional differences. These differences will depend on the varying levels of vulnerability of different regions of the world, which are driven by changes in local climate drivers, the intrinsic nature of the environmental services affected (land and water availability, land productivity, extent of flood-prone areas, and so on) and society's capacity to react to these changes with appropriate mitigation and adaptation measures.

Ultimately, climate change affects key aspects of our life: food and energy production, health, the degree of society's exposure to extreme events, mobility, and the inter- and intra-generational distribution of wealth.

[1] www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5.

Climate Change Impact Assessment: Methodological Issues

Assessing the current impacts of climate change, in physical and, then, economic terms, is extremely difficult. The main problem is that the available historical observations do not go back far enough to enable the proper attribution of a given phenomenon, including those with a clear weather-related component such as droughts, floods or heat waves, to climate change rather than natural climate variability. Moreover, these phenomena are often exacerbated by resource mismanagement. The IPCC's AR5 has made some progress on this issue, gathering better evidence that at least some of the episodes of water scarcity and yield decline experienced today can be imputed to climate change. There is then the difficulty of linking these phenomena to the right set of social and economic consequences (e.g. loss of land, labour and capital stock, or productivity) and, finally, of providing an economic assessment. Accordingly, estimates of the costs associated with current climate change are rare and basically consist of analyses of the direct economic losses entailed by a given well-defined extreme weather event. However, the main purpose of these exercises is more to offer an indication of what could reasonably be expected in a future characterised by greater changes in temperature than to determine current climate change costs.

The problem of attribution is somewhat less severe in long-term economic assessments of climate change impacts. However, in this case, uncertainty regarding future impacts, the structure of future societies and long-term aggregations of costs and benefits, including "intangibles," poses other daunting challenges. The dominant approach in these exercises is the use of a suite of coupled models. This makes it possible both to manage the huge complexity associated with the task and, by integrating knowledge from different disciplines (climate science, environmental concerns, socio-economic factors), to address all relevant aspects of the issue. Against this background, many different methodologies are used to conduct economic assessments. There are partial-equilibrium or bottom-up models providing detailed descriptions of impacts in a given market or sector with a focus on direct costs and there are top-down models emphasising long-term transitions, rebound effects and indirect costs.

Climate Change: Current Evidence and Future Trends in the Mediterranean

In the WGII's contribution to the IPCC's AR5 (2014), the Mediterranean picture can be derived by compounding the "regional" reports for Europe and Africa. Overall, the Mediterranean emerges as a climate hotspot[2] in terms of both natural conditions and society's attitude. Specifically, it is one of the regions of the world most subjected to phenomena such as soil degradation, desertification and water scarcity, especially on the southern shore. Moreover, the whole region may suffer from rising sea levels and droughts, the frequency and intensity of which have likely increased since 1950, as well as forest fires and heat waves. Extreme events such as coastal and river floods will be more frequent in the north. In Mediterranean Europe, for instance, there is already evidence of biodiversity reduction in plant and animal species, especially in mountain regions, which face a potential future loss of important ecosystem services. Wildfires have also generally consistently increased in recent decades, notwithstanding a decrease in the number of events and in total burnt area in the very last years.[3] In the longer term, the region is expected to experience a significant decline in yields, especially for cereals, given the sharp reduction in groundwater resources induced by significant changes in total runoff and evapotranspiration.[4] Health will likewise be strongly negatively impacted, due to more frequent and intense heat waves, with the associated reduction in labour productivity. The energy and recreational sectors will be also affected. Increased electricity demand due to increased cooling needs will raise generation costs,[5] while outdoor tourism activities are expected to decline as a result of the deteriorating climatic conditions, including unpleasantly high temperatures and

[2] IPCC AR5 defines "hotspot" as "A geographical area characterised by high vulnerability and exposure to climate change."
[3] Marques et al. (2011) in IPCC (2014).
[4] Olesen et al. (2011) in IPCC (2014).
[5] Giannakopoulos et al. (2009) in IPCC (2014).

increasingly heavy precipitations in summer. Unlike Mediterranean Europe, where negative climate change impacts will prevail, northern Europe may benefit from climate change, at least in moderate warming scenarios.[6] Therefore, climate change could be an additional factor contributing to widening the existing gap between northern and southern European countries.

The main climate change vulnerability of the southern Mediterranean region (i.e., North African countries) is expected in the agricultural sector. The observed changes in precipitation patterns in recent decades, with increases in autumn, but decreases in winter and spring, are expected to be further consolidated in the future.[7] This will exacerbate water scarcity and accelerate the negative change in yields.[8] Given the still high contribution of agriculture to the production of value added in the region, this effect is particularly worrisome. Another important stress factor is rising sea levels. In particular, the vulnerability of the Nile mega-delta will continue to increase due to higher population and infrastructure exposure on the already over-crowded and sea-flood-prone coastal system caused by migration/urbanisation phenomena[9] and to a sea-level rise that seems to be worse than anticipated in the IPCC AR4 (2007). Underlying all of this, health statuses may also worsen, due to both water-borne and vector-borne diseases, challenging regional healthcare systems.

Economic Estimates of Current Climate Change and a Glimpse into the Future

With all the caveats of the previous sections, to give an idea of the possible costs associated with climate change, we will first refer to the EMDAT International Disaster Database,[10] which reports extreme events occurring since 1900 by country and type, including, in some cases, the associated economic damage, although there is a particularly notable lack of data for North Africa and the Middle East.

The only two events somewhat related to weather conditions reported with the associated economic damage for the Mediterranean region in 2013 were a flash flood occurring in the French Pyrenees in June, killing two people and affecting 2,000 more, with an estimated cost of around $655 million, and a general flood occurring in Sardinia (Italy) in November, which killed 18 people and affected 2,700 more, causing $780 million in economic damage. In 2012, three flood events were recorded in Spain, Slovenia and Italy with estimated costs of $395, $265 and $15 million, respectively. Italy was also affected by a drought episode lasting from June to October, causing damage equal to $1,190 million. In Mediterranean Europe, the largest losses since 2005 were experienced by France, due to two storms, in 2010 and 2009, causing an estimated total damage of $4.23 and $3.2 billion, respectively. Wildfires have also been quite remarkable in the last decade, with two events in France (2005) and Greece (2007) causing economic losses of $2.05 and $1.75 billion, respectively. Overall, EEA (2012) estimates that costs linked to extreme events in Europe have increased from €9 billion/year in the 1980s to more than €13 billion/year in the 2000s (with a cumulative total of €445 billion over the 1980-2011 period) and that they could possibly increase to €15 billion/year by 2070.

The most recent economic assessment of a climate-related event for North Africa refers to a flood in the El-Bayadh region of Algeria occurring in October 2011, which killed 10 people and resulted in $779 million of economic damage. The EMDAT database reports other floods of minor intensity for Algeria in previous years, while other countries are very poorly covered. Only two floods are recorded for the eastern Mediterranean, both occurring in Turkey, in 2009 and 2006, entailing estimated losses of $550 and $317 million respectively; likewise, there is record of a wildfire in Israel in 2010, causing $270 million in damage.

Overall, since 2005 the average annual economic damage in the Mediterranean region due to weather-related events recorded by EMDAT amounted to $1.408 billion for floods, $2.816 billion for storms, $1.190 billion for droughts, and $971 million for wildfires.

[6] EEA (2012).
[7] Barkhordarian et al. (2012 and 2013) in IPCC (2014).
[8] Gao and Giorgi (2008) in IPCC (2014).
[9] Seto (2011) and Smith et al. (2013) in IPCC (2014).
[10] www.emdat.be/database.

Looking back slightly further, the heat wave that swept Europe in the summer of 2003, in addition to causing a heavy death toll, led to a remarkable 20% reduction in grain yields in Mediterranean and eastern Europe. The net primary productivity of France and Italy fell 17% and 12%, respectively,[11] with estimated economic losses of €4 billion each.

It is important to stress that we are not claiming that these losses were caused by climate change. Nonetheless, it can be correctly claimed that episodes such as heat waves, droughts, wildfires and extreme precipitation will increase in frequency and/or intensity in future due to climate change. Accordingly, the highlighted economic losses are also likely to increase in the absence of appropriate mitigation and adaptation strategies.

To conclude this section, we will just mention the results of the CIRCE[12] FP6 project. Among many other findings on future climate change and impacts in the Mediterranean, it reports the associated expected costs in terms of changes in gross domestic product (GDP). An initial survey of the existing literature found GDP losses ranging from 0.25% (or even slight gains) for moderate temperature increases (less than +2°C with regard to preindustrial levels) to 1.4% for quite extreme 5°C temperature increases for southern Europe and of around 2% for North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean by mid-century. Of major concern for Euro-Mediterranean countries are the impacts originated by rising sea levels and changes in tourism attractiveness, while in North Africa impacts on agricultural productivity are of greater concern, accounting for 77% of total losses. CIRCE also developed its own impact estimates, restricting the analysis to sea-level rise, energy demand and tourism. In terms of aggregate impact, by 2050, for a temperature increase of roughly 2°C with regard to 2000, GDP for the entire Mediterranean region would fall 1.2%, with the northern Mediterranean countries clearly less vulnerable than southern Mediterranean ones. Among the former, the average loss by 2050 would be 0.5% GDP, while among the latter it would be more than double that (Bosello and Shechter, 2013).

Conclusions

The Mediterranean region is particularly exposed to climate change. Some of the effects of climate change can already be detected today. Nonetheless, attributing economic losses to current climate change is very difficult. What can be said is that current economic losses associated with weather-related events such as floods, droughts, heat waves, wildfires and sea-level rise will increase in future because of the additional pressures posed by climate change. Also, in a scenario of moderate climate change with a limited number of impacts, the Mediterranean region as a whole could experience GDP losses of 1.2% by the mid-century. Furthermore, these costs will not be evenly borne. Northern Mediterranean countries are clearly less vulnerable than southern Mediterranean ones. The potential scale of impacts and their distribution thus calls for appropriate mitigation and adaptation measures.

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Energy Infrastructures in the Mediterranean: Fine Accomplishments but No Global Vision

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A Strong Energy Interdependence

The Mediterranean Basin today is home to 7% of the world's population and represents 10% of the word's GDP and over 8% of global energy demand. The region has 4.7% of the planet's natural gas reserves and 4.6% of oil reserves (though probably underestimated), concentrated in four countries that supply 22% of oil exports and 35% of gas exports to the ensemble of the Mediterranean Basin. There is a strong North-South interdependence: supply security for the former, funding of economic and social development for the latter.

Insofar as future perspectives, according to the Observatoire méditerranéen de l'énergie (OME, the Mediterranean Energy Observatory),[2] if the current trend continues, it will lead to a rise in demand of over 40% by 2030, with equivalent effects regarding CO_2 emissions. The OME has also drawn up a proactive scenario with greater energy efficiency and more renewable energy, in which demand would increase less quickly (23% by 2030). The energy mix will continue to be dominated by hydrocarbons (nearly 80% of demand by 2030), above all natural gas.

The electricity sector will continue expanding, with the installation of over 320 GW of new capacity by 2030, more than half of it in the South, and a less carbon-based electricity mix (less than 45% fossil fuels, of which 28% will be natural gas; and over 50% renewable energy, a third of which will be hydroelectric). Renewable energy is taking the lion's share, with the different national plans underway in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs), the 20 GW Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) and the Desertec initiative.

Since the energy resources are concentrated in the South while the greatest consumption is in the North, export flows move in a South to North direction, which requires heavy infrastructure. Also required in addition to production units are facilities designed for transport and distribution. Hence, considerable sums have been invested in developing various energy infrastructures around the Mediterranean Basin.

Important Energy Infrastructures

The Enrico Mattei Gas Pipeline, the first pipeline to cross the Mediterranean Sea, transports Algerian natural gas from Hassi R'mel to the terminal in Mazzara del Vallo (Sicily), after crossing Tunisian territory. Inaugurated in its first stage in August 1983, its capacity for transport was doubled to 24 Gm^3/year as of 1995, then raised to 32 Gm^3/year after bolstering the existing transport facilities in the Algerian and Tunisian sections. In 2012, the

[1] A Qualified Engineer, Abdelnour Keramane received his degree from the École nationale des ponts et chaussées (Paris Tech, civil engineering school), then served as Director General of the Algerian state electricity and gas company, Société algérienne de l'électricité et du gaz (Sonelgaz). A founding member and chairman of the Maghreb Electric Energy Committee (Comité maghrébin de l'énergie électrique, Comelec) and the Algerian Committee to the World Energy Conference and vice-president of the Algerian Gas Union (Union algérienne du gaz), he later became Algerian Minister of Industry and Mining and then Managing Director of the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline Company (Milan). At present, he is the director of *MedEnergie*, a journal of his creation.

[2] *The Mediterranean Energy Perspectives 2011* report presents an in-depth analysis of the energy situation in the Mediterranean Region and perspectives for the 2030 horizon.

Insofar as future perspectives, if the current trend continues, it will lead to a rise in demand of over 40% by 2030, with equivalent effects regarding CO_2 emissions

Enrico Mattei Gas Pipeline transported 20.6 Gm^3, i.e. approximately a third of Italy's natural gas imports.

The Pere Duran Farell Gas Pipeline connects the natural gas fields of Hassi R'Mel in Algeria to Morocco, Spain and Portugal. Its initial capacity was 8 Gm^3/year, with the first natural gas supply reaching Spain and Portugal in November 1996. The pipeline's current capacity is 12 Gm^3/year and could reach 18 to 20 Gm^3/year with the installation of additional compression stations. Nearly 11 Gm^3 were transported in 2007 (8.8 Gm^3 to Spain, 1.4 Gm^3 to Portugal and 0.5 Gm^3 to Morocco).

The Medgas Pipeline is the second Algerian natural gas pipeline to Europe via Spain, but this one does not traverse Morocco. With a capacity of 8 Gm^3/year, it began operating in May 2011. In 2012, the volumes transported were 10.2 Gm^3 for Spain through the two natural gas pipelines, 1.4 Gm^3 for Portugal and 0.5 Gm^3 for Morocco.

The GreenStream Pipeline links the Libyan natural gas fields of Bouri (offshore) and Wafa (onshore) to Sicily across the Mediterranean. It began operating in October 2004 with a capacity of 8 Gm^3/year. The GreenStream delivered 9.2 Gm^3 of Libyan natural gas to Italy in 2007, but only 6.5 in 2012 due to the 2011 political events.

In 2012, the overall volume of natural gas supplied to Europe via these pipelines totalled 39.3 Gm^3 over a total capacity of 58 Gm^3, that is, a utilisation rate of 68%.

Liquefaction Factories

Algeria has two enormous liquefied natural gas (LNG) complexes at Arzew and Skikda, comprised of several liquefaction units that exported 25 Gm^3 to Europe and Asia in 2007. With the recent creation of two new liquefaction trains in Skikda (4.5 Mt/year) and another in Arzew (4.7 Mt/year), the total export capacity for LNG is 38 billion m^3/year. In 2012, Algeria exported 14.4 Gm^3 of LNG to Europe and 15.3 in total, with an overall capacity of 30. Thus, the utilisation rate was approximately 50%.

In Egypt, there are two LNG plants manufacturing for export: the Spanish Egyptian Gas Company, with a liquefaction train having a capacity of 7.5 Gm^3 per year, and Egyptian LNG in Idku, with two trains having a total capacity of 10 Gm^3 per year. The total amount supplied in 2007 was 15 Gm^3, of which eight went to Mediterranean countries. In 2012, Egypt supplied 6.7 Gm^3 of LNG, of which 2.4 went to Europe.

Libya likewise has a liquefaction plant in Marsat Brega, with a capacity of 1 Gm^3/year. In 2011, it supplied 340 million m^3 of LNG to Spain.

Hence in total, according to these figures, less than 50% of LNG export capacity is being used.

The Maghreb-Europe Electricity Interconnection

The Maghreb's electricity grids, which are interconnected, are also connected to European grids via two 400-kV, alternating-current submarine cables between Morocco (Ferdioua) and Spain (Tarifa) running through the Strait of Gibraltar (with a length of 26 km and at a maximum depth of 660 m) with a 1,400-MW capacity, the first of which began operating in October 1997 and the second in June 2006. During the first years, this 400-kV AC interconnection, which functioned from North to South, allowed an energy flow from Spain to Morocco of an amount equivalent to 20% of the production by Morocco's Office National de l'Électricité (ONE). Within the framework of the perspectives of increased exchange and the preparation of the Maghreb market's integration into the European market, a 400-kV Spain-Morocco-Algeria-Tunisia electricity highway is being developed, with internal grids stepped up to 400 kV and an increase in the physical capacity of the Morocco-Algeria connection from 400 to 1000 MW. The strengthening of North-South and East-West electricity interconnections is considered a goal with multiple beneficial effects for the region. The same is true of the colossal project electricity companies of the Mediterranean Basin have been painstakingly implementing for nearly two decades now, which consists of connecting all electricity grids of the countries along the Mediterranean seaboard, from Spain to Morocco and across 8,000 km covering

the Maghreb, Mashreq and Turkey in the South and East, and Greece, Italy, France in the North, the final goal of this unprecedented construction project being the establishment of Euro-Mediterranean electricity and natural gas markets.

The development of renewable energy – energy sources considered intermittent – poses new problems for grid managers and operators. This will require strengthening of electricity grids and interconnections, not only to stabilise grids but also to allow green electricity to be exported from South to North under Article 9 of EU Energy Directive 2009/28/EC. The Medgrid consortium is working precisely on a simplified system facilitating the transfer of renewable-source electricity via submarine cables at a number of corridors across the Mediterranean, through third countries to the EU within the framework of Article 9.

Assessment: Lack of Global Vision

On the geostrategic level, the major works projects constituted by the natural gas pipelines and submarine electricity cables are certainly the result of excellent regional-scale cooperation and greatly contribute to strengthening ties between the North and South shores of the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the fact remains that, since these are sophisticated technical systems subject to contingencies and natural hazards, they must be the object of controls and attentive surveillance, not only insofar as the principles of supply security but also with regard to the imperatives of sustainable development: sustainable management of energy resources under acceptable economic conditions and in a manner limiting the effects of climate change, i.e. through the use of the appropriate, most environmentally-friendly forms of production and transport.

To this end, it is essential to establish appropriate regulatory and control mechanisms making it obligatory for owners and/or operators of these works to periodically publish detailed assessments and precise, transparent reports not only on their technical and commercial performance, but also on their state with regard to environmental impact.

From the standpoint of reliability and risks, natural gas pipelines have been operating for several decades and have not experienced any major technical incidents. This means their operation is reliable. The precious data accumulated on the state of the conduits and that of the seabed and its environment have contributed a great deal to both the hydrographic and maritime communities and specialised research institutions.

