
INTRODUCTION

SENÉN FLORENSA. Executive President, IEMed

The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) is a child of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in 1995 in Barcelona. Since then, the IEMed has always accompanied the various turning points that have shaped Euro-Mediterranean relations. It is therefore no surprise that the IEMed decided at the beginning of 2015 to dedicate resources to accompany the process of recalibration of the European Neighbourhood Policy launched with a Joint Consultation Paper by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) in March 2015. The IEMed formed a working group with experts from the EuroMeSCo¹ network and other researchers and came up with a consolidated contribution to the ENP review.² It also dedicated the main chapter of the *2015 IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook* to Euro-Mediterranean policies. More recently, it organised a roundtable in Brussels to discuss the ENP review with Michael Koehler (Director Neighbourhood South, DG NEAR, European Commission), Erwan Lanon (University of Ghent, College of Europe) the then Ambassador Menouar Alem (Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the EU) and Ehab Fawzy (Ambassador of Egypt to the EU).

In the same vein, the IEMed decided to dedicate this 6th Euromed Survey to the ENP review. The IEMed has carried out five “Euromed Surveys” so far. The Survey is based on a broad sample of policy-makers and experts, with the objective of covering the main issues on the political agenda of the region and monitoring the progress in Euro-Mediterranean perceptions and policies. This year, the Survey was conducted among 4,900 experts and actors from the 43 countries that are members of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 760 responses were received, constituting therefore a representative sample.

This volume offers a good opportunity to contrast the Joint Communication on the ENP review released on 18 November 2015 with the results of the Survey. However, this Survey is only one tool among others to measure how the ENP is perceived by experts on both shores of the Mediterranean. It has its limitations but it usefully complements the wide consultation conducted by the European institutions and summarised in the Joint Staff Working Document accompanying the Joint Communication. The preparations of the Survey as well as much of its results have shown that the ENP remains a very complex policy framework, difficult to apprehend and assess. The questionnaire contained a total of 22 general questions and has been designed to capture the main elements of the European Neighbourhood Policy review. It starts with a general assessment, followed by other sections focusing on specific issues. In addition to closed-ended questions, respondents were given the chance to elaborate on their answers through additional comments.

In addition to the descriptive report of the results and the annexes that set out the results in a comprehensive and visual manner, this publication also gives some space to more in-depth analyses of a few strategic issues related to the ENP review; the objective of the “qualitative analysis” written by experts and policy-makers is to offer keys to better understand some of the main issues at stake. Overall, the main findings of the Survey are in line with the outcome of the broad consultation process carried out by the European Commission and the HR/VP and summarised in the Joint Staff Working Document accompanying the Joint Communication. The results of the Survey show that there is a

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1. EuroMeSCo is the main network of research centres on politics and security in the Mediterranean. EuroMeSCo comprises 102 institutes from 32 countries out of the 43 members of the Union for the Mediterranean.

2. Florensa, S. (dir.) (July 2015). *Reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Barcelona: IEMed Papers no. 18.

Overall, there appears to be three main concerns:

-the need to better differentiate the relations between the EU and individual ENP partners,

-the need to address ongoing challenges in the Mediterranean in a more reactive and political way as a complement to a more strategic and long-term strategy,

-the need to better involve civil society.

Survey respondents indicate that specificities of single ENP countries should be better taken into account.

robust and rather homogeneous support for maintaining the ENP despite a certain disappointment with its achievements. Looking at the open answers of the respondents in the first section but also throughout the whole Survey, there appears to be three main concerns among respondents: the need to better differentiate the relations between the EU and individual ENP partners; the need to address ongoing challenges in the Mediterranean in a more reactive and political way as a complement to a more strategic and long-term strategy; and, last, the need to better involve civil society. While there is no doubt that respondents will find echoes of their first concern in the Joint Communication as mentioned below, the Joint Communication brings fewer novelties when it comes to the modalities of engagement with civil society. Unsurprisingly, the volatile situation and the ongoing crises in the Mediterranean clearly resonate in the results throughout the Survey. Open answers in the first block also relate to the important issue of ownership by partner countries but also of ownership by the EU Member States themselves (an issue that is analysed in more detail in one of the qualitative articles).

After this general assessment, the second block of the Survey aims to evaluate the perception of respondents on the parameters of the European Neighbourhood Policy, both in terms of geographical scope and in terms of actors and interlocutors involved. First, the results show overall support for the current geographical scope of the ENP. This also seems to be the conclusion that the European Commission and the HR/VP draw from their consultation process as they note that “most interlocutors in the consultation on the ENP wished to see some form of a common policy framework for the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood.” On these premises, the revised ENP does not depart from the principle of a single policy framework for the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. However, Survey respondents indicate that specificities of single ENP countries should be better taken into account. In this regard – and as mentioned above –, we note the strong focus on differentiation coming across clearly in the Joint Communication and hope it will lead to better acknowledgement not only of the separate dynamics in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood but also the various dynamics within the Southern Neighbourhood itself.

Second, the Survey also indicates rather straightforward results on the need for a more effective inclusion of non-state actors on a broader basis, with a more active role of the EU. In this regard, we should commend the European Commission and the HR/VP to acknowledge the need to increase engagement with civil society, including when the incentive-based approach with partner countries has not proven strong enough to create a commitment to reform. However, we note that the Joint Communication does not provide concrete indications on how to renew the engagement with civil society.

Third, results indicate the need to find a new formula to integrate other regional state actors, although respondents from the different sub-regions of the ENP do not agree on which regional actors should be included. In this regard, we note the idea presented in the Joint Communication to use “‘Thematic Frameworks’ to provide a regular forum to discuss joint policy approaches, programming and investment that reach beyond the neighbourhood,” including on issues such as migration, energy and security.

The third block of the Survey is dedicated to the methodology of the ENP, i.e. to the modalities of cooperation (ENP instruments) and to the scope (priorities/areas of cooperation). In general, there seems to be no massive discontent with current instruments of the ENP, which is a rather counter-

intuitive finding as the various instruments of the ENP (including Annual Reports, Association Agreements, Association Councils...) have been widely criticised during the consultation process and in fact have been revised with the ENP review. However, the results of the Survey are not completely at odds with this trend. Indeed, among all tools available, most of the respondents have chosen “issue-based cooperation agreements on an ad hoc basis” as the tool that should be privileged, thereby showing an appetite for moving away bureaucratic tools. The Joint Staff Working Document states that “many critics also challenged some of the formal tools the policy has used. Some think tank authors consider that the ENP Action Plans and Progress Reports are not suitable for many ENP countries and consider that the time, effort and EU resources that go into preparing the ENP reports are disproportionate to the practical results they generate in the ENP countries. Some partner governments also criticised these documents. However, civil society groups in particular consider that the ENP Action Plans and Progress Reports are useful tools for encouraging democratic reforms. Submissions from partners and civil society groups suggest that there is a strong case for lighter procedures.” All in all, the efforts of the Joint Communication to rationalise the toolbox (e.g. through getting rid of the annual progress report) and to make it more flexible (i.e. lighter and more flexible trade agreements for those partners who do not want DCFTAs) are welcomed. The ENP has been far too process-based until now and it needs to free itself from heavy procedures that make it difficult to understand.

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In terms of cooperation criteria, results show a preference to engage rather than to exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform. It is remarkable that the idea to exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform has most traction among Mediterranean Partner Countries, while this option is widely rejected among respondents from non-Mediterranean EU countries. Respondents have stressed rather consistently the need for the EU to engage civil society in cases of countries not committed to domestic reforms. It is therefore positive to find this scenario mentioned in the Joint Communication.

Linked to the issue of how to engage with partner countries and on what criteria is the issue of the scope of cooperation, i.e. what areas of cooperation should be privileged. This issue is all the more important now that the EU will engage in a consultation with ENP partners to determine specific areas of cooperation in order to address the criticism that the ENP has been encompassing too many cooperation areas until now. We decided to closely follow the typology of seven areas of focus identified in the Joint Consultation Paper released in March 2015: promote trade and inclusive and sustainable economic development; increase engagement with youth and women; transnational challenges such as health security, climate and environment; face governance challenges such as rule of law and human rights; improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy; mobility and migration; and security threats. Results highlight the difficulties of the exercise to set priorities and to limit the scope of cooperation to only a few areas. A number of pages of the descriptive report are dedicated to analysing the complex results in detail, including by highlighting differences of answers according to the origins of the respondents and their institutional affiliations. Among other findings, it comes out that “increasing engagement towards youth and women” is preeminent for some Mashreq countries, while in the Maghreb “governance and security” are considered more important. The Survey also looked more closely into the issues of migration and security. In terms of security, the main focus should be on prevention of radicalisation and the fight against terrorism according to the respondents. In turn, tackling structural causes of migration in the country of origin is identified as the main challenge when it comes to cooperation on migration and mobility. Therefore, it is to be welcomed

that the Joint Communication identifies increasing “cooperation on root causes of irregular migration” as a priority theme. The IEMed also welcomes the efforts to promote legal migration schemes.

The Survey shows that respondents think that the ENP is not applying EU values consistently.

The fourth and last block in the descriptive report looks into horizontal and strategic aspects of the ENP. Questions 7, 8 and 9 explore issues related to the articulation of the ENP with the wider EU policy framework and address the application of values, the prospects for integration with other EU policies for the partners and the relation with other foreign policy instruments. Questions 16 and 17, on their part, investigate the expectations of partner countries towards the ENP. The Survey shows that respondents think that the ENP is not applying EU values consistently. The IEMed also notes that “good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights” are included in a specific section under the Joint Communication and not under section V dedicated to proposed joint priorities of cooperation. It is important that the strategic move from the “more-for-more” discourse that dominated 2011 to the “stabilisation” discourse that seems to dominate in the latest Joint Communication is not accompanied by a lesser focus on dialogue on human rights, democracy and governance. As mentioned above, this block also aims to investigate what respondents believed the Mediterranean Partner Countries seek in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Open answers show that it is mainly thought that the economic gain has the biggest role in drawing the interest of the MPCs in the Policy. Many respondents also address the issue of sharing expertise and know-how in public policy and technical matters and the improvement of trade through the ENP.

Rather counter-intuitively, a breakdown of answers based on geographical criteria shows that respondents from the EU seem to be keener on the perspective of offering prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies than respondents from Mediterranean Partner Countries. The large majority of respondents see positively the integration of the ENP with the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The idea that the ENP should have a more integrated role in the overall external policies of the EU seems to feature strongly in the answers from EU respondents.

Conclusion

In April 2015, the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU noted in its conclusion that “the ENP aims to develop a democratic, stable and prosperous neighbourhood, based on a commitment to fundamental values, including the rule of law, the protection of human rights and gender equality.”

A stable neighbourhood. While we will need to wait for the outcome of the consultations between the EU and its partners to get a sense of how the ENP will look, the Joint Communication released on 18 November 2015 shows that stabilisation and security are at the core of the revised ENP. Stability and security are undoubtedly of key importance for the Mediterranean. EuroMeSCo will dedicate its 2016 annual conference to the security architecture in the Mediterranean ahead of the presentation of the new EU global strategy that we will follow closely. We at the IEMed are convinced that one of the best recipes for stabilisation is further regional cooperation and integration. In this regard, we note that the Joint Communication made strong references to the increasing role of the UfM as the central platform for regional cooperation and hope that, based on its successful achievements so far, the UfM will be given the means to fulfil the central task that it has to accomplish for the benefit of the whole region.

A prosperous neighbourhood is also essential to stability. And the European Union can contribute to the economic development of the Southern Mediterranean. The Survey shows that the ENP is expected to do more in terms of trade and economic cooperation. The question of financial assistance also arises. While we note that the ENP review as a political exercise is disconnected from the overall ENI financial allocation that remains the same for 2014-2020, we welcome the acknowledgement in the Joint Communication that: 1) financial and economic support is key (“Developments in the neighbourhood countries have indicated a growing need for international financial and economic support to underpin necessary transition and stability”); 2) existing support is too limited (“The European Union’s existing toolbox provides for resources that are targeted to a variety of issues, but in many cases limited in size when compared to the needs that have and can be identified”); and 3) the EU will review its financial tools (“The Commission will therefore conduct an in-depth assessment over the coming months with a view to developing options, including an instrument, which could better and more efficiently address the financial needs of neighbourhood countries, at the same time supporting their on-going necessary reform efforts. The Commission and the High Representative will seek to speed up aid delivery by streamlining procedures. They will examine the case for a ‘flexibility cushion’ within the ENI, i.e. to set aside resources until used for urgent programming of unforeseen needs, particularly for conflict and post-conflict needs; refugee support; crises and disaster response; and for security and stabilisation programmes.”). While doing so, we think it is important to give priority to the countries that are more ambitious in terms of more integration with the EU and that need it, Tunisia.

A democratic neighbourhood. The Joint Communication seems to announce a less prescriptive ENP. The assumption noted in the Joint Staff Working Document that “principles of democratic governance are embraced by only a few partners” should not lead to less engagement but rather to more engagement in the field of democracy and human rights. Being less prescriptive should not lead to giving up on the strong commitment of the EU to democracy and human rights that is in its DNA. The Joint Communication notes that more engagement with civil society is needed, in particular in the cases of these countries. However, it fails to give more detail on how to achieve this. We remain convinced that promoting stability in the Mediterranean goes hand in hand with the promotion of democracy and human rights.

THE SIXTH EUROMED SURVEY

METHODOLOGY

General Approach

The 6th Euromed Survey dedicated to the ENP review was conducted concomitant with the consultation process launched by the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) ahead of the release of the Joint Communication on the ENP review. In order to shape the questionnaire of the Survey, the IEMed formed a Steering Group on the ENP review¹ composed of top experts in the field of European external relations in the Mediterranean from the EuroMeSCo network, as well as researchers from other think tanks and institutions.

The questionnaire comprises 22 general questions designed to capture the main elements of the ENP review. It follows the broad lines of the Joint Consultation Paper.² It starts with a general assessment, followed by several blocks dedicated to the articulation with EU policies, the neighbourhood's definition, relations with partner countries and expectations of partner countries. Finally, a broader block of questions turns to the possible areas of cooperation, including addressing security threats and enhancing orderly migration.

The questionnaire combines open-ended questions and multiple-choice questions with pre-defined answers offering respondents the possibility to grade on a “very low” to “very high” scale. For these questions, an optional space is provided to explain the answer. This open part of the multiple-choice question is considered of great importance for a Survey of this kind as it contributes to improving the interpretation of its overall results. It has also to be noted that the “Don't know” option is of importance as it provides significant information in terms of the knowledge of the experts and actors of the variety of policies and actions proposed and implemented by the EU.

The descriptive report of this Survey is divided into four main chapters. The first one is a general review of the ENP; the second one tackles the redefinition of the ENP policy framework, including the geographical scope of the policy, the actors and interlocutors it has to involve and the balance between interests and values. The third chapter targets current policy tools. The last chapter addresses key strategic issues on the outset and implementation of the ENP.

1. The composition of the ad hoc Research Group was as follows: Xavier Aragall, Euro-Mediterranean Policies Technical Advisor, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed); Sven Biscop, Director of Europe in the World Programme. Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations; Gabriel Busquets, Spanish Ambassador on Special Mission for Mediterranean Affairs; Silvia Colombo, Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI); Francesca Fabbri, Research Assistant, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed); Josep Ferré, Managing Director, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed); Senén Florensa, Executive President, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed); Marc Franco. Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations. Former EU Head of Delegation in Cairo; Andrea Frontini, Policy Analyst. Europe in the World Programme, European Policy Centre (EPC); Florence Gaub, Senior Analyst. European Union Institute for Security Studies; Kristina Kausch, Nonresident Associate at Carnegie Europe; Erwan Lannon, Professor in European Law. University of Ghent and College of Europe; Stefan Lehne, Visiting Scholar. Carnegie Europe; Iván Martín, European University Institute. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; Juliane Schmidt, Programme Assistant, Europe in the World Programme, European Policy Centre (EPC); Claire Spencer, Senior Research Fellow. Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House; Richard Youngs, Senior Associate. Democracy and Rule of Law Program. Carnegie Europe.

2. Please find the full text of the Joint Consultation Paper at the following link: Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 4 March 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/consultation/index_en.htm


A Preliminary Survey to Feed a Structured Contribution to the ENP Review

Before launching the 6th Euromed Survey to 4,900 experts and actors, the IEMed collected initial feedback from EuroMeSCo network researchers and other experts that participated in the Steering Group on the ENP review. 206 people were invited for this preliminary step. The results were mentioned in the IEMed contribution to the consultation process “Reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy”.³

Survey Sample

To conduct the Survey, a universe of 4,900 experts, actors and policy-makers from the 43 Union for the Mediterranean countries was selected, all of whom received an invitation to participate in the Survey. As in previous years, geographical distribution, institutional typology, field of knowledge and gender balance were the reference criteria for selecting the universe, as well as knowledge of and involvement in the Euro-Mediterranean Process. Out of this broad universe, 760 responses were received (including 54% from the EU-28 countries).

Graph 1: Breakdown of responses by geographical origin: EU-28 and Mediterranean Partner Countries⁴



* Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monaco.


Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey

3. Florensa, S. (dir.) (July 2015). *Reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Barcelona: IEMed Papers no. 18.

4. Corresponds to UfM members

As to the distribution of responses per region, the Mediterranean EU countries⁵ (32%), the remaining EU countries and the Maghreb countries⁶ (with a 22% participation rate respectively) account for the bulk of the responses. Mashreq⁷ countries come in fourth position with 14.5% of responses.

Graph 2: Breakdown of respondents by region (in %)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey

The participation this year has been as important as in previous years. It continues to prove difficult to reach a representative distribution by country. Some countries are over-represented and others under-represented. In order to avoid bias in the results, we have weighted them according to distribution of the target by the countries in the sample (see annex II). With this weighting we avoid the over-representation of Spain, France, Italy Morocco and Tunisia largely determining the results of respondents overall.

Profile of Respondents

In the first block of questions, in addition to providing their country of origin, respondents were asked to indicate their gender, age range, and the type of institution (see graph 3) they belonged to.


As shown in the graph below, the majority of respondents to the questionnaire are “experts”, an aggregated category that includes respondents from think tanks, media and, above all, academia. Altogether, these groups roughly account for 49% of the total number of responses. The second category is “policy-makers”, embracing responses from diplomatic bodies, European or international institutions, political parties and governments. Altogether, these groups account for 28% of the total number of responses. Finally, the comparatively smaller but still well-represented category is “civil society”, encompassing trade unions, companies and mainly NGOs.

5. Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Croatia and Slovenia. The first three alone account for nearly 77% of responses from this region.

6. Maghreb countries include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. The first three alone account for 95% of responses from this region.

7. Mashreq countries include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria.


Graph 3: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey

When looking specifically at the individual groups (see graph 4 below), academia clearly emerges as the most represented institution (35% of total responses), followed by NGOs (18%) and governmental bodies (13.7%). Altogether, these groups account for two thirds of the total responses. Comparing the relative participation of the different groups in 2015 with their participation in the last Survey, there seems to be an overall continuity although an increase of 2.7 points of respondents from academics can be noted while NGOs and governmental institutions are slightly less represented (around 3 points each). From the remaining categories, it is interesting to note that representatives of EU institutions, with an increase of 3 points, double their presence.


Graph 4: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey

Respondents were also asked about their main sector of activity and were given the opportunity to indicate one or two areas of specialisation. As shown in the graph 5, which features aggregated figures for main and secondary areas of specialisation, 42% of the respondents operate in the area of “social, cultural and human exchanges”. “Political cooperation and security” ranks second as the main area of specialisation of respondents (35%), immediately followed by “economic and financial cooperation” (31%). Finally, “migration and justice affairs” comes in fourth place with 11%.


Graph 5: Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey (Respondents could indicate one or two areas of specialisation. This graph shows aggregated totals for first and second choices as areas of specialisation. This is why the total percentage exceeds 100%).

When analysing the previous figures by factoring in the geographical dimension, North and South have a differentiated distribution of areas of specialisation. In the North, political cooperation and security is the first area followed by a similar percentage of social, cultural and human exchanges. In the South, this latter area is the main one, while economic and financial cooperation experts is in second place.


Graph 6: Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation and by region



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey. (Respondents could indicate one or two areas of specialisation. This graph shows aggregated totals for first and second choices as areas of specialisation. This is why the total percentage exceeds 100%).


Finally, to complete the description of the sample on which this Survey is based, it is important to note that 30% of respondents are women, in line with the gender balance of the last Survey (see graph 7). When analysing the North/South dimension, the aggregate proportion of women amounts to 23% for MPCs, while it increases to 35% for EU countries. By regional groups, the Maghreb stands out as an outlier with around 20% of female participation, while the other regions, including the Mediterranean EU countries and the Mashreq, fall within the overall gender ratio (see graph 8).

Graph 7: Breakdown of respondents by gender



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey

Graph 8: Breakdown of respondents by gender and regional groups



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey

THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY'S IDENTITY CRISIS

ROSA BALFOUR

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The ENP is Dead... Long Live the ENP!

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has long been under the magnifying glass of analysts and the catalyst of much critique. After two modest appraisals in 2006 and 2011, in 2014 the Commission decided to launch a broader and deeper review which included, for the first time, a consultation process with governmental and non-governmental actors and analysts across the two shores of the Mediterranean and in Eastern Europe. The turmoil of the past few years seemed to warrant finding new ways to deal with the troubled neighbourhoods. The Commission and the European External Action Service running this exercise asked searching questions which, potentially, could have led to a radical overhaul of the policy.

The consultation asked whether the ENP should be maintained and, if so, what geographical scope it should have, not just in terms of differences between East and South but also with respect to other neighbouring countries. It questioned the relationship between the “partnership” approach, based on seeking joint objectives together with governments of the ENP countries, and the desire for a stronger political approach stemming from a clearer understanding of the priorities of the EU and its Member States towards each of the 16 neighbouring countries.

The consultation also encouraged questioning the validity of ENP tools and of the institutional framework based on Association and Trade Agreements, asking whether existing tools were appropriate to the objectives set out, whether and how a stronger security focus could and should be included in the policy, and how to balance differentiation between countries with sectoral cooperation, conditionality, reflecting EU interests and those of partner countries.

Yet the ENP review proposed in November 2015 did not overhaul the policy – rightly so if one looks at the results of the 6th Euromed Survey to be examined in this short contribution. Rather, the ENP review focused on identifying a more limited and, arguably, less ambitious but perhaps achievable set of priorities, on strengthening the “partnership” approach with the aim of setting more realistic and shared goals, and on improving the flexibility and visibility of the tools.

From the point of view of the institutions involved in the review, this risk-averse approach reflects the uncertainty about EU policy in general. The High Representative's exercise to devise an “EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy”, to be concluded in June 2016, belittled the ENP review and, if endorsed, may provide the blueprint for the neighbouring regions. The fact that the two review processes were not fine-tuned was a missed opportunity to make so-called “strategy” and tools work together. Given that of all the EU's foreign policy toolboxes the ENP has the most comprehensive, there could have been much of the ENP of relevance to more global approaches than might be superficially assumed.

Even if the two processes had been dove-tailed, the Euromed Survey asking about the future direction of the ENP reveals that the respondents struggle with the same dilemmas policy-makers have when it comes to dealing with the southern Mediterranean: a number of open answers as well as the responses to question 3 (see graph 1) indicate that the respondents

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The High Representative's exercise to devise an “EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy”, to be concluded in June 2016, belittled the ENP review. The fact that the two review processes were not fine-tuned was a missed opportunity.


are well aware of the limitations and failures of the ENP. However, 79% also think it should be maintained.

For instance, two thirds of respondents believe that the ENP has overwhelmingly fallen short of expectations, with a low credibility in the Maghreb, where 76% believe that “falling short of expectations leads to decreased credibility.” This suggests that the “capabilities-expectations gap” is a relevant explanation for the ENP’s travails.

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At the same time, however, when questioned about the reasons for the ENP’s failures, growing conflict and its spillover in North Africa and the Middle East rank as strong motivations – issues which the ENP was never designed to address, even if there may have been expectations about the ENP supporting stability.

Graph 1: To what extent the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 3

Both findings thus have paradoxical elements. A number of qualitative and open-ended answers provide no reason for maintaining the ENP in its current geographical set up. One quarter of the interviewees argued in favour of greater differentiation between individual countries, but also between East and South; some of the suggestions favour breaking down the ENP into sectoral or geographical components to better reflect regional patterns of interdependence and multipolar scenarios; few, if any, pointed out the advantages of a broad multilateral framework covering 16 countries; yet a clear majority believe the ENP should not be wound up.

The ENP is in Crisis but Continues to Survive

Another dilemma the EU consultation raised is the degree to which the ENP ought to be devised as a policy addressing EU collective interests and priorities or as a tool for improved cooperation. Here too the experts provide no clear-cut answer: 33% believe the ENP should evolve to become a “more equitable partnership” and 24% see it as a cooperation instrument; conversely, 19% advocate that the ENP should become a “political instrument”. 25% advise

The ENP review did not produce a “new” policy: it reflects widespread uncertainty in the expert community too. Differentiation, a greater focus on needs and expectations of partners, and more flexibility of engagement are to be expected for the near future.

greater differentiation, which can be applicable to both approaches. The more qualitative findings of the Survey show how respondents acknowledge the need for a comprehensive and multi-layered tool but offer no clear strategic trajectory for the policy.

It therefore comes as no surprise that the ENP review did not produce a “new” policy: it reflects widespread uncertainty in the expert community too. Differentiation, a greater focus on needs and expectations of partners, and more flexibility of engagement are to be expected for the near future.

An ENP Identity?

Why “identity” crisis? Firstly, two disclaimers are called for. Discussing “identity” issues would require theoretical tools which go beyond the scope of this article. My less ambitious aim is to offer some interpretations to understand the ENP’s simultaneous crisis and resilience, on the basis of the Survey results and of over ten years of engagement with the policy, the policy-makers, and the thinking and civil society community around it. Secondly, the obvious needs to be stated: the ENP is stuck in an inability to address the challenges in North Africa and the Middle East because most of those challenges are extremely hard to address.

Perhaps it is more appropriate to speak of a policy which is undergoing a phase of crisis and lack of direction but has resilience thanks to its “identity”; and “identity” should perhaps be more appropriately described as a loose network of interests, institutions, non-governmental organisations, and experts which gravitate around the policy. Indeed, the Survey results reveal a degree of osmosis of ideas between the communities working on and around the ENP. As was to be expected, think tank experts and NGO activists are more critical of the ENP than EU and national policy-makers, but the differences of opinion are not so great. Interviewees from Israel and Turkey were amongst the most critical (respectively, 43% and 40% do believe the ENP should be wound up) and, on the whole, southern Mediterranean experts are somewhat more sceptical and disappointed than their European counterparts. But divergence from the mean percentage of 79% favouring continuation of the ENP is not so significant.