With regard to the environment, the financial, economic and social crisis, the energy crisis, supply security concerns and the need to make transitions towards low-carbon economies in order to adapt to a context of climate change only accentuate the need for and the interest in a change of scale in the implementation of complementary policies of energy efficiency and conservation in the region, both in the North and the South. This complementarity could be extended to include in-depth cooperation not only in energy conservation and renewable energy, but also insofar as infrastructures and matters of common energy policy. It would also be appropriate to effect an energy assessment and a carbon assessment as well as an economic assessment before carrying out a project.

On the economic level, with the stagnation or reduction of the global energy demand, the works carried out are not being used to their full capacity, whether they be natural gas pipelines or liquefaction facilities. The question thus arises of whether, before undertaking certain projects as for instance, Medgaz, it would not be more economic to saturate the existing facilities and infrastructures, then proceed to their extension before considering new sites and routes. This would, moreover, allow environmental impact (soil deterioration, pollution, disturbance of wildlife, etc.) to be minimised. The existence of a long-term master plan for cross-Mediterranean energy highways would facilitate such an approach.

On the industrial level, in order to attain shared prosperity between North and South, it must be ensured that the projects carried out foster technology transfer and industrial partnership: stepping up research, construction, maintenance and operational capacities in countries of the South through the effective establishment of technology transfer systems allowing the development of local electricity facility engineering and a local electricity facility industry, which are practically nonexistent today.

Dossier: Barcelona +20: an Assessment

Migrations in the Mediterranean Region

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The Mediterranean Basin is one of the main migration arenas in the world. It is also, however, one of the most border-controlled areas, since it constitutes the outer border of the European Union on its southern side. Moreover, the EU has turned its back to migration from the South, because it is built on freedom of movement, residence and work within the wider Union, but closing its southern borders along the Mediterranean while opening its borders to the East.
Twenty-two states border the Mediterranean Sea. These can be divided into various places of exchange and confrontation: the Maghreb and Western Europe on the one hand, the Balkans, Turkey and the Mashreq on the other. Antiquity's 'sea in the middle of the lands' is today also the arena for some of the major conflicts in the world, a source of strife, insecurity and sometimes terrorism: Christians and Muslims, Israelis and Palestinians, Turks and Kurds, radical Islamists in Europe and in their own countries, not to mention the many disputes between neighbours (Macedonia, Cyprus, Western Sahara, etc). In sum, the south shore of the Mediterranean supplies the essential migration flows to the EU, which has established its border there, becoming the source of significant clandestine migration that sometimes ends in death, making this sea a vast cemetery.

The Mediterranean Migratory Area

Europe forms a migratory area with the south shore of the Mediterranean. The majority of migratory flows towards Europe are from there, considering the historic and neighbourhood ties it has with this region and the complimentary demographic and economic nature of the two areas. The gateways to Europe, i.e. Gibraltar, Melilla and Ceuta, Malta, Lampedusa, the Canary Islands and the Evros (or Maritsa) River border, where sub-Saharan Africans flock today, give the image of a Europe under siege having trouble controlling its borders while attempting to involve countries of transit, some of which have become countries of immigration, in controlling the flows by making them the border guards of Europe.
Over the course of twenty years, southern European countries and the Balkans, countries of emigration until the mid-1980s, have now become countries of immigration, a phenomenon extending to the threshold of Europe, from the Maghreb to Turkey, which have also now become regions of immigration and transit.
Today, the Mediterranean continues to be crossed by migrants. They begin along the edges of Europe: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, the Maghreb and Albania are at once countries of departure, transit and destination. Despite the globalisation of flows, historic, geographic and cultural proximity (languages, particularly transmitted by the media) continues to explain Europe as the desired destination of choice. This is true of Spain, where Moroccan migrants are the second immigrant nationality, Italy, where Romanians, Albanians and Moroccans are the most numerous, Greece, where Albanians make up two thirds of the foreigners, and France, with Maghrebi nationals in the forefront.
Various migratory configurations exist in the distribution of migration within the Euro-Mediterranean area: Paired migration countries, often associated with a colonial past or recruitment in years of contract worker growth, where a single nationality has the majority of its emigrants in a single host country (Al-

geria/France, for instance, where over 90% of Algerians immigrating to Europe live in France, and Turkey/Germany, where 70% of Turks immigrating to Europe live in Germany),

— Quasi-diasporas, characterised by a nationality present in numerous European countries and creating strong transnational economic, cultural, religious, familial and matrimonial networks and links among its different groups (this is the case of the Turks in Europe, followed by the Moroccans),
— Scattered distribution, reflecting the globalisation of flows characterising migratory movement to Europe since the 1990s.

The southern Mediterranean Basin, despite the closed borders, constitutes a region of considerable emigration: Morocco (3.5 million emigrants), Turkey (5.3 million), Egypt (2.7 million), Algeria (one million). In Morocco, emigration has doubled in 11 years.
Diasporas, formerly considered a threat to the sovereignty of the countries of origin, have today become highly solicited because they can allow those countries to exercise an influence on the host countries: acceptance of dual nationality, for instance – many European countries have opened their nationality laws to elements of *jus soli* over the course of the 1990s, whereas all the Muslim countries operate on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, with perpetual allegiance to the country of birth, as is the case in Morocco; acceptance by the country of origin of the political rights exercised by non-EU citizens on the local level in the host country and sometimes even the will to grant political rights to members of a diaspora through a consular vote or a vote in the country of origin; recognition of associations campaigning for the conditions of their compatriots, and not just friendly ones controlled by the country of origin; involvement of associations in local development programmes in the regions of origin; and organisation of religious affairs at a distance. Transnational networks of matrimonial, commercial or entrepreneurial nature cross the Mediterranean and make the border a resource for their exchanges.

But Europe only attracts half of the migrants from the south shore of the Mediterranean, since they also go to Arab countries such as Libya and the Gulf States, as well as the United States and Canada. Certain Mediterranean south shore countries are also countries of immigration. This is the case of Israel, Turkey, the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Jordan. In addition, there is an unknown number of illegal immigrants or migrants in transit, including sub-Saharans in the Maghreb and Sudanese in Egypt. Spain is the primary destination of these migrants from the South. It is the European country that has experienced the greatest migration hump in the past few years. In the mid 1980s, Southern European countries began establishing immigration policies with characteristics that distinguish them greatly from traditional countries of immigration: progressive accession to the 'acquis communautaire,' successive waves of legalisation, bilateral labour agreements in employment niches previously occupied by illegal migrants. On the other hand, south shore Mediterranean countries, which have emigration policies, have not established immigration policies apart from penalising illegal immigration.
Since 1985, Europe has strengthened its outer borders and opened its inner borders in the belief that immigration pressure from the southern Mediterranean was over.[1] A visa system was established to complement the programme for non-EU citizens and suspicion increased, with the Europeanisation of border controls as of the 1990s. Walls were built, as in Ceuta, on the initiative of the European Union, with camps not only in countries of transit such as Morocco and Libya, but also in Malta or outlying EU countries. These dissuasive and repressive measures tend to increase the random settlement of those who cannot return to their countries of origin, heightening migratory pressure at the threshold of Europe. Illegal immigration continues in order to reimburse the cost of the trip, and casualties mount along the borders.
Another challenge: Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. Hopes were soon dashed due to the implementation of an EU external border surveillance and anti-terrorism system (development aid being conditional to the capacity of countries of emigration to

[1] Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, *Faut-il ouvrir les frontières* ? Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2014, 2nd edition, and *Atlas des migrations dans le monde*, Paris, Autrement, 2012, 3rd edition.

control illegal migration), the asymmetry of trade, instability in the region (dialogue dependence on the Middle East conflict), corruption, Islamic terrorism and the weak appropriation of the partnership by south shore countries. Agriculture and fishing, the only sectors producing at competitive levels in the South, has run up against a protectionist EU system. In the North, Euro-Mediterranean dialogue remains far from interesting all EU Member States, some of them being more interested in the eastern neighbourhood or the Nordic Union. The Barcelona Process (1995-2005) was succeeded by the Union for the Mediterranean, launched by France in 2007, which eliminated migration from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership content.

Finally, Islam is also a challenge. In the past, Europe was built where Muslim powers retreated. But the confrontation of Islam with the secularisation of European countries is often a reciprocal ordeal and outbreaks of terrorism have aggravated the divide.

One of the Greatest Lines of Divide and Proximity in the World

The asymmetric population profiles are a first divide. Over the past sixty years, the population has grown significantly in the eastern and southern Mediterranean Basin, while it has stagnated in the North. The median age (the age separating the population of a country or group into two equal parts) in Europe today is forty, as compared to twenty-five on the south shore. This disparity is nonetheless diminishing due to the entrance of the majority of south shore countries into the demographic transition, that is, the transition from so-called traditional reproductive behaviours (some six births per woman) to generational replacement levels (two and a half children per woman on average). We are therefore now in a situation of complementarity between the two shores, with an ageing population in the North and the availability of a vast skilled labour reserve consisting of young adults in the South that the labour market there cannot absorb. The South-North migratory pressure in the Mediterranean area is diminishing.

Contrary to popular belief, the rise of political Islam has not had an impact on the demographic transition, as is indeed also the case in other Islamic countries such as Iran.[2] On the north shore of the Mediterranean, countries such as Italy and Spain have entered a stage of demographic ageing, with the number of children per woman at sub-replacement levels and the entrance of a growing proportion of the population into old age, which calls for new migration sources. At the same time, emerging together with the phenomenon of 'de-ageing'[3] (whereby senior citizens are in better physical and mental condition than the preceding generation at the same age) is the phenomenon of North-South migration that is often the extension of international tourism, with people settling long-term (in France for the British, Spain and Portugal for the Germans and British, Malta for the British, and Morocco and Tunisia for the French).

The asymmetric population profiles are a first divide. Over the past sixty years, the population has grown significantly in the eastern and southern Mediterranean Basin, while it has stagnated in the North

And finally, the rampant urbanisation of the planet also involves the south shore, marked by rural exodus, megapolisation (as in Cairo or Istanbul) and the transformation of south shore Mediterranean countries into countries of transit and immigration, with the settlement of migrants due to closed borders to the North. This is the case of Morocco and Turkey, as well as Algeria and Libya, which have become countries of transit for sub-Saharans.

The South's countries (French, Italian, Spanish), at times associated with the colonial past, is facilitated by dissemination through the media (television, internet, mobile telephones), transnational migrant networks built by migrant families that settled in European countries long ago (France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Benelux, Switzerland), remittances that, to-

[2] Youssef Courbage, Emmanuel Todd, *Le rendez-vous des civilisations*. Paris, Seuil, 2007.

[3] Raimondo Cagiano de Azevedo, Cinzia Castagnaro, "Vieillissement et dévieillissement: un débat européen," *Gérontologie et société*, No. 139, December 2011.

gether with films, foster the image of a European Eldorado where traversing the Mediterranean is like a modern odyssey.

The Arab revolutions, though they have not changed the trend, have at times accelerated the phenomenon, as with the arrival of Syrians in Turkey, Libyans in Tunisia and Tunisians in Italy and France in the spring of 2011. Certain Mediterranean islands, destinations for tourist and also recurrent arrivals of illegal immigrants, are at the heart of the confusion between the great openness to tourism and labour and the barring of undocumented migrants: this is the case on Lampedusa, Malta, Cyprus, the Greek islands, the Canary Islands and, to a lesser degree, the Balearic Islands. New borders have likewise appeared, associated with migration and strengthened by European border surveillance systems, as at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, or the Evros River marking the border between Greece and Turkey. These border scenes are a control production in a world where the aspiration to move freely has never been greater while at the same time there has never been a greater need for putting up barriers to migration.

The 22 states bordering the Mediterranean total approximately 400 million inhabitants. Seven of these States belong to the EU (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal –even if it is primarily Atlantic–, Greece, Malta and Cyprus), with a revenue ten times superior on average to that of their neighbours to the South. By 2025, the population of these European States will hardly have increased, whereas that of the other states will have grown by 70%. The closing of borders often combines with the absence of a genuine alternative to migration.

Each north-shore Mediterranean country, despite its proximity to the South, has its own migratory landscape: hence France is strongly marked by its colonial past through the presence of Maghrebis, but also by the Portuguese, the leading immigrant nationality in France according to the 1982 census; Spain, which in the past few years has become the second most popular country of immigration in Europe (5.5 million foreigners), is characterised by its proximity to Morocco, as well as its South American and African tropism; Italy, the third country of immigration, which has reached a population of 5 million foreigners, is a mosaic of nationalities arriving since the 1990s; while Portugal, apart from its Eastern European workers (Romanians and Ukrainians), is dominated by its migration of colonial origin, from Portuguese-speaking countries. And finally, Greece, which had no adjoining border with the EU until 2004, is characterised by the presence of Albanians and Eastern Europeans.

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In twenty years, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Malta, former countries of emigration, have become countries of immigration. This radical transition can be ascribed to a combination of factors: these countries' location along the external borders of Europe, the implementation, at times deferred, of EU border control systems, the demand for labour in sectors that cannot be delocalised (tourism, the restaurant business, fishing, agriculture, caring for the elderly, domestic services for nationals as well as for the elderly and European retirees), the existence of a 'black' labour market, and the frequent recourse to 'massive' regularisation to absorb a proportion of the illegal immigrants. Public opinion is still reticent to the idea of long-term immigrants, though they are nonetheless an integral part of these societies.

A European System of Border Control Is Characterised by Closing Off the South

The EU system to manage migratory flows is called the 'acquis communautaire,' constituted by the essential Schengen Agreements of 1985 on the elimination of internal EU borders and the strengthening of external borders. For non-EU foreign nationals, this has meant the obligation of obtaining a single-entry visa of less than three months in order to enter and travel as tourists within the Schengen Area. Readmission agreements were signed as of 1991 with

non-EU Member States bordering the Mediterranean or the EU, accompanied by the adoption of a computerised control system, the SIS (Schengen Information System), a database for sharing national data on 'undesirables' (illegal immigrants, rejected asylum seekers), obliging all EU Member States to refuse their right to residence and deport them. The Dublin Convention and Dublin II Regulation on asylum, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty on the Communitisation of the decision process and the 2007 Lisbon Treaty round off the system. Numerous instruments for heightened control of external EU borders have been deployed, such as the adoption in 2000 of a Eurodac Convention on asylum, facilitating comparison of digital fingerprints of asylum-seekers and individuals having irregularly crossed an EU border through an information database accessible to all EU Member States. The Frontex System of cooperation among EU Member State police forces has been patrolling the borders of Europe since 2005. In 2013, following the decease of 366 people in the vicinity of the island of Lampedusa, Italy decided to implement, until the end of autumn 2014, a national rescue operation called Mare Nostrum, which saved thousands of lives and was succeeded in late 2014 by Triton, a control mechanism belonging to Frontex, whose primary mission is not, however, the assistance of shipwrecked individuals.

The Mediterranean is increasingly serving as a new Rio Grande between its south and north shores. Visas are accompanied by walls, camps, radars, sensors, drones and the Frontex system

In any case, sovereignism, under pressure from the populism rampant here and there in Europe, is gaining ground over the Communitisation of migration policies, as demonstrated by debates on the modification of the Schengen Agreement and the return to national control of borders after the arrival of Tunisians and Libyans in Lampedusa and then Ventimiglia in spring 2011.

The Mediterranean is increasingly serving as a new Rio Grande between its south and north shores. Visas are accompanied by walls, camps, radars, sensors, drones and the Frontex system. This proliferation of migration controls is based on three essential factors: the security economy, whereby private companies have become specialised in conveying the deported and military technology recycles its instruments in the civil domain; the security escalation, amalgamating the struggle against illegal immigration, anti-terrorism and the struggle against the Rom; and the use of migrants as negotiation instruments through agreements made with countries in the South (Senegal, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco).

In 2014, Romanians and Bulgarians, whose countries became EU Member States in 2007, were granted the freedom to work and settle within the EU, and this has created a certain tension. The 'disentanglement' of nationalities occurring in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall was preceded by 'disentanglements' in Mediterranean Europe: nearly half a million Bulgarians of Turkish origin returned to Turkey, some 350,000 Pontic Greeks (from the region of Pontus, along the south-eastern coast of the Black Sea) returned to Greece, Romanians of Hungarian origin returned to Hungary and Albanians of Greek origin (the Arvanites) moved to Greece, where they comprise 60% of foreigners, while the departure of Romanians for Italy continued.

The struggle against illegal immigration in the Mediterranean area is a declared priority of the EU. Common regulations to combat irregular residence have been defined on an EU level since 1990. The strengthened border controls are also symbolised by SIVE (Spain's Integrated External Surveillance System), functioning with the aid of radars between Spain and the African coast. Readmission agreements between the EU and south Mediterranean countries tend to make numerous buffer states the 'border guards' of the EU, other states (particularly African) already being bound by obligatory readmission clauses. Immigration and asylum liaison officers, through the Frontex programme based at a specialised agency in Warsaw, ensures reinforced control of external EU borders, and EU repatriation (that is, where various EU Member States join efforts to repatriate people) is considered a strong deterrent.

Other instruments used to control the south European borders are bilateral agreements. These consist of agreements between the countries of arrival and departure on readmission of foreign nationals in an irregular situation to their countries of origin.

Libya is an example of bargained agreements in the name of the struggle against clandestine immigration. Libya has not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees and it does not adhere to the European Neighbourhood Policy. When in 2011, 1,500 immigrants arriving on the Sicilian island of Lampedusa were deported to Libya, the migrants seeking international protection were unable to exercise their rights. Colonel Gaddafi demanded five billion euros from the EU to 'stop' illegal immigration and build a road from Egypt to Tunisia. By a decision on 23 February 2011, the European Commission reiterated that Member States should always respect fundamental rights and suspend agreements whenever there was violation of fundamental rights.

Bilateral agreements often have the aim of limiting the migratory flow through policies of returning undocumented migrants to the other side of the border in exchange for development policies, trade agreements or the concession of residency permits for the elite.

One can observe a return to regarding border management as a state affair, while the existence of European borders along the external edges of the EU is emphatically displayed

Another type of agreement is multilateral, signed between a country of origin and transit with the ensemble of the EU. Numerous south-shore countries have signed such agreements. Others, such as Morocco, resist, due to the weakness of what Europe offers in return (Morocco wishes to receive privileged partners status with the EU, arguing that signing such agreements could ruin its relations with West African countries, whence come many of the migrants passing through Morocco on their way to Europe). In the same vein, Turkey, which has facilitated movement for migrants from neighbouring countries to the East and South was faced in 2010 with the Greek announcement that it was going to build a wall in Thrace, at the Greek-Turkish border to prevent entry by undocumented migrants from Turkey.

Countries of origin are, moreover, beginning to develop diaspora policies to use migrants as agents of influence in their host countries through the attention they garner the country: this is the case of Turkey and Morocco

One can observe a return to regarding border management as a state affair, while the existence of European borders along the external edges of the EU is emphatically displayed. This reveals a lack of confidence of EU Member States in EU policy, which is nonetheless highly security-oriented.

Conclusion: Migrants, Bridges between Two Shores[4]

Despite this closure, initiatives by migrants and their descendents contribute to building transnational spaces between the north and south shores of the Mediterranean: first of all through remittances, then through associations, as well as through people with dual nationality, whose elite are courted by the countries of origin, and finally through their everyday transnational practices, such as marriage, information exchange, trade, the creation of small businesses and the organisation of Islam in secularised European countries. Countries of origin are, moreover, beginning to develop diaspora policies to use migrants as agents of influence in their host countries through the attention they garner the country: this is the case of Turkey and Morocco. A number of hybrid cultural initiatives have been flourishing in music, theatre, dance and sports, and today are an integral part of popular European culture. Europe can no longer disregard this component of its diversity, in which migrants are among the main actors.

[4] Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "Pour accompagner les migrations en méditerranée." *La bibliothèque de l'iReMMO*, Paris, L'Harmatan 2013.

Mediterranean Flows into Europe. Refugees or Migrants?

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A Record Year for Migration across the Mediterranean

2014 represented a record year for Europe as a whole, and more intensely for the Mediterranean area, both in terms of the number of migrant and refugee arrivals by sea to Southern European Member States (primarily Italy, but also Greece and Malta) and in terms of asylum applications submitted overall in the European Union (EU). Maritime migration flows in the Mediterranean were characterised by an acute intensification, but the reason these flows are of particular concern is only partially related to numbers and has much to do with their mixed nature. This article will try to consider more analytically the concept of mixed migration, which is increasingly used to describe Mediterranean flows and which permeates the debate on fairness and effectiveness of policy responses to migratory pressures in the Mediterranean.

According to the UNHCR, in 2014 maritime arrivals to Europe across the Mediterranean stood at over 218,000 – three times the number of arrivals registered in 2011, at the height of the Arab Spring.[2] In 2014, Italy alone witnessed more than 170,000 arrivals on its southern shores, a four-fold increase compared to the previous year (43,000 arrivals in 2013) and an almost three-fold increase compared to 2011 (63,000 arrivals).[3]

These figures confirm that the central Mediterranean route is by far the corridor most used by migrants and asylum seekers to cross the Mediterranean and reach the EU. In the midst of a prolonged situation of anarchy, violence and lack of state authority, Libya has become a sort of Mediterranean 'hub' or 'funnel,' which migrants and refugees from Eastern and Western Africa (as well as from Syria) transit through, gather at and depart from. On the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, Italy is the main destination country (or transit country for those heading towards Central or Northern Europe).

Maritime arrivals to Greece have also significantly increased in 2014 (about 43,500 arrivals – a 280% increase compared to the previous year). This migration flow is of particular concern because it is mainly composed of people who flee situations of conflict, persecution and severe violence: about 60% of those who arrived by sea in 2014 came from Syria and many others came from Afghanistan, Somalia and Eritrea.[4]

The situation is expected to get even more serious and complex in 2015. Figures referring to the first two months of 2015 reveal a sharper increase in maritime arrivals compared to the same period of the previous year. Italy witnessed an increase in sea arrivals of 43% – from 5,500 to almost 7,900 arrivals, according to Interior Ministry statistics.[5] Moreover, as reported by Gil Arias Fernández, deputy executive director of Frontex, in January-February 2015 the agency re-

[1] This article was finalised in April 2015. I am grateful to Ferruccio Pastore for sharing his ideas on the issue of Mediterranean mixed flows with me on several occasions and for his comments for this article.
[2] UNHCR, *Asylum Trends 2014. Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries*, March 2015, www.unhcr.org/551128679.html.
[3] Figures released by the Italian Interior Ministry and available at: www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/dati_statistici_marzo_2015.pdf.
[4] UNHCR, *New UNHCR report warns against returning asylum-seekers to Greece*, Briefing Notes, 30 January 2015, www.unhcr.org/54cb698d9.html.
[5] Available at: www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/dati_statistici_marzo_2015.pdf.

corded almost 5,300 arrivals in the eastern Mediterranean, witnessing a 107% increase compared to the same period in 2014.[6] Moreover, the Greek coast guard counted almost 6,500 arrivals in March alone, meaning that the number of arrivals in the first three months of 2015 has tripled compared to the previous year.[7] Even more worryingly, the Italian coast guard authorities are reporting that about 10,000 people have been rescued from the sea in just five days between 10-14 April, whilst about 400 people are feared dead after their boat capsized on 13 April 120 km south of Lampedusa.[8] In a tragic escalation, on 19 April the world witnessed the deadliest shipwreck in the history of migration across the Mediterranean: at the moment of writing, between 700 and 900 people are feared drowned after their overcrowded boat capsized close to the Libyan coast.[9]

Asylum seekers, as already suggested, are a relevant part of Mediterranean migration flows. According to the UNHCR, 50% of arrivals in the Mediterranean consist of Syrian and Eritrean people, who are broadly recognised as people in need of protection (the former fleeing a longstanding conflict, the latter escaping a militarised dictatorial regime). As a consequence, along with the intensification of migration across the Mediterranean, in 2014 asylum applications in the EU increased by 44% as a whole. Germany alone recorded a 58% increase in applications, confirming for the second year its role as the largest recipient of asylum seekers in the industrialised world. Nonetheless, Southern Europe witnessed a 95% increase, which particularly affected Turkey and Italy: among the top five receiving countries in the industrialised world, Turkey ranked third (after the USA) and Italy fifth (after Sweden).[10] Asylum applications in Italy doubled and, among the EU Member States, Italy ranked third for the first time ever (with 65,000 applications), behind Germany (203,000) and Sweden (81,000).[11]

Refugees or Migrants? An Analysis of Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean

The concept of mixed migration generally refers to flows consisting of various categories of migrants with different motivations and different protection needs who travel together along the same migration routes, using the same means of transport and relying on the same smuggling networks.

This concept has developed over the past two decades and has become increasingly important in the policy field as of 2000, when the UNHCR launched the Global Consultations on International Protection in response to what the organisation considered as a crisis in international protection.[12] In order to tackle this issue, the UNHCR encouraged reflections and led debates at multilateral level on the so-called 'migration-asylum nexus' and the phenomenon of mixed migration. The outcome was a number of policy papers, the most relevant of which is *Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action*, published in January 2007.[13] This series of documents offers clear practical recommendations to

[6] Rick Lyman, 'Bulgaria Puts Up a New Wall, but This One Keeps People Out,' *The New York Times*, 5 April 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/world/europe/bulgaria-puts-up-a-new-wall-but-this-one-keeps-people-out.html?_r=0#.

[7] Euractiv.com, *Illegal migrants arriving in Greece by sea triple in 2015*, 10 April 2015, www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/illegal-migrants-arriving-sea-greece-triple-2015-313689?utm_source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=585a631fee-newsletter_weekly_update&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_bab5f0ea4e-585a631fee-245335561.

[8] EU Observer, *Italy rescues 10,000 migrants in past week*, 16 April 2015, https://euobserver.com/tickers/128338; UNHCR, *Latest deaths on Mediterranean highlight urgent need for increased rescue capacity*, 15 April 2015, www.unhcr.org/552e603f9.html; Amnesty International, *Mediterranean crisis: UN points to 50-fold increase in deaths amid European government inaction*, 15 April 2015, www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/04/mediterranean-crisis-50-fold-increase-in-deats-amid-european-inaction/.

[9] IOM, *Migrant Deaths Soar as Mediterranean Sees Worst Tragedy in Living Memory*, 19 April 2015, www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2015/pbn-listing/migrant-deaths-soar-as-mediterra.html.

[10] UNHCR, *Asylum Trends 2014*, cit.

[11] Eurostat, *Asylum applicants and first instance decisions on asylum applications: 2014*, March 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4168041/6742650/KS-QA-15-003-EN-N.pdf/b7786ec9-1ad6-4720-8a1d-430fcfc55018.

[12] Fifty years after the 1951 Geneva Convention, the UNHCR had observed in Western countries a growing prejudice against asylum seekers, who were largely perceived both by governments and public opinion as "economic migrants in disguise."

[13] UNHCR, *Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action*, January 2007, www.unhcr.org/4742a30b4.html. Other relevant policy papers are: UNHCR, *Agenda for Protection*, October 2003, www.unhcr.org/4742a30b4.html (in particular Goal 2); UNHCR, *Refugee Protection and Durable Solutions in the Context of International Migration*, Discussion Paper for the First High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges, November 2007, www.unhcr.org/4742a6b72.html. The most recent UNHCR document on the management of Mediterranean migration flows is a letter sent by the High Commissioner to the EU, see UNHCR 2015.

states and other international actors on the provision of protection in the context of mixed flows and represents a valuable contribution in the current elaboration of policy responses to such phenomenon.

However, if on the one hand, valuable steps have been done in the policy field to identify concrete ways to manage mixed flows while seeking a balance between protection and migration control, on the other hand, analytical reflection on the concept of mixed migration has been very limited. What do we mean exactly when we talk about mixed migration flows? The heterogeneity and complexity of mixed flows may be tentatively connected to four elements.

1. Contexts of origin

According to a traditional dichotomous analysis of migration, migrants are identified as 'forced migrants' when they *are compelled* to leave their country of origin due to situations of conflict, generalised violence or persecution (asylum seekers and refugees); conversely, they are considered 'voluntary migrants' when they *choose* to migrate with the aim of improving their economic and living conditions (economic migrants). But in reality the borders between forced and voluntary migration are not so clear-cut. For instance, so-called 'voluntary migrants' may have faced situations of extreme poverty or serious humanitarian crises in countries of origin and/or transit, so that their ability to actually choose to migrate may be considered very limited, if not completely absent.[14]

2. Individual profiles

Within mixed flows, one may further distinguish vulnerable people (minors and unaccompanied minors, trafficked people, pregnant women, people with seriously illnesses) from non-vulnerable people (to simplify, healthy non-trafficked adults). Both vulnerable and non-vulnerable people may be found among forced and non-forced migrants, thus creating a complexity of situations and protection needs.

3. Individual motivations

A migrant may be driven by different kinds of motivations, so that he or she may be escaping from a conflict while simultaneously looking for social and economic betterment. Motivations related to the political situation in one's country of origin may, thus, mingle with motivations related to future life opportunities in another country. It must be noted that in certain countries of origin, situations of conflict, violence, poverty and inequality actually coexist and all together represent migration determinants.

4. Diachronic stratification

Migration paths may be very long and the time variable may impact on both the objective profile of migrants (points 1 and 2) and the subjective profile (point 3), producing a shift from the 'migration pole' to the 'asylum pole' and vice versa. For instance, migrants may leave their country of origin for economic reasons and settle as migrant workers in another country, from where they may be forced to flee years later due to conflict (this is the case of sub-Saharan migrants escaping Libya in 2011) or they may be unable to return to their country of origin due to a changed political situation and thus become refugees *sur place*.

Although mixed flows exist all over the world, in the Mediterranean area their level of complexity and heterogeneity seems to be increasing, due to various interconnected geopolitical, institutional and socio-economic factors that make Mediterranean mixed flows a very specific phenomenon. Prolonged conflicts, dissolution or instability of states, porosity of borders, widespread violence and persecution (by both state, non-state and pseudo-state – i.e. the IS – actors), as well as economic, environmental and public health issues are among the factors that characterise in different ways Eastern, Western and Northern Africa (Sahel, Horn of Africa, Libya), the Middle East (Syria, Iraq) and the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen).

Policy Responses to Mixed Migration in the European Union: an Open Issue

Mediterranean flows are, thus, more and more populated by diverse groups of migrants, among which

[14] On the continuum between forced and voluntary migration, see Van Hear 2011.

the presence of asylum seekers, refugees and vulnerable people has been constantly growing. This has produced new challenges for receiving countries on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, in particular for Italy and Greece.[15]

Consistent with the UNHCR guidelines, these countries are asked to improve their capacity to produce and implement policy responses that consider the mixed nature of migration flows (i.e. the heterogeneity of the contexts of origin, profiles and motivations of migrants) as well as their differentiated protection needs, offering different treatments to different categories of migrants. These countries are also required to balance their protection responsibilities and their duty to respect migrants' fundamental rights with their (legitimate) border control priorities.

However, this is easier said than done, since the whole European legal and policy framework on migration is based on the fundamental distinction between voluntary migration and forced migration. This normative framework is evidently grounded on the assumption that migration is not mixed and that people migrate for a single reason (labour, study, international protection, family reunification). This normative architecture has produced a series of antinomies (voluntary vs forced, migration vs asylum, control vs protection) and a number of mutually exclusive categories of migrants, each category being entitled to a different set of rights and limits to such rights. But, as mentioned above, in reality, migration may be driven by a combination of motivations and factors (to live in a safe place, to improve one's living conditions, to join family, to study) which would need to be addressed by a correspondingly differentiated policy approach.

Therefore, the reality of migration, and in particular the increasingly complex and mixed nature of Mediterranean flows, calls into question the consistency and effectiveness of the European normative and policy framework on migration. On the one hand, mixed flows challenge the conceptual distinction between forced and voluntary migration and call for a revision of such a framework based on different grounds. On the other hand, maritime mixed flows pose new challenges in terms of their practical management, and countries located at the southern borders of the EU should not be left alone to face these challenges. A common European effort is required in order to overcome the current normative crisis and to pursue a sound, fair and protection-sensitive management of mixed migration in the Mediterranean.

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[15] For a detailed analysis of the implementation of asylum policies in the context of maritime mixed flows in Italy and Greece, see Pastore Roman 2014.

Youth Empowerment as a Collective, Bottom-Up and Long-Term Process

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The exceptional youth-led wave of anti-authoritarian protests in several Arab countries in 2010-2011, refocused the world's attention on Arab youth. In particular, the rapid and unexpected mass mobilisations, anticipated by the development of youth-based activist groups in the last decade and the spread of new communication technologies, brought to the fore the idea of youth as the engine for long-needed change in the region.

The recent negative, if not dramatic, course of events in most countries of the Arab region, should not divert our attention from the fact that youth can, and indeed should, represent "a force of cultural and social regeneration."[1] However, due to the severe political, economic and social conditions regarding youth exclusion in the region, this potential can only be realised through a *transformation* of the systemic inequalities that lead to exclusion in the first place. This can only happen through collective, bottom-up and long-term processes whereby young people gain by themselves the ability, authority and agency to implement change in their own life and in the life of society at large or, in other words, through processes of *youth empowerment*.

Youth Empowerment as a Collective and Bottom-Up Process

Empowerment is a widely used concept, but also one that is difficult to define and use correctly. As can be derived from the composition of the word itself, the concept has to do with the issue of *power* and implies a *change in power relations*. Youth empowerment should imply an expansion of the ability to make strategic life choices in a situation in which that ability was previously denied, as much as it should imply a challenge and a destabilisation of unequal power relations through a *transformative* process.

However, in a context in which dominant norms and cultural values strongly limit the ability of young people to make strategic life choices, structural constraints cannot be addressed by individuals alone. Young individuals can and do act against dominant norms, but their impact on the general situation of youth is limited and they might pay a high price for their autonomy. The process of youth empowerment depends on collective solidarity in the public arena, as well as individual assertiveness in the private one. Youth organisations and social movements thus have an important role to play in creating the conditions for change and in reducing the costs of individual action.[2]

Understanding youth empowerment as a transformation process of existing exclusionary power relations implies that it can only be brought about through a bottom-up process rather than a top-down strategy. To deal with social exclusion, young people cannot be 'empowered,' but they must empower themselves through forms of agency, although the pre-conditions for this to take place could depend on structural factors or even be facilitated by top-down policies. For instance, giving young people access to better education is unlikely to be automatically empowering, but it creates a favourable factor for creating the pre-condition for

[1] Herrera, Linda. "Youth and Generational Renewal in the Middle East." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 3 (2009), p. 368.
[2] Adapted from Kabeer, Naila. "Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurements of Women's Empowerment." *Development and Change* 30 (1999), p. 457.

youth empowerment (such as a more critical consciousness). Youth empowerment is also an open-ended process and cannot be predicted at its outset without running the risk of violating its essence, which is to enhance young people's capacity for self-determination.

The process of youth empowerment depends on collective solidarity in the public arena, as well as individual assertiveness in the private one. Youth organisations and social movements thus have an important role to play in creating the conditions for change and in reducing the costs of individual action

It is, furthermore, critical to recognise youth as a diversified category. The expressions, ideas and experiences of being young vary across cultures, classes, genders, ethnicities and other groupings. Young people from different social strata experience important social changes in different ways, and have different needs and demands. However, while it is true that young people cannot be considered a single homogeneous category, it is equally true that schooling, mass media, urban spaces (public parks, shopping malls) and new information technologies have played a crucial role in developing a particular consciousness about being young, which facilitates mutual influence and peer interactions.[3] Moreover, youth in Arab countries from almost all social classes have been confronted with an increasingly problematic transition into adulthood owing to economic, political and social failures of the system created by the older generation. This means that being young in the Arab region today is more than a biological attribute: it is the consciousness of a shared experience of exclusion determined by the failure of post-independence development models.[4]

More in general, and beyond the Arab region, certain conditions of the contemporary period have contributed to creating a distinct global political youth culture, thus increasing youth self-awareness and the chances for collective youth agency. For example, new forms of horizontal youth political involvement unmediated by the older generation (social movements vs. the youth section of traditional political parties) and new technologies mastered by youth (with young people playing a larger role than in the past in teaching and acquainting the older generation with new technologies and cultural patterns associated with globalisation) have opened up new avenues of active political, economic and socio-cultural participation for the current generation.

The 2011 uprisings that led to the overthrow of Ben Ali and Mubarak and seriously challenged other regimes in the region are a testimony that youth collective agency has today a great potential in transforming existing power relations, although its impact may be subtle, long-term and often unintended. During the decade prior to the uprisings, youth collective agency in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the region, brought about broad cultural transformations by affecting values, symbols and political cultures and challenged many of the dominant ideas that sustained the power structure of authoritarian regimes, such as hereditary rule, police brutality, emergency law and corruption.

Within political parties and organisations, a generation of young activists started to openly dissent from the old conservative leadership and to develop a more critical and less subordinate culture vis-à-vis the older generation (the young bloggers within the Muslim Brotherhood; Youth for Change within Kifaya). Young women activists also started to gradually shift the boundaries of acceptable public behaviour for their group, thus transforming power relations both within family and youth groups (for example, a young woman, Israa Abdel-Fattah was the co-founder of the April 6 Movement). In Tunisia, in 2006, unemployed graduates established the Union des Diplômés Chômeurs (UDC) to denounce their precarious situation. In a few months, the UDC, initially tolerated by the regime, was able to establish a

[3] Herrera, Linda and Bayat, Asef (eds.). *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North*, New York: Oxford University Press 2010.