These findings suggest that around the ENP there is a community of diverse experts which, formally and informally, provides for the exchange of ideas and debates about the policy itself. Alongside formal consultations introduced by the ENP with civil society networks, policy-makers participate in the expert and academic debates through workshops, conferences, and other occasions that the networks around the ENP organise. It is likely that these exchanges, however informal, have informed the discussions held during the review process, more deeply than the consultation process itself.

Think tank experts and NGO activists are more critical of the ENP than EU and national policy-makers, but the differences of opinion are not so great.

The ENP’s institutional and bureaucratic set-up provides another clue to explain its resilience. As “a whole of government” policy, its management straddles the Commission and the European External Action Service creating clusters of interests in the ENP’s survival. Secondly, embracing both the southern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe brings together communities of interest and analysis which rarely interact with each other (indeed, much advocacy has focused on splitting the ENP in two regional policies, a line which was not pursued in the Communication of November 2015). More importantly, they reflect the compromise between internal EU political constituencies more interested in the southern Mediterranean, on the one hand, and in Eastern Europe, on the other, which largely reflects geographical proximity.

Tied to this is the distribution of resources, with both constituencies eager to ensure that these limited resources are not concentrated in one region to the expense of the other. Breaking down the ENP into different components would upset the delicate balance achieved between these constituencies.

The institutional and bureaucratic path dependencies, in other words, reflect a deeper political issue which the EU is unlikely to resolve: for reasons of geography, both neighbourhoods require vital attention and the ENP set up has so far provided that balance. The severe crises hitting Eastern Europe with Russia's annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine, and the Middle East descending into chaos with the dangerous ramifications of the civil war in Syria, makes the salience of the two dimensions more acute. Russia's military intervention in Syria today justifies, ex post, the relevance of establishing linkages between Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Finally, the ENP's survival is likely to be due to the pivotal role it plays between the EU as an internally-focused European organisation and as a global actor. There have been debates over whether the EU should focus more exclusively on its neighbourhood rather than on global engagement, the argument being that if the EU is incapable of developing effective policies in its neighbourhood, how can it aim to play a global role?

Indeed, the EU's neighbourhood attracts much of the Union's political and financial resources: 28% of the EU's budget for external action (under the heading of Global Europe) is earmarked for the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, second only to the Development Cooperation Instrument which takes up 35% of the Global Europe budget; the countries involved in the ENP have seen a number of missions deployed under the Common Security and Defence Policy; many of the EU's most important internal policies (agriculture, the Energy Union, infrastructure, migration) have important ramifications in its neighbourhood. This also explains why the expectations from the ENP have been so high: proximity and interdependence make the EU's neighbourhood of vital importance to the EU.

The identity-forming networks built around the practice and analysis of the Neighbourhood Policy, the institutional and political path dependency due to the internal political compromise between South and East, made more salient in light of the dual crises in Ukraine and in the Middle East, and the demonstrating role the ENP plays for broader EU global ambitions all made the ENP a policy which is impossible to kill, despite the critiques it has provoked, and very difficult to change. The next steps to await, therefore, are how relations between the EU and individual countries will evolve and the guidelines that the forthcoming EU Global Strategy are likely to produce.

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EXTENDING THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF THE ENP?: THE NEIGHBOURS OF THE EU'S NEIGHBOURS

ERWAN LANNON

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The idea of extending the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the Middle East at large (GCC, Iraq, Iran and Yemen) is not new. Many debates have been held in the past to insist on the fact that this EU bureaucratic division was quite artificial and was in fact fragmenting the EU's overall approach towards the Arab world. With the progressive implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) since 2004, the southern and eastern Mediterranean has been integrated into a broader framework for cooperation including three Eastern European Countries (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) and later, three Southern Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). The so-called "Arab Spring" highlighted the interconnectedness of the Mediterranean with the Gulf while the military intervention in Libya brought attention to the existing links between North Africa and the Sahel region at large and more especially Mali.

The concept of the "neighbours of the EU's neighbours" appeared for the first time in 2006, with the idea to see if bridges could be built between the immediate neighbourhood and Africa, Central Asia and the Gulf.

The concept of the "neighbours of the EU's neighbours" appeared for the first time within the 2006 communication of the European Commission on "strengthening the ENP"¹, the main idea being to "look beyond the Union's immediate neighbourhood" and to see if bridges could be built between the areas covered by the latter and Africa, Central Asia and the Gulf. In terms of potential areas of trans-regional cooperation, the European Commission referred to energy, transport, environment, research policy, the fight against illegal immigration and peace and security. However, until the 2015 ENP review these proposals remained on the shelf. During the consultation process for the review of the ENP, the concept, which was explored at academic level after the war in Libya,² re-emerged and the Joint Consultation paper of the High Representative and the European Commission stated that: "many of the challenges that need to be tackled by the EU and its neighbours together cannot be adequately addressed without taking into account, or in some cases co-operating with, the neighbours of the neighbours." In this regard, a series of questions were put on the table: "Should the current geographical scope be maintained? Should the ENP allow for more flexible ways of working with the neighbours of the neighbours? How can the EU, through the ENP framework, support its neighbours in their interactions with their own neighbours? What could be done better to ensure greater coherence between the ENP and the EU's relations with Russia, with partners in Central Asia, or in Africa, especially in the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa, and with the Gulf countries?"³

1. European Commission, Communication on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy COM(2006) 726 final, p. 11.

2. Lannon, E. (2014). Introduction: the 'neighbours of the EU's neighbours', the 'EU's broader neighbourhood' and the 'arc of crisis and strategic challenges' from the Sahel to Central Asia. In S. Gstöhl & E. Lannon. *The Neighbours of the European Union's Neighbours – Diplomatic and Geopolitical Dimensions beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2014, pp. 1-25.

3. European Commission and High Representative, Joint Consultation Paper, Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 4.3.2015 JOIN(2015) 6 final, p. 4.


These issues have been addressed within the framework of the Euromed Survey and more particularly within the framework of questions 10, 11, and 13. Questions 10 and 11 are more theoretical as it seems very doubtful that, for the time being, the ENP as such could be extended to other regions but an extension of the ENP to a country like Iraq seems, in the longer term, possible. Question 13 is much more relevant in the framework of the current review of the ENP as it is feasible to build ad hoc bridges between the different regions at stake.

An extension of the ENP to a country like Iraq seems, in the longer term, possible.

Question 10 was formulated as follows: "To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?"

- i) The current geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained;
- ii) The differentiation between East and South should be kept;
- iii) The definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional state actors".


Graph 1: To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 10

Regarding the first sub-question, 35% of the respondents think that the current scope should not be maintained, whereas 44% are in favour of maintaining it. For the second question, 37% do not think the East/South differentiation should be maintained whilst 48% think the differentiation should be kept. For the third one, 29% do not think the ENP should be extended in order to include other regional state actors, while 56% are in favour. It is thus quite difficult to draw straightforward conclusions except that the respondents are quite divided on this issue. On the other hand, there is a relative majority of responses in favour of extending the ENP to other regional state actors. One should, in this regard, turn to question 11 (see graph 2) to understand the reason why.


Graph 2: In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 11

51% of the respondents are in favour of extending the geographical scope of the ENP to the Sahel. On the other hand 66% are against extending it to the Horn of Africa; 52% are against the ENP extension to the GCC and 51% are against its extension to Iraq and 55% to Iran. Unsurprisingly, it is the respondents originating from the Maghreb that are strongly in favour of extending the ENP to the Sahel (70%), whereas 74% of those from the Mashreq are in favour of an extension to Iraq and 62% in favour of an extension to the Gulf (see graph 3). In other words, geographical proximity matters more than a country belonging to the League of Arab States (with the exception of Mauritania in the Sahel).


Graph 3: In case you think that geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included? (the graph below displays the % of YES answers)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 11

Question 13 asked: “To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?” Here the answer is more straightforward as, in total, 72% believe the ENP should facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with the neighbours of the EU's neighbours. For the EU-28, 74% are in favour, a figure almost the same as for the MPCs (73%) (see graph 4).

Graph 4: To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 13

It is interesting that the open question “to what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?” generated a number of interesting comments. The latter have been summarised hereinafter and regrouped under three main headings: “Which methodology is to be followed?”; “Which kind of actors should be involved?”; and “What are the main potential areas of trans-regional cooperation?”.

Which Methodology Is to Be Followed?

In terms of methodology, there is a strong consensus among respondents, summarised by one of them: “we should develop partnerships based on mutual respect and common interests” and “prevent ritualised and technocratic discussions that do not match our common ambitions and political realities both within the EU and in partner countries, and look into more innovative formats of engaging with partners bilaterally and regionally.” Many answers indeed stressed the need to be “less bureaucratic” (or even “Brussels-centred”) and more “issue-focused” in order to promote “Project-based cooperation” and especially more “joint projects”.⁴ The need for a more decentralised approach has been underlined several times in the responses as well as the use of “bottom-up approaches” (“speaking first with local people”). The association of observers to dialogues and the need to better associate local and regional actors has also been underlined. The emphasis is put on the need to promote a “regular” political dialogue in a more “flexible” manner in order to identify “common issues and interactions between the neighbours and their neighbours.” Dialogue between CSOs and political leaders and governments is also mentioned several times and a respondent proposed the creation of a “structured strategic dialogue” stressing that “geographical distance should not be primary criteria for engagement and interaction.” Most proposals emphasise the need to have “regular” and “flexible” meetings at all levels “taking into account the social, political and economic features of each country.” It is stressed that if the EU must be more flexible, its approach should also be more rigorous,

In terms of methodology, there is a strong consensus to “develop partnerships based on mutual respect and common interests” and “prevent ritualised and technocratic discussions...”.

4. See complementary results in the same direction that can be found in question 12 on proposals to redefine the neighbourhood, particularly 12.3 (EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic) and 12.4 (EU initiatives should be issue-focused).

i.e. based on precise, global and scientific analyses of the various issues at stake, especially regarding immigration, terrorism and climate change.

Flexibility is mentioned many times by respondents.

Flexibility is a concept that has been mentioned many times. Most of the respondents stress that a step-by-step approach is needed and that, first of all, the ENP must be consolidated and improved. Then the dynamics among the neighbours should be identified as well as their common interests, concerns and aspirations. Initiatives should be developed “taking into account the different situations” and should be “more adaptable to the local needs” and Action Plans should be “tailor-made”. One respondent wrote that for “those countries not willing to subscribe to ENP values different formats for political cooperation” should be envisaged. Another expert stressed that flexibility should be applied to the “tempo of reforms and not to the nature of reforms to be accomplished.” Concepts like “variable geometry schemes”, “ad-hoc” groups and co-operations regarding “topical issues”, “triangular cooperation” (EU, its neighbours and their neighbours) have been emphasised as well as the need to focus on “technical cooperation” and “tailor-made bilateral relations”.

As far as conditionality is concerned, different views have been put forward. Some would like to end the “more for more” approach. One respondent wrote that the EU and its Member States should “stop intervening in the internal affairs of each country, and stop linking aid with the question of human rights.” However, the majority of respondents clearly plead for a stricter approach in order to “promote the core values of the EU, the respect for human rights, rule of law, social and economic developments.”⁵ Sector policy dialogue and cooperation in different fields are important elements of the ENP to also bring the neighbours of the neighbours closer to EU policies and standards. A respondent stressed the need to “be intractable on democracy and secularism.” Another underlined the necessity to take into consideration “the national context without sacrificing the principles of democracy, equality and equity” and a third insisted on the fact that “there are principles and criteria that are fundamental and should be strictly applied.” Several respondents are in favour of a “more incentive-based approach.” One respondent proposed granting “additional incentives for countries engaged in regional groupings.”

The need to “concentrate on selected issues and a more limited number of objectives with clear measurable results” has been mentioned several times.

The need to “concentrate on selected issues and a more limited number of objectives with clear measurable results” has been mentioned several times. Also the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours should be integrated “in a long-term strategy of global human development and (one should) not only cooperate with them on a security basis.” The latter could also benefit from an extended eligibility “in some programmes where cross-border cooperation may have a positive impact” but it “depends on the type of cooperation foreseen. If it denotes externalisation of border control measures and migration (mis)management further to the South, absolutely not.” The need to promote co-ownership and mutual responsibility has also been put forward. Finally, a respondent suggested promoting “an increased complementarity between the ENP instruments and the Lisbon Treaty’s toolbox in other fields such as the CFSP/CSDF.”

Which Kind of Actors Should Be Involved?

Many responses do focus on the need to associate more and better with civil society at large.

In this regard, many responses do focus on the need to associate more and better with civil society at large (NGOs, CSOs, private sector, trade unions, employers’ organisations, media and universities) and to involve “less bureaucratic clerks” and have “more practitioners who may understand the needs of the challenging regions.” There is a general consensus for associating in different ways the CSOs in the decision shaping/making processes through meetings, forums, conferences, in an ad hoc manner if necessary. One respondent recommended to develop a policy for improving exchanges of researchers and promote PhDs.

5. Q.7 asked if EU values are applied through the ENP. The answers were mainly negative (43%) showing a general scepticism, greater in the case of respondents from MPCs than from EU countries.

Also “international organisations like the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), African Union and the Council of Europe should be involved.” One respondent proposed considering that “Morocco and other partners are in fact cooperating with African countries. This should be taken into account to support cooperation initiatives in a broader context.” Another suggested developing “EU-GCC-North Africa cooperation to strengthen production/employment in North Africa.” It has been also underlined that “Turkey can also play active role” while “coordination with the US is beneficial.” Finally, one respondent pleaded for “defining an ‘Arab policy’, now completely non-existent” and added that “this implies a radical change in the policy towards Israel.”

What Are the Main Potential Areas of Trans-Regional Cooperation?

Respondents identified a number of potential areas of trans-regional cooperation, summarised below:

In the political and security fields:

- Promote mediation, and (frozen) conflict resolution;
- Regional security projects aimed at fighting terrorism, organised crime, and in particular human trafficking, drug trafficking and arms smuggling;
- Take into consideration border issues in a comprehensive framework;
- Develop “science diplomacy”.

In the economic, trade and financial domain:

- Promote triangular economic cooperation and trade;
- Promote economic cooperation, intra-regional trade, redefining trade agreements;
- Encourage the establishment of free trade areas with other neighbours;
- Allowing for a larger space for cumulation of origin specifically if MPCs are part of FTAs with regional partners;
- Combine geo-economics with social issues (migrations);
- Promote job creation (enhance employment as knowledge of traditional craftsmanship, using the products on site, working on better education);
- Develop environmental and energy cooperation (especially more water, conventional and renewable energy cooperation);
- Develop regional road networks;
- Promote EU investments;
- Enhance closer cooperation on development aspects;
- Improve the ownership of programmes fostering partners’ involvement in the programming processes;
- Work on the absorption capacity of the partners;
- Allow for statistical data harmonisation;
- Promote twinning agreements and adequate trainings;
- Trans-border initiatives through EU delegation cooperation;
- Create joint focal points of needs and cooperation areas;
- Create co-development basin based on complementarity.

In the human and social areas:

- Educational and cultural programmes;
- Migration, especially mobility and visa facilitation (notably for medium sized company personnel);
- Employment policies;
- Enhancement of living conditions;
- Access to basics needs (medical, schools, food);
- Humanitarian assistance and political asylum;
- Doctoral trainings and common research, granting scholarships and hosting foreign scientists and academics, developing educational exchanges;
- Exchange programmes using NGOs;
- Integrate religious considerations and multi-cultural differences.

According to the Joint Communication on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy⁶ the “new ENP will now seek to involve other regional actors, beyond the neighbourhood where appropriate, in addressing regional challenges.”⁷ In this regard, migration, security and energy have been prioritised. This is certainly a good initiative that could be enlarged to other areas of cooperation, as identified by the respondents of the Euromed Survey.⁸ On the other hand, it looks like the issue of the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours will be increasingly taken into consideration as a cross-cutting issue. The respondents of the Euromed Survey identified a number of potential areas of cooperation that could also be taken into consideration, notably at socio-economic levels. It is also noticeable that the respondents focused less on the security dimension (CFSP/CSDP) compared to the proposals of the High Representative and the European Commission.

In terms of methodology, the Joint Communication stressed that the EU “will use Thematic Frameworks to offer cooperation on regional issues (...) to provide a regular forum to discuss joint policy approaches, programming and investment that reach beyond the neighbourhood,”⁹ Turkey being mentioned explicitly in this framework. This is in line with the proposals of the respondents that insisted on the need to promote regular dialogue and to be quite flexible regarding the formats of these multi-level dialogues.

However, one major difference is that the majority of the respondents insisted on the need to be strict regarding conditionality, whereas the Joint Communication mentioned the fact that there “will no longer be a single set of progress reports on all countries simultaneously. Instead, the EU will seek to develop a new style of assessment, focusing specifically on meeting the goals agreed with partners.”¹⁰ If flexibility is also applied to conditionality this might indeed generate a double standard perception that could undermine the EU’s credibility in its wider neighbourhood. The Euromed Survey respondents are apparently very much aware of and concerned about this key issue.

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6. European Commission and High Representative, Joint Communication on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 18 November 2015, JOIN(2015) 50 final.

7. JOIN(2015) 6 final, p. 3.

8. For other proposals, see also: Gsöhl, S., & Lannon, E. (Eds.). *The European Union’s Broader Neighbourhood: Challenges and opportunities for cooperation beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Oxon: Routledge, 2015, 348 p.

9. JOIN(2015) 50, p. 18.

10. Ibid., p. 5.

DIFFERENTIATION IN EU-NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS

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The Ontology of Differentiation in EU-Neighbourhood Relations

After two review processes destined to give differentiation greater salience, it seems obvious that much has gone wrong, or at least not the way policy-makers in the Commission had expected.

Throughout the years, analysts, policy-makers and observers alike have been regularly calling upon the EU to practise greater differentiation in its relations with its southern and eastern neighbours. Formally introduced with much fanfare in the framework of the publication of the European Commission's Wider Europe 2003 Communication (Commission, 2003), differentiation – the practice of developing and pursuing tailor-made EU policies that distinguish between the political, socio-economic, cultural, regional and geo-political specificities and needs of the recipient countries and societies in the EU's neighbourhood – was supposed to be at the core of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) when it was launched some 12 years ago. As the EU's Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood looks increasingly like a “ring of fire”¹ rather than a “ring of friends”, and after two quite lengthy review processes in 2010/2011 and 2015, destined to make the ENP more effective and give differentiation greater salience, it seems obvious that much has gone wrong, or at least not the way policy-makers in the Commission had expected when they developed the policy.

The principle of differentiation was formally introduced in the European Commission's wider Europe Communication 2003.

Back in 2003, when the Commission presented mainly to the EU's southern neighbours and, initially, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the new differentiated approach, it was hailed by the Commission and EU Member States, as well as by the neighbours – old and new – as a means to advance EU-neighbourhood relations in post-enlargement times. After the sobering experience with multilateral cooperation efforts in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) – also called the Barcelona Process – and the failure to induce democratic reforms in the EU's Southern Neighbourhood, differentiated bilateralism was thus considered to be a tool to dynamise relations and incentivise autocratic regimes to engage in lasting and wide-ranging political and economic reform. However, strictly speaking, differentiation had already been – at least on the declaratory level – part of the EMP's “DNA” and thus of the EU's relations with its “near abroad”. The founding document of the Barcelona Process, i.e. the Barcelona Declaration, adopted on 27/28 November 1995 by the EU, its Member States and the then 12 partner countries from the southern Mediterranean, already contained one direct reference to differentiation. In the section on migration cooperation, the declaration stipulated explicitly “the need for a differentiated approach that takes into account the diversity of the situation in each country” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). While this was the only direct reference to the principle of differentiation, the declaration is noteworthy for its many indirect references. For example, the section on economic cooperation calls for the EU and its southern neighbours to take “into account their respective needs and levels of development” and the section outlining Euro-Mediterranean financial cooperation states that “effective financial cooperation” must take “into account the special characteristics of each of the partners” (ibid.). Moreover, and most important, the Barcelona Declaration recognised the right of each partner involved in the EMP “to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system” (ibid.). This is remarkable for two reasons: first, it demonstrates that the EU, already eight years before the ENP was initiated, acknowledged publicly that diverging views existed in EU-neighbourhood relations in what regards democratic governance and the

Strictly speaking, differentiation had already been – at least on the declaratory level – part of the EMP's “DNA” and thus of the EU's relations with its “near abroad”.

1. Charlemagne (2014, 20th September). “Europe's ring of fire”. *The Economist*.


rule of law; secondly, by explicitly recognising the right of each neighbour “to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system,” the EU, while emphasising differentiation, conditionality and thus democratic reform, de facto undermined these principles from the beginning.

The Empty Promise of Differentiation

In the framework of the ENP, and in particular after its first revision in 2010/2011, the EU showed greater determination to no longer tolerate neighbours' divergent views. By adopting the much discussed “more for more” and “less for less” principles (European Commission and EEAS, 2011), it went beyond past discourses and in fact the principle of negative conditionality that – strictly speaking – only applies to the rather narrow contents of the bilaterally concluded Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (AAs). This was facilitated by the outbreak of the Arab Spring in early 2011 and the premature belief that democratic change was under way in the southern neighbourhood, as well as by the Lisbon Treaty and thus the EU's self-imposed ambition to act as a norms promoter beyond its borders. Yet, even though differentiation was suddenly more than ever before linked to conditionality, the past four years visibly demonstrated that the EU's initial determination was once more confined to mere rhetoric and did not alter the pattern of past practices: regardless of whether regimes in the EU's southern neighbourhood – and in the eastern neighbourhood for that matter – displayed reform orientation or reform aversion, the EU abstained from utilising (the threat of) negative conditionality or the principle of “less-for-less” and thus continued to de-legitimize differentiation as a structuring and sanctioning tool. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that – as graph 1 shows – a considerable number of respondents of past surveys increasingly regarded differentiation sceptically or even questioned its utility.

Even though differentiation was suddenly more than ever before linked to conditionality, the past four years visibly showed that the EU's initial determination was once more confined to mere rhetoric.

Graph 1: Do you think that the development of differentiation and reinforced cooperation (including Advanced Status and other types of preferential partnerships) are detrimental or beneficial to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 1st Euromed Survey (2009)

In recent years, the de facto absence of differentiation in EU-neighbourhood relations also came to the fore in the Action Plans (APs) with both southern and eastern neighbours.


Interestingly, in spite of the DCFTA's inherently problematic potential, as well as the AP's and in particular the AA's lack of differentiation, this year's Euromed Survey shows broad support for all three instruments.

In recent years, the de facto absence of differentiation in EU-neighbourhood relations also came to the fore in the Action Plans (APs) with both southern and eastern neighbours and most recently in the newly concluded AAs with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova and thus the corresponding chapters that relate to the creation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). While several APs are rather similar as regards their reform demands and objectives and have in common that they lack clear-cut benchmarks (Del Sarto et al., 2006; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011), the new generation of neighbourhood AAs and in particular their DCFTA stipulations all seem to follow one template as they are marked only by a few distinctions and differences.

From an economic perspective, though the majority of southern and eastern neighbours have in common that they suffer from an insufficient integration into world economic structures, their economic systems and micro- and macro-economic development differ considerably from one another. Yet, formal negotiating directives were also put in place in December 2011 for Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan and while none of them has shown particular enthusiasm towards engaging in the (costly and time consuming) establishment of DCFTAs with the EU and its Member States, Morocco and Tunisia are currently in the midst of negotiations (Holden, 2016). These take place in spite of the fact that the corresponding liberalisation of trade and services and thus the opening up of neighbourhood partner countries' markets expose local businesses to fierce competition by resource and capital rich European enterprises, many of which, operating in the agricultural industry, even benefit from EU sponsored subsidies.²

Interestingly, in spite of the DCFTA's inherently problematic potential, as well as the AP's and in particular the AA's lack of differentiation, the 2015 Euromed Survey showed broad support for all three instruments.

Graph 2: In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 14

In fact, almost 70% of all respondents regard these three instruments to be of particular importance and assess them generally rather positively. Variation could have been expected as regards the views of respondents from within the EU as opposed to those from the Southern Neighbourhood, not least as a result of different degrees of familiarity.

2. In 2013 and 2014, the EU commissioned several studies to assess the impact of DCFTAs on the economies of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. All studies have in common that they predict positive effects as regards GDP growth, GDP per capita, and their respective export industries. See more at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/analysis/sustainability-impact-assessments/assessments/>. However, these predictions stand in sharp contrast to studies by Arab civil society organisations. See for example: Arab NGO Network for Development, Civil Society Reaction to the Joint Communication "A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity". Available at: http://www.eurostep.org/wcm/dmdocuments/es_internal/Civil_Society_Reaction_to_the_Joint_Communication_on_MENA_partnership_final_version-1.pdf

Yet, it is noteworthy that the general approval rates, by and large, are quite similar, though respondents from the South, in contrast to their northern counterparts, consider that the three instruments should be given even more salience in EU-neighbourhood relations³ (see graph 3).

Graph 3: In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged? (the graph below displays the % answers considering high or very high extent)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 14

In order to take into account the insufficient consideration and implementation of differentiation throughout the last 12 years, and with a view to addressing the many critical voices, as reflected in graph 1 above, the most recent review of the ENP paid particular attention to the revitalisation of differentiation. In fact, the Joint Commission/EEAS Task Force in charge of drafting the “new ENP” set up one working group that focused exclusively on differentiation. The final communication, published on 18 November 2015, reflecting the working group’s recommendations, echoed past communications in so far as it stipulated that “differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP” (European Commission and High Representative, 2015, p. 2). However, it went beyond past communications as it recognises “that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards” and that the new policy thus needs to reflect “the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus of its partnership with the EU” (ibid.). While this is in line with the findings of the 2015 Euromed Survey, which clearly demonstrates broad support in favour of providing neighbours with cooperation offers that are more issue-focused and that accommodate shifting interests in the region⁴ (see graph 4), such an announcement is equally problematic: the EU implicitly acknowledges the failure of the “less for less” principle and subordinates the promotion of democracy, good governance, rule of law, and human rights – policy fields that autocratic regimes have been least favourable to in the past – to those issue areas and policy fields that are less sensitive and that do not pose a potential challenge to authoritarian rule in the southern neighbourhood.


The most recent review of the ENP paid particular attention to the revitalisation of differentiation.

The EU implicitly acknowledges the failure of the “less-for-less” principle.

3. See Euromed Survey Q.14. in developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged? See in particular EU-28 graph and MPC graph.