[4] Murphy, Emma. "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systemic Failure." *Mediterranean Politics*, 17: 1 (2012).

number of small committees in the most marginalised areas of the country, including Gafsa and Redeyef. These committees were at the heart of the large protest movement that erupted in the mining area of Gafsa in January 2008. The protests, although harshly repressed by police, began to call into discussion the prevailing discourse of Tunisia's economic miracle, seriously undermining the legitimacy of the Ben Ali regime.[5]

Largely unnoticed or underestimated by scholars and analysts working in the region, these ideas started to enter the public debate and gained increasing legitimacy among the masses, thereby laying the groundwork for widespread protests.

Youth Empowerment as a Nonlinear and Long-Term Process

It is also of fundamental importance to consider that, like all social processes, youth empowerment is a complex, contradictory and long-term process. As such, it does not have a linear development: it can make significant achievements and also suffer major setbacks.

As stated above, the wave of youth-led protests in most Arab countries in 2010-11 represented a significant challenge to traditional power relations. Not only were the security apparatuses taken by surprise and, at least in Tunisia and Egypt, temporarily defeated by the unexpected and large-scale spontaneous mobilisation of millions of people, but also protestors subverted well-established patterns of oppositional politics in the region by creating new slogans and symbols and by side-stepping traditional opposition parties and organisations, which did not have a significant role in promoting and sustaining the uprisings.

However, shortly after the revolutionary events, it became apparent that the entrenched structure of power was much more difficult to eradicate than the activists had initially hoped, especially in the absence of organised revolutionary movements that could channel youth energy and demands. This is most evident in the case of post-Mubarak Egypt, but also in Tunisia, where the voices of youth and particularly those who inspired the popular uprisings have continued to remain unheard in policy decision-making and also excluded from major political organisations. In Egypt, all post-uprising authorities have governed in a top-down manner without any genuine involvement or consultation with youth groups, have been reluctant to discard the old system of power and have increasingly resorted to repressive tactics such as arrests, intimidation, and the use of force to placate youth protests. After the first elected President, Mohamed Morsi, was deposed, the crackdown on youth activists has intensified. Prominent activists of the April 6 Youth Movement were sentenced to three years in jail for joining the "No Military Trials for Civilians" campaign last November against the new protest law, approved by President Adly Mansour on 24 November.

Youth groups who were behind the mass protests against authoritarian regimes have been left out of emerging institutions and parties, both in Egypt and Tunisia, or simply destroyed by the violent turn of events in other contexts. For example, in the first parliamentary elections after the overthrow of Mubarak and Ben Ali, not only did youth groups from traditional opposition forces play a minor role in setting the agenda, but also youth coalitions such as the Egyptian Revolution Continues Alliance coalition, which included a number of youth groups and activists that contributed to the fall of Mubarak, took less than ten parliamentary seats, while al-Adl Party, another force composed of youth activists, only won two seats. Similarly, in Tunisia, despite a number of newly formed political parties (e.g., the Mouvement des Jeunes Tunisiens Libres and Rencontre Jeunes Libres) and independent lists representing youth and the unemployed (e.g., the Afkar Mostaquilla platform and some members of the Union of Unemployed Graduates) as well as the requirement that at least one candidate on each list be under the age of 30, the Constituent Assembly elected in October 2011 was unrepresentative of young people. Finally, the involvement of a few youth representatives in decision-making is likely to reflect the post-uprising authorities' attempts to co-opt young activists into

[5] Allal Amin. "'Ici, si ça ne 'bouge' pas ça n'avance pas !' Les mobilisations protestataires de l'année 2008 dans la région minière de Gafsa. Réformes néo libérales, clientélismes et contestation," in Myriam Catusse, Blandine Destremau et Éric Verdier (eds.), *L'État face aux débordements du social au Maghreb. Formation, travail et protection*, Paris, Karthala, 2010.

the existing system.[6] For example, Ahmed Maher, leader of the April 6 Youth Movement was member of the second Constituent Assembly elected in June 2012, but later withdrew from the assembly criticising the slow pace of drafting, the scarce representativeness of the Assembly and the lack of consideration for proposals made by civil society forces. Much worse is the situation in countries where the initial peaceful uprisings led to immediate harsh repression, foreign military interventions or to the escalation of violence and civil war, such as Bahrein, Libya or Syria.

More in general, the transformative potential of youth collective agency on the existing power system has been weakened over the last three years by a number of factors. Youth activism has been dispersed in myriad groups and initiatives, scarcely coordinated and representing different, albeit not necessarily, conflicting demands. Political youth groups have suffered from ideological and strategic divergences, as well as rivalries and a lack of a clear coherent strategy to adopt in the post-uprisings era. For example, in Egypt, they were unprepared, divided and confused regarding the best strategy to follow ahead of the 19 March Referendum of 2011 and the legislative elections of November 2011. After the military coup that deposed Morsi, youth groups are now even more plagued by contrasts and divisions. As it was for the first presidential elections, they have not reached a unified consensus on a presidential candidate. The leaders of the Tamarrod movement have decided to support the military and the presidential candidacy of Field Marshal General Abdel Fattah Sisi. At the same time, the April 6 Movement and others have expressed their refusal. The same Tamarrod is now plagued by internal divisions, as a number of its activists have announced their support for Hamdeh Sabahi. Ideological and strategic divergences have thus prevented youth groups from elaborating a unified and coherent policy vis-à-vis the post-Mubarak authorities, have diminished their ability to influence Egyptian politics beyond street protests and have compromised their credibility, causing them to lose popular support. In many Arab countries, the Islamist / non-Islamist ideological divide among youth activists, which has deepened in the wake of the uprisings, is likely to undermine youth collective action. The Tamarrod movement in Egypt, for example, has led to similar movements in other countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and the Palestinian Territories, raising contrasts among young people. In Egypt, the lack of alliance and cooperation between youth groups and independent trade unions has also weakened the likelihood of revolutionary forces having a stronger influence on policy decision-making. Similarly, in Morocco, the 20 February Movement and the unemployed graduates have failed to cooperate.

However, in the face of the current and well-placed widespread pessimism, many observers have underlined the long-term importance of an 'awakened and mobilised society;' one in which a youth component that does not passively accept the long-term authoritarian re-composition of power relations is crucial. After decades of authoritarianism it would be at best naïve to think that bottom-up, well-organised and participatory political actors could suddenly emerge, or that traditional parties and organisation could promptly welcome the active participation of young activists. The renewal of the dynamics of participation in any context is a long and difficult process and could take years or even decades to actually have an impact at the macro-structural level.

Nevertheless, the largely unexpected nature of the 2010-11 mobilisations should teach us a lesson: the importance of looking at below-the-radar dynamics and processes to understand the prospects for change.

In the last few years, some authors, mainly from the field of political sociology, have given new strength to promising bottom-up approaches, paying more attention to subaltern actors (such as youth) and to informal and often unnoticed forms of (political) agency.[7]

[6] For example, the young blogger and activist Slim Amamou, who was arrested during the early days of the anti-Ben Ali protests, was appointed Secretary of State for Youth and Sport Affairs in January 2011. Probably being aware of the risk of cooptation, Amamou resigned from his cabinet post in May 2011. In Egypt, Mahmoud Badr et Mohamed Abdel Aziz from Tamarrod were appointed in Egypt's 50 member constitution committee to modify the 2012 constitution.

[7] See for instance: Bayat, Asef, *Life as Politics. How Ordinary People Change the Middle* East. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009; Beinin, Joel and Vairel, Frédéric (eds.). *Social Movements, Mobilisation, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2011.

Although the current structural/policy context is unfavourable to creating the right pre-conditions for youth empowerment and young people are excluded from political processes, we should not overlook the long-term implications of youth agency in challenging existing power relations. For example, in Tunisia, last December, in response to the candidature of old personalities to form a new government, a group of young Tunisians launched a campaign, "Jeunesse Décide" (Youth Decides), on Facebook, calling for youth to take part in decision-making. Young people posted their candidature to Prime Minister and their CV. Within a few days, many Facebook pages and groups were created drawing thousands of followers. While this campaign did not lead to an immediate visible success, these young people continue to openly challenge the prevailing hierarchical structure of power, which is biased against youth.

More in general, beyond street protests, young activists and groups in Egypt, Tunisia and other Arab countries have been experimenting with new creative ways of doing politics and raising public awareness of political manipulations, based on transparency and participatory democracy. While it is too early to gauge the extent to which these forms of youth agency will effectively undermine existing power relations, they are likely to generate self-identity, confidence and awareness among those involved. In Egypt, with the renewed crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, women, particularly young women, seem to be playing a more central role within the movement. In November 2013, twenty-one female members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of them under the age of 18, were condemned to 11 years in prison for taking part in pro-Morsi demonstrations. The growing mobilisation of young MB women could have an enormous transformative potential: destabilising existing gender relations within the movement; enlarging the chances for collective agency among young women in a country where the public sphere of political activism remains heavily male; and favouring important psychological transformations among women from being passive subjects to more active agents of self-expression. In the Palestinian Territories, although most young Palestinians are disillusioned and have abandoned politics, a vibrant, albeit small, youth movement has been emerging that is challenging not only Israeli occupation but also the existing elite, the Palestinian leadership. While the movement is faced with many obstacles such as the Israeli occupation and oppression by Fatah and Hamas, it bears many similarities to the youth activism of the 1980s which eventually led to the First Intifada.[8] In addition, as Bayat argued, beyond organised collective agency, under repressive contexts, youth continue to reclaim their youthfulness and enhance their individual lives through dispersed actions and with no aim of overthrowing authoritarian regimes.[9] These non-movements of youth, according to Bayat, probably became part of the 2011 Arab uprisings and merged into a more concerted collective action once they were provided with an opportunity. The transformative impact of youth activism should then be assessed in multiple dimensions, even, and maybe most of all, below the level of real immediate impact on state policies or institutions. The Arab region is rich with forms of political contestation and mobilisation – mostly led by youth – which, while not leading inexorably towards the expansion of civil society or democratisation, still have potential for a long-term transformative impact on the political culture or on forms of participation (although this is less visible). For example, as was mentioned above and as has already happened, social movements can bring about cultural transformation by affecting values and symbols as well as by reshaping public debates towards key political issues. Other kinds of consequences include movement spill-over effects. Social movements may indeed have an impact in that they inspire other forms of mobilisations. The gains or losses made by one movement can have beneficial consequences for the demands or the strategies of other movements, or their success can encourage further mobilisation (e.g. the labour movement vs the youth movement as happened in 1968 in the US and Europe).

[8] Hoigilt, Jacob. "The Palestinian Spring That Was Not: The Youth and Political Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35: 4 (Fall) 2013.

[9] "Urban Subalterns and the Non-Movements of the Arab Uprisings: An Interview with Asef Bayat." *al-Jadaliyya*, 26 March 2013. Available at www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10815/the-urban-subalterns-and-the-non-movements-of-the-

Youth Unemployment in Mediterranean Countries

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It is a well-known fact that youth unemployment rates are currently alarmingly high in all of the EU's Mediterranean countries (comprising France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Even before the economic crisis hit in 2008, unemployment in each of these countries was already higher than the EU average. During and after the crisis, youth unemployment increased sharply, especially in Greece and Spain. By the end of 2012, the youth unemployment rate was above 50% in both countries: 55.0% in Spain and 58.1% in Greece. Likewise, the rate in Italy and Portugal was almost 40%, although in France it was only slightly higher than the EU average. In 2013, youth unemployment rates continued to rise, by 0.1% in the EU as a whole, 1.7% in Spain, and 2.9% in Italy. In Greece, youth unemployment remained quasi stable at 58.0% (-0.1). In France, the rate decreased in the third quarter of 2013 to 25.2%. The most significant drop was observed in Portugal.

According to Eurostat, the share of pupils in upper-secondary education enrolled in the vocational stream in the EU was 55.7% for males and 44.7% for females. The shares are lower than in the EU as a whole for all of the Mediterranean countries except Italy (70.1% male, 49.2% female).

The unemployment rate of people aged 15 to 24 is more than twice as high as that of people aged 25 and over, both in the EU as a whole and in the Mediterranean countries. However, those numbers must be interpreted carefully for two reasons (Barslund and Gros, 2013). First, the group of 15-to-24-year-olds actually consists of two subgroups, teenagers (aged 15 to 19) and young adults between the ages of 20 and 24. Most of the teenagers are still in school or training or, if not, are likely to be very low-skilled. Therefore, even in normal times, they would have difficulties finding a job. Young people aged 20 to 24 have typically completed secondary education or finished their university studies early and are seeking a full-time job. Second, only a small fraction of young people are in the labour force, on average only about 10%. A youth unemployment rate of 60% does not mean that 60% of the whole cohort is unemployed. It means that 60% of young people in the labour force are unemployed. The youth unemployment rate is thus potentially misleading, and it is therefore preferable to look at the youth unemployment ratio instead. This is the percentage of unemployed people in the reference population. The youth unemployment ratio of young people aged 15 to 24 is only slightly higher than the unemployment rate for those aged 25 and over and is somewhat less alarming.

In Italy and France, the youth unemployment ratio is similar to that for the EU-28 as a whole. In contrast, in Spain, the ratio increased dramatically during and after the economic crisis. In Greece and Portugal, the percentage of out-of-work young people looking for a job did not increase until 2009. After 2009, the ratio in both countries consistently went up, reaching 14.3% in Portugal and 16.1% in Greece in 2012.

An alternative indicator is the NEET rate. This includes all young people aged 15 to 24 who are not in education, employment, or training. The NEET rate for teenagers is usually much lower than the NEET rate both for young adults aged 20 to 24 and for the age group as a whole, as most of them are still in

CHART 16 **Youth Unemployment Rate (ages 15 to 24)**



Source: Eurostat.

CHART 17 **Different EU-28 Indicators of Youth Exclusion**



Source: Eurostat.

school or training. The NEET average for the EU is lower than the youth unemployment rate. However, especially in Italy, Spain, and Greece, the NEET rate is much higher than in the EU as a whole. In Spain, it grew tremendously during and after the recession, rising from 12.2% in 2007 to 18.3% in 2009, and it has remained high at about 19%. The NEET rate in Italy was already high even before the recession, at

The youth unemployment rate is potentially misleading, and it is therefore preferable to look at the youth unemployment ratio instead. This is the percentage of unemployed people in the reference population

about 17%. It, too, continued to grow during and after the crisis, reaching 21.1% in 2012. In Greece, the rate began to climb in 2009; by 2012, it had reached a similar level as in Italy (20.3%).

CHART 18 **Youth Unemployment Ratio (ages 15-24)**



Source: Eurostat.

CHART 19 **NEET Rates (ages 15-24)**



Source: Eurostat.

Macro vs. Institutions

The high youth unemployment rates in the EU's Mediterranean countries clearly reflect a structural problem with regard to training for youths and other institutional aspects of the labour market. The first problem is the dualisation of the labour market between permanent and fixed-term contracts. While permanent employment has strict dismissal protection, with temporary employment this protection is reduced. This makes the transition to a permanent job more difficult as it is quite costly for the employer. Furthermore, the NEET rates are above the EU average; it is not only low-skilled young people but also university graduates who are having significant problems finding work. This is due to the marginal role of vocational training, which is mainly school-based. Better integration of employer-provided training could improve this situation. Active labour market policies (ALMPs), which focus on hiring subsidies for apprentices, have only a limited impact (Zimmermann et al., 2013).

It is not only low-skilled young people but also university graduates who are having significant problems finding work. This is due to the marginal role of vocational training, which is mainly school-based. Better integration of employer-provided training could improve this situation

In **Italy**, the school-to-work transition is very problematic. In the Italian system, the presence of the State is marginal compared to the central role played by the family, which bears the primary costs of the transition to adulthood. In Italy, more than 60% of the unemployed belong to the category of new labour market entrants, and the share of long-term youth unemployment (more than 12 months) is also significant. This is due to the excessively rigid educational system, particularly in the tertiary stage, which results in very late entry into the labour market. Furthermore, Italy has extremely high dropout rates at all stages of schooling. Economic returns for tertiary education have fallen, and the number of university enrolments is higher than the number of graduates.

The level of secondary and tertiary education is low, and there is insufficient contact between the education system and the labour market. By focusing mainly on theory rather than practical applications, young people do not develop the problem-solving skills and competencies required by potential employers and have hardly any chance to gain early work experience. Moreover, the task of filling the youth experience gap has been left to the market, which has resulted in inadequate solutions such as temporary employment. Also, the lack of an adequate vocational training system and the absence of post-graduate bridges, such as job placement activities, are problematic. Furthermore, the significant mismatch of human capital generated by disparities in demand (technical) and supply (humanistic) is a problem in Italy. Because of the lack of demand for their particular type of qualification, young people are forced to accept jobs designed for candidates with lower qualifications. This phenomenon is called overeducation. McGuinness and Sloane (2010) report that overeducation is normally below 10% in the EU, but in Italy the percentage of graduates employed in posts designed for those with a secondary school diploma is one of the highest (23% for first-time hiring) in the EU. With a total of 13%, Italy is the third lowest in terms of performance five years after graduation, just marginally ahead of Spain.

In **Spain** the educational structure is also deeply polarised. The country has the highest rate of both early dropouts (almost 25% in 2012) and university graduates in the EU. University graduates have the same problem of mismatched skills as their Italian counterparts. More than 40% of young Spanish university graduates work in occupations requiring only low or medium skills (Garcia, 2011). Prior to the crisis, the construction boom-and-bust cycle and high growth in low-knowledge intensive service jobs raised the wages for unskilled workers during the long expansion period, thereby discouraging the pursuit of education. As a consequence, both during and after the crisis, employment rates among unskilled workers have fallen considerably. Since the crisis, participation in education has risen again (Dolado et al., 2013). Furthermore, there is a lack of means for developing specific occupational skills and acquiring practical experience with employers. Most of the vocational training in Spain is school-based. Only 4% of vocational training combines school- and work-based training. Introducing dual training in Spain could facilitate screening by firms to find potentially good job matches and would provide young people with occupation-specific work experience, thereby easing their transition into permanent positions. Instead, youth employment policies have concentrated on offering training contracts, which mainly reduce the cost to the employer of hiring young workers via subsidies. This has not increased firms' investment in the youth population's specific human capital because the training is not work-based. Instead, it has increased youth employment turnover, shifting the occupational distribution towards less qualified jobs. Moreover, because these contracts have not lowered entry-level wages, they have provided the wrong kind of incentives, encouraging students to drop out of school at a young age (Zimmermann et al., 2013).

In **France**, vocational trainees can enrol in either full-time vocational schooling or on-the-job apprenticeships combined with part-time study at training centres. Apprenticeships in France suffer from the perception that this training path is an inferior alternative to full-time vocational schooling (Cahuc et al., 2013). Employers receive some support for providing training. To address the issue of young people who fail to enter the training system, there is a long-standing tradition in France of subsidising temporary employment and training contracts as an ALMP. During the crisis, support was also given for additional apprenticeships, as well as the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones. Yet the effectiveness of these measures is questionable (Zimmermann et al., 2013).

Dual vocational training connects with the changing needs of the economy and gives young people the opportunity to gain specific knowledge and preliminary job experience

In general, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece have only limited provisions for training. In contrast, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Denmark have maintained a highly successful dual education and

training system through apprenticeships. In all four countries, over 40% of young people who leave school when it ceases to be compulsory take on apprenticeships (EEAG, 2013). Dual vocational training connects with the changing needs of the economy and gives young people the opportunity to gain specific knowledge and preliminary job experience. Firms contribute alongside the government to the costs and co-management of the overall system (Eichhorst et al., 2013). In this system, the transition from education to work is smoothed and young people have better chances of ending up in a permanent job.

Over the last few years, the importance and the share of public expenditure on ALMPs have risen in all of the EU's Mediterranean countries. The share of public expenditure spent on training is high in Portugal, modest in France and Italy, only small in Spain and almost non-existent in Greece. In Spain, most ALMPs consist of wage subsidies and reductions of non-wage labour costs in order to encourage companies to hire the unemployed or maintain their staff (Zimmermann et al., 2013). The same pattern can be found in Italy and Greece. This is not a good bridge to regular employment. Subsidised forms of employment should be combined with substantial job-related training by employers to increase young peoples' employability and productivity. Furthermore, support for start-ups, which is minor in all Mediterranean countries, can be a useful tool for creating jobs for young people and help to boost economic development.

A high level of employment protection for permanent jobs makes dismissing employees expensive. In contrast, firing costs are much lower in fixed-term contracts. As especially marginal workers, young people are generally less qualified and are often employed with temporary contracts. On the one hand, fixed-term contracts can help workers accumulate human capital and experience, potentially resulting in a permanent job. On the other, there is a danger that young people will simply move from one fixed-term contract to the next without improving their job situation. Therefore, the effects on workers are ambiguous. The dualisation between permanent contracts and temporary contracts is crucial. Fixed-term employment has been highly responsive to the crisis. Most employment adjustment took place via termination of fixed-term contracts and was concentrated among young people (Zimmermann et al., 2013). In countries hit hard by the crisis, young people stay in school longer because of the lack of employment options. At the same time, more and more youths fall into the NEET category. In countries like Spain, France, and Italy, non-standard employment has been an alternative for jobseekers and for taking on apprenticeships. Non-standard employment provides learning opportunities, but at the same time, young workers are confined to the lower segment of a dual labour market, which leaves them to bear the brunt of labour demand shocks (EEAG, 2013).

CHART 20 **Temporary Employees Aged 15 to 24 as a Percentage of the Total Number of Employees**



Source: Eurostat.

The share of temporary employment is high in all countries except for Greece. Spain has the highest share of temporary jobs in the EU for all sectors and occupations (Dolado et al., 2013). Spain has a long history of very high and volatile unemployment. A high share of temporary jobs results in a lack of employment stability and increasing job insecurity (Dolado et al., 2013). The strong concentration of temporary employment in conjunction with structural change problems caused the current youth unemployment disaster (Eichhorst et al., 2013). The share of temporary employment is also very high in Germany. But the vast majority of teenagers (94.4% in 2010) are covered by a training period as an apprentice or through training that culminates in permanent employment. In contrast, most teenagers in Spain (60% of teenagers and 77% of the young adults in the 20-to-24 age group) accept a fixed-

TABLE 12 **Comparing Minimum Wages and Special Rules for Young People**

	Monthly minimum wage (MW), second half 2013	Special rule for young people
France	€1,430.22[1]	Workers under the age of 17: 80% MW Workers aged 17-18: 90% MW[2]
Greece	€683.76[1]	Workers aged 15-18: 70% MW First entrants aged 19-21: 80% MW First entrants aged 22-25: 84% MW[2]
Portugal	€565.83[1]	No[2]
Spain	€565.83[1]	No[2]

[1] Eurostat and [2] Eurofound 2011.

term contract because they failed to find a permanent job and are therefore on a fixed-term contract involuntarily (Dolado et al., 2013).

The existence of a minimum wage raises the payment of the least well-paid workers, who are generally young and less qualified. There are minimum wages in France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Some countries employ a special rule for the young workforce, normally consisting of a fraction of the prime-age minimum wage rate. Without a provision like this, young workers can be squeezed out of the labour market. In general, young people are less experienced, and those young people who are affected by the minimum wage are mostly less qualified and therefore less productive. In consequence, the minimum wage is too high in some countries to hire young people.

In France the monthly minimum wage is very high. This creates a substantial barrier to accessing employment for low-skilled, young and inexperienced job seekers. A large number of young people in France are not sufficiently qualified to be as productive as the minimum wage requires them to be. In Greece, the exception to the minimum wage is broader and includes a higher share of young people. Until 1998, the Spanish distinguished between employees under and over the age of 18, but the country no longer has a special rule for young people. In Portugal, a reduction of up to 20% can be applied to apprentices and interns for a period not to exceed one year.

Outlook and Policy Conclusion

In EU Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is mostly structural and has deteriorated during the Great Recession. Therefore, well organised strategies to fight youth unemployment should improve the overall performance of the labour market. The goal is to reduce the high unemployment level, the volatility of employment and the risk of exclusion of specific groups from the labour market. Reforms have to be introduced that try to reconcile the security, efficiency, and fiscal aspects of labour market policies. It is important to set the right incentives to reduce high dropout rates, smooth the transition from education to work and increase the possibility of securing a permanent job. At the same time, returns to (vocational) education have to be high, to make investing in all varieties of education worthwhile. Furthermore, the match between the supply and demand for skills has to be improved. Better interaction between the education system and the working world is pivotal in this regard. The gap between the high employment protection and firing costs of permanent contracts and the negligible protection and job security of fixed-term contracts has to be narrowed. The limits on the widespread use of fixed-term contracts must be stricter. Each employment contract could be seen as unlimited, and the longer it remains in force, the more claims could be granted (Eichhorst et al. 2013). Also more flexible wages are needed.

In EU Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is mostly structural and has deteriorated during the Great Recession. Therefore, well organised strategies to fight youth unemployment should improve the overall performance of the labour market

Still, structural reforms of this kind will need some time to show effects and improve the situation for young people in the labour market in a sustainable way. Of course, they will also interact with the overall

At the same time, returns to (vocational) education have to be high, to make investing in all varieties of education worthwhile. Furthermore, the match between the supply and demand for skills has to be improved. Better interaction between the education system and the working world is pivotal in this regard

macroeconomic environment and labour demand. But the losers of the Great Recession and the labour market cannot be left on their own. The State has a responsibility and must give financial and active support to activate young people in the current situation.

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Labour Market and Education: Youth and Unemployment in the Spotlight

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Since the global economic crisis, youth employment prospects have worsened continuously throughout the world, in developed, transition and developing countries alike. The situation is particularly acute in the Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs) as a result of additional specific factors. As well as the global economic crisis, some countries experienced extraordinary political changes in what is now called the Arab Spring. 'Employment, Liberty, Dignity' was the slogan of the Jasmin Revolution of January 2011 in Tunisia, which created a domino effect across the whole region. The initial economic impact of the Arab Spring was rather negative owing to political turbulence and social unrest, which have had a particular impact on the tourism, production and export sectors and on foreign direct investment.

Beyond this political and economic context, what is unique about youth in AMCs is the high share of youth population. Indeed AMCs are experiencing the largest cohorts of their youth population in history, which is likely to continue for at least three to four decades. Whether youth is a 'gift' or a 'burden' is a matter of long discussion, but demographic pressure is a key feature of educational systems and labour markets in most of the AMCs. The share of the population under the age of 30 years has exceeded 60%, and as a result the working-age population is approaching 70% (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2012). Considering the high aspirations of youth for education, jobs, marriage, housing etc., this puts a tremendous pressure on national economies and political systems in general. If the situation is not well managed, it may well pose a risk of social instability (ETF, 2013).

Key Features of the Youth Labour Market

Labour markets in AMCs have many challenges, but this article focuses on the youth labour market. Before youth unemployment rates, though, one should start with labour force participation rates of youth. According to the ILO (2013), on average, the youth labour force participation rate in 2012 ranged from 30.3% in the Middle East to 33.2% in North Africa, while the world average of youth labour force participation stands at slightly below 50%. Furthermore, there is a significant difference by gender: on average around 45% of young males and only 15% of young females are active in the labour markets of AMCs. Female labour force participation is particularly low in Mashreq countries (Jordan, Palestine), while the regional youth male participation rate – 45% – is comparable to the rates in advanced economies. Youth employment rates are even lower (around 35% for males and around 10% for females).

This very low youth activity rate (less than one third) suggests three important implications. *Firstly*, youth unemployment rates (Table 2 below) refer to only those unemployed within this 'active youth group' (currently standing at around 31%). In other words, although the youth unemployment rate is very high in the region, the highest regional average in the world and more than twice as high as the global average (as highlighted by ILO 2014), it corresponds only to the share of unemployed within 31% of youth, not the whole youth population. Hence when we talk of youth unemployment this refers to quite a small number of youth (approximately 8.6% of the total young population).

Nevertheless, the youth unemployment rate has increased after the Arab Spring, estimated at 28.1% in 2013 in the region, and is projected to increase gradually to 30% by 2018 (ILO, 2014). For example, unemployment among young people was 25% in Algeria, 30% in Egypt, 31% in Jordan, 42% in Tunisia, 44% in Palestine and 49% in Libya (see Chart 5). Indeed the majority of unemployed people in MPCs (up to 80% in some countries, such as Egypt) are first job seekers with no previous work experience. Moreover, most of them have intermediate and higher education, implying that educational attainment actually increases the risk of joblessness. For instance, the unemployment rates for those with tertiary education are 30% in Tunisia, 22% in Egypt, 19% in Morocco and 18% in Jordan (see Chart 6). *Secondly*, there is also clear gender segmentation in the labour market opportunities for young people: employment opportunities are rare for young men in the region, but almost non-existent for young women, as most employers openly give preference to male job seekers (ETF, 2012). Other employers do prefer female workers, though the jobs offered are low skilled and low paid, and hence not attractive to the few 'educated' females who seek employment. As seen in Table 2, the unemployment rate for young women is extremely high despite the fact that the female labour force participation rate is the lowest of

TABLE 2 **Unemployment Rates: Total, Female Total, Youth Total and Youth Female (last available year)**

Country and date of data	Total Unemployment (15+)	Female Unemployment (15+)	Total Youth Unemployment (15-24)	Youth Female Unemployment (15-24)
Algeria 2013	9.8	16.3	24.8	39.7
Egypt 2012	12.7	24.1	29.7	53.2
Jordan 2013	12.6	22.2	31.2	55.1
Lebanon 2009	11.4	23	16.8	22.3
Libya 2012	19.03	25.05	48.7	NA
Morocco 2013	9.2	9.6	19.3	18.1
Palestine 2013	23.4	35.0	43.9	62.1
Tunisia 2013	15.9	23.0	42.3	45.4
EU28	10.8	10.9	22.9	–

Source: National Statistical Offices; EU28: Eurostat; Libya ILOSTAT database. Notes: Egypt unemployment rates 15-64; EU28 15-74; Tunisia: data from 2nd trimester of 2013

CHART 4 **Gross Enrolment Rates in Lower Secondary and Upper Secondary Education and the Share of VET Students in Upper Secondary**



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics UIS-UNESCO; Note: *Libya are UIS estimations

CHART 5 **Unemployment Rates: Total, Female Total and Youth Total (last available year)**



Source: National Statistical Offices; EU28: Eurostat; Libya ILOSTAT database. Notes: Egypt's unemployment rates 15-64; EU28 15-74; Tunisia: data from 2nd trimester of 2013.

CHART 6 **Unemployment Rate of Total Population and those with Higher Education by Sex**



Source National Statistical Office, Notes: Algeria 15-59, Superiéur 2013; Egypt: 51-64, 2012, Jordan: 2012. Data refer to 2nd trimester of the year; Morocco 2011. ISCED: International Standard Classification on Education.

all regions. Young female unemployment is particularly high in Palestine (62%), Jordan (55%), Egypt (53%), Tunisia (45%) and Algeria (40%). Therefore, the current employment gap between males and females is reflected in the same way among the youth population as well – and this gap will not decrease, even in the medium term, in the AMCs.

Thirdly, we do not know exactly what the rest of the youth population (almost 70%) is doing, as they are neither employed nor unemployed (not in the labour market). Given the age group 15-24, part of the youth population are students at different levels and types of education. As seen in Chart 4, gross enrolment rates in lower secondary education are almost universal (with the exceptions of Morocco, Lebanon and Palestine), but they are relatively low in upper secondary education which corresponds to the age group of 15-18 (ranging from 54% to 77%). Moreover, the share of vocational education and training (VET) students at upper secondary level is extremely small in AMCs – with the exception of Egypt, with almost half of students directed to VET streams. This means that there are a considerable number of early school leavers (or school drop-outs) in most AMCs.

Considering the gross enrolment rates of secondary and higher education in the region, ETF calculated that around 30-40% of youth population are currently in education (with wide variations between countries) (ETF, 2012). Putting together the 'active youth population' (31% including employed and unemployed) and 'youth in education' (30-40%), there is no information on the remaining one-third of the youth population. Indeed this group is neither in education nor in the labour market, and is not visible in statistics. The article employs here the concept of NEETs: young people who are not in education, training and employment. NEETs refer to those youth who currently do not have a job, are not enrolled in training or are not classified as students. Therefore it focuses on the 'youth at risk' who lack access to learning opportunities and are jobless and/or inactive.

As seen in Table 3 (and Chart 7), the NEETs are a more serious problem in AMCs and exceed the EU28 average. They increase from the age group 15-24 towards 15-29. For the age group 15-29, it reaches 41% in Egypt, for which data is available, 35% in Palestine, 32% in Tunisia and 29% in Jordan. This means that at least one out of three youth aged 15-29 is not in education or training, and not employed. Moreover, there is a big difference in the NEET rate for males and females. In Egypt, for instance, there are 40 percentage points difference between males and females in the NEET rate, 30 percentage points in Jordan, 23 in Palestine and 20 in Tunisia (see Table 2). Female NEETs are primarily 'inactive' in these countries (around 80% of them), while male NEETs are mainly 'unemployed' instead of inactive. This may be explained by typical gender roles pushing women to take care of a household, children or other relatives and remain at home.

High Diversity among the Youth Groups

Youth are not only at a disadvantage compared with adults, there are also particular youth groups that are more vulnerable to social and economic disadvantages and poor performance in education

TABLE 3 **NEETs Rate in Available AMCs and EU28**

	15-24 age group	15-29 age group	Males (15-29)	Females (15-29)
Egypt 2012	35.9	40.5	9.3	49.5
Jordan 2012	24.6	29.0	14.9	44.2
Palestine 2013	28.1	35.0	23.6	46.2
Tunisia 2013	25.4	32.2	22.4	42.2
EU28 2013	17.7	14.1	14.1	17.7

Source: Jordan, Tunisia, Palestine: ETF calculations based on ILO School to Work Transition Surveys; Egypt: ETF calculations based on the Egyptian labour market panel survey 2012 (ELMPS); EU28: Eurostat.

CHART 7 **NEETs Rate in Available AMCs and EU28 (15-29 age group)**



Source: ETF calculations based on ILO School to Work Transition Survey; Egypt: ELMPS 2012, Eurostat for EU28. Note: Data for Egypt and Jordan 2012, for Palestine and Tunisia 2013.

and employment. This is particularly the case in AMCs where the social and economic inequality is very high (ETF, 2012) and the traditional state institutions (including education and the job market) tend to reinforce inequality rather than reduce it. The determinants of such disadvantages include:

- *Socio-economic background*: Young people from poor households tend to become young working poor, because of missed education opportunities and/or poor employment opportunities. They tend to leave education early.
- *Literacy, education and skills*: Less-educated (uneducated) youth are more vulnerable in life and in the job market, although they may start working earlier in poor quality and informal jobs. In most cases, they remain trapped in these jobs.
- *Gender*: Being female means a higher risk of being inactive or unemployed, having lower wages and directed to low-paid segregated jobs that are traditionally accepted 'female' jobs.
- *Rural/urban (and regional):* The prospects and opportunities of youth in urban and rural areas are completely different. In general rural youth and youth from less developed regions are more vulnerable in education and employment.
- *Health conditions:* Youth with learning difficulties and the disabled youth are not even visible in society and public policies, although in most cases they are vulnerable to much abuse.

Therefore, 'heterogeneity' and 'diversity' are the key words to understanding the youth in AMCs, as well as their labour market situation. Despite the difficulties of mapping all youth groups in the region, and at the risk of oversimplification, a few distinct groups of young people with different types of employment challenges can already be identified.

The first such group is the youth with relatively good access to education opportunities and who go through the upper secondary, post-secondary and/or university education. Strangely enough, this is the group who face higher unemployment in the region, the so-called 'educated unemployed,' which receives a lot of attention. Despite the seriousness of the problem, we must remember that the proportion and absolute number of educated youth within the total age group of 15–30 is very small, and they are more likely to belong to the higher socioeconomic strata of society. This means that they may be able to choose between 'available jobs' or 'remain unemployed.' Their labour market entry is slow (postponed adulthood), but they are more likely to get better jobs in the end. Exception to this pattern is young females, whose unemployment rate is three times higher than that of their male counterparts (e.g. Egypt, Jordan and Palestine). As the labour market (in particular the private sector) is mostly closed to females, the majority become discouraged and drop out of it after a few attempts.

The second youth group consists of unskilled and low-skilled young people who tend to start working early. They are, in general, early school leavers and under strong social pressure to meet the economic needs of their families (early adulthood). A large part of this group are young males who occupy precarious positions in the labour market and move between short-term insecure jobs without experiencing long-term unemployment. There are also some young females working mainly in subsistence agriculture as family helpers in this group. Being employed, they may not get attention, but in reality they cannot afford to be unemployed. They do not have the necessary financial or human resources to improve/upgrade their skills. Thus they search for any (precarious) jobs and accept the poorest working conditions in the informal sector that will allow them to make a living, with subsistence wages and without any prospects for improvement.