4. See Euromed Survey, Q.12: to what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?.


Graph 4: To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 12

The geographical and geopolitical rationale that is underpinning EU-neighbourhood relations and that regards the 16 ENP partner countries as the constituent units of one space has throughout the last decade increasingly raised concerns among many. While several neighbours were rather quick to regard the idea of “one neighbourhood” with a considerable degree of scepticism, academic calls for reconceptualising Brussels’ notion of “neighbourhood” came in waves and originally targeted only the EU’s southern dimension. In recent years, though, several pundits advocated true and greater differentiation in the EU’s understanding of neighbourhood and a termination of the rather artificial disconnect between what the EU considers to be the “neighbours of the neighbours” (Gstöhl & Lannon, 2014). This is also reflected in this year’s Euromed Survey, as can be seen in graph 5.

Graph 5: Redefining the neighbourhood: To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 10

Not only do the majority of respondents from both the EU and the southern neighbourhood agree that the current geographical scope of the ENP should be changed, but they also agree that the definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other state actors that are of relevance to the EU's neighbours. However, different views exist with respect to maintaining the formal distinction between the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. While 57% of respondents from EU Member States support the existing formula, which, at least formally, differentiates between the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, only 37% of their southern Mediterranean counterparts consider this to be appropriate (see graph 6). These findings are striking, as they seem to imply that the majority of southern respondents perceive the ENP to be discriminating against them. In practice, though, the southern neighbours were the first to receive fully fledged AAs in the mid-late 1990s and early 2000s and they also benefit from greater amounts of EU financial assistance. Nonetheless, this perception can be explained by the rather widespread belief among both governmental and non-governmental actors from within the southern neighbourhood that the EU's eastern neighbours, as a result of being located on the European continent, are invariably in a comparatively more favourable position.

The majority of respondents agree that the definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other state actors that are of relevance to the EU's neighbours.

Graph 6: Redefining the neighbourhood: To what extent do you agree the differentiation between East and South should be kept?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 10

While the EU in its 2015 review has left untouched the financial assistance ratio of 2:1 (South vs. East), as well as the geographical parameters of the ENP, it has given geopolitical differentiation greater accentuation to the extent that it promises a new “outreach beyond the boundaries of the ENP area” in those cases where “connections and interdependencies with other partners require broader formats of cooperation” (European Commission and HR/VP, 2015, p. 18). Thus, the 2015 review of the ENP reflects the opinion of a large number of respondents to this year’s Euromed Survey, the majority of whom believe that the EU’s, as well as the neighbours’, long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa should be revitalised.⁵

5. See *ibid.*

Conclusions

Though differentiation has also been put at the core of the newly revised ENP of 2015, doubts as to how seriously it will be implemented in practice are in order. Given the way the EU and its Member States have pursued the ENP throughout the last 12 years, systematically undermining the principle of differentiation, it is difficult to see this seemingly established practice change in the near future. In fact, the emphasis of the 2015 ENP on transactional cooperation and its objective to focus on thematic frameworks in policy areas such as migration, energy and security, in conjunction with its explicit recognition that for some neighbours past editions of the ENP have been “too prescriptive” (ibid., pp. 2-3), indicate that the democratic governance and human rights acquis in EU-neighbourhood relations is bound to degenerate further. This is a severe blow to neighbourhood societies’ quest for democratic change, as well as to all those who have been arguing for years that, after all, the EU is complicit in the stabilisation of autocratic rule in its neighbourhood (Barbé & Johansson-Nogués, 2008; Pace & Seeberg, 2010). Also, and equally important, such a development is detrimental to the EU’s ambition to enhance its credibility as a foreign policy actor in, as well as beyond, its southern and eastern neighbourhood in times of crisis, radicalisation, violence, and territorial conflict. If the EU is to have at least some relevance in its neighbourhood, it cannot continue undermining its foreign policy objectives by diluting the ENP any further. However, the 2015 review shows that apparently this view is not shared by all stakeholders in Brussels and Member States’ capitals.

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EU MEMBER STATES AND THE ENP: TOWARDS GREATER OWNERSHIP?

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"(...) it will be important to seek a deeper involvement of EU Member States in re-energising work with our neighbours."

Joint Communication on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 18.11.2015

Ownership of the ENP by EU Member States themselves is a critical issue that deserves scrutiny. The Survey shows that the lack of involvement from Member States is not an unknown reality to its respondents.

When the word "ownership" is used in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), it is most often to refer to the need to better involve EU neighbours. However, the ownership of the ENP by EU Member States themselves is also a critical issue that deserves scrutiny. And this is not a new issue. In May 2011, the Joint Communication on the ENP review¹ already stated that "co-ordination between the EU, its Member States and main international partners is essential and can be improved" and that "the ENP should be a policy of the Union with the Member States aligning their own bilateral efforts in support of its overall political objectives." The Joint Communication published on 18 November 2015 provides an honest assessment of the ENP and its limitations. As part of this assessment, the Joint Communication also acknowledges that the involvement of the Member States remains insufficient.

An analysis of open answers to questions 4 and 6 shows that the lack of involvement from Member States is not an unknown reality to the respondents of the Survey. "Better involve the EU Member States", "all the 28 members of the EU should be involved", "it would need more attention from EU Member States" are examples of how a German, a Finn and a Hungarian respondent, respectively, answered the question "how can the European neighbourhood policy perform best?"

Question 4

What should be the vision for the future relations between the EU and the Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?

Question 5

What do you expect from the EU relations with its Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?

Question 6

How can the European Neighbourhood Policy perform best?

The objective of this contribution, whose scope is limited to the Southern Neighbourhood and to the political aspects of the ENP (leaving aside the financial arm of the ENP that is not directly affected by the Joint Communication), will be to substantiate the alleged lack of involvement of Member States and to try to explain it.

1. A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood – Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 25 May 2011.

Some Mechanisms Are Foreseen to Involve Member States in the Conduct and Design of the ENP

A mere theoretical review of ENP structures and tools would not necessarily help in substantiating the lack of involvement of Member States. On paper, the ENP foresees an important role for Member States that are both invited to contribute to ENP-related documents and to participate in relevant meetings. Let's take the example of ENP Action Plans: Member States are involved at working level in the drafting exercise through the Maghreb-Mashreq (MAMA) working group of the Council and at political level as the Action Plan needs to be adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council. EU Member States are also involved in the Association Councils, at least in two ways. First, the EU line-to-take during the meeting as well as the final statement coming out of the meeting are prepared, negotiated and need to be approved by the Member States ahead of the meeting. Second, Ministers of the EU-28 Member States are invited to attend - as observers - part of the Association Council where they may also be given the floor.

It should not be forgotten that Member States are not only involved in the conduct of the ENP; they are also involved in shaping its design. The ENP review as presented in the Joint Communication on 18 November for instance was only a proposal to the Member States that endorsed it through Council Conclusions on 14 December 2015.² Moreover, even before the Joint Communication was presented, Member States had several opportunities to express their views and to influence its content.

Member States have arguably good reasons to show interest in the ENP. The first reason is political. Behind the technical dimension of some sectorial sub-committee meetings lay sometimes important issues that might have – positive or negative – implications for the bilateral relationships of Member States with their southern Mediterranean partners. The interest of Member States in some sub-committees is particularly high when they relate to a policy for which the EU has strong competence (trade for instance), when sensitive political issues are being discussed (labelling of products coming from Israeli occupied territories for instance)³, and when they deem it useful that the EU conveys certain messages to neighbouring countries, i.e. without necessarily having to do it themselves. Last, for a majority of Member States that do not have strong bilateral cooperation with southern Mediterranean partners, the ENP potentially represents a good source of information and provides fora for interaction with those partners at different levels.

Some Keys to Understand the Malaise of Member States vis-à-vis the ENP

Despite the structural design of the ENP that gives some space to the Member States and the aforementioned interests they have in being involved, it appears that the conduct of the ENP is not characterised by a strong involvement of Member States. For instance, a very limited number of ministers usually participate in Association Council meetings with southern Mediterranean partners.⁴ The same goes for meetings at a lower level. The development of alternative formats by Member States is another indicator of the rather low involvement of Member States in the conduct of the ENP. Some Member States have developed strictly inter-governmental processes outside the ENP, such as the 5+5 format that offers a cooperation framework for western Mediterranean countries. Some observers have also analysed the creation of the Union

On paper, the ENP foresees an important role for Member States that are both invited to contribute to ENP-related documents and to participate in relevant meetings.

In practice, the conduct of the ENP is not characterised by a strong involvement of Member States.

2. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/14-conclusions-european-neighbourhood/>

3. See, for instance, the issue of the non-recognition by Algeria for trade purposes of Croatia's accession to the EU that prompted Croatia to ask the EU to make the point in the Association Council with Algeria in June 2014.


4. There are exceptions though, e.g. Association Councils with Israel always attract quite a deal of attention from Member States. Similarly, after a long period without an Association Council with Egypt, one could assume that the next meeting will mobilise a certain number of ministers.

for the Mediterranean upon French initiative in 2008 as an attempt to create an alternative – and more intergovernmental – framework to the existing EU-Mediterranean frameworks. There has also been the tendency to multiply alternative formats at the ministerial level through the so-called “Friends of” meetings, not only with candidate countries (e.g. Serbia) or countries in crises (Syria, Yemen) but also with Lebanon. Although these meetings are ad hoc and do not tend to repeat themselves, they reflect a certain malaise of Member States vis-à-vis the ENP that needs to be analysed.

Respondents to the Survey from EU countries seem to be the ones with less faith in the ENP toolbox.

If “(...) the ENP needs to demonstrate its relevance first and foremost to European states,” as Rosa Balfour puts it,⁵ it means among other things that Member States have not seen the benefits of the policy framework. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, in relative terms, the respondents to the Survey from EU countries – and in particular the non-Mediterranean EU countries – seem to be the ones with less faith in the ENP toolbox (see graph 1).

Graph 1: In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged? (the graph below displays the % answers considering high or very high extent)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 14

Member States tend to assess ENP procedures as too heavy and “overwhelming” and some find it difficult to attend all ENP related meetings. ENP processes are also seen as too scripted. Association Council meetings, for instance, are often described as particularly uneventful.

Member States tend to assess ENP procedures as too heavy and “overwhelming”⁶ and some find it difficult to attend all ENP related meetings. ENP processes are also seen as too scripted. Association Council meetings, for instance, are often described as particularly uneventful. In a volatile Mediterranean, Member States are inclined to focus on the short term and on addressing the crises, for which the ENP is of limited help.

Some argue that the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission bear some responsibility for the disengagement of the Member States. In the post-Lisbon context, the EEAS has been eager to assert its profile in foreign policy, and some Member States have felt that it has tried to maximise its autonomy in policies such as the ENP to the detriment of Member States.⁷

5. Balfour, Rosa, *Making the Most of the European Neighbourhood Policy Toolbox*, German Marshall Fund, 18 November 2015.

6. Interview with a Member State diplomat based in Brussels.

7. A fundamental institutional debate on the legal nature of the ENP relates to this issue and originates from the fact that Article 8 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) introduces a legal basis for the EU to develop a “special relationship” with its neighbours that no longer binds the ENP either to the enlargement provisions or to the provisions of the treaties relating to the external action of the Union.

It is true that the EEAS has a decisive role to play in the ENP. The European External Action Service is responsible for drafting documents that then go through the relevant Council structures, especially the MAMA working group (which an EEAS representative has chaired since the Lisbon Treaty). It is equally true that Member States are not fully associated with some ENP meetings: ministers from Member States are only invited to the plenary part of Association Councils, which are usually followed by a more restricted session excluding Member States.

However, the lack of involvement of Member States in the ENP is prone to subjective interpretations and it would be misleading to only put the blame on the European Commission or the EEAS. Member States have often been reluctant to let the exclusivity of their bilateral relationships with southern partners dissolve into an EU framework. Another phenomenon highlighted by some respondents to the Survey is the unhealthy division of labour between the EU institutions and Member States on human rights, whereby Member States tend to let the EU convey difficult messages on human rights violations to partners without supporting the same line unequivocally in the context of their bilateral relations. For instance, a French respondent commented "...all EU Member States should be equally engaged in the promotion of its principles." However, it appears that there are variations among Member States on the importance attached to human rights and it seems that the language on human rights has been a contentious point among Member States in the ENP review process up to the adoption of the Council conclusions on 14 December 2015. Traditionally, northern European countries have been more attached to the "more-for-more" rationale than some Mediterranean EU countries.

In addition to the distinctions made between small and big Member States (regarding the capacity to cope with the ENP toolbox), on the one hand, and northern and southern Member States (regarding the importance of "more-for-more" and human rights in the ENP), on the other, it is important to introduce another distinction between those Member States that have more interest in the EU's southern neighbourhood and those that are more inclined to the eastern neighbourhood. It could be argued that there is only a partial ownership of the ENP by Member States, with EU southern Member States involving themselves more on the southern Mediterranean and the EU eastern Member States showing more interest in the eastern dimension of the ENP. This can be illustrated by the attendance of Association Councils: most often, the few ministers that attend Association Councils with southern partners are from EU Mediterranean countries. This specialisation is not healthy according to a Swedish respondent who claims that the ENP should not be outsourced to some specific EU countries: "France is not the country to run EU-Algeria policy and neither should Germany, Sweden or Poland run the Union's Russia policy."

Reviewing the dynamics that may have an impact on Member States' involvement in the ENP without mentioning the divisions on foreign policy matters among Member States would not be satisfactory. The ENP is not only the victim of a lack of coordination between the Member States but also of substantive divisions within the 28 countries on how to deal with situations in the EU's Southern Neighbourhood. Respondents to the ENP Survey make no mistake about it. To the fourth question (on the vision for future relations between the EU and the Southern Neighbourhood partner countries), a respondent wrote: "I don't see a real European policy in Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen even Tunisia. Instead, disinterest, alignment on the US position or continuation with national policies." Another respondent introduces a link between the lack of visibility of the EU and the inner divisions, for example, on migration: "the EU at the moment is practically invisible from the South. There is still a lot to be done on the EU's side to have a joint view on questions and represent them. I don't see this happening in the short term on most of the issues, e.g. speaking with one voice on the migration issue has been impossible so far."

Member States have often been reluctant to let the exclusivity of their bilateral relationships with southern partners dissolve into an EU framework.

Most often, the few ministers that attend Association Councils with southern partners are from EU Mediterranean countries.

The ENP is not only the victim of a lack of coordination between the Member States but also of substantive divisions within the 28 countries on how to deal with situations in the EU's Southern Neighbourhood.

Conclusion

The mere repetition of a formula referring to the lack of involvement of Member States in successive ENP reviews is a good indicator of the seriousness of the issue. Therefore, the effort of the latest review released on 18 November 2015 to address some of the concerns of Member States that may explain their relative disengagement should be commended. The ENP was considered too ambitious, too broad and too bureaucratic. The ENP review proposes to go for streamlined priorities, to concentrate on interests of stakeholders, including EU Member States (hence the focus on migration and security) and to rationalise the toolbox, including the reporting exercise. The effort will need to be sustained in the upcoming period: when engaging with partner countries on the revised policy, EU institutions will need to closely involve Member States. However, the success of the ENP will also require a constructive engagement from Member States that should not only be concerned with making the ENP work for their bilateral relations. Only under this condition will the ENP perform better and the EU will be able to avoid the prognosis made by a respondent to the Survey: *“Il existe une tendance lourde a voir l'UE devenir un partenaire banal parmi les acteurs regionaux, a la fois politiquement et surtout econmiquement.”*

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EU VALUES AND THE ENP: TOWARDS A TRANSFORMED CONDITIONALITY

NADINE ABDALLA


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The Arab uprisings have highlighted not only the EU's lack of means to react decisively to the events occurring in its neighbourhood but also its inability to consistently promote its values outside its borders.

Introduction

The Arab uprisings have highlighted not only the EU's lack of means to react decisively to the events occurring in its neighbourhood but also its inability to consistently promote its values outside its borders. Indeed, the results of the Survey show that a relative majority of respondents both from EU countries and from Mediterranean Partner Countries agrees that EU values are not applied in the ENP context. Actually, 44% among them think that these values are applied to a low and very low extent. This proportion is higher among respondents from Mediterranean Partner Countries (50%) than among EU respondents (38%).


Graph 1: To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 7

When it comes to the question related to the exclusion of the countries that do not commit to reforms (part of question 14 of the Survey), 41% do not support this exclusion notion (to either a low or very low extent) and 39% encourage it (to a high and very high extent) while 20% do not seem to have a clear position about exclusion (but do not reject it either).

Graph 2: In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the exclusion of the countries not committed to reforms be privileged?




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 14

The analysis of the results shows that some of those who argue that these countries should be excluded would advise dealing with the civil society instead. In this case, they would tend to push the EU to revise its agreements with countries that are breaching the human rights “clauses” in the Association Agreement.

Other respondents would rather advise the EU to dedicate less attention to reforms and to focus only on trade, security and energy, or, in other words, they would think that strategic interests should dominate over democratic and sometimes impossible economic reforms. The reason that was sometimes provided here is that partner countries should manage their internal affairs as they wish, since not all of them already have the structural ability to adopt a western democratic style. Nevertheless, the general tendency of the whole Survey encourages the engagement with the countries that are not committed to domestic reforms in order to encourage them, at least in the longer term, to adopt the latter. A relative majority of 46% encourage the engagement with those countries (see graph 3).

Graph 3: In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 14

Hence, we will next emphasise and discuss the four main tools that the analysis of this Survey suggests for the EU to deal with those partner countries that remain reluctant to implement reforms, as follows:

Increasing Dialogue and Trickle-Down Effect Cooperation

Dialogue and cooperation in areas of common interest can open the door for a deeper cooperation in political reform areas, whereas exclusion will only push the reluctant regimes to make connections with authoritarian countries such as Russia and China. However, the results of the Survey stress two elements that need to be taken into consideration while cooperating with partner countries: (a) cooperation should be based on research on the ground that leads to a deeper understanding of the problems that partner countries face, the rationale behind their resilience toward reforms, and a better understanding of what can motivate them to implement reforms; (b) this cooperation should be based on a more strategic orientation. Thus, European countries should identify the areas of cooperation, which are not only considered as fields of common interest but that can also lead to a trickle-down effect in terms of domestic reforms. Providing training for the judiciary sector or even the state administration can be considered a concrete example here. Hence, the mutual transfer of know-how and technical capacity building is supposed to lead, in the longer term, to deeper political, yet gradual, reforms.

Dialogue and cooperation in areas of common interest can open the door for a deeper cooperation in political reform areas, whereas exclusion will only push the reluctant regimes to make connections with authoritarian countries.

Nevertheless, while the work on capacity building of the state institutions is a tool that can guarantee the support for democracy and efficiency, the EU should take into consideration at least two points: (a) following up on the implementation of its programmes and benchmarking

the latter. This is especially because of the political instability that occurred in most of the partner countries in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. The latter have hindered the implementation of several EU programmes despite the fact that the EU had already provided funds and support for them; (b) the EU should not only give support in areas of common interest but also needs to establish an efficient carrot/stick system that can push rulers to go further in implementing reforms – a fact leading us to the following point.

Conditioned Incentives

The results of the Survey suggest that access to the EU market, investments and financial assistance should be linked to some conditions guaranteeing good governance, i.e. progress in institution building, the fight of corruption and progress in political and civil rights.

The results of the Survey suggest that access to the EU market, investments and financial assistance should be linked to some conditions guaranteeing good governance, i.e. progress in institution building, the fight against corruption and for progress in political and civil rights. With a view to engaging even with those regimes that remain reluctant to reforms, a more-for-more approach should be adopted: the latter should not apply “nothing for no commitment” but “less for no commitment”.

However, for these conditionality measures to be efficient, three points need to be taken into consideration by the EU: (a) the implementation of conditionality requires, as Balfour notes, a similar understanding of sovereignty and external interference in the internal affairs of the state (Balfour, 2012, p. 17). While western European interference was welcomed by Eastern Europe before the big enlargement of 2004, this is not the case for the EU Southern Neighbourhood partner countries where European interference triggers nationalistic feelings, such as in the case of Egypt. Unfortunately, those feelings are easily exploited by the regimes to harm the credibility of actors seeking the promotion of European values of liberalism and democracy. Anti-liberal measures can be supported by segments of the society helping the regime to consolidate its authoritarian rule; (b) to be effective, the EU needs to think of attractive carrots. The problem lies in the fact that the ENP has imported much of the logic of enlargement without taking into consideration the differences between eastern partners and the Southern Neighbourhood partner countries. Unfortunately, the incentives incorporated into each of the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean do not constitute carrots for the countries in the southern Mediterranean. The EU has offered neither full access to the single market nor the free movement of labour to the Mediterranean countries, which is what they are seeking the most (Elmola 2009, pp. 11-12); (c) related to this, to be effective, conditionality requires an asymmetry of leverage and influence tilted in favour of the EU. However, the EU influence in the region, as Balfour notes, is by no means comparable to that of a traditional relationship between donor and beneficiary, nor to the case of the accession process in Eastern Europe. The change of power dynamics in the region with the emergence of regional actors who try to play a political role, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other global powers that are working on shaping economic ties such as China and Russia, decreases the EU's capacity to exert influence (Balfour, 2012, pp. 29-30).

Building Infrastructure for Democracy and Revising the EU's Economic Approach

The results of the Survey suggest the need for increasing exchanges and training experiences with the societal organisations such as the universities' staff or NGOs; and with institutional authorities such as legislative institutions or the judiciary. These exchanges that promote the values of accountability, good governance and democracy, when reaching a critical level, will in the medium or longer term create lobbies that will exert internal pressure and thus push for reforms. In the same vein, the increase of investment in human capital (health and education) and the work on issue-based programmes that have developmental aims can build a certain infrastructure for democracy in the respective partner countries.

Indeed, the lack of infrastructure for democracy made itself evident through the choices that have been made by several segments of those societies during the post-revolutionary period. Social and economic needs pushed segments of the population to support authoritarian options. Thus, for the EU, building an infrastructure for democracy in the partner countries would mean focusing on financing development projects, which can develop human capacities and socially empower people. However, while supporting such activities, the EU needs to refer to a rights-based approach. In other words, development projects linked with a rights-based approach should be one of the main targets of the EU. This would mean that the EU should condition the receipt of funds to the promotion of a culture of accountability among the beneficiaries of the funds. The target groups should not only benefit from funds that develop their capacities and empower them but should also learn to ask for their rights and push the government to be more accountable. This behaviour will prevent the EU from offering funds that promote stability instead of democratisation.

On the other hand, for the EU to be consistent and credible in these steps, it should reconsider its economic agendas: especially because neo-liberal reforms have led to a more unequal distribution and thus to the increase of social protests over the last two decades in most of the partner countries (Huber, 2013, p. 107). In this perspective, the principle of economic liberalisation as a prerequisite for political reform should be revisited. The proof is that the liberalisation of the economy in several partner countries was accompanied by a political de-liberalisation.

Supporting Civil Society

The Survey's results suggest that providing support for civil society should be a priority for the EU, so that pressure can occur from within. This would concretely mean, on the one hand, assisting civil society organisations (CSOs) and, on the other hand, supporting youths as part of the broader civil society, universities, and so on, through providing exchanges of experiences and scholarships, for instance.

Nevertheless, the EU should not fall in the trap of a non-calculated optimism regarding the CSOs. In fact, as Teti remarks, not only has a considerable body of academic literature confirmed the limitations of civil society as a democratising or even as liberal force, but also the authoritarian government's practices aiming to control dissident CSOs (through controls on registration, financial monitoring, co-option, etc.) make it difficult for the latter to "check government excesses" (Teti, 2015, p. 18). More importantly, the CSOs working in the field of human rights remain elitist and mostly disconnected from the wider society. They are unable to reach the grassroots and thus unable to counterbalance the state's authoritarianism. In this context, it should be noted that in most of the partner countries the birth of these organisations working on civil and political rights was not the result of a social dynamic. On the contrary, their proliferation is more a strategy of the authoritarian regimes to allow a sort of controlled liberalisation. Some organisations are completely dependent on foreign funds and thus at least partially dependent on the donors' agenda. These factors result in the formation of an elite that is seeking to promote liberal values among elitist segments of society while being completely disconnected from the wider society; and therefore unable to mobilise it. Hence, the EU notion of civil society needs to be more inclusive to include other major constituents of civil society in the Arab context, such as professional associations and syndicates: while organisations focusing on civil and political rights receive considerable attention, trade unions and other organisations working on socio-economic rights remain absent (Teti, 2015, pp. 18-19).

Support for civil society should be a priority for the EU. Assisting civil society organisations (CSOs) and supporting youths as part of the broader civil society can make pressure occur from within the countries.

Conclusion and Recommendation

While the EU certainly needs to find a balance between preserving its security and promoting its values, the EU's policy in terms of democracy assistance needs to be consistent and the EU needs to set its priorities. In this perspective, it also needs to focus more on extending the infrastructure of democracy in the Arab countries rather than on promoting an elitist human rights agenda. Hence, development projects linked with a rights-based approach should be one of the main targets of the EU. Therefore, the target groups should not only benefit from funds that develop their capacities and empower them but should also learn to ask for their rights and push the government to be more accountable. Moreover, the EU has to adopt a different strategy in a new geopolitical context: it should thus base its policy not only according to its strategic interests but also according to the new challenges that the partner societies are facing, whether on the economic, institutional or security level. Hence, the EU needs to shape specific programmes and policies for each of the partner countries. These programmes should take into account both European interests and the political conditions of the partner countries as well as their specific needs. They must take also into account the new actors that are emerging, such as youth groups or new trade unions. However, in the current situation where activists or societal actors cooperating with foreigners are discredited internally in several Arab countries, the EU needs to currently focus more on long-term projects that build an image of the EU as a partner in the process of economic development and institutional building.

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EMBRACING A WIDER RANGE OF ACTORS

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Introduction

International relations have become an increasingly complex arena that includes an ever growing and diverse set of actors. Besides state institutions and persons representing the state, these also encompass a variety of nationally, transnationally and internationally operating non-state actors. The interests of a wide range of non-state actors can deviate from those of the traditional foreign policy-makers in the respective countries.

The proliferation of agents of international relations reflects the transformations that have been taking place within most societies around the globe. In particular, neoliberal interventions have had drastic effects on the functioning of the state. In most parts of the global southern neoliberal reform, policies entailed the end of the state-centric model, in which the state and its institutions were perceived as the premier authority for promoting development and maintaining security (Günay, 2008).

The Arab Spring revealed the huge number and the diversity of non-state agents that had grown under the surface of authoritarianism.