The third group is inactive youth who are neither in education and training nor in the labour market. This is the most vulnerable to social exclusion as they are likely to be illiterate and/or uneducated women, including those who have dropped out of school. Surveys for some countries indicate that more than 40% of the young population is in this situation. Evidence points to rates close to 25% of the young male population in countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Palestine and close to 70% for young women (ETF, 2012). A large part of this gender difference is due to early school leaving and gender-related social norms that restrict mobility and access to further education or work for young girls after they have completed compulsory education.

It is clear that each of these groups requires different types of help for their specific needs. Given the large numbers of disadvantaged and vulnerable youth in

the second and third groups, there is a need to balance policy measures among these youth groups and to develop more instruments for those young people who are less visible in AMCs. For example, the second group needs special programmes for school reintegration combined with apprenticeships and/or second-chance adult training courses to enable them to upgrade their skills and hence progress in their careers and find better-quality jobs. The most effective actions for the third group would be those that promote universal literacy, together with developing key life competences for women, including mentoring programmes and second-chance adult training courses.

Key Barriers for Youth Insertion in the Labour Market

It must be remembered that the main factors affecting youth employment prospects are poor macroeconomic performance and growth (particularly deteriorated after the Arab Spring), the model of development, which determines the intensity of employment growth and the level of skilled job creation, and a lack of sufficient labour demand corresponding to the high demographic pressure. This is related to the model and stage of economic development in AMCs, but also to inbuilt factors such as the rigidity of labour market regulations. However, from the point of view of employability there are also a number of factors that make insertion into the labour market more difficult (ETF, 2012).

Adequate education and training: Despite wide-ranging improvements in educational coverage and achievement, school drop-out and illiteracy rates are still relatively high, and upper secondary enrolment rates relatively low. Young people refuse to enrol in VET programmes and are unwilling to learn manual work or craft professions. This still poses a major challenge to employability in large populations. Moreover, the low quality and Labour Market relevance of academic-oriented education, individuals' preference for humanities degrees, the low proportion of young people opting for VETs, the strong gender segregation in VET occupations and the mismatch between individuals' skills and employers' needs are frequently mentioned in this regard.

Generic and/or soft skills (key competences): These include ICT literacy, foreign languages, communications and social skills, analysis and synthesis, critical thinking and work discipline. All studies point to this element as a major shortcoming in AMCs. Soft skills are tightly linked to cultural attitudes and need to be seen as a process rather than a single intervention. Teachers' professional development and changes in school and university curricula and teaching methods could contribute much more to improving them than a proliferation of programmes such as those being implemented in some countries.

Social expectations: These still dissuade young people from enrolling in VETs and working in technical/manual occupations. Even graduation from prestigious VET centres, a step that opens positive employment prospects, is used as a method of entry into university by many students, and there is still a strong preference, in particular among graduates, for obtaining a state job (offering full social security and job security), despite the fact that for many young individuals this entails undertaking unproductive and unsatisfactory work. Although the State is no longer the employer of last resort for all graduates, political mobilisation often leads to increased public sector hiring, and being unemployed is a precondition for entry into the public sector.

Overall business environment: The business environment, the amount of red tape and bureaucracy involved in creating a company, and in particular the conditions prevailing in the financial sector do not encourage self-employment and SME development, despite positive experiences of entrepreneurship programmes on labour market insertion and employability. The structure of unemployment suggests that a significant part of unemployment results from high job expectations by workers with some formal education and a low valuation of these credentials by the private sector. Indeed many private companies identify the lack of skills among workers as a major constraint to business development.

Efficient job-matching services and transparent labour market information systems: Weak job-matching services is reflected in the fact that most jobs are found through personal contacts and social networks by those who are already employed, rather than through transparent and merit-based recruitment mechanisms involving open competition and/or job intermediation by public employment services.

Women are in particular at a great disadvantage as they lack personal contacts. Very low activity rates and very high unemployment rates imply strong discrimination suffered by women in relation to access to employment. Indeed, female employment is highly concentrated either in the public sector (in the education, health and social sectors) or in agriculture as family helpers.

Conclusions

The above analysis of the youth labour market implies much vulnerability among a highly diverse young population, poor performance of education and training systems, strong discrimination of females in the labour market, the devaluation of (scarce) national human resources and an increased risk of social instability. Some social theories point to the correlation between the proportion of unemployed young people in a society and the incidence of political violence (ETF, 2012). Nonetheless, there is a wide spectrum of policy options available in the field of youth employment promotion and employability to address the challenges of specific youth groups over the short, medium and long term, given the need to optimise the limited resources allocated to promoting employment.

- Young people are not a homogeneous group; therefore, targeting specific groups and specific disadvantages in the labour market is more effective. In particular, more measures for vulnerable groups are needed (early school leavers, inactive females, informal workers, NEETs etc.).
- The quality and relevance of, and access to, universal education need to be improved to reduce school drop-out rates and prevent youth from falling into the unemployment and poverty trap. Particular attention needs to be given to secondary education (both lower and upper secondary).
- Focusing principally on supply-side interventions will not solve the problem. Job creation policies (e.g. growth strategy, private sector development) and the use of labour market policies for targeted groups, such as wage subsidies, apprenticeships and training programmes, are needed.
- Entrepreneurship, self-employment, cooperatives, public investment programmes and employment intermediation services should be given priority to increase employment opportunities, particularly for the disadvantaged youth groups identified.
- VET systems have to be made more attractive, better quality and more responsive to the rapidly changing demand for skills in local labour markets. A more diverse offer of VET programmes, improved curricula and teachers, and extended outreach of VET to the youth are all needed. More emphasis on lifelong learning and soft skills is key to improving youth employability.

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North African Women's Rights in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring

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Women's rights movements more or less thrived in North Africa[1] prior to what is known as the Arab Spring: the Egyptian movement (1920s), the Moroccan movement (1940s), the Algerian movement (1970s), the Tunisian movement (1980s), and the Mauritanian movement (1980s). These movements basically fought for authority in a space-based patriarchy and managed to feminise the public spheres of power, especially civil society. With all the region's ups and downs, women's movements managed to make significant educational, social, political and legal gains. From the end of the 1970s onward, the success of the Iranian revolution (1979), the downfall of the Soviet Union (1991) and the subsequent emergence of the US as the sole superpower led to the emergence of 'political Islam.' This gradually resulted in a complex situation where women's voices started to be categorised as 'secular' or 'Islamic.' The question to ask at this juncture is: What has become of all this in the aftermath of the uprisings that the media dubbed the 'Arab Spring'?

In reflecting on the fate of women's rights some three years after the commencement of the Arab (but also Berber, Coptic, etc.) revolts in North Africa and in the sixth year after a global financial and economic crisis, words from the introductory paragraph of Charles Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities*, published in 1859, resonate strangely across time and place:

> "It was the best times, it was the worst times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the other way."

Amidst this dilemma, three things come to mind:

1. A paradoxical situation
2. The realisation that North Africa is not the Maghreb and the Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) is not the Middle East (with Egypt being both North Africa and the Middle East).[2]
3. Shifting strategies as a response to shifting challenges

A Paradoxical Situation

Two major paradoxes have emerged after the Arab Spring. On the one hand, there was a spectacular street presence of women of all ages, ideologies, ethnicities and social statuses during the political mobilisation phases of the uprisings (this has been well documented by all types of media), but, on the other hand, these women were then excluded from decision-making posts after the uprisings. As mobilisers and political actors during the revolutions, women stunned the world by braving gunfire, successfully manipulating social media, and actively

[1] North Africa is a broad regional sweep covering the coastal region from Egypt to Mauritania, stretching from the Atlantic to the Suez Canal, and from the Mediterranean across the Sahara Desert. The countries of North Africa are: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.
[2] The expression 'North Africa' includes Egypt.

pushing for democratic elections. Their image has been repeatedly used to provide a narrative for the Arab uprisings, yet the outcome for them was not so positive. The governments elected by the people after the revolutions represented women either poorly or not at all. For example, in Egypt, the women who bravely stood up to army-sanctioned 'virginity tests,' were absent; the constitutional committee appointed by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces includes no women. Indeed, women won fewer than 10 of the roughly 500 seats, making up only 2% of the first post-Arab Spring parliament in Egypt (compared with the 12% of seats that they held in the previous government). In Tunisia, the October 2011 elections allowed 49 women to be elected to the Constituent Assembly, that is 22% out of 217 seats. However, the backward direction of the political discourse was exemplified by the woman who was allegedly raped by policemen and then, when she filed a complaint, was accused of public indecency. In Libya, which had not had a civil government in four decades, women were used as pawns in complex politics, tainted by tribal and central power interests. In Morocco, women won 67 parliamentary seats (out of 395, that is 17% of the seats), but there was only one woman in the elected government (compared with the previous 2007 government which contained seven women). In addition to all this, women were excluded from the transitional governing bodies, constituent assemblies and committees that rewrote the first draft constitutions. Furthermore, debates on the appropriateness of women as heads of state increased public rhetoric about women's proper place in the domestic sphere, strident campaigns by Islamists to roll back relatively progressive family law, and, most tragically, increased politically motivated violence against women.

With respect to the second paradox, on the one hand, the political Islamisation of the region is a fact (with the adjectives 'moderate' and 'Salafist' added to reflect the different doses of Islamisation); yet, what most women's rights advocates (scholars and activists) gained during the decades that preceded the Arab Spring were also 'Islamic' gains: women's rights advocates in the region fought to improve, and not replace, Sharia (Islamic) laws and they targeted patriarchy not Islam. Moreover, many secular and Islamic feminists (scholars and activists) worked together, showing that Islam had never been a problem so far as women's rights advocates in the region are concerned.

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The Maghreb Is Different from North Africa and the Middle East

One of the major revelations of the Arab Spring is that in matters of women's rights, the Maghreb is different from the Mashreq (the Middle East). An important indicator of this is that in the post-Arab Spring period, more women were elected/appointed in the Parliament in the Maghreb than in the Middle East. The main reason for this may be formulated in the following terms. As a social movement, the women's rights movement 'functions' in the male-dominated public space and, hence, is bound to either clash or interact with three powerful sources of authority in this space: politics, economy and religion. In Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen or Kuwait, women's issues have never been positioned as a crucial player in the political games of the public sphere. By contrast, in the Maghreb, especially Tunisia and Morocco, they are. Ever since their independence, the countries of the Maghreb have 'used' women's rights as part of the State's socio-political dynamics, as a means of modernisation. In post-Arab Spring Tunisia, the relatively high number of women in the Parliament was partly made possible by the 1956 Personal Status Code which protects women's rights. Indeed, this Code was heavily instrumentalised by women's NGOs in the recent political campaigns as a shield against extremism and a guarantee of women's rights.

In Morocco, more women had access to the Parliament due to the success of the One Million Signatures to reform the *Mudawwana* (Family Law) in the early nineties, after which women's issues became

part and parcel of the ideological wars that opposed secularists to Islamists. The fact that the King is the highest political and religious authority and that the interests of the monarchy coincided with those of women in the face of rampant Islamism, facilitated the strategising between the two and led to various reforms that somehow saved Morocco during the Arab Spring uprisings.

Shifting Strategies

Another characterising feature of the post-Arab Spring uprisings is the dramatic shift of strategies on the part of women's rights movements. Five such shifts may be singled out:

- First, women's rights highlighted as a *genuine prerequisite for democracy*. While women's rights are sometimes seen as secondary to democratic change, gender equality needs to be presented as an essential prerequisite of true democracy.
- Second, acknowledging the strength of the law and fighting the side-lining of the concept of gender equality as a human right in the implementation of the new constitutions. This means working towards the inclusion of gender equality in every process of democratisation and understanding that gender is not only a symptom but also the backbone of every development strategy, because it is the main engine of economic development.
- Third, the push for more interaction between liberal/secular and Islamic feminists in the region in spite of the fact that Islamic feminists work more from inside Islamic political parties. Avoiding polarisation and seeking a centre where democracy and liberalism are maintained.
- Fourth, the avoidance of blaming religion and understanding that religion becomes very complex when mixed with politics in a region with high female illiteracy and a strong space-based patriarchy.
- Fifth, the use of social media to foster grassroots movements and allow visibility of political action.

Conclusion

What we are witnessing in North Africa right now is the beginning of a *process* by which democratisation is becoming rooted in the region. Democratisation in the region is very much a *process*, not a government programme implemented by staunch democrats. This is why maintaining and improving women's rights in the region is absolutely crucial. It is and will remain the litmus test of any future democracy. It is true that the region is being Islamised, but we need to understand that religious identity and faith are two different (and possibly opposing) concepts in politics. The reason for this is that the religious field in North Africa is becoming increasingly diversified, and hence increasingly less likely to be reconstructed as political ideology. Because of religious diversification, what we are witnessing is a deconstruction of Islam where the aim is not so much a secularisation of society but an 'autonomisation' of politics from religion, and of religion from politics. Again women's rights in the region are crucial to the striking of this very balance.

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ALGERIA

Official Name:	People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
Form of Government:	Semi-presidential republic
Head of State:	Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Head of Government:	Abdelmalek Sellal

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National People's Assembly)

National Liberation Front (FLN)	207	Independents	18
National Rally for Democracy (RND)	65	Algerian National Front (FNA, nationalist/conservative)	9
Green Algeria Alliance (AVV, Islamist coalition)	48	Front for Justice and Development (FJD, Islamist)	8
Socialist Forces Front (FFS, social democrat)	26	Algerian Popular Movement (MPA, democrat)	7
Worker's Party (PT, communist)	24	Others	50

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Algiers (2.56)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Oran (0.85); Constantine (0.43)

Area km^2:	2,381,740	Population age <15 (%):	28
Population (millions):	39.2	Population age >64 (%):	5
Population density (hab/km^2):	16	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2.80
Urban population (%):	70	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	69/73
Average annual population growth rate (%):	1.9	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	22

Economy

GDP & Debt	
GDP (millions $):	214,080
GDP per capita ($, PPP):	14,258
GDP growth (%):	4.1
Public Debt (in % GDP):	8.7
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-6.2
External Debt (millions $):	5,231
Inflation Rate (%):	2.9
FDI	
Inflows (millions $):	1,691
Outflows (millions $):	-268
International tourism	
Tourist arrivals (000):	2,634
Tourism receipts (million $):	326
Migrant remittances	
Receipts (millions $):	2,000
Receipts (in % GDP):	1.0

Economic Sectors	
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	11
Industry, value added (% of GDP):	48
Services, value added (% of GDP):	42
Labour market	
Labour participation rate, female (%):	15.2
Unemployment rate (%):	9.8
Youth unemployment rate (%):	24.0
Employment in:	
Agriculture (% of total employment):	10.8
Industry (% of total employment):	30.9
Services (% of total employment):	58.4
Energy	
Production (millions mt oil eq):	145.8
Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	41.9
Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	1,108
Import (% energy used):	-248.0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions $)	69,367	68,242	-1,125
in goods (millions $)	58,737	64,204	5,467
in services (millions $)	10,630	4,038	-6,593
in goods and services (% GDP)	33.0	32.5	-0.5

Main Trading Partners

Import: China (12%), France (11%), Italy (10%), Spain (9%), Germany (5%)

Export: Spain (16%), Italy (14%), United Kingdom (11%), France (10%), United States (8%)

Society

Education	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	87.2/73.1
Net enrolment rate (primary):	97
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	96
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	33
Mean years of schooling:	7.6
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):	4.3
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	0.07
Water	
Water resources (km^3):	11.7
Water withdrawal (m^3 per capita):	176
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	61
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	15
Desalinated water production (millions m^3):	17
Security	
Total armed forces (000):	317
Military expenditure (% GDP):	4.8

Development	
Human Development Index (Value):	0.717
Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	93
Health	
Physicians density (per 10,000):	12.1
Hospital beds (per 10,000):	..
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	4.4
Emissions	
CO_2 Emissions (mt per capita):	3.0
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	79
Protected areas	
Terrestrial (% of total land area):	7.5
Marine (% of territorial waters):	0.4
ICT	
Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	100.8
Households with computer (per 100):	20.0
Internet users (per 100):	16.5

FRANCE

Official Name:	French Republic
Form of Government:	Semi-presidential constitutional republic
Head of State:	François Hollande
Head of Government:	Manuel Valls

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National Assembly)

Socialist, Republican, and Citizen Group (centre-left, social democrat)	292	Radical Party of the Left (centre-left, social liberal)	16
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP, liberal conservative)	199	Democratic and Republican Left (left coalition)	15
Union of Democrats and Independents (centre-right, liberal)	30	Non registered	8
Ecologists	17		

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Paris (10.76)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Lyon (1.60);Marseille-Aix-en-Provence (1.60); Lille (1.03); Nice-Cannes (0.96); Toulouse (0.92)

Area km^2:	549,190	Population age <15 (%):	18
Population (millions):	65.9	Population age >64 (%):	18
Population density (hab/km^2):	121	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2.01
Urban population (%):	79	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	79/86
Average annual population growth rate (%):	0.4	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	4

Economy

GDP & Debt	
GDP (millions $):	2,846,890
GDP per capita ($, PPP):	40,374
GDP growth (%):	0.2
Public Debt (in % GDP):	95.1
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-4.2
External Debt (millions $):	..
Inflation Rate (%):	0.6
FDI	
Inflows (millions $):	4,875
Outflows (millions $):	-2,555
International tourism	
Tourist arrivals (000):	84,726
Tourism receipts (million $):	66,064
Migrant remittances	
Receipts (millions $):	22,863
Receipts (in % GDP):	0.8

Economic Sectors	
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	2
Industry, value added (% of GDP):	20
Services, value added (% of GDP):	79
Labour market	
Labour participation rate, female (%):	50.7
Unemployment rate (%):	10.4
Youth unemployment rate (%):	23.7
Employment in:	
Agriculture (% of total employment):	2.9
Industry (% of total employment):	21.7
Services (% of total employment):	74.9
Energy	
Production (millions mt oil eq):	133.1
Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	251.7
Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	3,831
Import (% energy used):	47.0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions $)	847,216	812,643	-34,574
in goods (millions $)	658,279	575,585	-82,694
in services (millions $)	188,937	237,058	48,121
in goods and services (% GDP)	30.9	29.7	-1.3

Main Trading Partners

Import: Germany (17%), China (8%), Belgium (8%), Italy (7%), United States (7%)

Export: Germany (16%), Belgium (8%), Italy (7%), United Kingdom (7%), Spain (7%)

Society

Education	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	../..
Net enrolment rate (primary):	98
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	108
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	60
Mean years of schooling:	11.1
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):	5.7
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	2.26
Water	
Water resources (km^3):	211.0
Water withdrawal (m^3 per capita):	508
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	12
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	69
Desalinated water production (millions m^3):	12
Security	
Total armed forces (000):	326
Military expenditure (% GDP):	2.2