The turmoil in the course of the Arab Spring confirmed the weakening capacities of the Arab states to shape and transform their societies and revealed the huge number and diversity of non-state agents that had grown under the surface of authoritarianism. The EU's policies in reaction to the developments seemed to acknowledge the increasingly complex cartography of political power in the region (Back, Keith, Khan, Shukra and Solomos, 2009). After self-critique – Commissioner Štefan Füle stated that the EU and its Member States had fallen prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region (Füle in Tocci, 2011) – the Union reviewed its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The reviewed ENP entails various new financial instruments, programmes and initiatives, more country-specific approaches and claims stronger support for locally rooted civil society actors (Behr & Siitonen, 2013). In particular, the newly-established Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility as well as the European Endowment of Democracy have aimed at supporting democratisation in the region through civil society assistance.

Normative Conceptions of Democracy and Civil Society

The EU's and its Member States' conception of democracy is strongly shaped by liberal paradigms.

Compared to its involvement in the democratic transformations of the former communist states in Eastern Europe, the EU's support for democratisation in the Arab world has been relatively weak. From a European perspective, different from the fall of the communist regimes, the events of the Arab Spring did not signify the victory of western liberalism over eastern despotism. Although, for a short period, the call for values such as freedom and democracy raised hopes for the proliferation of liberal democracy in the Arab world, these hopes soon dwindled with the rise of Islamist actors. The EU's and its Member States' conception of democracy is strongly shaped by liberal paradigms. The concept of liberal democracy became hegemonic after the end of the Cold War. Democracy promoters around the globe have perceived liberal democracy as a teleological and universal model that can be applied anywhere, leaving other concepts of democratic rule, such


as social or participatory democracy aside (Haller, 2015). The democratisation of other societies was seen as a technical process that entailed the adaptation of institutional and organisational settings modelled on western experiences. Carothers (1999) speaks in this context of the application of a “democracy template”.

The role civil rights movements had played in the transformations of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe advanced the idea of the democratising potential of civil society. Civil society, perceived as an independent civic control institution opposed to the state or as an arbiter between state and society, came to be seen as a *sine qua non* of liberal democracy and a prerequisite for democratisation (Radu, 2009). This idea of civil society as a facilitator of democratisation gained popularity among academics as well as policy-makers and activists around the world, and has been “seen as both an explanatory variable and as a normative idea” (Behr & Siitonen, 2013, p. 7). Hence, assistance for civil society and support through funding became a core element of democracy assistance.

Although civil society assistance and exchange between civil society actors within the EuroMed area has been an important element of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and later the ENP, the effect of these policies proved to be rather weak. This has led 83% of the participants of the 6th Euromed Survey to state that they believe (to a high or very high extent) that non-state actors should be involved more effectively and on a broader basis in order to making the ENP more effective. But which civil society actors should be involved?

When it comes to the question related to the exclusion of countries that do not commit to reforms, the analysis of the results highlights that some of those who argue that these countries should be excluded would advise dealing with civil society instead.

Graph 1: To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 18

The Contested Nature of Civil Society

The EU's liberal concept of civil society as a benign force acting as a buffer or intermediary between state and society assumes a generally agreed definition of civil society. Hardly acknowledging different historical developments and functions of civil society within Europe (ranging from state dependent to independent civil society formations) (White, 2004) and different theoretical approaches, – Gramsci sees civil society as an extension of the state and as an instrument to enforce hegemony (2005) – the concept remains rather vague. It is not clear whether civil society simply refers to all non-state actors, if it entails interest groups such as trade unions, syndicates and business associations or whether it only refers to NGOs. Besides that, can media be labelled as part of civil society? Does the concept only refer to institutionalised and licensed organisations and associations? Or are social movements, thematic platforms, informal networks and other un-institutionalised formations also part of civil society? After all, although they do not match with EU standards and normative conceptions of associations, they do often fulfil the same functions as civil society organisations in a European definition; they promote thematic issues and serve as an arbiter, counter-weight

Some of the respondents who argue that countries not committed to reform should be excluded would advise dealing with civil society.

Civil society remains an essentially contested concept that is characterised by a plurality of meanings, which evolve differently depending on the context.

or even antidote to the state (Günay, 2015). In other words, despite its common reference, civil society remains an essentially contested concept that is characterised by a plurality of meanings, which evolve differently depending on the context – encompassing time, place and the societies involved (Haller, 2015).


The EU's normative liberal definition of civil society builds on Europe's experiences with enlightenment and secular assumptions about religion and politics. In that sense, it is reflective of a secularist European epistemology which produces a certain understanding of what can be considered as “normal politics”. The situation in Muslim societies has been often perceived as a deviation from this norm, either due to the appearance of Islam in politics and its equation with fundamentalism or intolerance, or its appearance as “ill-fitting imitations of a Western secular ideal” (Shakman-Hurd, 2007). Again, this perception denies the variety of secular practices in different European countries and assumes a generally accepted and agreed model of secularism.

The programmes and initiatives aimed at civil society assistance in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and the standards and norms applied in regard to which organisations and associations have been acknowledged as civil society organisations (CSOs) and which not can also be seen as a feature of the EU's general ambition to extend its own rules and norms beyond its borders. Schimmelfennig holds that the EU has acted as a power that is “civilizing the international system by transforming it into a system of rule-based governance according to its own model” (Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 5).

The EU's narrow liberal conception of civil society has ignored important agents of social and political change on the ground. This sense is also confirmed by respondents to the Survey, particularly those from the southern countries, among whom a large number highlight the need for a better knowledge of local actors.

The EU's narrow liberal conception of civil society has ignored important agents of social and political change on the ground.

Graph 2: To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood Partner countries?: Increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 14

At the margins of the state, where state power has been fraying out, established Islamic organisations but particularly informal networks based on religious affiliations or kinship have often compensated the absence of state institutions.

While in most parts of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, “western-style civil society organisations” have promoted values such as human, women’s and minority rights that resonated with a liberal western discourse and could therefore raise the attention of external supporters and donors, a large variety of informal, un-institutionalised movements and networks have filled the vacuum left behind by the state’s withdrawal from social welfare in the course of neoliberal interventions. At the margins of the state, where state power has been fraying

out, established Islamic organisations but particularly informal networks based on religious affiliations or kinship have often compensated the absence of state institutions. By providing welfare, social order and security they have often functioned like local authorities (Günay, 2012). The responsiveness of this broad variety of un-institutionalised networks to basic local needs has given them wide support and recognition by local populations (Lee & Shitrit, 2014).

Informal networks and local institutions can be a base for self-organisation; they can function as arbiters between the formal and informal space and thereby secure the basic needs of otherwise excluded people and even promote their active participation in political processes. Often starting to evolve at the family level, they can develop beyond that and form interest groups according to certain ideas and needs. Therefore, informal networks are not necessarily exclusively informed by primordial ties, but can be inclusive and multi-functional (Harders & Schaubert, 1999). One can conclude that un-institutionalised platforms and informal networks have been important agents of social and political change.


However, the EU's normative understanding of what can be considered as civil society and as eligible partners for cooperation (Hobson & Kurki, 2013) had the effect that most of these potential agents of social and political change have remained off its radars.

The EU's normative understanding of what can be considered as civil society and as eligible partners for cooperation (Hobson & Kurki, 2013) had the effect that most of these potential agents of social and political change have remained off its radars.

How to Embrace a Wider Range of Actors

As the results of the 6th Euromed Survey illustrate, a large majority of respondents think that in order to make the ENP more effective a larger number of non-state actors should be embraced. Again, with 82%, a large majority of respondents believes that increased capacities of EU officials on the ground would be an important measure to make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive.

Graph 3: To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood Partner countries?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 18

However, in order to be effective (support democratic dynamics and assist agents of political and social change), EU policies and officials should be able to move beyond normative conceptions that have been produced out of a Eurocentric perspective. A more effective ENP would require a more pluralistic and diverse strategy that also includes social and political dynamics that do not fit into the EU's liberal conceptions. This would entail social movements that have emerged in various European societies as well as informal networks and platforms

Remaining confined to normative conceptions of civil society has the effect that relations between the EU and southern societies remain limited to western-style NGOs.

that do play a crucial role in many southern societies. Considering the weakening capacities of state institutions and agencies, these local providers of social cohesion and order might constitute important partners in the fight against terrorism, human trafficking and other security issues. In the past, the EU's and its Member States' policies shaped by secularist epistemology have failed to develop a deeper understanding for the secular tradition in Muslim countries. The inability to distinguish between the various religious actors has had the effect that most of the Islamic formations that have come to play a dominant role amongst the lower middle classes and in the poor suburban areas have remained outside the radar of the European Union. Remaining confined by normative conceptions of civil society has the effect that relations between the EU and southern societies remain limited to western-style NGOs. Most of them promote important liberal values but often their activities have been limited to the large cities and they have been the domain of representatives of the western-educated elites. While western donors have almost exclusively supported these secular western-style associations, many Islamic associations, organisations and movements have received financial support from different Islamic donors in countries such as Qatar, Turkey or Saudi Arabia (Günay, 2015).

Acknowledging the different dynamics in different countries, defining potential agents of change and engaging with them could promote a more tailor-made and hence more effective European Neighbourhood Policy.

A more open approach that includes formal and informal actors involved in spiritual, political, educational or service functions could also strengthen the role of civil society as a facilitator of democracy (Golan & Salem, 2014). It would include secular and Islamist, liberal and non-liberal, state and non-state, formal and informal actors, as long as they are committed to certain norms that guarantee a dignified life. An open conception of civil society should also refrain from perceiving civil society per se as a benign force.

In particular, ideas of barely institutionalised grassroots organisations, networks and individual agents should be heard, as they are usually closer and more responsive to local demands. Rather than denying the potentials of certain actors in achieving pre-defined goals, research on how and which actors could contribute to shared goals could improve the relations with the southern neighbourhood. All in all, leaving normative assumptions aside, acknowledging the different dynamics in different countries, defining potential agents of change and engaging with them through studies, dialogue, exchange programmes and mutual training could promote a more tailor-made and hence more effective European Neighbourhood Policy.

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WHAT PRIORITY AREAS OF COOPERATION UNDER THE REVISED ENP?

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Introduction

The EUROMED Survey (afterwards referred to as “Survey”) reveals interesting perspectives in the Euro-Mediterranean relations, showing in particular the need for more effective cooperation and a deeper policy convergence between the North and the South of the Mediterranean. The publication of the Survey is very timely against the background of the recent turmoil in the region and the terrorist threat in the EU. It also follows the presentation of the “Review of the Neighbourhood Policy – a stronger partnership for a stronger neighbourhood”¹ (afterwards referred to as “Review”) by the European Commission and EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 18 November 2015. From a broader perspective, it is also interesting to compare the findings of the Survey and the Review with some of the results of the recent Eurobarometer². After a brief overall assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (afterwards ENP), in this article we will analyze first the replies to the questions 19-22 on cooperation, then the replies to question 8 on the prospects for further integration in EU policies to compare the results of the Survey with the main conclusions of the recent Review of ENP.

The Survey reflects a more positive assessment of the ENP in the EU than in the South Mediterranean countries.


Overall Assessment of ENP

In general, it could be argued that the Survey reflects a more positive assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the EU than in the South Mediterranean countries. About half of respondents from the South Mediterranean consider that the EU values are only to a low extent applied in the context of the ENP, whereas only 38% of the respondents from the EU are of this opinion.

1. European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions – Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy – (SWD(2015) 500 final – Brussels, 18.11.2015.

2. European Commission – Eurobarometer, Brussels, December 2015.

Graph 1: To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 7

Across the board, high priority is attached to various areas of the cooperation between the EU and the South Mediterranean partners in both the EU and in the partner countries. As far as future policy orientation is concerned, respondents from the EU are more optimistic about the prospects for further integration of the ENP with EU policies. Whereas the assessment about EU values and the high priority attached to cooperation, are results that can be expected the result about further integration with some EU policies is rather counterintuitive and will be further analyzed.

Whereas the general assessment of the Survey is rather optimistic, the tone of the Review itself has changed from an optimistic perspective of the integration in the internal market to an overriding preoccupation with stability and the need to face challenges on the borders.

Survey: Priority Areas of Cooperation

The Survey makes a distinction between priority areas of cooperation (questions 19-22) and the question of the integration of ENP South Mediterranean partners to some EU policies (question 8).


Addressing first the areas of cooperation, it is to be noted that combining the scores of “high” and “very high” priority, there is hardly any distinction in the degree of priority attributed to the various areas of cooperation. In the replies to questions 19-22 respondents rate the areas of cooperation from 80% (“security” and “migration”) to 87% (“trade, sustainable development”).

These hardly differentiated scores show the importance respondents on both sides of the Mediterranean attach to the intensification of cooperation between the EU and the South Mediterranean partners in a broad range of activities. The relatively low scores for security and migration are a bit surprising in the light of the present crisis but can perhaps be explained by the fact that the data are collected some time ago at a moment when the crisis was less acute.

Concentrating on the segment “very high” priority, there is more differentiation. The areas of cooperation “women and youth” and “governance/human rights” are identified by more than 50% of respondents as top priority areas; “transport and energy connectivity” has a clear last place in the ranking with 35%. Also “trade and sustainable development” receives a relatively low score: only 43% consider it a very high priority. These two economic sectors of cooperation receive the largest support in the category “high” priority.

Hardly differentiated scores on priority areas, show the importance respondents on both sides of the Mediterranean attach to the intensification of cooperation in a broad range of activities.


Graph 2: To what extent do you think the followings areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

It is also interesting to look a bit more closely at the scores of the different groups of respondents. The scores for the different groups of expertise or affiliation are fairly predictable. Respondents with an economic background consider “trade and inclusive and sustainable economic development” the most important field of cooperation; for those with a background in Migration and Justice it is “governance and rule of law”; the respondents from civil society and with a social and cultural background place cooperation with “women and children” at the first place; for policy makers, “security” is the first priority. Remarkable is that most groups give “connectivity in transport and energy” the lowest priority despite the fact that the region lacks interconnected infrastructure. The detailed scores for the country groups (see graph 3) are less intuitive: Respondents from Maghreb consider “governance and human rights” the most important sector of cooperation but for both Mashreq and EU respondents it is “youth and women”. Could this be due to a higher representation of the groups of expertise or affiliation that attach importance to these issues in the respective geographical groups?

Graph 3: To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?
Mean (1 – very low – to 5 – very high) by country groups and by respondent's affiliation and respondent's field of expertise



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

Putting all the elements of analysis together, the main conclusion is the emphasis on cooperation in the area of “women and youth” and the relatively lower score for “security” and “migration”, perhaps due to the timing of the Survey, before the migration crisis broke out.

Survey: Prospects for Integration with EU Policies

Putting together the results of the replies to the questions on areas of cooperation (18-22) with the question on prospects of further integration in EU policies (question 8), does give some additional insight in the opinions of the respondents. Indeed, Question 8, which collects open-ended answers about the prospects of further integration with some EU policies, gives a more differentiated picture. There is a clear difference between the policy area that is considered as a priority for policy approximation (economic cooperation with 23%) and the policy area that is considered least important (transport with 2%).

Remarkable is the emphasis that is put on economic development, whether under the category “economic cooperation” or under the categories economic in nature: “agriculture”, “energy”, “transport” and “regional cooperation”. Together, these policy areas are identified as priority policy areas by about 40% of the respondents. Looking more closely at the formulation in the replies, this policy area covers a wide variety of concrete activities, including alignment of the legal framework, procedures for policy definition and implementation, improvement policies for SME development, investment in infrastructure, in rural development etc. There are relatively few references to the distributional aspects of the policies and also environmental policy is only mentioned by 8% of the respondents.

The second policy priority that emerges from this part of the Survey is “migration”. This is quite understandable in the light of the events of the last years following the Arab Spring and especially after the chaos in Libya and the war in Syria. In the Survey, 17% of the respondents

Perception on migrations is different North and South. Whereas the respondents from the EU use the word “migration” or “immigration”, most of the respondents from the South use the term “mobility”.

identified this as a priority area for policy alignment with the EU. Reading the replies to the Survey in more detail, it emerges that the perception of the problem of migration is different North and South of the Mediterranean. Whereas the respondents from the EU use the word “migration” or “immigration”, most of the respondents from the South Mediterranean use the term “mobility” rather than migration. This reflects the fairly obvious fact that the preoccupation of citizens of the EU is to control the flow of refugees fleeing the war situation in their countries and to stop the flow of migrants arriving in the EU in search of better economic perspectives. The respondents to the Survey in the South Mediterranean, mostly educated citizens, are in the first place interested in a better access to the EU. This implies visa free travel for short term stays and easier conditions for establishment or residence.

A policy area, that would have come out even more strongly had the Survey been concluded some months later, is the area of “security”. In the Survey this issue is mentioned by 8% of the respondents as a priority area of cooperation. It is a joint preoccupation by respondents from North and South of the Mediterranean.

The issue of Governance and Human Rights is considered by the respondents in the Survey to be of lesser importance as an issue of policy alignment with a relatively low score of 7%. This is to some extent contradictory with the result of question 19 where 83% of the respondents supported the cooperation in the field of Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights. Would this imply that the respondents to the Survey consider that support is needed in those areas but that this does not necessarily imply a full compliance with EU policies and standards?

An interesting result of the Survey is the large majority of respondents that are in favor of a further integration of the ENP in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In fact, the neighbourhood is the region where EU has its most influence and ENP is (with Enlargement) the most elaborated (geographical) component of the EU Foreign Policy. The reinforcement of CSDP interventions in the neighbourhood is also a key proposal of the Review that identifies economic development and security as the two elements that can reinforce stability in the region. This is certainly a consideration that will be taken into account in the revision of EU's Security Strategy (expected in June 2016).

Main Results of EU's ENP Review – Compared with the Main Results of the Survey

Narrowing down ENP cooperation to priority areas has always been a difficult exercise. Both the Survey and the Review itself are further evidence of this. Review processes of this magnitude involve many parts of the administration and usually suffer from an accumulation of issues as each department wants to add its own concerns. In order to identify what areas are really considered as overall priorities, attention is focused in this analysis on the summary provided by the Commission,³ rather than on the complete text.

In EU's Review of the Neighbourhood Policy, “stability” is the key concern, and “economic development” is prioritized and highlighted as key to stabilizing societies. In the ENP Review economic reforms and measures to improve competitiveness are singled out as focal areas. Remarkably, the development of “poor regions” is mentioned as a means for creating a safer environment, but “social development” is not prioritized as such, neither in the responses of the Survey, nor in the ENP Review. The Review does however mention the economic prospects for young people, connected with education and vocational training. Both the Survey and the ENP Review are also rather vague on environmental and sustainable development.

3. European Commission – Press Release – Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): stronger partnership for a stronger neighbourhood – Brussels, 18 November 2015 and European Commission – Fact Sheet – European Neighbourhood Policy reviewed and explained – Brussels 18 November 2015.

The second policy priority that emerges from both the Survey and the ENP review is “migration”. This is quite understandable in the light of the events of the last years following the Arab Spring and especially after the chaos in Libya and the war in Syria. In the Survey, 17% of the respondents identified this as a priority area for policy alignment with the EU. This attitude is also reflected in the recent Eurobarometer where “migration” emerges by far (60% of respondents) as the most important issue of preoccupation of EU citizens.

The ENP Review indicates that the new ENP will reflect an intensified cooperation on both regular and irregular migration. Although in principle the “mobility partnerships” offered by the EU comprises both aspects, it is clear that for the EU the emphasis lies on stricter border control and cooperation with partner countries to reinforce the measures for retaining refugees and migrants in the region of origin. The score in the Survey reflects a lower level of priority than the importance attached to security in the ENP Review. In the presentation that HRVP Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn gave of the ENP Review, the issue of security has been strongly stressed. In the recent Eurobarometer, the fear for “terrorism” emerges as the second preoccupation of the EU citizens (25% of respondents). In the Review, security in the partner countries is considered the basis of stabilization. The fight against fundamentalism has to be undertaken in the first place in the countries where it has led to terrorism and civil and sectarian war. That is where it has made up till now by far most of the victims. But, as the recent events have shown: terrorism and radicalization threaten also the citizens of the EU. For the EU, in order to combat radicalization, it is important to remove the sources of insecurity, poverty, corruption and poor governance. This of course reinforces the importance of economic development. In the fight against terrorism, the EU will increase policy cooperation in security matters with the partner governments in areas where the EU has a competence.

In the Review of ENP, the promotion of common values is considered a key element in the policy to promote stability and indicates the need to identify more effective ways to promote democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. In the way the issue is presented in the text of the summary gives the impression that as a priority, Governance and Human Rights takes second place to stability and economic development.

It is interesting to compare the visions that emerge from the Survey and from the Review.

- The Survey reveals only lukewarm enthusiasm from the South Mediterranean partners to integrate further in EU policies. “Economic development” is the overriding priority of the policy alignment. Understandably, “migration” (mobility) is the second priority area as far as integration in EU policies is concerned, less so as an area of cooperation. Security is remarkably low on the list. As far as social development is concerned, only education is mentioned as areas for alignment with EU policies, but “women and youth” are considered an important area of cooperation. Governance and human rights have a remarkably low score as far as alignment on EU policies is concerned, despite a high score as a cooperation priority. There is on some issues a confusing contradiction between priority areas of cooperation and priority areas of policy integration.
- As far as the EU is concerned, the Review stresses “stability” as the key objective, to be realized through (inclusive) economic development and cooperation in the security area. Cooperation on common values and education are mentioned as means for realizing stability. Youth is singled out as an important target group. Common values, democracy, human rights are mentioned as area for cooperation but the issue of governance is not mentioned specifically in the summary.

Both the Survey and the Review reflect a greater emphasis on governance and on further alignment between the ENP and the EU policies. This objective is stronger in the EU than in the partner countries of the South Mediterranean. This may well reflect a degree of despair about the growing turmoil in the South Mediterranean region in the EU and the perception

that it could have some impact in the EU. In order to sort out the problems, adequate policies and better governance inspired by the European example are considered to be the way forward. While accepting that EU can provide guidance in this field, respondents in the South Mediterranean seem not convinced that the EU example is always relevant in all cases.

Some Concluding Remarks

“Economic cooperation” emerges as the main area for policy alignment and cooperation, both in the Survey and in the Review.

“Economic cooperation” emerges as the main area for policy alignment and cooperation, both in the Survey and in the Review. In the Review, economic development is the key to the fight against radicalization and the threat of terrorism. Democracy and human rights are mentioned in both Survey and Review as components of the cooperation, but taking second place to economic development.

In a sense, the Review takes a step back from an overall approach to Neighbourhood Policy. By stressing differentiation and flexibility, the Review offer a wide variety of possible approaches and actions to be combined in a manner taking into account the specific situation of the partner country concerned. It is a more pragmatic and realistic approach that takes into account the diversity of the region but it can be questioned whether one can still call it a Neighbourhood Policy.⁴ The same issues, the demise of an overall policy and the reliance on a set of instruments and approaches that can be used custom made to each country has also been mentioned in a recent article by T. Schumacher who calls it the “end of an ambition”.⁵

The two documents are convergent in approach, with a stronger emphasis on economic development in the Survey and a stronger emphasis on stability/security in the Review.

Little attention is paid, both in the Review and the Survey to:

-the problems of poverty and social inequality,

-the need to improve the way government and administration function receive adequate attention.

Two important elements are receiving less attention than they deserve in both the Review and the Survey. In the first place, too little attention is paid to the problems of poverty and social inequality. It is true that in question 19 the priority for cooperation is “inclusive and sustainable development”, but these aspects are not reflected in question 8 that deals with the policy aspects. Economic growth does not automatically bring about better income distribution and economic perspectives for the urban and rural poor. The Arab Spring happened at a moment when growth in countries like Egypt and Tunisia had been fairly high for a decade. The motivation behind the revolt was to some extent political (freedom, democracy, respect), but overwhelmingly the driving force behind the movement was the lack of economic perspectives. The downfall of Muslim Brothers in Egypt can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that they had not been able to implement a significantly more inclusive economic policy. The most vocal part of the population without economic perspectives are the young. Education, vocational training, youth employment schemes etc. are mentioned, but a different, generally more inclusive economic policy is needed to respond to the aspiration of the poor urban and rural masses. In the absence of such inclusiveness economic growth, benefiting the few will only contribute to the further development of radicalism, leading to terrorism as fundamentalist organizations will find an eager response to their messages.

The preoccupation with Governance is evidently underpinning many of the ideas for cooperation, and Governance receives a 83% score in question 19, However, neither in question 8 of the Survey, nor in the summary of the Review, the need to improve the way government and administration function receive adequate attention. The structural social inequality usually goes hand in hand with inadequate governance: the existing of what Acemoglu and Robinson call

4. See also the comments on the “Review” by Rosa Balfour, “Making the most of the European Policy Toolbox” – German Marshall Fund, Blogpost, 18 November 2015.

5. T. Schumacher, Back to the Future: The “new” ENP towards the Southern Neighbourhood and the End of Ambition, College of Europe Policy Brief, #1.16, January 2016.

the “extractive institutions”.⁶ It is not enough to modernize administrative practices, improve financial management etc. Modernization, cutting red tape, increasing efficiency etc. can make a valid contribution to better governance, but the whole governmental machinery, and the relations between administration and the political decision making as well as the relations between administration and the business world need to be critically examined and streamlined. Real inclusive social and economic development requires a dismantlement of the existing links between the vested economic and political interest. This is not an easy task as those that have to undertake the reforms often have a vested interest in the continuation of the existing power relations.

An innovative and coherent approach to the ENP in the South Mediterranean does not come across in the Review. The approach that emerges from it is pragmatic, but concentrates on the symptoms of the present crisis rather than on the underlying main factors. A longer term perspective would certainly need a more visionary approach.

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6. Acemoglu D. and J.A. Robinson (2012) *The Origin of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*, London, Profile Books.

WHAT ROLE FOR THE ENP IN ADDRESSING SECURITY THREATS?

NICK WESTCOTT

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The EU cannot solve the many challenges of the region alone, and there are limits to its leverage, but the new ENP will play its part in helping to create the conditions for positive development.


During the public consultation on the review of the ENP, a large number of stakeholders including many partner countries strongly expressed the view that the EU should increase its engagement with partners in the security sector.

The neighbourhood has changed radically over the past 12 years, since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. The events of recent years have demonstrated the need for a new approach, which is the subject of a Joint Communication presented by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on 18 November 2015 and of conclusions adopted by the Council on 14 December.

More than ever after the 13 November terrorist attacks in Paris, but also recent attacks in Lebanon and Tunisia, intensified security cooperation with our neighbours is needed. Armed conflict and rising extremism have left their marks across North Africa and the Middle East. Safe and legal mobility and tackling irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling are also priorities, as conflict and tensions have resulted in major refugee flows.

The EU cannot solve the many challenges of the region alone, and there are limits to its leverage, but the new ENP will play its part in helping to create the conditions for positive development. For the next three to five years, stabilisation will be at the heart of the EU's actions in its neighbourhood. The EU will offer ways to strengthen the resilience of its partners in the face of external pressures and their ability to make their own sovereign choices. In doing so, particular attention will be paid to supporting reforms in the security sector: there will be a new focus on stepping up work with our partners on security sector reform, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation policies.

During the public consultation on the review of the ENP, a large number of stakeholders including many partner countries strongly expressed the view that the EU should increase its engagement with partners in the security sector. As in other areas, the revised ENP will offer a tailor-made approach to cooperating on security-related matters, and will actively ensure that its overall engagement is conflict-sensitive, and fully compliant with international law, including international human rights law.

Graph 1: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

The ENP is not about to become a crisis management tool – it will continue to engage with partners in a mid- to long-term perspective. As the causes of instability often lie outside the security domain alone, the EU will seek to comprehensively address sources of instability across sectors. Poverty, inequality, a perceived sense of injustice, corruption, weak economic and social development and lack of opportunity – particularly for young people – are at the roots of instability, increasing vulnerability to radicalisation. The new ENP will make a determined effort to support economies and improve prospects for the local population. The policy should help make partner countries places where people want to build their future, and help tackle uncontrolled movement of people.

The ENP is not about to become a crisis management tool – it will continue to engage with partners in a mid- to long-term perspective.

In addition to a new focus on economic resilience and growth, the reviewed ENP will expand other essential strands of cooperation with partners: the EU will work more on security, with more partners. Security sector reform needs to be fully included in the EU's outreach to partner countries' authorities. Law enforcement, the judiciary, and the military represent the backbone of a state's resilience. Interested partner countries should be supported in their reform of the civilian and military security. Such cooperation may include strategic and policy advice, institution and capacity-building activities, dialogues with civil society, and support for community security programmes.

The reviewed ENP will expand other essential strands of cooperation. Security sector reform needs to be fully included in the EU's outreach to partner countries' authorities.

As the threat of terrorism and radicalisation is affecting both Europe and its neighbours, the EU will step up work with partners on counter-terrorism, including preventing radicalisation and countering violent extremism. Criminal justice responses and suppressing the financing of terrorism will become priorities. Involving civil society, especially youth organisations, in preventing radicalisation will be crucial. Tackling broader issues such as ineffective justice, gender inequality, hate speech, youth unemployment, and illiteracy will all also be part of a wider de-radicalisation effort. Cross-cultural dialogue, such as that promoted by the Anna Lindh Foundation, will be key.

Organised crime and corruption also threaten stability in the wider region. The EU will increase support to partner countries in their fight against serious and organised international crime, including in the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings. The EU will also explore the possibility of involving partner countries in existing financial investigation networks. Furthermore, the EU will prioritise work with partner countries on countering the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons. Further support will be available on integrated

and balanced national drug policies. With Interpol, the need should be examined to build further law enforcement capacity in neighbouring countries and work on facilitating information exchanges with EU Member States and Europol. With Eurojust, the EU will promote a stronger engagement and cooperation in order to ease judicial cooperation on all serious crime investigations.

Structures set up under the EU's security and defence architecture can be a forum for an exchange of best practice, for cooperation on common objectives, and for capacity building.

In addition, structures set up under the EU's security and defence architecture can be a forum for an exchange of best practice, for cooperation on common objectives, and for capacity building. Thus, a new impetus will be given to cooperation on matters related to the Common Security and Defence Policy. This includes the promotion of the participation of partner countries in EU missions and operations, EU Battlegroups, and their association to relevant programmes and agencies such as the European Defence Agency and the European Security and Defence College. The EU will also seek to establish security and defence dialogues with partner countries and facilitate the participation of officials and officers from partner countries in courses at relevant defence colleges.

Civil protection also plays an important role in building resilience. The EU will offer close partnerships in civil protection, building up partners' early warning, prevention and preparedness capacity. Stronger emphasis will be put on health security aspects by strengthening capacities to respond effectively to health threats such as communicable diseases. Access to imagery provided by the EU Satellite Centre could also be considered in light of crisis response needs. In order to put these proposals into practice, flexibility in programming and the coherent use of the ENP and other financial instruments will be crucial. Therefore, close coordination will be ensured between the security work done under the European Neighbourhood Instrument with wider activities related to the EU's foreign and security policy, with the work of EU Member States bilaterally and with relevant international organisations.

All these initiatives should be based on a thorough analysis of instability factors, including an assessment of the role and interests of third parties, to inform the EU's engagement and support. The EU will develop a differentiated approach to partners based on this analysis and adapted to mutually agreed goals, commitment to reform and universal values, and EU interests.

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WHAT ROLE FOR THE REVIEWED ENP IN THE BROADER EU EXTERNAL ACTION?

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The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), created in 2004, has been struggling to be an effective foreign policy instrument and to fulfil the – ambitious – objective to create an “area of prosperity and stability”. As a consequence, it has undergone several reviews following the past years’ geopolitical turmoil in the EU’s neighbouring regions and especially in the Mediterranean.

The purpose of the ENP review process was to convert the current relations with partner countries into more political ones and to make the EU a key partner for the neighbouring countries.

The purpose of the ENP review process, launched in April 2015, was to adapt the framework to the changes that have occurred in the Southern Neighbourhood since 2011, enabling it to better respond to the ongoing developments. In the Joint Press Conference by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn, announcing the launching of the consultation process on the ENP review, it has been stated that the revised framework would aim at converting the current relations with partner countries into more political ones. The objective of the renewed Policy would also be to increase the EU influence in the region and make it a key partner for the neighbouring countries.¹

The aim of this article is to analyse whether the revised ENP is sufficiently ambitious to respond to the challenges posed by the region and contribute to the achievement of the EU foreign and political priorities and interests. The article will focus on questions 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Euromed Survey, related to the strategic aspects of the ENP, including its integration into the CFSP/CSDP, its geographical scope and the redefinition of the current ways of cooperation. The first part will analyse the stance of the Survey’s respondents on making the ENP more strategic and political. The article will then contrast the Survey results with the outcome of the Joint Communication “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy” released on the 18 November. It will examine whether and to what extent the revised ENP is more strategic and coherent with the security and foreign policy dimensions of the EU’s interactions with its neighbourhood. Finally, some proposals will follow on what further strategy should be adapted to adequately and efficiently address manifold challenges in the Euro-Mediterranean region.


ENP as a Strategic Tool: From Expectations...

According to the results of the 6th Euromed Survey, the vast majority of respondents would prefer the reviewed ENP to be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (see graph 1). This support might result from the conviction that enhanced coordination with those policies would increase the

1 . Joint Press Conference by HR/VR Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on European Neighbourhood Policy Review. 4 March 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4553_en.htm

leverage of the ENP. Interestingly, the level of support for ensuring a better coherence of the ENP with the foreign and security policy dimensions of the EU's external actions varies according to the different groups of respondents. While 73% of policy-makers advocate enhanced integration of the ENP to the CFSP and the CSDP, this idea receives support from less than 60% of civil society respondents. This difference might result from the fact that most civil society operators and organisations fear that an enhanced security dimension of the ENP would entail the risk of diluting the human rights dimension of the ENP.

Graph 1: To what extent should the ENP be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 9


Taking into account the proposals to redefine the neighbourhood, almost half of the respondents think that those countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP framework should be dealt with in the broader context of the CFSP. This is extremely important if we consider that currently, out of 16 countries included in the ENP, only 5 of them – Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Morocco and Tunisia – are willing to pursue deeper relations with the EU. The rest of the countries, both from the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood, seem not to perceive the ENP to be the most attractive framework of cooperation. This perception is influenced by various factors. On the one hand, for some partner countries the costs of conditionality largely exceed the benefits offered under the ENP. Moreover, many Southern Neighbourhood partner countries receive unconditional economic and political support from other international and regional actors, pursuing their quest for influence. On the other hand, some partner countries prefer not to fully engage in the ENP in order to maintain their bargaining position with the EU and other regional and international actors. Therefore, the fact that so few countries are committed to cooperate within the ENP framework is an argument in favour of linking the ENP closer to the CFSP/CSDP.

A large majority of respondents consider that the EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic (88%) and more issue-focused (92%) (see graph 2). Since its creation, the ENP, conceived by the European Commission, has been widely criticised for its bureaucratic and technocratic approach, aiming to reproduce the success of the enlargement in a completely different political and security context. For this reason, the programmes and areas for cooperation set-up have been often said to be detached from the regional political reality. Also, the wide scope of the ENP, designed in this fashion in order to safeguard the different interests of the EU Member States, prevented it from addressing specific needs of the partner countries. Better coordination of the ENP actions and initiatives with the EU's foreign policy priorities would make the policy more streamlined, strategic and coherent.

Some partner countries prefer not to fully engage in the ENP in order to maintain their bargaining position with the EU and other regional and international actors.

Better coordination of the ENP actions and initiatives with the EU's foreign policy priorities would make the policy more streamlined, strategic and coherent.


Graph 2: To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 12

An aspect that also plays a central role in the redefinition of the ENP and that is relevant to CFSP and CDSP matters is its geographical scope.² It has been widely noted that the challenges faced by the Middle East and North Africa region largely exceed the current geographical framework of the ENP.³ Many observed that the developments in Syria cannot be solved without designing a comprehensive strategy towards Iraq. Likewise, the security challenges in Maghreb countries cannot be addressed without engaging in dialogue with Sahel countries. These views have been expressed in the Survey responses. 56% of respondents consider that the definition of neighbourhood should be extended to include other regional state actors (see graph 3). More than half of all the respondents would support the inclusion of the Gulf Cooperation Countries and Iraq.

Graph 3: To what extent do you agree that the definition of Neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors?




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 10

When analysing the answers from regional groups, it can be observed that each strongly supports the extension of the ENP scope to its neighbouring region. Thus, 70% of respondents from the Maghreb are in favour of inclusion of Sahel countries, while the respondents from Mashreq consider that the extension should apply to Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council (74% and 63% of respondents respectively) (see graph 4). These results clearly show that regional problems demand regional solutions and a broader cooperation between countries, not limited to the arbitrary geographical framework of the ENP. Therefore, in order to be able to respond to the current challenges, the ENP would need to be better integrated into the CFSP and other areas of the EU's external policies.

2. For more details on the geographical scope of the ENP, please refer to the article by Lannon, E., "Extending the Geographical Scope of the ENP?: the Neighbours of the EU's Neighbours" in the same volume.

3. See, for example, Leigh, M. (2015). *New Policies Urgently Needed for EU Neighbourhood*. The German Marshall Fund, or Youngs, R., & Gutman J.P. (2015). *Is the EU Tackling the Root Causes of Middle Eastern Conflict*. Carnegie Europe.

Graph 4: In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 11

To Reality: A Pragmatic Framework Acting Strategically in a Fluid Environment or the Usual Approach in Facing New Challenges

Following a public consultation, to which the IEMed has also contributed,⁴ the EEAS and the European Commission released on the 18 of November a Joint Communication, “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy”,⁵ establishing “a new approach, a re-prioritisation and an introduction of new ways of working” to the ENP. The document is also accompanied by a Joint Staff Working Document explaining how the consultation has been conducted and describing what has been suggested by governments, international organisations, think tanks, civil society, academia and other stakeholders. Coupling these two documents and the results of the IEMed Survey, as well as some contributions and reactions to the Joint Communication, it clearly emerges that the reviewed ENP will be more low-key and pragmatic than expected, especially in what concerns its link to the broader European external policies. In fact, the Joint Communication recognises the failure of the ENP in achieving its purpose to establish “an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation,” but it falls below expectations in providing a fully-fledged strategic revision and an ambitious strategy for the region.

The Joint Communication falls below expectations in providing a fully-fledged strategic revision and an ambitious strategy for the region.

Question 9 of the Survey shows well the dichotomy between what has been answered by experts and actors and the actual reviewed ENP. Although mainly programmatic, and thus not conclusive, the Joint Communication does not concretely envisage further integration of the ENP in the overall EU foreign dimension, in particular in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the document it is stated that the review “is being closely coordinated as part of the broader work on the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy,” but it is not specified how, also taking into

4. Aragall, X., Chmielewska, A., Fabbri, F. & Florensa, S. (2015). *Reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy*. European Institute of the Mediterranean.

5. European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication JOIN(2015) 50 final, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 18 November, 2015.

account that the reviewed ENP has been published several months before the EU Global Strategy is released.⁶ For the moment, the ENP is defined as a partnership framework, part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards the stabilisation of the neighbourhood, but there is no reference to a much needed regional strategy based on a tangible coordination among services of the EU and with the EU Member States, integrating the ENP in the CFSP and CSDP. Moreover, just 5 ENP partner countries – Morocco, Tunisia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – are indicated as partners wishing to pursue deeper relations with the EU and thus leaving to the other ENP countries a more ad-hoc cooperation whose methodology still needs to be clarified. Therefore, it is not clear how this framework would enable better integration with the EU's overall foreign policy. The Joint Communication envisages areas where CSDP and CFSP activities can support the ENP because of the current situation and security concerns in the region, allowing a more flexible programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and other financial instruments. This is a fairly positive factor as, while an overall new vision has still not been devised, it underlines that the ENP could make itself useful through its renewed pragmatic approach.

To tackle the manifold challenges the Southern Neighbourhood poses to the region, the ENP would either need to be part of an overarching political and security regional strategy or/and to be more ambitious.

Also, the Joint Communication does not present substantial geographical adjustments to the ENP. As has also been noted by the experts and actors of the Survey in questions 10, 11, 12 and 13, a partial rethinking of the geographical scope of the ENP would allow the framework of the regional challenges presented by the Southern Neighbourhood to be adapted. The document recognises the wide influence of bordering countries and regions and of major regional actors, making vague reference to an eventual new outreach of existing regional frameworks, such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), creating new Thematic Frameworks involving the “neighbours of the neighbours” and indicating that the EU will pursue cooperation in other regional forums. Nonetheless, to tackle the manifold challenges the Southern Neighbourhood poses to the region, the ENP would either need to be part of an overarching political and security regional strategy or/and be more ambitious. The Joint Communication is not conclusive and envisages further inter-institutional consultation; therefore, the next months will be key for enhancing the ENP's political and strategic aspects. The reviewed ENP would then need to fulfil a broader vision through specific political objectives and should then be managed jointly by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission and in close coordination with the EU Member States, thus allowing a more strategic and coherent framework to respond to the geopolitical challenges in the Middle East and North Africa.

Conclusion

The Foreign Affairs Council of April 2015 indicated the neighbourhood as a strategic priority and that the new ENP, key for the CFSP and other areas of the EU's external action, should be streamlined with the EU's political priorities and interests and coherent with the security and foreign policy dimensions of the EU's actions abroad.⁷ In its resolution of July 2015, the European Parliament called for closer coordination between the ENP and wider CFSP and CSDP activities and stressed the need for coherence and full alignment between the review of the ENP and the revision of the EU Security Strategy.⁸ In the same line, the Joint Staff Working Document, accompanying the Joint Communication on the review of the ENP and summarising the results of the public consultation, makes reference to the contributions of some EU Member States, think tanks and academics suggesting stronger coordination between the ENP and

6. A website summarising this process has been created and can be found on the official website of the Global Strategy: <http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>. Another important reference is this volume produced by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and fully available online: Missiroli, A. (2015). *Towards an EU global strategy – Background, process, references*. EU Institute for Security Studies.

7. Outcome of the Foreign Affairs Council, 20 April 2015.

8. European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2015 on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2015/2002(INI)).

the CFSP and CSDP. These observations are widely mirrored in the Euromed Survey answers to questions 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, emphasising once more how the Southern Neighbourhood, largely entrenched with the wider Middle East, requires a more complex political and strategic framework than the ENP is able to provide at the moment, especially taking into account that it was not aligned with the EU global strategy review process. Some of the reactions⁹ to the Joint Communication publication also highlight the risks related to a failure in merging the EU Global Strategy with the ENP review and making the ENP a more ambitious framework. It is therefore widely acknowledged that the stabilisation of the neighbourhood, and more specifically of the Middle East and North Africa, should be addressed through a specific regional framework encompassing political and security objectives and it is quite possible that this will not be found in the reviewed ENP, when it will take its final form after the next months' consultations. As a result, the EU needs to envisage new policy solutions in its Global Strategy, with a more coherent geographical scope for the Middle East and North Africa, with a multilateral approach and with more ambitious political aims. Better coordination between the EU and the Member States would allow for swifter diplomatic solutions and conflict resolution actions with a broader and more coherent perspective, keeping the inclusive criteria and other important lessons learned from the ENP.

The EU needs to envisage new policy solutions in its Global Strategy, with a more coherent geographical scope, with a multilateral approach and with more ambitious political aims.

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9. For instance, of Rosa Balfour, Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in her blog post "Making the Most of the European Neighbourhood Policy Toolbox", and Anthony Dworkin, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

WHAT PLACE FOR MIGRATIONS IN THE ENP AGENDA?

XAVIER ARAGALL

Euro-Mediterranean Policies Technical Advisor, European Institute of the Mediterranean

The situation at the borders has made it clear that the EU's migration agenda in relation to the southern neighbourhood has been shaped with excessive dominance of the security dimension.

The revision of the ENP has been carried out in a critical year for migration management in the Mediterranean. The humanitarian crisis resulting from the war in Syria and the instability of the region have caused an increasing flow of refugees to the EU, who, faced with the impossibility of entering community territory through regular channels have turned to those traditionally used by irregular migrations in the centre and east of the Mediterranean. The situation of control and blockade on the borders has made it clear that the EU's migration agenda in relation to the southern neighbourhood has been shaped with excessive dominance of the security dimension and improvisation.

Today, the overlapping of migration flows with those of refugees demands a complex analysis of the current situation and also shared ways of managing them, given that only from a common European approach can the current situation be effectively resolved.

The current humanitarian emergency context, in addition to the debate about control and security, has influenced the process of revising the ENP in its migration field.

It is clear that the current humanitarian emergency context, in addition to the debate about control and security, has influenced the process of revising the ENP in its migration field, and therefore should allow for an order of priorities to be re-established in order to design improved management of human movements and migrations at regional level.

In this respect, the Joint Staff Working Document that accompanies the document Review of the ENP¹ highlights three elements that require special attention. Firstly, within the field of ENP interaction with other policies, "a greater consistency between internal and external strands of EU policy in migration" becomes necessary. Secondly, and more at the level of design and implementation of policies, it notes that "the challenges in the field of migration can be more appropriately addressed in collaboration of ENP countries and its neighbours." Finally, also an element of design and implementation, it calls for "the ENP to be used as a framework for addressing more effectively the root causes of the issue in partner countries."

Factors related to the management that affect the causes of emigration receive a higher percentage of responses stressing their importance over elements linked to management aimed at establishing orderly mobility.

These three elements are connected to current debates linking migration management and the ENP review. First debate is the need to clearly and effectively integrate the ENP "in the overall migration architecture of the EU, linking Home and Foreign Affairs."² Second debate is related to promote a transregional approach,³ that is, taking into consideration the regions adjacent to the southern neighbourhood (especially the Sahel-Sahara arc of crisis). Finally the third debate is closely linked to the latter, is about the effective action on the primary causes of migrations and how to influence them.

To some extent, these three elements go back to the need for coordination with the external agenda, especially with the southern neighbourhood countries (and their respective neighbours) to act on the root causes of migrations. These elements can also be seen in the results of the


1. Joint Staff Working Document. Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy. SWD (2015) 500 final.

2. Migration in the new European Neighbourhood Policy, ICMPD (2015)

3. Wolff, S. (2015). *Migration and refugee governance in the Mediterranean: Europe and international organisations at a crossroads*. IAI. Working Papers 15/42.

Euromed Survey, and would explain why those factors related to the management that affect the causes of emigration receive a higher percentage of responses stressing their importance over elements linked to management aimed at establishing orderly mobility (see graph 1).

Graph 1: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 22

In the Survey's open answers we can see an element that enables another dimension to be added, time, which summarises the current framework and the policies to be implemented to manage it: "the EU is facing massive migration due to political instability and lack of economic opportunity. Thus addressing state fragility (political and economic) should be a priority in the long term. In the short term bilateral agreements and tools can help but won't be sustainable anyway."

These answers suggest that there are two logics simultaneously influencing the approach to manage human movements in the region. In the long term, action is needed on political and economic security, basic for tackling the primary causes of emigration. In the short term, we must act immediately with efficient tools and keep in mind that these would be temporary solutions that are unlikely to be long-lasting. It is clear that in both aspects the ENP can and must act more efficiently.


Another dimension that must not be forgotten and can also affect the revised ENP is the division between the partner states when addressing this situation. After the agreement to urgently relocate 160,000 refugees in Italy, Greece and Hungary, approved in the extraordinary Home Affairs Council in September 2015, a group of four countries – Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary itself – said that they would not adhere to the agreement, and other countries such as Finland abstained from voting. Without a homogeneous position from the partner countries, a situation of blockade can emerge that makes the articulation of the ENP more complicated in this field.

Addressing Long-Term Factors to Improve Migration Management

It is essential to act in the direction indicated in the revision of the ENP: challenges in terms of migrations (also in security and energy) must be tackled in a broader format and in collaboration with the ENP countries and their neighbours.

The detail of the responses related to the action that in the long term should improve migration management (see graph 2) indicates the priorities that the experts have highlighted and that are in tune, as also reflected in the ENP consultation,⁴ with the need to use “the ENP Framework for addressing more effectively the root causes of migration in partner countries.” In this respect, it must be kept in mind that action is needed in 16 countries with their respective specificities and, given that today the Mediterranean is the point of articulation of migration movements that share areas of origin, reception and transit of human movements, it is obvious that without taking into account the neighbouring countries or regions of these partner countries, the ENP action is unlikely to be effective. Consequently, it is essential to act in the direction indicated in the revision of the ENP, and that indicates that the current challenges in terms of migrations (also in security and energy) must be tackled in a broader format and in collaboration with the ENP countries and their neighbours.⁵

Graph 2: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 22

Results concerning the “sustainable livelihoods of the country of origin” linked to state fragility state and the conflicts in the region, indicate that migrations should be placed at the core of the ENP.

The results concerning the sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin as well as for the fragility of the state and the conflicts in the region, indicate that migrations should be placed at the core of the ENP, especially if we bear in mind the importance given by its current revision to stability, which is directly related to the main objectives of this regional policy: “the promotion of democracy, human rights and socioeconomic development.”

Also notable is the result concerning environmental degradation and its effect on migrations. This aspect should warn us mainly at a forward-looking level, because environmental degradation is closely linked to the effect of climate change. Here we must carefully follow

4. Joint Staff Working Document. Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy. SWD (2015) 500 final.

5. See *ibid.*

the results of the Valletta Summit on Migration held in November 2015, which put on the table the Emergency Trust Fund for stability of €1.8 billion and addressing root causes of irregular migration in Africa. Specifically, it would be urgent for the objective of improving development cooperation and the action on the root causes of migration in the African continent. Today, the migration movements caused by environmental factors have begun to have a specific weight, and the debate around their categorisation as forced migration or as voluntary migration must not be ignored over the next few years.


Measures to Promote Mobility

At the level of the most immediate management, the measures linked to improving and promoting mobility (see graph 3) also have an important impact in the Survey, although their priority is not as high as the previously analysed measures. These results must be interpreted based on the current framework in which the refugee crisis conditions the debate on the dialogue on mobility and migrations. In fact, it can be argued that the low development of options of regular migrations at EU and consequently ENP level come from far away and is due to its security approach and that it has been based more on internal fears than on economic factors⁶ of a more global dimension. In this line, it is increasingly necessary for the internal dynamics of the Member States and their positioning faced with the reception of new migrants to not condition regional dialogue on human movements and migrations. Here, the ENP can support and promote the potential of the existing regional initiatives, specifically the regional consultation processes such as the Rabat Process and the Khartoum Process, which are examples of cooperation between governments, dialogue and exchange of information and establishment of an agreed agenda to address the issue of human movements in the Mediterranean. In this respect, the promotion of a transregional approach would be strengthened, as previously noted.

Results on measures linked to improve and promote mobility, are affected by the refugee crisis, which conditions the debate on the dialogue on mobility and migrations.

The low development of options of regular migrations at EU and consequently ENP level come from far away and is due to its security approach.

Graph 3: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on? (the graph below displays the % answers considering very high extent)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 22

6. Neuvonen, M. (2015). *Fear of Migration: Is the EU's Southern Neighbourhood policy fading away?* Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Briefing Paper 177.

It is worth emphasising the favourable result obtained by the Mobility Package agreements by respondents from Maghreb countries, given that the EU concluded Mobility Partnerships with Morocco in 2013 and with Tunisia in 2014.

The agenda on migration for the neighbourhood needs to be clearly and effectively integrated in the EU policies, with a notable presence on the foreign affairs agenda, which takes into account the regions adjacent to the southern neighbourhood.

Finally, it is worth emphasising the favourable result obtained by the Mobility Package agreements by respondents from Maghreb countries, given the EU concluded Mobility Partnerships with Morocco in 2013 and with Tunisia in 2014. It is an instrument promoted since the revision of the ENP in 2011⁷ and that should enable an all-encompassing and orderly management of migrations based on the introduction of programmes to allow the mobility of migrant workers through stable and regular channels. The socioeconomic reality of each country and its capacity for negotiation (for instance, by strengthening or not the control on irregular flows) suggests the need to apply the principles of differentiation and flexibility when putting forward these Mobility Package agreements.

Conclusions

The revision of the ENP in terms of migration has identified those fields on which to act and also elements of design and implementation to ensure that the actions have an efficient outcome. Specifically, the need for the agenda on migration for the neighbourhood to be clearly and effectively integrated in the EU policies and with a notable presence on the foreign affairs agenda, which takes into account the regions adjacent to the southern neighbourhood and finally an effective action on the primary causes of migrations and on how to have an effect on them.

However, the different policy approaches of the Member States that have prevented the establishment of a common migration policy can also explain why the ENP is inoperative in migration terms despite having identified the what and how on the regulation of human movements in the Mediterranean.

Finally, it is worth repeating the importance attached to the causes of migrations and, given their current complexity, in which flows of war refugees, forced migrations and voluntary migrations overlap, it is complex to address this action and it requires a long-term strategy. Without economic and political stability in the mid-term, it is not possible to envisage an optimistic horizon for the human movements in the Mediterranean and therefore migrations should have a central position in the design of the revised ENP.

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7. A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with Southern Mediterranean countries. EC COM(2011) 292 final.