Development	
Human Development Index (Value):	0.884
Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	20
Health	
Physicians density (per 10,000):	31.8
Hospital beds (per 10,000):	64.0
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	11.6
Emissions	
CO_2 Emissions (mt per capita):	5.1
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	482
Protected areas	
Terrestrial (% of total land area):	24.7
Marine (% of territorial waters):	58.5
ICT	
Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	98.5
Households with computer (per 100):	81.6
Internet users (per 100):	81.9

ITALY

Official Name:	Italian Republic
Form of Government:	Parliamentary constitutional republic
Head of State:	Sergio Mattarella
Head of Government:	Mateo Renzi

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Chamber of Deputies)

Democratic Party (social democrat)	310	Left Ecology Freedom (eco-socialism)	26
Five Star Movement (M5S, populist movement)	91	Northern League (LN, regionalists, populist right)	17
Forza Italia- The People of Freedom (PdL, conservative)	70	For Italy (Christian-democratic)	13
New Centre-Right (centre-right)	33	Brothers of Italy – National Alliance (national consevative)	8
Civic choice (centre-liberal)	25	Others	42

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Rome (3.70)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Milan (3.09); Naples (2.21); Torino (1.7); Palermo (0.86); Bergamo (0.83)

Area km^2:	301,340	Population age <15 (%):	14
Population (millions):	60.2	Population age >64 (%):	21
Population density (hab/km^2):	203	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	1.43
Urban population (%):	69	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	80/86
Average annual population growth rate (%):	1.2	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	3

Economy

GDP & Debt	
GDP (millions $):	2,147,950
GDP per capita ($, PPP):	35,486
GDP growth (%):	-0.4
Public Debt (in % GDP):	132.1
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-3.0
External Debt (millions $):	..
Inflation Rate (%):	0.2
FDI	
Inflows (millions $):	16,508
Outflows (millions $):	31,663
International tourism	
Tourist arrivals (000):	47,704
Tourism receipts (million $):	46,190
Migrant remittances	
Receipts (millions $):	7,536
Receipts (in % GDP):	0.4

Economic Sectors	
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	2
Industry, value added (% of GDP):	23
Services, value added (% of GDP):	74
Labour market	
Labour participation rate, female (%):	39.6
Unemployment rate (%):	12.2
Youth unemployment rate (%):	39.7
Employment in:	
Agriculture (% of total employment):	3.7
Industry (% of total employment):	27.8
Services (% of total employment):	68.5
Energy	
Production (millions mt oil eq):	32.7
Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	158.6
Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	2,664
Import (% energy used):	79.0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions $)	579,964	631,089	51,124
in goods (millions $)	470,527	519,973	49,445
in services (millions $)	109,437	111,116	1,679
in goods and services (% GDP)	28.0	30.5	2.5

Main Trading Partners

Import: Germany (15%), France (8%), China (6%), Netherlands (6%), Russian Federation (6%)

Export: Germany (13%), France (11%), United States (7%), Switzerland (5%), United Kingdom (5%)

Society

Education	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	99.4/99.0
Net enrolment rate (primary):	96
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	100
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	62
Mean years of schooling:	10.1
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):	4.3
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	1.27
Water	
Water resources (km^3):	191.3
Water withdrawal (m^3 per capita):	790
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	44
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	36
Desalinated water production (millions m^3):	97
Security	
Total armed forces (000):	360
Military expenditure (% GDP):	1.6

Development	
Human Development Index (Value):	0.872
Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	26
Health	
Physicians density (per 10,000):	40.9
Hospital beds (per 10,000):	34.0
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	9.2
Emissions	
CO_2 Emissions (mt per capita):	6.2
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	605
Protected areas	
Terrestrial (% of total land area):	21.6
Marine (% of territorial waters):	19.9
ICT	
Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	158.8
Households with computer (per 100):	71.1
Internet users (per 100):	58.5

LIBYA

Official Name:	State of Libya
Form of Government:	Provisional parliamentary republic
Head of State:	Aguila Saleh Issa (President of the House of Representatives of Libya)
Head of Government:	Abdullah al-Thani (Tobruk)

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

Uncertain state due to the collapse of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 2011 and an ongoing civil war between the Council of Deputies in Tobruk and its supporters, the New General National Congress in Tripoli and its supporters, and various jihadist and tribal elements controlling parts of the country

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Tripoli (1.13)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Benghazi (0.74); Misrata (0.64); Zawiya (0.20)

Area km^2:	1,759,540	Population age <15 (%):	29
Population (millions):	6.2	Population age >64 (%):	5
Population density (hab/km^2):	4	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2.36
Urban population (%):	78	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	73/77
Average annual population growth rate (%):	0.8	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	12

Economy

GDP & Debt		**Economic Sectors**	
GDP (millions $):	41,148	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	..
GDP per capita ($, PPP):	15,706	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	..
GDP growth (%):	-24.0	Services, value added (% of GDP):	..
Public Debt (in % GDP):	39.3	**Labour market**	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-37.7	Labour participation rate, female (%):	30.0
External Debt (millions $):	..	Unemployment rate (%):	19.6
Inflation Rate (%):	2.8	Youth unemployment rate (%):	51.2
FDI		**Employment in:**	
Inflows (millions $):	702	Agriculture (% of total employment):	..
Outflows (millions $):	180	Industry (% of total employment):	..
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	..
Tourist arrivals (000):	..	**Energy**	
Tourism receipts (million $):	..	Production (millions mt oil eq):	31.0
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	13.3
Receipts (millions $):	..	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	2,186
Receipts (in % GDP):	..	Import (% energy used):	-132.0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions $)	..	..	..
in goods (millions $)	31,406	43,557	12,151
in services (millions $)	..	..	..
in goods and services (% GDP)*	32.4	45.0	12.5

Main Trading Partners

Import: Italy (14%),China (11%), Turkey (11%), Egypt (6%), Germany (6%)

Export: Italy (25%), Germany (13%), France (11%), Spain (7%), China (6%)

Society

Education		**Development**	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	96.7/85.6	Human Development Index (Value):	0.784
Net enrolment rate (primary):	..	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	55
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	..	**Health**	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	..	Physicians density (per 10,000):	19.0
Mean years of schooling:	7.5	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	37.0
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):	..	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	3.9
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	..	**Emissions**	
Water		CO_2 Emissions (mt per capita):	7.2
Water resources (km^3):	0.7	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	230
Water withdrawal (m^3 per capita):	810	**Protected areas**	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	83	Terrestrial (% of total land area):	0.1
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	3	Marine (% of territorial waters):	0.1
Desalinated water production (millions m^3):	18	**ICT**	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	165.4
Total armed forces (000):	7	Households with computer (per 100):	..
Military expenditure (% GDP):	3.3	Internet users (per 100):	16.5

* Data only refer to trade in goods.

MALTA

Official Name:	Republic of Malta
Form of Government:	Parliamentary republic
Head of State:	Marie Louise Coleiro Preca
Head of Government:	Joseph Muscat

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) House of Representatives

Malta Labour Party (MLP, social democracy)	39	Nationalist Party (NP, centre-right)	29
		Independent	1

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Valleta (0.19)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Birkirkara (0.02); Qormi (0.01)

Area km^2:	320	Population age <15 (%):	15
Population (millions):	0.4	Population age >64 (%):	16
Population density (hab/km^2):	1,323	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	1.43
Urban population (%):	95	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	79/83
Average annual population growth rate (%):	0.9	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	5

Economy

GDP & Debt	
GDP (millions $):	10,582
GDP per capita ($, PPP):	32,216
GDP growth (%):	2.9
Public Debt (in % GDP):	68.1
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-2.2
External Debt (millions $):	..
Inflation Rate (%):	0.8
FDI	
Inflows (millions $):	-2,100
Outflows (millions $):	-7
International tourism	
Tourist arrivals (000):	1,582
Tourism receipts (million $):	1,616
Migrant remittances	
Receipts (millions $):	35
Receipts (in % GDP):	0.4

Economic Sectors	
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	2
Industry, value added (% of GDP):	33
Services, value added (% of GDP):	65
Labour market	
Labour participation rate, female (%):	37.9
Unemployment rate (%):	6.5
Youth unemployment rate (%):	14.1
Employment in:	
Agriculture (% of total employment):	1.0
Industry (% of total employment):	22.1
Services (% of total employment):	76.4
Energy	
Production (millions mt oil eq):	0.0
Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	0.9
Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	2,060
Import (% energy used):	94.0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions $)	8,346	8,921	575
in goods (millions $)	5,219	3,909	-1,310
in services (millions $)	3,127	5,012	1,885
in goods and services (% GDP)	89.6	95.8	6.2

Main Trading Partners

Import: Russian Federation (18%), Italy (16%), China (11%), Singapore (5%), France (5%)

Export: Germany (10%), Republic of Korea (7%), China (7%), Singapore (6%), France (4%)

Society

Education	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	93.1/95.8
Net enrolment rate (primary):	95
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	85
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	41
Mean years of schooling:	9.9
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):	8.0
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	0.84
Water	
Water resources (km^3):	0.1
Water withdrawal (m^3 per capita):	132
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	35
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	1
Desalinated water production (millions m^3):	19
Security	
Total armed forces (000):	2
Military expenditure (% GDP):	0.6

Development	
Human Development Index (Value):	0.829
Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	39
Health	
Physicians density (per 10,000):	35.0
Hospital beds (per 10,000):	48.0
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	8.7
Emissions	
CO_2 Emissions (mt per capita):	6.0
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	595
Protected areas	
Terrestrial (% of total land area):	21.5
Marine (% of territorial waters):	0.6
ICT	
Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	129.8
Households with computer (per 100):	80.3
Internet users (per 100):	68.9

MAURITANIA

Official Name	Islamic Republic of Mauritania
Form of Government	Presidential republic
Head of State	Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz
Head of Government	Yahya Ould Hademine

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

House of Representatives Union for the Republic (UPR)	60	El Wiam	3
Assembly of Democratic Forces (RDF)	6	People's Progressive Alliance	3
Union of the Forces of Progress (UFP)	5	Union for Democracy and Progress	3
National Rally for Reform and Development (RNRD)	4	Democracy Renovation	1
Republican Party for Democracy and Renewal	4	ADIL	1

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Nouakchott (0.95)

Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Nouadhibou (0.14); Rosso (0.05)

Area km2	1.030.700	Population age <15 (%)	40
Population (millions)	4,0	Population age >64 (%)	3
Population density (hab/km2)	4	Total fertility rate (births per woman)	4,60
Urban population (%)	59	Life Expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years)	62/65
Average annual population growth rate (%)	2.5	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive)	65

Economy

GDP & Debt		**Economic Sectors**	
GDP (millions $)	5.300	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	23
GDP per capita ($, PPP)	4	Industry, value added (% of GDP)	36
GDP growth (%)	6,4	Services, value added (% of GDP)	42
Public Debt (in % GDP)	89,9	**Labour market**	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP)	-2.5	Labour participation rate, female (%)	29,0
External Debt (millions $)	3.522	Unemployment Rate (%)	30,9
Inflation Rate (%)	3,7	Youth Unemployment Rate (%)	46,7
FDI		Employment in	
Inflows (millions $)	492	agriculture (% of total employment)	...
Outflows (millions $)	4	industry (% of total employment)	...
International tourism		in services (% of total employment)	...
Tourists arrivals (000)	...	**Energy**	
Tourism receipts (million $)	41	production (millions mt oil eq)	...
Migrant remittances		consumption (millions mt oil eq)	...
Receipts (millions $)	...	consumption per capita (kg oil eq)	...
Receipts (in % GDP)	...	import (% energy used)	...

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance	Main Trading Partners
in goods and services (millions $)	4.044	2.838	-1.206	Import: China (16%), Netherlands (13%), France (8%), United States (7%), Belgium (5%)
in goods (millions $)	3.044	2.651	-393	
in services (millions $)	999	186	-813	Export: China (55%), Italy (8%), Japan (5%), United States (4%), Spain (3%)
in goods and services (% GDP)	99,6	69,9	-29,7	

Society

Education		**Development**	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%)	62.6/41.6	Human Development index (Value)	0.506
Net enrolment rate (primary)	74,5	Human Development index (Position in ranking)	156
Net enrolment rate (secondary)	30	**Health**	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary)	5	Physicians density (per 10,000)	1,3
Mean years of schooling	...	Hospital beds (per 10,000)	...
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP)	3,3	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP)	3,8
R&D expenditure (% of GDP)	...	**Emissions**	
Water		CO2 Emissions (mt per capita)	...
Water resources (km3)	11,4	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people)	...
Water withdrawal (m3 per capita)	406	**Protected areas**	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture)	91	Terrestrial (% of total land area)	1.0
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry)	2	Marine (% of territorial waters))	32,3
Desalinated water production (millions m3)	0	**ICT**	
Security		Mobile phones (per 100)	94,2
Total armed forces (000)	21	Households with computer (per 100)	...
Military expenditure (% GDP)	3,9	Internet users (per 100)	...

MOROCCO

Official Name:	Kingdom of Morocco
Form of Government:	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy
Head of State:	King Mohammed VI
Head of Government:	Abdelilah Benkirane

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (House of Representatives)

Justice and Development Party (PJD, Islamist)	107	Popular Movement (MP, conservative)	32
Istiqlal Party (PI, Centre-right, nationalism)	60	Constitutional Union (UC, centrist)	23
National Rally of Independents (RNI, centre-right, liberal)	52	Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS, communist)	18
Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM, liberal)	47	Labour Party (PT, Centre-left)	4
Socialist Union of People's Forces (USFP)	39	Others	13

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Rabat (1.93)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Casablanca (3.49); Fes (1.15); Marrakech (1.10); Tanger (0.95); Meknes (0.70)

Area km^2:	446,550	Population age <15 (%):	28
Population (millions):	33.0	Population age >64 (%):	5
Population density (hab/km^2):	74	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2.74
Urban population (%):	59	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	69/72
Average annual population growth rate (%):	1.5	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	26

Economy

GDP & Debt	
GDP (millions $):	109,201
GDP per capita ($, PPP):	7,606
GDP growth (%):	2.6
Public Debt (in % GDP):	63.9
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-4.9
External Debt (millions $):	39,261
Inflation Rate (%):	0.4
FDI	
Inflows (millions $):	3,358
Outflows (millions $):	331
International tourism	
Tourist arrivals (000):	10,046
Tourism receipts (million $):	8,201
Migrant remittances	
Receipts (millions $):	6,619
Receipts (in % GDP):	6.4

Economic Sectors	
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	17
Industry, value added (% of GDP):	29
Services, value added (% of GDP):	55
Labour market	
Labour participation rate, female (%):	26.5
Unemployment rate (%):	9.2
Youth unemployment rate (%):	18.5
Employment in:	
Agriculture (% of total employment):	39.2
Industry (% of total employment):	21.4
Services (% of total employment):	39.3
Energy	
Production (millions mt oil eq):	0.8
Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	17.3
Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	539
Import (% energy used):	96.0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions $)	50,029	35,375	-14,654
in goods (millions $)	42,257	21,947	-20,310
in services (millions $)	7,772	13,428	5,656
in goods and services (% GDP)	48.0	33.9	-14.1

Main Trading Partners

Import: Spain (14%), France (13%), United States (8%), China (7%) Saudi Arabia (6%)

Export: France (22%), Spain (19%), Brazil (6%), United States (4%), Italy, (4%)

Society

Education	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	78.6/58.8
Net enrolment rate (primary):	98
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	74
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	16
Mean years of schooling:	4.4
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):	6.6
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	0.73
Water	
Water resources (km^3):	29.0
Water withdrawal (m^3 per capita):	321
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	88
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	2
Desalinated water production (millions m^3):	7
Security	
Total armed forces (000):	246
Military expenditure (% GDP):	3.8

Development	
Human Development Index (Value):	0.617
Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	129
Health	
Physicians density (per 10,000):	6.2
Hospital beds (per 10,000):	9.0
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	6.0
Emissions	
CO_2 Emissions (mt per capita):	1.6
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	65
Protected areas	
Terrestrial (% of total land area):	21.5
Marine (% of territorial waters):	2.5
ICT	
Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	128.5
Households with computer (per 100):	47.1
Internet users (per 100):	56.0

PORTUGAL

Official Name:	Portuguese Republic
Form of Government:	Semi-presidential constitutional republic
Head of State:	Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa
Head of Government:	António Costa

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Assembly of the Republic)

PSD / CDS-PP	102	UDC	17
Socialist Party (PS)	86	Sociali Democratic	5
Left Bloc	19	People-Animals-Nature	1

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Lisbon (2.87)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Porto (1.30); Braga (0.18); Guimaraes (0.16)

Area km^2:	92,210	Population age <15 (%):	15
Population (millions):	10.5	Population age >64 (%):	19
Population density (hab/km^2):	114	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	1.28
Urban population (%):	62	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	77/84
Average annual population growth rate (%):	-0.5	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	3

Economy

GDP & Debt	
GDP (millions $):	230,012
GDP per capita ($, PPP):	26,975
GDP growth (%):	0.9
Public Debt (in % GDP):	130.2
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-4.5
External Debt (millions $):	..
Inflation Rate (%):	-0.2
FDI	
Inflows (millions $):	8,916
Outflows (millions $):	1,915
International tourism	
Tourist arrivals (000):	8,097
Tourism receipts (million $):	16,221
Migrant remittances	
Receipts (millions $):	4,288
Receipts (in % GDP):	2.0

Economic Sectors	
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	2
Industry, value added (% of GDP):	21
Services, value added (% of GDP):	77
Labour market	
Labour participation rate, female (%):	54.9
Unemployment rate (%):	16.5
Youth unemployment rate (%):	37.8
Employment in:	
Agriculture (% of total employment):	10.5
Industry (% of total employment):	25.6
Services (% of total employment):	63.8
Energy	
Production (millions mt oil eq):	4.8
Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	21.9
Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	2,087
Import (% energy used):	78.0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions $)	86,812	90,552	3,741
in goods (millions $)	72,685	63,246	-9,439
in services (millions $)	14,127	27,307	13,180
in goods and services (% GDP)	39.5	41.2	1.7

Main Trading Partners

Import: Spain (32%), Germany (11%), France (7%), Italy (5%), Netherlands (5%)

Export: Spain (23%), Germany (11%), France (11%), Angola (7%), United Kingdom (5%)

Society

Education	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	97.1/94.4
Net enrolment rate (primary):	99
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	123
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	66
Mean years of schooling:	8.2
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):	5.3
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	1.50
Water	
Water resources (km^3):	77.4
Water withdrawal (m^3 per capita):	514
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	73
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	19
Desalinated water production (millions m^3):	2
Security	
Total armed forces (000):	90
Military expenditure (% GDP):	2.2

Development	
Human Development Index (Value):	0.822
Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	41
Health	
Physicians density (per 10,000):	..
Hospital beds (per 10,000):	34.0
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	9.3
Emissions	
CO_2 Emissions (mt per capita):	4.3
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	446
Protected areas	
Terrestrial (% of total land area):	22.3
Marine (% of territorial waters):	4.1
ICT	
Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	113.0
Households with computer (per 100):	66.7
Internet users (per 100):	62.1

SPAIN

Official Name:	Kingdom of Spain
Form of Government:	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy
Head of State:	King Felipe VI
Head of Government:	Mariano Rajoy

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Congress of Deputies)

People's Party (PP, conservative)	185	Union, Progress and Democracy (UPD, liberal)	5
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE, social democrat)	110	Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV, conservative regional)	5
Convergence and Union (CiU, conservative regional)	16	Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC, independentist regional)	3
United Left (IU-ICV-CHA, left wing)	11	Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG, left independentist regional)	2
Amaiur (left wing independentist regional)	7	Others	6

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Madrid (6.13)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Barcelona (5.21); Valencia (0.80); Sevilla (0.70); Zaragoza (0.67)

Area km^2:	505,600	Population age <15 (%):	15
Population (millions):	46.6	Population age >64 (%):	18
Population density (hab/km^2):	94	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	1.32
Urban population (%):	79	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	80/85
Average annual population growth rate (%):	-0.3	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	4

Economy

GDP & Debt	
GDP (millions $):	1,406,860
GDP per capita ($, PPP):	37,711
GDP growth (%):	1.4
Public Debt (in % GDP):	97.7
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-5.8
External Debt (millions $):	..
Inflation Rate (%):	-0.2
FDI	
Inflows (millions $):	39,167
Outflows (millions $):	26,035
International tourism	
Tourist arrivals (000):	60,661
Tourism receipts (million $):	67,608
Migrant remittances	
Receipts (millions $):	10,133
Receipts (in % GDP):	0.7

Economic Sectors	
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	3
Industry, value added (% of GDP):	23
Services, value added (% of GDP):	74
Labour market	
Labour participation rate, female (%):	52.5
Unemployment rate (%):	26.6
Youth unemployment rate (%):	57.3
Employment in:	
Agriculture (% of total employment):	4.4
Industry (% of total employment):	20.7
Services (% of total employment):	74.9
Energy	
Production (millions mt oil eq):	32.2
Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	124.7
Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	2,666
Import (% energy used):	74.0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions $)	424,981	463,095	38,114
in goods (millions $)	332,385	316,936	-15,450
in services (millions $)	92,595	146,159	53,564
in goods and services (% GDP)	31.3	34.1	2.8

Main Trading Partners

Import: Germany (11%), France (11%), China (7%), Italy (6%), United States (4%)

Export: France (16%), Germany (10%), Portugal (8%), Italy (7%), United Kingdom (7%)

Society

Education	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	98.8/97.5
Net enrolment rate (primary):	100
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	130
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	86
Mean years of schooling:	9.6
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):	5.0
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	1.30
Water	
Water resources (km^3):	111.5
Water withdrawal (m^3 per capita):	694
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	61
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	22
Desalinated water production (millions m^3):	100
Security	
Total armed forces (000):	216
Military expenditure (% GDP):	0.9

Development	
Human Development Index (Value):	0.869
Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	27
Health	
Physicians density (per 10,000):	37.0
Hospital beds (per 10,000):	31.0
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	9.3
Emissions	
CO_2 Emissions (mt per capita):	5.8
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	482
Protected areas	
Terrestrial (% of total land area):	29.0
Marine (% of territorial waters):	9.4
ICT	
Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	106.9
Households with computer (per 100):	73.4
Internet users (per 100):	71.6

TUNISIA

Official Name:	Republic of Tunisia
Form of Government:	Semi-Presidential Republic
Head of State:	Beji Caid Essebsi
Head of Government:	Habib Essid

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National Constituent Assembly)

Call for Tunisia (NT) (Secularism, Social democracy)	86	Congress of the Republic (CPR) (Secularism, Social liberalism)	4
Ennahdha (Islamist)	69	Democratic Current (Pan-Arabism)	3
Free Patriotic Union (UPL) (Secularism, Liberalism)	16	Republican Party (Secularism, Liberalism)	1
Popular Front (FP) (Secularism, Socialism)	15	People's Movement (Secularism, Socialism)	3
Tunisian Aspiration (Secularism, Liberalism)	8	Others	12

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Tunis (1.98)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Sfax (0.70); Sousse (0.67); Ettadhamen (0.42); Gabès (0.34)

Area km^2:	163,610	Population age <15 (%):	23
Population (millions):	10.9	Population age >64 (%):	7
Population density (hab/km^2):	69	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2.25
Urban population (%):	66	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	73/77
Average annual population growth rate (%):	1.0	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	13

Economy

GDP & Debt	
GDP (millions $):	48,553
GDP per capita ($, PPP):	11,300
GDP growth (%):	2.5
Public Debt (in % GDP):	47.5
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-3.5
External Debt (millions $):	25,827
Inflation Rate (%):	4.9
FDI	
Inflows (millions $):	1,096
Outflows (millions $):	22
International tourism	
Tourist arrivals (000):	6,269
Tourism receipts (million $):	2,863
Migrant remittances	
Receipts (millions $):	2,300
Receipts (in % GDP):	4.9

Economic Sectors	
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	9
Industry, value added (% of GDP):	30
Services, value added (% of GDP):	61
Labour market	
Labour participation rate, female (%):	25.1
Unemployment rate (%):	13.3
Youth unemployment rate (%):	31.2
Employment in:	
Agriculture (% of total employment):	16.2
Industry (% of total employment):	33.5
Services (% of total employment):	49.3
Energy	
Production (millions mt oil eq):	7.5
Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	9.5
Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	890
Import (% energy used):	21.0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions $)	26,274	22,086	-4,188
in goods (millions $)	22,988	17,054	-5,934
in services (millions $)	3,286	5,032	1,476
in goods and services (% GDP)	55.4	46.6	-8.8

Main Trading Partners

Import: France (18%), Italy (15%), Germany (7%), China (6%), Algeria (4%)

Export: France (26%), Italy (18%), Germany (9%), Libya (5%), Spain (5%)

Society

Education	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	89.6/74.2
Net enrolment rate (primary):	99
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	89
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	34
Mean years of schooling:	6.5
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):	6.2
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	1.10
Water	
Water resources (km^3):	4.6
Water withdrawal (m^3 per capita):	303
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	80
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	5
Desalinated water production (millions m^3):	19
Security	
Total armed forces (000):	48
Military expenditure (% GDP):	2.0

Development	
Human Development Index (Value):	0.721
Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	90
Health	
Physicians density (per 10,000):	12.2
Hospital beds (per 10,000):	21.0
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	7.0
Emissions	
CO_2 Emissions (mt per capita):	2.1
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	91
Protected areas	
Terrestrial (% of total land area):	5.4
Marine (% of territorial waters):	2.5
ICT	
Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	115.6
Households with computer (per 100):	23.2
Internet users (per 100):	43.8

Chronologies

Other Cooperation Initiatives in the Mediterranean

5+5 Dialogue

The 5+5 Dialogue comes from a French proposal and was set up on 10 October 1990 during a ministerial meeting in Rome. It gathers the ten countries of the Western Mediterranean Basin: five countries from the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Tunisia) and five members of the European Union (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta who joined in 1991). The 5+5 Dialogue has a flexible and informal nature. Over the years, it has been transformed from a merely political forum to one for strengthened regional and multidisciplinary cooperation in the Western Mediterranean. Its flexibility and informality have enabled a gradual opening up, and the participating ministers and senior officials now meet to discuss an increasing number of issues. Originally just a political compromise between Foreign Ministers dealing with security and stability, as well as economic integration, it later expanded to include other spheres, such as Education, the Environment and Renewable Energies, Home Affairs (since 1995), Migration (since 2002), Inter-parliamentary Relations (since 2003), Defence (since 2004), Tourism (since 2006) and Transport (since 2007). Due to its practical and operational nature, it is a forum for the exchange of ideas and the launch of new initiatives. It can also capitalise on its restricted geographical scope, which is limited to the Western Mediterranean. This initiative has encouraged the insertion of Libya and Mauritania in the regional context

Main Meetings in 2014

Health

During the 10th Foreign Affairs Meeting of the 5+5 Dialogue held in Nouakchott in 2013, emphasis is placed on the importance of deepening the dialogue on health issues. In this regard the Moroccan Ministry of Health, with the support of the Institut de Prospective Economique du Monde Méditerranéen (IPEMED), launches the Technical Working Group "Health in the Western Mediterranean" to hold a dialogue on health between the "5+5 countries" and in order to identify areas of collaboration (as both shores face common challenges that need a global reflection and answer). The final aim is to develop a common policy on Health in the Western Mediterranean. The first areas identified for collaboration are pharmacovigilance as well as health coverage and pharmaceutical biotechnology. The Technical Working group holds two meetings in 2014 (on 17 January and 26 November), both of which take place in Rabat.
www.ipemed.coop/fr/-r16/sante-c142/

Water

Taking into account the importance of water and its scarcity in the Mediterranean region, Spain and Algeria decide to promote a series of seminars within the 5+5 framework in order to develop a water strategy for the Western Mediterranean. The aim is to promote sustainable water use at local, regional and national levels, through the adoption of cross-cutting goals, management criteria and objectives in order to harmonise water policies in the Mediterranean. This harmonisation will help to prevent conflicts, promote co-development and the human right to water and sanitation. In this context, three workshops are held during the year.

- 25-26 February, Valence (Spain): The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs points out the need to address the risks and challenges relating to water through three fundamental approaches: peace and security; development; and human rights.
- 25-26 June, Oran (Algeria): 2nd Workshop of the Water Expert Group of the 5+5 Dialogue. At the end of the meeting they provide a preliminary draft for the 5+5 Water Strategy and agree to intensify their contacts by creating a network of focal points in charge of water issues.
- 9-10 September, Valence (Spain): The 3rd Workshop to elaborate Water Strategy is held together with the steering committee of the Euro-Mediterranean Water Information System (EMWIS).

Valence – Concept Note
www.semide.net/media_server/files/semide/thematicdirs/news/2014/03/5-5-water-strategy-western-mediterranean.-1sr-workshop.-valencia-25th-26th/ConceptNote_WSWM.pdf
Oran Declaration
www.semide.net/media_server/files/semide/thematicdirs/news/2014/06/5-5-water-strategy-western-mediterranean-2nd-workshop-oran-algeria-25-26-06-2014/DecalationOran26juin2014.docx

Parliamentary Dimension

The Parliamentary Dimension of the 5+5 Dialogue is entrusted to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM), which coordinates and promotes the activities of this important sub-regional parliamentary forum. PAM, moreover, represents itself at ministerial meetings and Heads of State and Government Summits of the 5+5 Dialogue, as well as special events of this initiative, such as dedicated military exercises.

• 20 May, Lisbon (Portugal): The 5th High Level Meeting of the National Parliaments of the Western Mediterranean Cooperation (5+5 Dialogue) takes place on the occasion of the 11th Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers. National parliamentary delegations from the 5+5 Dialogue Member States, PAM and other invited representatives from relevant regional parliamentary institutions, address the main issues on the table from the parliamentary perspective in the sectors of regional security, economic growth, climate change and the protection of victims of human trafficking and the fight against organised crime. They reaffirm the fundamental role of the parliaments in the 5+5 Dialogue since these are best placed to respond to political and economic challenges and to deepen integration.

Economic Forum

• 21 May, Lisbon (Portugal): The 2nd Economic Forum of the Western Mediterranean "Towards a strengthened regional economic integration" brings together more than 400 business leaders and high-level representatives of major enterprises and economic institutions from the 5+5 countries. The Portuguese deputy Prime Minister reaffirms Portugal's full support for this informal but dynamic and efficient process and stresses the importance of the UfM's role for its consolidation. The central theme of the event is Sustainable Development and it is structured around four strategic pillars: water, environment, infrastructure and financing. The forum provides a space for reflection and discussion on each country's economic challenges and the opportunities for cooperation in joint projects or initiatives

Foreign Affairs

• 22 May, Lisbon (Portugal): The 11th Foreign Affairs Meeting of the 5+5 Dialogue takes place under the Portuguese and Mauritanian Co-Presidency and provides the opportunity to discuss different regional issues, set a series of objectives and assess the work carried out so far. Ministers consider the 5+5 Dialogue a paradigmatic framework for political dialogue and cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean. This cooperation has to be inspired by the democratic principles spreading in the region. They praise Tunisia's adoption of a new Constitution and express their concern for the situation in Libya. On regional Security they agree to enhance strategic and regional cooperation to fight terrorism through judicial cooperation and intelligence exchange. The situation in Sahel with the proliferation of international illicit networks; the degradation of the situation in Mali; the ongoing violence in Syria; the development of the Peace Process in the Middle East; and the need for a global approach to tackle migration in the Mediterranean are other topics linked with security and discussed by Ministers. Economic and Social development are also on the agenda. Ministers reaffirm the need to promote investments and trade and develop infrastructures, and facilitate the exchange of expertise and human exchange between the two shores. The Foreign Affairs meeting is the occasion to review the work carried out so far on the different sectors of the 5+5 Dialogue: Environment, Water, Energy, Climate Change, Defence, Transport, Education and Tourism. Besides these sectors, new perspectives are envisaged: Health, Culture, Trade and Investments. Finally they underline the importance of strengthening complementarity between the Dialogue and the UfM.

Final Declaration:
http://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/D%C3%A9claration5+5_Lisbonne.pdf

Transport

The 5+5 Dialogue on Transport brings together the GTMO 5+5 - the Transport Group of the Western Mediterranean. Ministers of the 10 countries of the Western Mediterranean participate as members while the EC Directorate General for Mobility and Transport and the General Secretariat of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) attend as observers. CETMO performs the function of Technical Secretariat. Operational cooperation with UfM has been consolidated since 2013.

• 22 October, Lisbon (Portugal): The Transport Ministers of the Western Mediterranean gather for the 8th Conference of the GTMO 5+5. Ministers agree to intensify their efforts to complete the Central Section of the Trans-Maghreb Motorway Axis project (the first example of effective operational collaboration between GTMO 5+5 and the UfM). This project will generate a positive impact on regional and international levels because it will increase the mobility of persons and international freight flows. The next conference will be organised in 2016 by Mauritania.

Final Declaration:
www.cetmo.org/pdf/Conclusions%20GTMO%205+5%20Lisbonne.pdf

Education

27-28 October, Marseille (France): Following the recommendation made during the 5+5 Dialogue Foreign Affairs Meeting in Lisbon, the Education/Vocational Training Ministers of the ten countries of the Western Mediterranean gather under the Moroccan and Portuguese Co-Presidency. There are many different challenges, which vary between countries but which are often shared: low participation and employment rates, inadequate correlation between education and employment, high school or vocational training drop-out rates and a lack of vocationally-oriented higher education. The Ministers of Education express their willingness to: develop vocational education and training and align it with the economic and labour market demand; promote a better match between training provision and business needs; promote the social inclusion of young people; improve the efficiency of vocational education and training systems; propose new governance models and public practices; and establish avenues for the mutual recognition of qualifications of each country by all the others. They identify three objectives to be achieved: improve the quality and attractiveness of vocational education and training; secure and facilitate young people's training programmes; and take better account of business needs in vocational education and training. In this perspective, they identify some priority occupational sectors: Automobile and aircraft maintenance, Mechanics and mechatronics; Digital professions; Building and public works; Tourism, hotels

and catering; Transport; Energy and mining industries; Agriculture and agri-food businesses; Environment and sustainable development; and the Maritime sector. A concrete Action Plan for 2015-2016 is also signed, whose aim is to promote mobility and improve the comparability of systems by establishing a Euro-Mediterranean competence framework, which should help increase the employability of young people in the Mediterranean region. Some of the Action Plan priority axes are to establish a Euro-Mediterranean competence assessment framework, to favour the use of digital media to create a EURO MED PASS, a 'passport' to enhance mobility. The next 5+5 Education meeting will take place in Mauritania in 2016. Meanwhile, an expert group will be responsible for implementing these recommendations, and in 2015 a conference will be held as a forum for reflection and dialogue and to propose initiatives.

Final Declaration:
www.dimed.gouv.fr/sites/dimed.gouv.fr/files/declaration_finale_version_en.pdf

Tourism

• 3 December, Lisbon (Portugal): The ministers of the 5+5 Dialogue and representatives from the UfM and World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) gather and recognise the strategic role played by the tourism sector in the socio-economic development of the Western Mediterranean countries. In this perspective, a common approach to enhance tourism cooperation is necessary. They acknowledge the importance of training and qualifications for human capital, as well as the need for an evaluation of the services and performances in the field of tourism. To this end, they decide to share their common experience and heritage as well as best practises. The fourth Ministerial conference on tourism will take place in Morocco in 2016.

Final Declaration:
www.turismodeportugal.pt/Portugu%C3%AAs/turismodeportugal/destaque/Documents/Declaracao-de-Lisboa-3-12-2014.pdf

Defence

The '5+5 Defence Initiative' was set up in 2004 after a Declaration of Intent was signed to foster mutual knowledge about Member States, strengthen understanding and confidence between them and develop multilateral cooperation with a view to promoting security in the Western Mediterranean. The presidency is held on a rotating basis for one year, during which time that country is responsible for organising the forums for developing the proposals made in the annual Action Plan and the ministerial meeting, while defining the strategic directives for forthcoming activities. In 2014, Spain holds the Chairmanship of the Initiative. Practical activities focus on three areas: maritime security, aviation security and participation by armed forces in support of civil protection.

• 10-11 December, Granada (Spain): The Ministerial Meeting on cooperation, security and defence of the 5+5 Defence Initiative focuses, among other themes, on security in the Western Mediterranean area and regional crisis scenarios, in particular Libya, Iraq and Syria. The Ministers discuss major threats such as terrorism and illegal trafficking and issues connected with migration flows and humanitarian crises such as natural disasters and healthcare emergencies. Furthermore, Defence Ministers reiterate the value of the 5+5 Initiative as a discussion forum given the concrete contribution it provides to the sectors of maritime surveillance, airspace security and Armed Forces' aid to civil protection operations, education and training. Ministers also sign a joint declaration to further develop multilateral cooperation and convert the Western Mediterranean into a privileged forum of confidence and security. They approve the 2015 Action Plan and agree to implement a coordination mechanism for issuing instructions to tackle the management of natural disasters and emergencies, as well as during any healthcare activities carried out with affected populations, and the development of an operational Coordination and Planning Centre for armed forces support for civil protection. For 2015, the Chairmanship hands over to Tunisia.

www.defensa.gob.es/5mas5/es/