GENERAL REVIEW OF THE ENP

This first block is composed of two sets of questions. The first group on “General Assessment” seeks to capture the overall support for the ENP and also to identify factors where the ENP has not been able to offer adequate solutions to the EU neighbourhood. The second group of questions on “Reviewing the ENP” aim to take the pulse on some fundamental questions underpinning the ENP review: what the vision of future relations between the EU and the Southern Neighbourhood partner countries should be, what is expected from these relations and finally how the ENP could perform best.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT


Main findings

- A significant majority of respondents agree that the ENP framework should be maintained. Notwithstanding general support for the ENP, responses from Israel and Turkey show a slightly more nuanced picture.
- Those calling for the ENP to be reshaped do so on various accounts but often regret the inability of the ENP to address ongoing challenges in the Mediterranean in a more reactive, political but also differentiated way, and to link the long-term approach with short-term actions.
- When asked to identify the reasons explaining why the ENP did not deliver in a more decisive way, the impediments of the Syrian and Libyan wars are mentioned by a majority of respondents. More generally, the inability to respond to southern partners’ expectations is also identified as a critical issue.
- Asked to share their vision and expectations for the ENP, respondents think that the ENP is bound to adapt to a growing multipolar scenario, to address security and economic challenges more forcefully and that both shores of the Mediterranean should enhance their cooperation.
- Fostering a partnership based on mutual interests and on differentiation (country-by-country approach) is seen as a critical condition for the ENP to perform best.

The first question was aimed at determining the overall support for the ENP framework. 79% of respondents agree that the ENP should be kept. However, a closer analysis of the answers by geographical origin and institutional affiliation reveals some discrepancies that need to be mentioned.

Maghreb countries (87%) and non-Mediterranean EU countries (83%) show a percentage of negative answers (in favour of maintaining the ENP framework) higher than the Survey mean. Just below the mean, Mediterranean EU countries and Mashreq countries (76%) still express strong support for maintaining the ENP. Answers from Turkey and Israel show a slightly different trend, with a ratio of positive answers twice the Survey mean (see graph 1).


Graph 1: Should the European Neighbourhood Policy be wound up?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 1

A more detailed reading of the results ordered according to the institutional affiliation of the respondents shows that those who are mostly negative about keeping the ENP are the experts based in think tanks (31%), while those most favourable are respondents from international organisations (only 7% want to put an end to the ENP). Responses from governmental policy actors also show a very low ratio contesting the continuity of the ENP (12.5%). Finally, the percentages in answers given by respondents from EU institutions, academia and NGOs are close to the Survey mean (see graph 2).

Graph 2: Should the European Neighbourhood Policy be wound up?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 1

Respondents answering yes to question 1 also had the option to substantiate their position. Three clusters can be identified from the open answers. A first group of answers regret a lack of strategic scope of the ENP, and suggest going back to the roots of the policy or developing a more mature strategy, linking the long-term approach and political goals, taking into account the conflicts in the region.

The ENP was typically conceived as a "strategy by default": what to do when we don't know what to. It was clear from the very beginning that it wouldn't work. The circumstances in the last few years simply aggravate this.

Spanish respondent

The ENP has been a clumsy and incoherent instrument, with equally unclear objectives. It should be replaced by a range of area frameworks, with regionally specific objectives and *modi operandi*.

British respondent

A second group of answers focuses on differentiation. Respondents insist on the new needs of the southern countries after the political and social changes from 2011 onwards, and underline the importance of developing a specific policy for the South, especially tackling socio-economic issues.

The EU should propose a policy having a Mediterranean focus, instead of the double focus (East/South) the ENP has today. This should entail a differentiated budget line, exclusively dedicated to the South. A more pragmatic approach is needed. Relations should develop on a bilateral EU/state basis.

Greek respondent

In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions there is a need for a complete rethinking of this policy.

French respondent

The EU neighbourhood policies should be more aligned with the needs of the southern Mediterranean countries and more importantly should respond to the aspirations of their population, i.e. focusing on growth and development is essential but equally important is the distribution of the gains, benefits of this growth.

Egyptian respondent

Keep all ENP members in one format but organise them after the degree of transformation (not geographically).

German respondent

Increased differentiation between different countries and regions in the EU's neighbourhood according to the variety of needs, expectations, and political realities.

Israeli respondent

The ENP should be reviewed in such a way that neighbours' demands are taken into account.

Turkish respondent

A third group observes that the ENP should be reformulated in light of the multiple crises and challenges in the Mediterranean (including migration and terrorism). These answers hint at the need to develop rapid reaction tools.

Une attitude plus réaliste comprenant la menace des islamistes et la difficulté extrême de l'émigration qui va faire « dégenerer » les projets européens.


Moroccan respondent

The current migration crisis in the Mediterranean region shows the need for revision and adjustment to the new circumstances.

Montenegrin respondent

As a complement to this overall assessment, question 3 of the Survey lists six possible factors that may explain why the ENP has failed to offer adequate solutions to the EU neighbourhood.

Graph 3: To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 3

Two main groups can be identified from the graph above. Respondents identify the first three elements as the main causes for which the ENP has not been able to offer adequate responses. The Libyan and Syrian wars (78%) and more generally the inability to respond to southern partners' expectations (74%) are identified as the main causes. The second group comprises less decisive explanatory factors according to the respondents, including recent changes in the region (58% state that it affects to a high or very high extent the ability of the ENP to deliver), the unequal treatment of southern partner countries (57%) and the fact that ENP partner countries do not share ENP goals (56%).


The outlook changes slightly between answers from EU respondents on the one hand and respondents from Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) on the other hand. The MPC respondents stress the EU's inability to respond to southern neighbours' expectations (74% of the answers from MPC countries), while EU respondents indicate in a larger proportion the spillover effects of the Syrian and Libyan wars (81%) as illustrated by the following open answer:

Political developments in the Arab World have made a large part of the ENP irrelevant. The basic pre-assumption of the ENP framework by which partner countries are all functioning states has become inadequate. Thus, the issues such as engaging the non-state actors in conflict-torn areas and state-reconstruction assistance should be included in the ENP.

Polish respondent

It is also worth mentioning that respondents from the Maghreb have indicated “falling short of expectations” at a higher percentage than the respondents from the Mashreq.

Graph 4: To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses? Falling short of expectations leads to decreasing credibility



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 3

La PEV n'a pas apporté de solutions pour les deux rives de la Méditerranée, elle peut être considérée comme un autre instrument à côté d'autres qui n'ont pas su apporter du nouveau pour la région.

Moroccan respondent

La PEV manque d'une vision claire contre les stratégies d'un islamisme armé soutenu par des partis politiques intégristes qui profitent des révolutions arabes. La PEV manque d'une vision claire pour répondre aux attentes des jeunes diplômés dans les pays partenaires du voisinage du sud pour assurer la continuité du partenariat.

Tunisian respondent

Finally, an open-ended question offered the possibility for the respondents to substantiate their views. In this context, a number of answers refer to ENP tools and to the need to further engage with civil society, thereby anticipating other questions of the Survey.

The timeframe necessary to finalise the administrative procedure on behalf of the EU is long and by the time the support is translated into projects on the ground, the priorities might have changed.

Lebanese respondent

The tool is not properly geared towards supporting societies of the South as it doesn't take into consideration the priorities and work experience of the civil society prior to setting its own priorities, which are defined by the southern countries' governments who do not consult their own civil society.

Jordan respondent

Other open answers question the nature of the ENP, its coherence and the role of principles and values.

Ambivalence about the very nature of the ENP: an EU policy (in which case it should be based on EU interests and some degree of conflicts with the interests of partner countries is normal and acceptable) or a partnership with southern partners? There is a tendency of EU Member States to leave to Brussels the promotion of the ENP principles.

French respondent

The ENP was not designed regarding partner countries development needs, expanding trade opportunities are not enough. The ENP should also consider investment in human capital and production sectors to enhance employment.

Turkish respondent

EU inability to fully respond to the "normative expectations" it has set to fulfil its relations with the South. There is an intense feeling that EU policy is based on hypocrisy and, at times, hidden superiority. The following paradox arises: how can the EU claim to promote democratisation in the South when it clearly faces one of its most severe political crises in its interior?


Greek respondent

REVIEWING THE ENP

Questions 4, 5 and 6 were open-ended and aimed to take the pulse on some fundamental questions underpinning the ENP review: what should be the vision of future relations between the EU and the Southern Neighbourhood partner countries, what is expected from these relations and, finally, how the ENP could perform best.

Question 4 resulted in 650 open-ended answers that can be clustered in five main categories (see graph 5) that reflect some of the main debates over the ENP revision.

Graph 5: What should be the vision for the future relations between the EU and the Southern Neighbourhood partner countries? (categories developed from the open-ended question)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 4

About 34% of open-ended answers somehow relate to the need for the EU and its southern Mediterranean neighbours to face an increasing multipolar scenario with new interdependencies in the region.

A vision which takes into account that the world and the MENA region are moving towards multipolarity – in other words, a vision which seeks to stake out a new role for the EU in a multipolar world.

Italian respondent

Il y a plusieurs scénarios qui se présentent, d'abord certains pays du sud peuvent faire un choix stratégique en s'orientant vers les pays de l'Afrique et aussi pour les pays de l'Asie pour combler l'insuffisance et le retard des relations avec l'UE.

Moroccan respondent

Supporting democratic political processes and developments; creating a space of shared responsibilities and interdependence in human, environmental, security and economic areas.

Portuguese respondent

A future vision should be more closely related to a future vision also of the EU and its diverse circles of relationships with enlargement and partner countries, also beyond the neighbourhood.

German respondent

Conflict resolution is mentioned in 22% of the answers. The EU's capacity to act as a mediator and peace broker in the region (which was assessed as weak in last year's Survey dedicated to this issue) is identified as a major concern.

...the vision should focus on conflict resolution including the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as other conflicts by addressing the root causes instead of dealing with the results.

Lebanese respondent

The vision for the future relations between the EU and the Southern Neighbourhood countries should reinforce the EU's contribution to promoting the settlement of regional conflicts.

Greek respondent

The vision should be long term – horizon 2040 for instance – to develop civil society actors in the Southern Neighbourhood with tools of methods of strategic nonviolence, mediation/negotiation, and leadership, especially designed to empower women, but also young men who are willing to challenge the age-old patriarchal structures of their societies, which are at the core of the systemic violence.

French respondent

A similar percentage of answers (19%) addressed social and economic cooperation.

Basic reasons behind the unrest in the Southern Neighbourhood countries are those related to economics, insufficient income of the majority of the population, uneven distribution of wealth, corruption, etc. More attention should be provided to economic and developmental cooperation.

Turkish respondent

La relation doit mettre l'accent beaucoup plus sur un accompagnement réel et sur une stratégie d'uniformisation ou de mise à niveau du développement du pays par rapport à ses voisins immédiats.

Mauritanian respondent

The vision should be aimed more at contributing to improving the people's wellbeing through more youth employment based on local industrialisation and rural development.

Italian respondent

Les futures relations des pays partenaires du voisinage sud avec l'UE doivent prendre avec sérénité les problèmes liés au rattrapage des économies des pays du sud.

Belgian respondent

16% of answers relate to the idea of differentiation based on partners' capacities, priorities and challenges.

At this point, there is not a single vision. Some countries need stabilisation, like Libya; others need real help and involvement, like Tunisia; some need to be monitored closely, especially in terms of civil rights, like Egypt...

Spanish respondent

Every Southern Neighbourhood partner country's democratic and economic status should be seriously taken into consideration. If the ENP is to have continuing relevance as an overall policy framework for such a diverse, and currently violent, region, the principle of differentiation in approaches between countries will need to come even more to the fore.

Lithuanian respondent

Need for a clear common vision (including common strategy) of what we want to achieve in the neighbourhood, particularly with regard to countries/regions in conflict. Working closely with them and listening to their ideas. Existing regional comprehensive strategies, Action Plans as a basis for preparing comprehensive (sub) regional and country-specific external action (including security) strategies.

Slovakian respondent

Finally, 9% of responses point out the importance of fostering human rights and democratic values.

The vision should be based on some kind of conditionality. The EU should not assist countries where there are systematic violations of human rights.

Spanish respondent

Engage in more dialogue with a wider variety of partners (country leaders, NGOs/civil society organisations, and other stakeholders). Alliance building platform with partners in order to agree common aims for the region. Proactive engagement: the European policy-makers should engage with partner countries in order to direct their activism towards promotion of peace, stability, and democracy.

Cypriot respondent

Among other answers, some express the need to rethink interdependence between the two shores; some make reference to challenges in the region, to the need for more EU political weight and for an increased consistency and coherence of EU Members States.

... Europe will continue to be the reference for standards and values for the next decade. The European policy needs to be more independent and more intrusive, based on soft power.

Syrian respondent

"Neighbourhood" and "partnership" need to be re-conceptualised to mean something. Relations cannot be seen and formed as a "lesser form of accession". It's not only about common and shared standards and principles but about shared objectives in the area of foreign policy.

German respondent

Less differentiation and more "positive engagement". A vision based on sincerity (telling the truth), equality (real and not formal co-ownership) and respect. It should be a vision based not on the idea of "Southern Neighbourhood" but on the idea of shared Mediterranean neighbourhood.

Belgian respondent

Ces relations sont confrontées à des défis importants qui risquent, s'ils ne sont pas pris sérieusement en compte, d'aggraver la fracture entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée.


Moroccan respondent

Sortir de l'approche ambivalente avec les pays du sud. Dans le discours on prétend vouloir soutenir les réformes démocratiques et le progrès social, alors qu'une étude attentive de l'action réelle de l'UE dans le cadre de la PEV montre qu'elle vise avant tout à imposer un modèle économique ultra libéral et un plus grand contrôle des migrations.

Lebanese respondent

Question 5 asked what respondents expect from the relations of the EU with its southern partner countries. Answers generally provide constructive assessments, although some reflect a certain sense of pessimism. They are grouped in five main categories giving some indications on what the respondents expect from a renewed ENP.

Graph 6: What do you expect from the EU relations with its Southern Neighbourhood partner countries? (categories developed from the open-ended question)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 5

About a third of the responses refer to a strengthened and enhanced cooperation, and propose specific fields of cooperation. The principle of differentiation again constitutes a common denominator in a number of answers.

I expect a closer cooperation, more specifically adjusted cooperation programmes which could respond to the serious challenges confronting the Southern Neighbourhood partner countries, which also affect the EU.

Romanian respondent

Bilans des politiques précédentes et approche constructive (par le dialogue) face aux défis économiques, écologiques et culturels communs qui forment la base des futurs rapports et détermineront leur nature conflictuelle ou de coopération.

Algerian respondent

A strong support for education and culture. An economic partnership based on traditional relations with some well-known historical partners, no global agreements with the EU, no take-it-or-leave-it free-trade agreements (even with grace periods), no intimidation using unrealistic economic theories.

Lebanese respondent

Davantage de coopération universitaire (formation, recherche) sur des enjeux communs aux pays méditerranéens (changement climatique, pollution, démographie, religions...). Un renforcement de la coopération des régions (plus que des Etats).

French respondent

Finding common grounds to achieve the needs of the Southern Neighbourhood partner countries by addressing the needs of each country and not grouping the needs of all countries in one basket.

Lebanese respondent

Every partner country should be given the possibility to develop its relations with the EU in its own way, in accordance with its own needs and capacities. This does not imply the adoption of double standards, nor does it negate the unified nature of the ENP, by which means the EU has succeeded in taking a coherent approach to all its ENP partners.

Spanish respondent

22% of the open-ended answers address security and stability in a broad sense, tackling violence and conflict resolution in the region, but also as a result of socio-economic security and stable governments.

The EU should be more proactive in helping to settle the region's conflict, and boost the efforts of viable countries to regain growth and development.

Egyptian respondent

Play an active role of diplomacy in bridging internally the Middle East and overcoming the divides (intra-country conflicts like in Yemen, Libya, Syria or Bahrain), between the countries like Morocco and Algeria, between major religious communities like Sunni and Shia, or ethnic groups like Kurds, Arabs and Turks, etc.

Belgian respondent

A serious commitment to implement programmes for less unemployment, less poverty, lower population growth, less corruption and less despotism, which would provide hope for the southern neighbouring countries and security for the EU.

Syrian respondent

18% of answers express a concern about human mobility in the region, namely irregular migrants and refugees. Answers point out the importance of facing the challenges in a comprehensive way.

The EU will only have enough leverage on the southern partners if it starts sharing the migratory burden seriously.

Slovenian respondent

More EU understanding of the realities of the southern Mediterranean. Dealing better with human aspects (migrations, refugees...). Better EU understanding of conflicts and their dynamics and logics. More awareness of the social dimension.

French respondent

Traiter la question migratoire avec une logique réaliste qui doit aider les Etats partenaires à confronter les problèmes de développement au niveau local, source d'émigration vers l'étranger. La PEV doit intégrer dans ses directives les immigrés présents sur les territoires européens et qui sont très attachés par la dynamique de leurs réseaux sociaux aux origines locales dans leurs pays.

Tunisian respondent

13% of answers believe that EU relations with southern partners should be based on strategic long-term objectives.

Close cooperation on jointly tackling trans-national challenges; and functional bilateral cooperation reflecting both sides' interests without losing sight of the long-term goal of developing a shared political vision.

German respondent

Longer-term commitment to those who share the EU values, if the EU strategy is, say, 5 or 10 years long, gives the local non-governmental partners more time to achieve the same objectives and goals.

British respondent

13% of answers give a more pessimistic outlook.

I don't expect a lot if it continues working in the same way, building only on security and economics and stopping immigrants.

Palestinian respondent

I don't see a real European policy in Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, even Tunisia. Instead, disinterest, alignment on US position or continuation with national policies.


Turkish respondent

That we will have continuous difficulties in developing agreements which in a real way make it possible for the southern partners to see the advantages in cooperating with the EU.

Danish respondent

The last question of this block aims to assess how the ENP can perform best. Results reflect some of the main issues that dominated the debate over the ENP review, e.g. ownership and differentiation. Results also relate to the very nature of the ENP, with some answers calling for the ENP to concentrate on its cooperation pillar and others calling for the ENP to be more political.

Graph 7: How can the European Neighbourhood Policy perform best? (categories developed from the open-ended question)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 6

A large number of answers address the importance of fostering a partnership based on mutual interests (33%). The idea of differentiation can be traced in 25% of the answers, with some respondents emphasising the country-by-country approach, and others referring to a deeper East-South differentiation. Part of the answers highlight that the ENP can best perform acting as an exclusively cooperation instrument (24%), while 19% consider the ENP would perform better as a more political instrument.

More equitable partnership:

To develop partnerships based on mutual interests. We should also prevent ritualised and technocratic discussions both within the EU and in partner countries, and look into more innovative formats of engaging bilaterally and regionally. In this respect, initiatives such as the Barcelona Conference should guide us towards more synergy between the EU and its neighbours.

Slovak respondent

When it cooperates on principles: equality and reciprocity as well as consultation and mutual assistance in order to effectively bring about poverty alleviation, sustainable development and promote the participation and integration of all concerned major groups.

Lebanese respondent

En renforçant l'équité, la transparence et la représentativité sud. Alléger les procédures et la bureaucratie.

Moroccan respondent

Differentiation:

La PEV devrait davantage distinguer les mécanismes de coopération entre le volet à l'Est et celui au Sud. La différenciation doit se poursuivre étant donné une hétérogénéité croissante des Etats méditerranéens. Il importe aussi de mettre davantage l'accent sur certains secteurs de coopération où les intérêts stratégiques sont forts, comme l'agriculture, la sécurité alimentaire et les zones rurales.

French respondent

The European Neighbourhood Policy could perform better if it took into consideration the diversified needs and situation in each country, and setting achievable milestones to attain reciprocal development on all levels in the region.

Lebanese respondent

Performing as a cooperation instrument:

Multilateral cooperation, solidarity, visibility, sufficient funding, including better coordination with EU Member States. Now there is a lot of competition (GIZ, AfD, etc.) and all this should be labelled EU. What we are giving southern countries is ridiculous; we also need to better involve all EU Member States. Southern countries want dialogue with all EU Member States and not only a few coming with funds.

Spanish respondent

The current ways of working need serious improvement. The EU should act decisively on all fronts in cooperation with its international partners to support younger generations and women in science and technology careers and integration (with an appropriate recovery plan).

Syrian respondent

Performing as a political instrument:

A serious effort is needed in order to enhance the information and visibility of the ENP and other policies. Better coordination between the EC, EEAS, and EU Member States and a stronger focus on policy actions are crucial to increase the EU's impact and visibility. More organised migration management is urgently needed.

Cypriot respondent

Par en faire un instrument politique plutôt qu'un instrument budgétaire comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui.

Lebanese respondent

By adapting the policies to the needs of the different countries and by being part of a broader geopolitical assessment of the region. It needs to be in line with the strategic thinking developed in the new European Security Strategy (the policies of the ENP should be aimed at implementing the political/strategic priorities defined in Mogherini's new strategy).

Spanish respondent

DEFINING THE POLICY FRAMEWORK

This block aims to evaluate the perception of respondents on the definition of the neighbourhood. This aim is twofold. On the one hand, the block takes into account the geographical scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy through questions 10, 11, 12 and 13. On the other hand, it examines the involvement in the policy of a range of interlocutors and actors through questions 12 and 18.


REDEFINING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

Main findings

- The Survey shows overall support results for the current geographical scope of the ENP, i.e. support for maintaining a single framework for the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. However, specificities of single ENP countries should be better taken into account.
- An appropriate framework should be designed in order to better deal with some “neighbours of the neighbours”. However, respondents from the different sub-regions of the ENP do not agree on which regional actors should then be included.
- The Survey indicates the need for a more effective inclusion of non-state actors on a broader basis, with a more active role of the EU.

The first part of question 10 aimed at gathering views from the respondents on whether the geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained. Respondents are quite split on this issue with 44% who agreed it should be maintained, 35% who said that it should be changed and 21% who do not take sides.


Graph 8: To what extent do you agree that the current geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 10

More specifically, question 10.2 asked whether the differentiation between East and South should be kept. One of the findings is that European respondents and MPC respondents are fairly divided on this issue. While EU respondents are manifestly affirmative on keeping the differentiation (57%), MPC respondents, and especially those from the Maghreb, seem largely critical of this setting and state that it should not be kept (50%). Answers to other questions of the Survey, including the open-ended ones, indicate that the main concern for MPC respondents is rather that the specificities of the individual countries and of their regional background should be more respected by the ENP.


Graph 9: To what extent do you agree that the differentiation between East and South should be kept?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 10

Another geographical issue that has been explored by the Survey in question 10.3 is the inclusion of other regional state actors by extending the definition of the Neighbourhood in the ENP. A significant majority of respondents (56%) agree that the ENP should be redefined in order to somehow include other regional actors in a meaningful manner. Questions 12.6 and 13 highlight the perception among respondents that, even if other regional state actors may not be included in the ENP scope, there should at least be ways to better structure relations with them.


Graph 10: To what extent do you agree that the definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 10

In question 12.6, 60% of respondents agree that long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf, Sahel and Horn of Africa countries should be revitalised. However, Israeli respondents do not share this view (52.4%).


Graph 11: To what extent do you agree with the following proposal to redefine the neighbourhood? Revitalise long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, Sahel and the Horn of Africa



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 12

At the same time, a large majority of the respondents (72%) agree that the ENP should facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with the “neighbours of the neighbours”.

Graph 12: To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 13

In the open comments related to question 10, a number of respondents elaborate on the importance that other regional state actors have for ENP countries. Some propose new forms of cooperation:

The issue is not to extend the scope of the ENP, but to embed it in a wider layer of regional policies where cooperation scope is more balanced (South-South and North-South) and addressing fundamentals of democracy, values and security/peace-keeping policies. In this context, the ENP will remain the EU-based contribution to development programmes in specific sectors.


Italian respondent

While maintaining the current geographical scope of the Neighbourhood Policy, it should include programmes and projects that allow us to deepen cooperation with neighbours, especially the Arab Gulf countries and the countries of the Nile Basin and Horn of Africa.

Egyptian respondent

Addressed to the respondents that argued the ENP should be extended to more countries, question 11 narrowed it down to specific regions or countries. It is widely agreed that the countries from the Horn of Africa should not be included (66%).

Graph 13: In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 11

For the Sahel countries: 51% of respondents say they should be included, but looking only at the answers of the Maghreb countries the breakdown comes to 70%.

For GCC countries, Iraq and Iran, there is a significant difference between the answers given by different categories of respondents. Overall results indicate that on average respondents are half-hearted about the inclusion of GCC countries, Iraq and Iran. While respondents from the Maghreb widely reject the inclusion of these regional actors, respondents from the Mashreq would see the GCC (62%), Iran (53%) and most of all Iraq (74%) within the ENP. Data also shows that Israeli respondents have the strongest stance against the inclusion of these countries with 71% against the inclusion of GCC and Iran and 67% against the inclusion of Iraq.

Graph 14: In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 11

INTERLOCUTORS AND ACTORS

Respondents were asked to what extent the ENP should effectively involve non-state actors on a broader basis. The results are rather straightforward as 84% agreed that non-state actors should be included, with no substantial difference according to the geographical or professional profile of the respondents. This trend also occurs in other questions throughout the Survey.


Graph 15: To what extent do you agree with the following proposal to redefine the neighbourhood?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 12

Responses to question 18 also illustrate consistent support for a series of suggested measures in order to make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries. These were namely: diplomatic action involving civil society (73%), bottom-up policy on economic entrepreneurship (84%), greater political and resource support for actors committed to transform their societies (83%) and increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors (82%).

Graph 16: To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 18

ENP METHODOLOGY

This block includes questions on instruments and criteria of cooperation as well questions on the areas of focus. Questions on instruments are designed to evaluate the relevance of the existing ENP toolbox, and questions on criteria refer to the central issue of how to deal with countries that are not committed to domestic reform. As for the proposed areas of focus, the questions evaluate the ENP scope and follow those areas identified by the Joint Consultation Paper issued by the European Commission. A special focus is on areas of security, migration and governance where specific questions allow a closer look at and detailed assessment of its respective priority issues.


INSTRUMENTS AND CRITERIA OF COOPERATION

Main findings

- In general, there seems to be no massive discontent with current instruments of the ENP. However, support for the current ENP toolbox is somewhat less strong among non-Mediterranean EU respondents.
- The great majority of respondents have indicated that issue-based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis should be privileged.
- In terms of criteria of cooperation, results show a preference to engage rather than to exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform.

Question 14 was designed to gather the views from the respondents on the formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries that should be privileged. Existing instruments such as Association Agreements, ENP Action Plans, ENP progress reports and DCFTAs were positively evaluated by the majority of respondents at rates ranging around 70%.


Graph 17: In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be prioritised?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 14

However, it appears that respondents from non-Mediterranean EU countries are consistently more lukewarm towards these tools than other geographic categories, although the results do not show any massive discontent from this category (see graph 18).

Graph 18: In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged? (the graph below displays the % answers considering high or very high extent)




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/ Question 14

Notwithstanding the relative support for existing tools, results also point to the need to renew the toolbox as the most selected category is the “issue-based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis” (79%). This view is reflected in other parts of the Survey, i.e. Q.12.4 (see graph 19) and in open answers to questions 4 and 5 and above all to number 6, where many respondents refer to the need for a more differentiated and ad-hoc approach:

The European Neighbourhood Policy can focus on a concrete collaboration with the southern countries by sharing together the good (national and regional) practices on the common challenges and issues and on the basis that each stakeholder and/or country can provide positivity on Mediterranean developments.

Portuguese respondent


Graph 19: To what extent do you agree with the following proposal to redefine the neighbourhood?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 12

Question 14 not only addresses the relevance of the toolbox but also tackles the fundamental issue of how to deal with countries that are not committed to domestic reform. A relative majority of respondents (46%) is of the opinion that these countries should be engaged.


Graph 20: In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be prioritised?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 14

It is remarkable that the idea of excluding countries that are not committed to domestic reform has most traction among Mediterranean Partner Countries, while this option is widely rejected among respondents from non-Mediterranean EU countries. Looking to the results clustering respondents based on their institutional affiliation, those from civil society are the most confident about the idea of engaging countries not committed to domestic reform (51%).

Graph 21: In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the engagement of countries that are not committed to domestic reform be privileged?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 14

In its second part, question 14 also asks respondents to list any further proposal for cooperation formats, instruments or criteria. Here is a sample of some of the proposals that came up in the open answers:

Cooperation will drive reform even in the worst situations. Once there is an agreed vision of the future, this will include deep reforms that are part of each country's own commitments. Not imposed by the EU. No "conditionalities". Make countries work for themselves.

Egyptian respondent

Un suivi par la société civile et les institutions élues des actions menées dans le cadre de la PEV doit être prévu. Doit être prévu également, selon une périodicité adéquate et dans un cadre de transparence, le suivi de tous les programmes contenus dans la PEV, y compris bien évidemment du déblocage et de l'usage effectif des financements qui leur sont alloués.

Moroccan respondent

Une charte de la coopération traduisible en grille d'analyse avec pour chaque accord / instrument un contrôle de conformité aux 1. grandes orientations stratégiques européennes et 2. à ses valeurs. Ceci pourrait induire plus de souplesse, pragmatisme tout en restant cohérent.

French respondent

Modular formats should be used, depending on the nature of the relationship. With some it will be just diplomacy and political dialogue, with others a full spectrum of tools can be used. But the logic of engagement needs to be more flexible and cannot be defined a priori by a policy framework which reflects bureaucratic needs rather than concrete challenges.


British respondent

Regarding domestic reform, there is a need for the partnership to push forward such reforms and to take action and impose penalties if such reforms are not introduced. A tougher stance towards such reforms should be agreed upon and implemented.

Lebanese respondent

Question 15 was an open-ended question designed to determine how the EU should engage with those countries not committed to domestic reform. The open-ended question was directed to the respondents that indicated in question 14 that the countries not committed to domestic reforms should be engaged. Four main categories of answers can be identified from the answers received (see graph 22). 35% of them mentioned the need to involve non-state actors. 28% stressed that the engagement could be done on a country-by-country basis, which backs up the need for further differentiation mentioned in previous blocks (see block 2 and 3). 24% plea for some political and/or economic pressure or even sanctions on these countries. The idea of conditionality will be further explored through other questions. Last, the answers of 13% of the respondents converge towards the idea that further economic cooperation is the way ahead to engage these countries, in view of a long-term scenario of reform.

Graph 22: How should the EU engage with those countries not committed to domestic reform?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 15

Tout en privilégiant le principe de la différenciation et le recours à une approche du *less for less*, l'UE devrait contribuer au soutien au sein de ses pays des acteurs qui peuvent constituer des vecteurs de changement.

Moroccan respondent

Grassroots level. The countries, i.e. governing bodies, may not be committed but this does not exclude a need. If needs on the societal level are indicating needs for change, these changes should come from those communities, so work on grassroots level to empower communities to affect the changes they wish to see.

Palestinian respondent

Distant and critical political dialogue. Economic and social cooperation on a smaller level than with other states. Increase support for non-state actors. No direct state budget financing, only concrete project-related funding.

German respondent

The ENP cannot leave them out... It should engage with their civil societies, ensure mobility schemes with those wanting to study in the EU, direct contacts with business.

Greek respondent

Through a country-by-country approach:

The question concerns the fields countries are willing to reform. The fields should be identified for each country and analysed in its context.

Egyptian respondent

Trying to identify areas that are in the country's interest and likely to lead to trickle down domestic reform (judicial programmes for better contracts, which can have an impact on governance, etc.).

Luxembourger respondent

Seek to cooperate in those areas in which they are interested on the basis of ad-hoc agreements so long as this is feasible and does not harm the EU's interests.

Maltese respondent

Through economic and political sanctions/pressure:

Diplomacy and political dialogue. The diplomatic message on so-called values needs to be very clear, but should not prevent a discussion on the political and security issues. Aid should not be offered to countries which do not respect basic rights.

British respondent

It is difficult to help a country where there is no political will. The EU should be coherent and, although it is important to maintain a political dialogue, EU money and assistance should not be wasted in those countries unwilling to change.

Lebanese respondent

Keep channels open but do not enter trade agreements or security dialogue that does not include governance issues. Use financial clout and speak with one voice. Prioritise results over rhetoric, i.e. hands-on projects to educate civil servants, judges and police over joint statements on human rights.

Swedish respondent

Through political dialogue:

Le dialogue doit être noué de manière souple et générant des opportunités au lieu des contraintes. Cela encouragera ces pays à trouver dans les réformes une opportunité et non pas une source supplémentaire de pression.

Moroccan respondent

Diplomacy instead of impositions. To abandon the idea that domestic reforms are the only objective that the EU can pursue in the relations with these countries.

Polish respondent

Un dialogue constructif ayant pour objectif de sensibiliser tous les pays sur la nécessité d'apporter des réformes intérieures et de préparer un climat favorable aux actions futures de l'UE avec ces pays et lier ces réformes aux actions futures de coopération mutuelle.

Tunisian respondent

Through economic cooperation:

As it did with Arab authoritarian regimes: pushing for economic reforms (in a less neoliberal way though) to, in the long run, allow a middle class to emerge. Drawing lessons from the disastrous way it has been carried out with Arab regimes is the first step on this path.

French respondent

The EU should not abandon them altogether, as this might lead to even further worsening of the situation in those countries. The EU should offer incentives (e.g. trade incentives) to reform, at the same time strictly enforcing commitments undertaken on the part of those countries.

Polish respondent

Other ideas are expressed by some respondents, such as the option to engage these countries through regional initiatives.

Through regional initiatives, these countries might not listen to what the EU is preaching but might listen to their peers, especially with all the restructuring of governments that took place and are still taking place in the region.

Lebanese respondent

PROPOSED AREAS OF FOCUS


The analysis of the responses related to areas of focus is developed following three types of categories of respondents. This specific analysis of the answers allows us to have a better approach to the categories identified in the Joint Consultation Paper. Therefore, in this description of the results, responses are classified by region, area of specialisation and institution of affiliation.¹

Main findings

- It is difficult to draw decisive conclusions from the responses as the respondents had difficulties to prioritise areas of focus and indicated that the ENP had to address a number of areas.
- However, “promoting trade and inclusive economic development” and “increasing engagement with youth and women” were most popular among respondents.
- “Increase engagement towards youth and women” is preeminent for some Mashreq countries, while in the Maghreb “governance and security” are considered more important.
- Policy-makers give more priority to security while civil society and expert respondents would prioritise engagement towards youth and women.
- In terms of security, the main focus should be on prevention of radicalisation and the fight against terrorism.
- Tackling structural causes of migration in the country of origin is identified as the main challenge when it comes to cooperation on migration and mobility.

In the Joint Consultation Paper (JCP) issued by the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs in March 2015, it is mentioned that ongoing cooperation with ENP partners is very broad and that there may be a need to further streamline this cooperation and define priority areas of focus. However, this exercise proves difficult as illustrated by the Euromed Survey, which used the categories identified in the JCP. With slight differences, all these categories were considered as priorities by the respondents.

Graph 23: To what extent do you think should the following areas be prioritised in the new ENP framework?




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

1. By country region: Maghreb, Mashreq, Mediterranean EU countries and rest of the EU. By areas of specialisation: Political Cooperation and Security; Economic and Financial Cooperation; Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges; and, finally, Migration and Justice Affairs. By institution of affiliation: Policy-makers, Experts and Civil society

However, behind these general trends, there are some useful hints about preferences by geographic origin. For instance, increasing engagement towards youths and women is preminent for some Mashreq countries, while in the Maghreb governance and security are considered more important.


Graph 24: To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritised in the new ENP framework? Most relevant area by respondents of each partner country. (the graph below shows the % answers considering high or very high extent)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

In the overall results, 87% of respondents consider the option “promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development” as a priority to a high or very high extent. The differences according to the origin of respondents are generally minimal and range between 89% for the Maghreb and 84% for the Mashreq. The most interesting differences are due to the intensity in the assessment; thus, 54% of respondents from the Mashreq or 49% from the Maghreb believe that this should be prioritised to a “very high extent” while most non-Mediterranean EU respondents consider it a priority to a “high” extent (53%). By area of specialisation, respondents from the economic world consider this option a very high priority (above 92%) (see graph 25).


Graph 25: To what extent do you think that “Promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development” should be prioritised in the new ENP framework? (% of answers by category of respondent: geographical, institutional affiliation, area of expertise)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

The second priority “increase engagement with youth and women” has 86% of “high and very high extent” responses (see graph 26). Focusing on “very high extent” answers, the highest percentages are to be found in respondents from Mashreq (65%) and civil society (also a 65%). The lowest percentage 44%, is from respondents specialised in political cooperation and security (see also graph 26).


Graph 26: To what extent do you think that “Increase engagement with youth and women” should be prioritised in the new ENP framework? (% of answers by category of respondent: geographical, institutional affiliation, area of expertise)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

In third place, “address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change” is considered a high or very high priority (83%), although with notable differences between geographical groups with a clear distinction between North and South. Maghreb and Mashreq respondents see this option as more of a priority (88% and 85%, respectively) than those from the EU (80%). Moreover, by area of specialisation, respondents from the political and security fields again account for the lowest percentage of all groups (77%) (see graph 27).

Graph 27: To what extent do you think that “Address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change” should be prioritised in the new ENP framework? (% of answers by category of respondent: geographical, institutional affiliation, area of expertise)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

“Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights” is ranked in fourth position, also with 83% of respondents who agree it should be prioritised to a “high or very high extent”. By regional groups, the assessments by Maghreb respondents stand out as they not only reach 87% but most of them (66% of respondents) answer “very high” (see graph 28). Civil society respondents have a slight tendency to assess this aspect more positively in comparison with the others, while experts in the field of migration and home affairs clearly agree to prioritise this option.


Governance, rule of law and human rights issues must also be approached very cautiously and realistically, so as to not dissuade state-governments from implementing reform. As opposed to the idealistic view of immediate universal human rights implementation, the EU should focus on the concept of gradual implementation of the very fundamental elements necessary to build states.

Turkish respondent

La lecture des thèmes proposés montre un parti pris claire à continuer à faire ce que la PEV fait sans se remettre en question. Le premier domaine à prioriser c'est la transparence et l'analyse de l'impact réel des actions. Actuellement, même quand elle finance des projets de droits humains, l'UE fait plus de mal que du bien en terme global.

Lebanese respondent


Graph 28: To what extent do you think that “Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights” should be prioritised in the new ENP framework? (% of answers by category of respondent: geographical, institutional affiliation, area of expertise)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

The fifth aspect, “improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy”, stands out as an important priority for partner countries respondents, particularly for those from Mashreq, who account for more than 50% of those answering “very high extent” (see graph 29). By area of specialisation, the group from the economic world considers this proposal a higher priority than the three other groups.


Graph 29: To what extent do you think that “Improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy” should be prioritised in the new ENP framework? (% of answers by category of respondent: geographical, institutional affiliation, area of expertise)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

In the sixth place we find “enhance orderly migration and promote mobility”. Within its high assessment by respondents (80%), the differences between groups are minimal. It is only worth emphasising that Maghreb respondents consider it a slightly higher priority than the others (see graph 30). However, there are differences by area of specialisation, where respondents who are experts or specialists in migrations account for 58% of those who consider it a priority “to a very high extent”.

Graph 30: To what extent do you think that “Enhance orderly migration and promote mobility” should be prioritised in the new ENP framework? (% of answers by category of respondent: geographical, institutional affiliation, area of expertise)




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

Finally, “address security threats” also achieves 79%. The most outstanding aspect is that almost 50% of respondents consider that it should be a priority to a “very high extent” (see graph 31). This structure is repeated in the different groups analysed by origin although with mostly moderate assessments, except among Maghreb respondents, of whom 60% consider it a priority to a “very high extent”. By type of institution there are also differences because policy-makers consider it a higher priority than civil society respondents. This is repeated by area of specialisation because respondents from the political field consider it a higher priority than those from the socio-cultural field.

Reforming the security sector is a challenge that most southern partners face or will face in the wake of imminent security challenges. The EU is well-positioned to provide advice, methodology and for lessons learned.

Slovak respondent


Graph 31: To what extent do you think that “Address security threats” should be prioritised in the new ENP framework? (% of answers by category of respondent: geographical, institutional affiliation, area of expertise)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

Graph 32 summarises, based on arithmetic means,¹ how respondents prioritise the different areas of cooperation, differentiating the diverse groups of respondents by geographical area, institutional affiliation and area of expertise.

Graph 32: To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritised in the new ENP framework?
 Mean (1 – very low – to 5 – very high) by country groups and by respondent's affiliation and respondent's field of expertise



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 19

1. Where 1 represents a very low extent and 5 a very high extent.


Addressing security threats, governance challenges and orderly migration

The final questions of the questionnaire focus on three fields of cooperation (security, governance and migrations), achieving a more detailed approach to each of these areas of cooperation.

SECURITY THREATS

Question 20 focuses on security issues, asking for an assessment of six specific aspects of this field (see graph 33).

Graph 33: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 20

Graph 33 clearly illustrates that the option to be prioritized is the joint work of prevention of radicalisation. With similar results follow the “identification of differentiated initiatives by country” the “improvement of civil society capacities to monitor state security forces” and “enhancing security reform”. The graphic also shows that options involving related to military operations are remarkably below the rest of options.

The graphs for each one of the different groups analysed show that the order is almost the same (see graph 34); in fact, the only significant variation is the result for “improving civil society capacity to monitor state security forces”, which in some cases is more highly assessed (civil society, migration or socio-cultural institutions) and in others less so (policy-makers, experts from the economic field or Maghreb respondents).

Graph 34: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on? Mean (1 – very low – to 5 – very high) by country groups and by respondent’s affiliation and respondent’s field of expertise



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 20

Here is a sample of complementary observations made by some respondents on security issues:

The ENP should not address these issues per se. Any overlap of policies (for instance with CFSP and CSDP) will create inconsistencies on the internal EU level.
Austrian respondent

La question sécuritaire dépend de deux facteurs essentiels: un soutien inconditionnel aux pays en question et une nouvelle conception de la coopération économique. Déraciner le mal du terrorisme par un soutien au développement économique générateur d’emplois et de bien-être et le combattre là où il se trouve.
Tunisian respondent


Political, social and economic reforms are the path of “deradicalisation”. Some EU Member States can carry out military operations. I doubt the EU, as such, can do so. Security reform should be included in the package of reforms of the “action plans”. Civil societies are not well-equipped, as in the EU, to monitor state security forces. They should be helped to perform such a role.
Belgian respondent

The most important issue is to stop the double standard policies, namely: stop the European silence regarding human rights abuse in Israel and the Gulf States.
Palestinian respondent

GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES

Question 21 serves to assess different options on governance challenges. Contrary to question 20 on security, answers are more homogeneous. Consequently, it is necessary to note the small differences between these favourable positions.

Graph 35: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 21

In graph 35, we can clearly see the arrangement of the different options. For respondents overall, the first option is the one related to the fight against corruption followed by the two options linked to the promotion of human rights. Meanwhile, improving the management of public finance and guaranteeing the rule of law are the two least positively assessed positions.

In advocating human rights: a) promote human rights using a realistic approach and utilise the concept of progressive realisation; b) understand where reform is accepted and where it is not; c) work gradually with partner countries to improve the overall situation; and d) help upgrade and develop higher standards of research and information collection in partner countries.

Turkish respondent


Graph 36 shows that most groups have a similar distribution, although with exceptions. Thus, for Mashreq respondents the best assessment corresponds to the improvement in public finance management while for those from civil society or the socio-cultural field the priority focuses on socio-economic rights. Moreover, the option on public finance is assessed more negatively by EU respondents (Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean) and by respondents from the political and security and migration fields, while policy-makers most negatively assess civil rights.

By regional groups we see how the Maghreb is above the others analysed in all cases while the means of non-Mediterranean European respondents focus on the left side of the graph featuring the lowest assessments in all cases except for that of guaranteeing the rule of law. Mashreq follows Maghreb and then EU Mediterranean respondents.

Answers grouped by kind of institution show that civil society respondents feature values with higher results with respect to the group of experts. The group of policy-makers concentrates its assessments in central values, with the exception of the option related to guaranteeing the rule of law, which has a much higher assessment than the others.

Finally, in terms of area of specialisation, a series of elements stand out. First, the fact that respondents from the economic field represent the central point of this division of groups with little dispersion and close to central values while those from the field of migration and justice show the highest values. Those from the socio-cultural fields show a great dispersion of results with major differences between options. The group from the political and security field stands out for its lower values with respect to the remaining groups and are concentrated on the left side of the graph.

Graph 36: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on? Mean (1 – very low – to 5 – very high) by country groups and by respondent’s affiliation and respondent’s field of expertise




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 21

CHALLENGES ON MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITY

The last question of the questionnaire deals with the options in terms of migrations and mobility. Although most respondents assess the options positively, they do not reach the level of consensus on the options in the previous question. More importance is attached to acting on the causes of migrations than on cooperation in terms of management of migration flows (see graph 37)

Graph 37: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 22


Graph 38 allows us to see and compare the priorities of each group of participants. We clearly see how the option “support sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin” is the most positively assessed by all groups, followed by “addressing state fragility and conflicts in the country of origin”, making it clear that respondents consider the policies on mobility in the Mediterranean in the countries of origin to be a priority.

Addressing needs in home countries will need to come from an intelligent assessment of conditions on the ground. And the EU needs to realise that people will not stop migrating. They simply will not. As such, any policy that assumes that it can dry up the flow of migrants is misguided at best. 86% of today's refugees now live in developing countries. Addressing South-South migration is the key.

Egyptian respondent

The other policy option in the country of origin, “tackling environmental degradation in the country of origin”, along with the one related to the signing of “mobility package agreements” occupy the intermediate position in almost all groups. Finally, the policies linked to the labour market are most negatively assessed, out of which the possibility of opening the labour market to refugees has the least support. Nevertheless, we should recall that all the assessments are mostly positive towards the actions proposed.

Graph 38: To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on? Mean (1 – very low – to 5 – very high) by country groups and by respondent’s affiliation and respondent’s field of expertise



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 22

ADDRESSING STRATEGIC ISSUES

Through the set of questions in this block, the opinion of the respondents on two main strategic aspects of the ENP was investigated. Questions 7, 8 and 9 explore issues related to the articulation of the ENP with the wider EU policy framework and address the application of values, the prospects for integration with other EU policies for the partners and the relation with other foreign policy instruments. Questions 16 and 17 have been designed to illustrate the concept of ownership by ENP partners; they investigate the expectations and interests of partner countries towards the ENP.

Main findings


- The Survey shows that respondents, and especially academics, think that the ENP is not applying EU values consistently.
- The vast majority of respondents see positively the integration of the ENP with the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
- In terms of expectations, it was mostly indicated that MPC interests and aspirations would be better served by reviewing the institutional setting of EU policies and the nature of the partnerships involved.

ARTICULATION WITH OTHER EU POLICIES

The key documents of the European Neighbourhood Policy consistently refer to the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union – freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – as well as to Article 8 (“The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”) and underline how these are at the heart of the processes of political association and cooperation with the neighbours.

Question 7 asked respondents to what extent they think these values are actually applied through the ENP. The answers were mainly negative (43%), showing a general scepticism (even greater in the case of respondents from MPCs than respondents from the EU), yet with a large percentage of respondents not expressing a clear view on the matter (33%).


Graph 39: To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 7

Differences according to institutional affiliations are even wider, with experts expressing the strongest degree of scepticism (51%).


Graph 40: To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 7

It was then asked (in question 8) to what extent the European Neighbourhood Policy should offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies. In general, respondents were quite positive on the idea (52%). However, many chose not to give a clear answer on the issue (32% stated neither low nor high extent).

Graph 41: To what extent should the European Neighbourhood Policy offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies?




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 8

Rather counter-intuitively, a breakdown of answers based on geographical criteria shows that respondents from the EU seem to be keener on offering prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies than respondents from MPCs.

Respondents who agreed that the ENP should offer prospects for further integration were then asked what these policies could potentially be. The respondents itemised a number of policies that could be regrouped in a few main policy sectors: 23% listed policies concerning economic cooperation, 17% migration, 11% education, 8% security, 8% environment; other issues were human rights, governance, culture, energy, agriculture, and transportation.


Graph 42: To what extent should the European Neighbourhood Policy offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies? (categories developed from the open-ended question)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 8


Another strategic issue addressed by this block (question 9) is the relation of the ENP with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The vast majority (67%) of respondents agree that the ENP should be better integrated into these policies, 20% do not position themselves and only 13% are negative. The idea that the ENP should have a more integrated role in the overall external policies of the EU seems to feature strongly in the answers from EU respondents (71%).

Graph 43: To what extent should the ENP be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 9

These results can be complemented with the results of Q.12.1, where participants responding to proposals to redefine the neighbourhood consider that countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP can be dealt with through the CFSP (41% to a high or very high extent and 26% considering to a low or very low extent).

Graph 44: To what extent do you agree with the following proposal to redefine the neighbourhood?

Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 12

EXPECTATIONS OF PARTNER COUNTRIES

This part of the Survey aims to investigate what, according to respondents, the Mediterranean Partner Countries seek in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Open answers show that it is mainly thought that the economic benefits are driving the interest of the MPCs in the Policy (28% of respondents stating this as one of the main purposes). Complementarily, many respondents also address the issue of sharing expertise and know-how in public policy and technical matters (22%) and the improvement of trade through the ENP (14%).

Stability and security (14%) constitute another concern for MPC countries that are interested in their partnership with the EU. The same goes for mobility (10%), which since the beginning has played a major role in the attractiveness of the overall relations of Europe with the Mediterranean. However, the complexity of the issue is made clear by the large number of additional themes that are mentioned, such as the interest in maintaining special relations with the EU and in having a cooperative framework in which human rights are promoted and civil society is empowered:

Putting human rights approach and norms at the core of the ENP and consolidating strong partnerships with civil society in the Mediterranean Partner Countries.

Tunisian respondent

The following statement sharply recapitulates some of the most sophisticated aspects in terms of needs and expectations in the ENP:

It is important to distinguish between governments and societies. Governments seek trade, mobility, investment, and tourism so mainly economic prosperity. Societies seek to get closer to the value model the EU represents, especially in terms of human rights, freedoms and pluralism (and often differ in this desire with their governments).

German respondent

Graph 45: What do partners (Mediterranean Partner Countries) seek in the European Neighbourhood Policy?
(categories developed from the open-ended question)




Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 16

Question 17 consequently addresses how the ENP could best accommodate the interests and aspirations of the Mediterranean Partner Countries. It was mainly argued by the respondents that a step in this direction could be the reform of the ENP and changes in its institutional setting (32%). In more detail, the observations made underlined the need for a more differentiated and equitable partnership, including civil society, promoting regional integration on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, increasing mobility and complementing the bilateral setting with more effective foreign policy initiatives in the Euro-Mediterranean space.

The idea of enhancing the social, human and cultural dimensions in the ENP has been indicated as one of the most preferable (26%) and country-by-country approach has been listed in 21% of the answers, hence the enhancement of the bilateral negotiations. Another element that has been widely mentioned is the prioritisation of economic demands in terms of market integration, trade and investments (21%); moreover, as seen in question 16, this dimension is perceived to have a major role.

Graph 46: How can the ENP best accommodate Mediterranean Partner Countries' interests and aspirations?
(categories developed from the open-ended question)



Source: Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 6th Euromed Survey/Question 17

Individual country-related programmes and solutions; support regional South-South integration (political, economic, cultural); increase opportunities for legal migration and mobility (interregional, intraregional between MPCs and Europe); involve MPCs more efficiently in political EU-MED dialogue processes and the conceptualising process of new programmes and instruments.

German respondent

Revoir la notion de valeurs partagées, politique adaptée aux besoins de chaque pays, équilibre entre différenciation par sous-région, par pays et vision commune sur la base de principes fondateurs, mise en cohérence et efficacité des instruments, mobiliser plus de ressources, appropriation effective de la PEV par des pays membres et des pays partenaires.

Moroccan respondent



LIST OF RESPONDENTS

LIST OF RESPONDENTS

The European Institute of the Mediterranean ensures the absolute anonymity of the replies by participants. The data has been processed after coding each questionnaire. In addition, there is a minimum number of respondents per country to ensure that the responses cannot be traced back to any of them.

In addition, respondents had the option of not appearing on this final list of participants. 77 out of 760 respondents chose not to be included; therefore this list has a total of 683 names.

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ABOU EL ENEIN, MOHAMMED. Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. Egypt

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- TLEMCANI, RACHID. Université d'Alger. Algeria
- TLILI, RIDHA. Fondation Ahmed Tlili pour la Culture Démocratique. Tunisia
- TOIVANEN, REETTA. University of Helsinki. Finland
- TOMESCU, VIOREL. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Romania
- TORELLI, STEFANO. ISPI. Italy
- TORRENT, RAMON. University of Barcelona. Spain
- TORRES, MIGUEL. Executive Coordinator of the Portuguese network of the Anna Lindh Foundation. Portugal
- TOTAH, PAM. Palestinian Business Woman Association (ASALA). Palestine
- TOUMAZIS, TONIS. Cyprus Research Centre (KYKEM). Cyprus
- TOURI, ABDELAZIZ. Institut National des Sciences de l'Archéologie et du Patrimoine, Hay Riad-Rabat Instituts. Morocco
- TOZZI, MARIA DINA. Regione Toscana-Servizio Attività Internazionali. Italy
- TRAMONTINI, LESLIE. Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Marburg. Germany
- TRIANTAPHYLLOU, DIMITRIOS. Center for International and European Studies (CIES), Kadir Has University. Greece
- TRIKI, MAHMOUD. South Mediterranean University. Tunisia
- TRIULZI, UMBERTO. Department of Economic and Social Science, Sapienza University of Rome. Italy
- TRUNK, NADA. International School for Social and Business Studies (ISSBS). Slovenia
- TSAKAS, CONSTANTIN. FEMISE. France
- TSALTAMPASI, APOSTOLINA. Greek Association of Women Entrepreneurs. Greece
- TULUS, CANA. Istanbul Policy Center. Turkey
- TURE, CAN. Turkish Asian Centre for Strategic Studies (TASAM). Turkey
- TURSINOVIC, MIRALEM. Youth Resource Centre (ORC), Tuzla. Bosnia and Herzegovina
- UNAL HALIL, ATA. Istanbul University Theatre. Turkey
- VALERIANI, ELISA. ERVET SPA. Italy
- VAN DER VELDE, DAVID. Consult and Design International. United Kingdom
- VAN HÜLLEN, VERA. Freie Universität Berlin. Germany
- VAN NES, RENÉ. European External Action Service. Netherlands
- VARELA ORTEGA, CONSUELO. Universidad Politécnica de Madrid. Spain
- VARELLA, EVANGELIA. Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Greece
- VARGULIS, MARTINS. Latvian Institute of International Affairs. Latvia
- VESA, UNTO. Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere. Finland
- VIGOTTI, ROBERTO. OME. Italy
- VILLALONGA, FERRAN. Institut Ignasi Villalonga d'Economia i Empresa. Spain
- WENERSKI, LUKASZ. The European Programme. Institute of Public Affairs. Warsaw. Poland
- WERENFELS, ISABELLE. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Germany
- WIHTOL DE WENDEN, CATHERINE. CNRS (CERI). France
- WOERTZ, ECKART. Gulf Research Center. Germany
- YALÇINKAYA, HALDUN. Centre for Middle Eastern and Strategic Studies (ORSAM). Turkey
- YASSINE, MANAL. Ministry of Industry. Lebanon
- YILDIZ, NETICE, Eastern Mediterranean University. Cyprus
- YILDRIM, SELAHATTIN. UCLG-MEWA. France
- YOGUN, ESMEYAY. Toros University. Turkey
- YOUBI IDRISSE, MOHAMED. Université Abdelmalek Essaadi de Tétouan. Morocco
- YOUNGS, RICHARD. Carnegie Europe. United Kingdom

ZAGAGLIA, BARBARA. Università Politecnica delle Marche. Italy

ZAJAC, JUSTYNA. University of Warsaw, Institute of International Relations. Poland

ZALDO, JOSÉ MIGUEL. Comité empresarial. Spain

ZANK, WOLFGANG. Centre for Comparative Integration Studies (CCIS). Germany

ZAPATA, RICARD. Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Spain

ZATARA, SHADI. JUZOOR. Palestine

ZEITHAMLOVA, MILENA. Czech Arab Society. Czech Republic

ZEMMOURI, MALIKA. Université Farhat Abbas, Sétif. Algeria

ZENIA, SALEM. Algerian journalist and writer in Tamazight language. Hosted in Barcelona by Catalan PEN, 'Refuge Writer' Programme. Algeria

ZENON, MAGDA. Hands Across the Divide. Cyprus

ZEYTINOGLU, CEREN. TESEV. Turkey

ZIAD, AYOUB ARBACHE. Damascus University and Private Institutions and Universities. Syria

ZIRARI, HAYAT. Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines ben m'Sik, Casablanca. Morocco

ZOGAIB, ASSAD. Zahle Maalaka Municipality. Lebanon

ZOGLHAMI, MOHAMED. La Financière Interactive. Tunisia

ZOHRY, AYMAN. Egyptian Society for Migration Studies (EGYMIG). Egypt

ZOROB, ANJA. Institute of Development Research and Development Policy, Ruhr-University Bochum. Germany



SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY

SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY

Country	Answers 2011		Answers 2012		Answers 2013/14		Answers 2015	
	Total	% Total Survey	Total	% Total Survey	Total	% Total Survey	Total	% Total Survey
Morocco	58	8.3%	62	7.4%	85	10.1%	72	9.5%
Algeria	45	6.5%	45	5.6%	40	4.8%	41	5.4%
Turkey	40	5.8%	43	5.1%	43	5.1%	30	3.9%
Egypt	35	5.0%	40	4.7%	46	5.5%	41	5.4%
Tunisia	35	5.0%	43	5.1%	42	5.0%	45	5.9%
Syria	8	1.2%	12	1.4%	15	1.8%	11	1.4%
Israel	24	3.5%	26	3.1%	21	2.5%	21	2.8%
Occupied Palestinian Territories	21	3.0%	24	2.8%	25	3.0%	23	3.0%
Lebanon	24	3.5%	29	3.4%	33	3.9%	26	3.4%
Jordan	20	2.9%	26	3.1%	26	3.1%	12	1.6%
Mauritania	7	1.0%	8	0.9%	7	0.8%	5	0.7%
Libya	1	0.1%	1	0.1%	1	0.1%	2	0.3%
Croatia (before 2014)	6	0.9%	12	1.4%				
Albania	3	0.4%	3	0.4%	5	0.6%	3	0.4%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	35	0.7%	4	0.5%	6	0.7%	3	0.4%
Montenegro	6	0.9%	3	0.4%	4	0.5%	3	0.4%
Monaco	2	0.3%	0	0.0%	1	0.1%		0.0%
Total MPCs	340	48.9%	383	45.4%	400	47.7%	338	44.5%
France	43	6.2%	61	7.5%	71	8.5%	77	10.1%
Spain	34	4.9%	63	5.7%	59	7.0%	57	7.5%
Italy	37	5.3%	48	5.6%	49	5.8%	54	7.1%
Germany	37	5.3%	47	3.1%	43	5.1%	40	5.3%
United Kingdom	15	2.2%	26	1.2%	17	2.0%	17	2.2%
Belgium	14	2.0%	10	1.4%	11	1.3%	9	1.2%
Portugal	9	1.3%	12	3.0%	10	1.2%	10	1.3%
Greece	19	2.7%	25	1.5%	20	2.4%	18	2.4%
Netherlands	6	0.9%	13	1.9%	12	1.4%	8	1.1%
Poland	15	2.2%	16	0.8%	17	2.0%	14	1.8%
Romania	6	0.9%	7	1.1%	7	0.8%	8	1.1%
Denmark	10	1.4%	9	1.2%	5	0.6%	5	0.7%
Czech Republic	7	1.0%	10	1.4%	7	0.8%	11	1.4%
Finland	9	1.3%	12	1.4%	11	1.3%	9	1.2%
Sweden	12	1.7%	12	0.8%	13	1.6%	9	1.2%
Austria	7	1.0%	7	0.9%	9	1.1%	7	0.9%
Ireland	6	0.9%	8	0.9%	4	0.5%	4	0.5%
Hungary	7	1.0%	8	1.5%	10	1.2%	8	1.1%
Cyprus	7	1.0%	13	0.2%	9	1.1%	8	1.1%
Slovakia	3	0.4%	2	0.8%	4	0.5%	4	0.5%
Slovenia	10	1.4%	7	0.5%	10	1.2%	8	1.1%
Lithuania	6	0.9%	4	1.1%	3	0.4%	2	0.3%
Malta	9	1.3%	9	0.4%	7	0.8%	5	0.7%
Latvia	4	0.6%	3	0.8%	3	0.4%	3	0.4%
Bulgaria	5	0.7%	7	0.2%	5	0.6%	6	0.8%
Estonia	3	0.4%	2	0.7%	2	0.2%	2	0.3%
Luxembourg	2	0.3%	6	0.0%	3	0.4%	4	0.5%
Croatia (from 2014 onwards)					8	1	7	0.9%
Total EU	342	49.2%	447	53%	429	51.2%	414	54.5%
Other*	13	1.9%	13	1.5%	9	1.2%	8	1.1%
TOTAL	695	100%	843	100%	838	100%	760	100%

* Responses from: Macedonia, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, USA (5)



QUESTIONNAIRE

BLOCK 0

COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

In order to facilitate the data processing and to improve the statistical analysis, we would be very pleased if you could provide us with the following information:

Gender

Male	<input type="text"/>
Female	<input type="text"/>

Nationality

Albania	<input type="text"/>	Lebanon	<input type="text"/>
Algeria	<input type="text"/>	Lithuania	<input type="text"/>
Austria	<input type="text"/>	Luxembourg	<input type="text"/>
Belgium	<input type="text"/>	Libya	<input type="text"/>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="text"/>	Malta	<input type="text"/>
Bulgaria	<input type="text"/>	Mauritania	<input type="text"/>
Croatia	<input type="text"/>	Montenegro	<input type="text"/>
Cyprus	<input type="text"/>	Morocco	<input type="text"/>
Czech Republic	<input type="text"/>	Netherlands	<input type="text"/>
Denmark	<input type="text"/>	Occupied Palestinian Territories	<input type="text"/>
Egypt	<input type="text"/>	Poland	<input type="text"/>
Estonia	<input type="text"/>	Portugal	<input type="text"/>
Finland	<input type="text"/>	Romania	<input type="text"/>
France	<input type="text"/>	Slovakia	<input type="text"/>
Germany	<input type="text"/>	Slovenia	<input type="text"/>
Greece	<input type="text"/>	Spain	<input type="text"/>
Hungary	<input type="text"/>	Sweden	<input type="text"/>
Ireland	<input type="text"/>	Syria	<input type="text"/>
Israel	<input type="text"/>	Tunisia	<input type="text"/>
Italy	<input type="text"/>	Turkey	<input type="text"/>
Jordan	<input type="text"/>	United Kingdom	<input type="text"/>
Latvia	<input type="text"/>	Other	<input type="text"/>

Position (optional)
Institution (optional)
Institution of affiliation

<input type="checkbox"/>	Governmental	<input type="checkbox"/>	Academic
<input type="checkbox"/>	Diplomatic	<input type="checkbox"/>	Media
<input type="checkbox"/>	EU institution	<input type="checkbox"/>	NGO
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other international organisation	<input type="checkbox"/>	Trade union
<input type="checkbox"/>	Political party	<input type="checkbox"/>	Company (Business sector)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Think tank		

What is your main area of specialisation?

Political Cooperation and Security		
Economic and Financial Cooperation		
Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges		
Migration and Justice Affairs		



QUESTIONNAIRE

BLOCK 0

COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

In order to facilitate the data processing and to improve the statistical analysis, we would be very pleased if you could provide us with the following information:

Gender

Male	<input type="text"/>
Female	<input type="text"/>

Nationality

Albania	<input type="text"/>	Lebanon	<input type="text"/>
Algeria	<input type="text"/>	Lithuania	<input type="text"/>
Austria	<input type="text"/>	Luxembourg	<input type="text"/>
Belgium	<input type="text"/>	Libya	<input type="text"/>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="text"/>	Malta	<input type="text"/>
Bulgaria	<input type="text"/>	Mauritania	<input type="text"/>
Croatia	<input type="text"/>	Montenegro	<input type="text"/>
Cyprus	<input type="text"/>	Morocco	<input type="text"/>
Czech Republic	<input type="text"/>	Netherlands	<input type="text"/>
Denmark	<input type="text"/>	Occupied Palestinian Territories	<input type="text"/>
Egypt	<input type="text"/>	Poland	<input type="text"/>
Estonia	<input type="text"/>	Portugal	<input type="text"/>
Finland	<input type="text"/>	Romania	<input type="text"/>
France	<input type="text"/>	Slovakia	<input type="text"/>
Germany	<input type="text"/>	Slovenia	<input type="text"/>
Greece	<input type="text"/>	Spain	<input type="text"/>
Hungary	<input type="text"/>	Sweden	<input type="text"/>
Ireland	<input type="text"/>	Syria	<input type="text"/>
Israel	<input type="text"/>	Tunisia	<input type="text"/>
Italy	<input type="text"/>	Turkey	<input type="text"/>
Jordan	<input type="text"/>	United Kingdom	<input type="text"/>
Latvia	<input type="text"/>	Other	<input type="text"/>

Position (optional)

Institution (optional)

Institution of affiliation

<input type="checkbox"/>	Governmental	<input type="checkbox"/>	Academic
<input type="checkbox"/>	Diplomatic	<input type="checkbox"/>	Media
<input type="checkbox"/>	EU institution	<input type="checkbox"/>	NGO
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other international organisation	<input type="checkbox"/>	Trade union
<input type="checkbox"/>	Political party	<input type="checkbox"/>	Company (Business sector)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Think tank		

What is your main area of specialisation?

Political Cooperation and Security		
Economic and Financial Cooperation		
Social, Cultural and Human Exchanges		
Migration and Justice Affairs		

BLOCK A

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

Q.1 In your opinion, should the European Neighbourhood Policy be wound up?

Yes	<input type="text"/>
No	<input type="text"/>

Q.2 In case you answered YES, what would you propose instead?

Q.3 To what extent the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know
Political developments in the Southern Mediterranean regions in the last years made ENP a non-valid instrument						
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries do not share the ENP goals						
ENP framework cannot face spillover effects of Libyan and Syrian wars						
Falling short of expectations lead to decreasing credibility						
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries are not treated on equal foot						
EU inability to respond Southern Neighbourhood partner countries expectations						

Other elements:

BLOCK B

REVIEWING ENP

Q.4 What should be the vision for the future relations between the EU and the Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?

Q.5 What do you expect from the EU relations with its Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?

Q.6 How can the European Neighbourhood Policy perform best?

BLOCK C

ARTICULATION WITH EU POLICIES

Q.7 To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?

Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know

Q.8 To what extent should the European Neighbourhood Policy offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies?

Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know

If high/very high extent, which policies?

--

Q.9 To what extent should the ENP be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and defence Policy (CSDP)?

Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know

BLOCK D

REDEFINING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

Q.10 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know
The current geographical scope of the ENP be maintained						
The differentiation between East and South should be kept						
The definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors						

Comments:

--

Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

	Yes	No
Sahel countries		
Horn of Africa countries		
Gulf Cooperation Council countries		
Iraq		
Iran		

Q.12 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know
Deal with the countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP framework through the broader context of the CFSP						
Offer ways of cooperation able to accommodate present shifting interests of partner States in the region						
EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic						
EU initiatives should be issue-focused						
Effectively involve non-state actors on a broader basis						
Revitalize long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, Sahel and the Horn of Africa						

Other proposals:

Q.13 To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?

Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know

How?

BLOCK E

RELATIONS WITH PARTNER COUNTRIES
(MEDITERRANEAN PARTNER COUNTRIES)

Q.14 In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent the following should be privileged?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know
Association Agreements						
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)						
Issue based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis						
ENP Action Plans						
ENP Progress Reports						
Engage countries that are not committed to domestic reform						
Exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform						

Other proposals

Q.15 Open answer for Q.14.F: How should the EU engage with those countries not committed to domestic reform?

--

BLOCK F

EXPECTATIONS OF PARTNER COUNTRIES

Q.16 What do partners (Mediterranean Partner Countries) seek in the European Neighbourhood Policy?

Q.17 How can the ENP best accommodate Mediterranean Partner Countries' interests and aspirations?

Q.18 To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know
Diplomatic action involving civil society						
Bottom-up policy on economic entrepreneurship						
Greater political and resource support for actors committed to transform their societies						
Increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors						
Other measures						

BLOCK G

PROPOSED AREAS OF FOCUS

Q.19 To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know
Promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development						
Improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy						
Address security threats						
Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights						
Enhance orderly migration and promote mobility						
Increase engagement with youth and women						
Address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change						

Additional priorities

Q.20 To what extent ENP actions/policies to address security threats should focus on:

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know
Working with partners on the prevention of radicalisation, the fight against terrorism and organised crime						
Placing the EU as the first-line security provider in its own neighbourhood						
Assuming EU potential need to carry out more autonomous military operations in the future						
Identifying differentiated initiatives on a country-by-country basis						
Enhancing Security Sector Reform						
Improving civil society capacity to monitor state's security forces						

Additional priorities

Q.21 To what extent ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges should focus on:

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know
Ensuring rule of law in terms of legal certainty						
Guaranteeing good governance and fighting corruption						
Promoting human rights: civil rights and liberties						
Promoting human rights: socio-economic rights						
Improving public finance management						

Additional actions/policies

Q.22 To what extent ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility should focus on:

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither high nor low extent	High extent	Very high extent	Don't know
Creating bilateral labour market information systems as stepping stone of a future regional (EU-Med) labour market information system						
Opening the access to labour market to asylum seekers and refugees						
Promoting and concluding effective Mobility Package agreements						
Support sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin						
Tackling environmental degradation in the country of origin						
Addressing state fragility and conflict in the country of origin						

Additional actions/policies


IV

SET OF RESULTS

BLOCK 0


COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

Graph 1: Breakdown of responses by geographical origin: EU-28 and Mediterranean Partner Countries¹




* Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monaco.

Graph 2: Breakdown of respondents by region (in %)




1. Corresponds to UfM members


Graph 3: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution




Graph 4: Breakdown of respondents by type of institution




Graph 5: Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation




Graph 6: Breakdown of respondents by area of specialisation and by region



Graph 7: Breakdown of respondents by gender



Graph 8: Breakdown of respondents by gender and regional groups




BLOCK A

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

Q.1 In your opinion, should the European Neighbourhood Policy be wound up?

	Yes	No	Total
All survey	158	602	760
	21%	79%	100%
Mediterranean Partner Countries	70	264	334
	21%	79%	100%
EU-28	87	327	414
	21%	79%	100%

Should the European Neighbourhood Policy be wound up?




Q.1 In your opinion, should the European Neighbourhood Policy be wound up?

Geographic

	Yes	No	Total
Maghreb	22	142	164
	13%	87%	100%
Mashreq	26	84	110
	24%	76%	100%
Turkey	12	18	30
	40%	60%	100%
Israel	9	12	21
	43%	57%	100%
European non-EU	1	8	9
	11%	89%	100%
Mediterranean EU	58	186	244
	24%	76%	100%
Rest of EU	29	141	170
	17%	83%	100%

Should the European Neighbourhood Policy be wound up?




Q.1 In your opinion, should the European Neighbourhood Policy be wound up?

Institution

	Yes	No	Total
Policy-makers	33	174	207
	16%	84%	100%
Experts	86	283	369
	23%	77%	100%
Civil society	39	145	184
	21%	79%	100%

Should the European Neighbourhood Policy be wound up?



Q.3 To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?


All survey

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Political developments in the Southern Mediterranean regions in the last years made ENP a non-valid instrument	50	113	144	287	145	739	21	760
	7%	15%	19%	39%	20%	100%	3%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries do not share the ENP goals	36	110	172	281	127	726	34	760
	5%	15%	24%	39%	17%	100%	4%	
ENP framework cannot face spillover effects of Libyan and Syrian wars	32	63	69	242	325	731	29	760
	4%	9%	9%	33%	44%	100%	4%	
Falling short of expectations lead to deceasing credibility	15	52	145	297	218	727	33	760
	2%	7%	20%	41%	30%	100%	4%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries are not treated on equal foot	41	108	163	196	210	718	42	760
	6%	15%	23%	27%	29%	100%	6%	
EU inability to respond Southern Neighbourhood partner countries expectations	25	46	116	298	242	727	33	760
	3%	6%	16%	41%	33%	100%	4%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?



Q.3 To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?


EU-28

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Political developments in the Southern Mediterranean regions in the last years made ENP a non-valid instrument	23	66	77	150	90	406	8	414
	6%	16%	19%	37%	22%	100%	2%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries do not share the ENP goals	14	66	91	163	61	395	19	414
	4%	17%	23%	41%	15%	100%	5%	
ENP framework cannot face spillover effects of Libyan and Syrian wars	8	35	34	139	190	406	8	414
	2%	9%	8%	34%	47%	100%	2%	
Falling short of expectations lead to decreasing credibility	7	33	81	175	106	402	12	414
	2%	8%	20%	44%	26%	100%	3%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries are not treated on equal foot	19	75	105	115	80	394	20	414
	5%	19%	27%	29%	20%	100%	5%	
EU inability to respond Southern Neighbourhood partner countries expectations	7	29	66	186	115	403	11	414
	2%	7%	16%	46%	29%	100%	3%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?



Q.3 To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?


MPC

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Political developments in the Southern Mediterranean regions in the last years made ENP a non-valid instrument	27	46	65	132	52	322	12	334
	8%	14%	20%	41%	16%	100%	4%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries do not share the ENP goals	22	42	80	112	64	320	14	334
	7%	13%	25%	35%	20%	100%	4%	
ENP framework cannot face spillover effects of Libyan and Syrian wars	24	28	34	96	131	313	21	334
	8%	9%	11%	31%	42%	100%	6%	
Falling short of expectations lead to decreasing credibility	8	19	61	119	106	313	21	334
	3%	6%	19%	38%	34%	100%	6%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries are not treated on equal foot	22	31	55	79	126	313	21	334
	7%	10%	18%	25%	40%	100%	6%	
EU inability to respond Southern Neighbourhood partner countries expectations	18	17	48	105	124	312	22	334
	6%	5%	15%	34%	40%	100%	7%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?



Q.3 To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?


Maghreb

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Political developments in the Southern Mediterranean regions in the last years made ENP a non-valid instrument	11	27	34	61	24	157	7	164
	7%	17%	22%	39%	15%	100%	4%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries do not share the ENP goals	13	18	46	55	23	155	9	164
	8%	12%	30%	35%	15%	100%	5%	
ENP framework cannot face spillover effects of Libyan and Syrian wars	11	11	12	48	70	152	12	164
	7%	7%	8%	32%	46%	100%	7%	
Falling short of expectations lead to deceasing credibility	4	7	25	56	62	154	10	164
	3%	5%	16%	36%	40%	100%	6%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries are not treated on equal foot	13	9	28	29	71	150	14	164
	9%	6%	19%	19%	47%	100%	9%	
EU inability to respond Southern Neighbourhood partner countries expectations	9	9	21	44	67	150	14	164
	6%	6%	14%	29%	45%	100%	9%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?



Q.3 To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?


Mashreq

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Political developments in the Southern Mediterranean regions in the last years made ENP a non-valid instrument	11	13	25	45	14	108	2	110
	10%	12%	23%	42%	13%	100%	2%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries do not share the ENP goals	5	19	24	38	22	108	2	110
	5%	18%	22%	35%	20%	100%	2%	
ENP framework cannot face spillover effects of Libyan and Syrian wars	9	12	17	33	33	104	6	110
	9%	12%	16%	32%	32%	100%	5%	
Falling short of expectations lead to decreasing credibility	2	8	26	44	26	106	4	110
	2%	8%	25%	42%	25%	100%	4%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries are not treated on equal foot	3	12	17	37	39	108	2	110
	3%	11%	16%	34%	36%	100%	2%	
EU inability to respond Southern Neighbourhood partner countries expectations	6	5	17	42	38	108	2	110
	6%	5%	16%	39%	35%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?



Q.3 To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?


Mediterranean EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Political developments in the Southern Mediterranean regions in the last years made ENP a non-valid instrument	15	31	45	94	56	241	3	244
	6%	13%	19%	39%	23%	100%	1%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries do not share the ENP goals	10	39	51	95	37	232	12	244
	4%	17%	22%	41%	16%	100%	5%	
ENP framework cannot face spillover effects of Libyan and Syrian wars	8	24	17	79	111	239	5	244
	3%	10%	7%	33%	46%	100%	2%	
Falling short of expectations lead to deceasing credibility	4	20	46	102	68	240	4	244
	2%	8%	19%	43%	28%	100%	2%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries are not treated on equal foot	10	37	56	79	53	235	9	244
	4%	16%	24%	34%	23%	100%	4%	
EU inability to respond Southern Neighbourhood partner countries expectations	5	15	31	120	68	239	5	244
	2%	6%	13%	50%	28%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?



Q.3 To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?


Rest of EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Political developments in the Southern Mediterranean regions in the last years made ENP a non-valid instrument	8	35	32	56	34	165	5	170
	5%	21%	19%	34%	21%	100%	3%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries do not share the ENP goals	4	27	40	68	24	163	7	170
	2%	17%	25%	42%	15%	100%	4%	
ENP framework cannot face spillover effects of Libyan and Syrian wars	0	11	17	60	79	167	3	170
	0%	7%	10%	36%	47%	100%	2%	
Falling short of expectations lead to decreasing credibility	3	13	35	73	38	162	8	170
	2%	8%	22%	45%	23%	100%	5%	
Southern Neighbourhood partner countries are not treated on equal foot	9	38	49	36	27	159	11	170
	6%	24%	31%	23%	17%	100%	6%	
EU inability to respond Southern Neighbourhood partner countries expectations	2	14	35	66	47	164	6	170
	1%	9%	21%	40%	29%	100%	4%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do the following elements explain why the European Neighbourhood Policy has not always been able to offer adequate responses?



BLOCK B

REVIEWING ENP

CORRESPONDS TO QUESTIONS 4, 5 AND 6 WHICH WERE OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS. THE ANALYSIS OF THESE ANSWERS CAN BE FOUND IN THE QUALITATIVE REPORT.

BLOCK C

ARTICULATION WITH EU POLICIES


Q.7 To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
All survey	55	259	237	147	31	729	31	760
	8%	36%	33%	20%	4%	100%	4%	
Mediterranean Partner Countries	31	126	99	53	7	316	18	334
	10%	40%	31%	17%	2%	100%	5%	
EU-28	24	127	134	93	24	402	12	414
	6%	32%	33%	23%	6%	100%	3%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?



Q.7 To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?


Geographic

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Maghreb	19	62	50	22	1	154	10	164
	12%	40%	32%	14%	1%	100%	6%	
Mashreq	9	34	36	23	5	107	3	110
	8%	32%	34%	21%	5%	100%	3%	
Mediterranean EU countries	17	81	84	44	11	237	7	244
	7%	34%	35%	19%	5%	100%	3%	
Rest of EU	7	46	50	49	13	165	5	170
	4%	28%	30%	30%	8%	100%	3%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?



Q.7 To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?


Institution

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Policy-makers	14	49	73	46	17	199	8	207
	7%	25%	37%	23%	9%	100%	4%	
Experts	26	156	100	67	9	358	11	369
	7%	44%	28%	19%	3%	100%	3%	
Civil society	15	54	64	34	5	172	12	184
	9%	31%	37%	20%	3%	100%	7%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent are the EU values applied through the European Neighbourhood Policy?




Q.8 To what extent should the European Neighbourhood Policy offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
All survey	14	106	230	244	132	726	34	760
	2%	15%	32%	34%	18%	100%	4%	
Mediterranean Partner Countries	8	51	113	89	53	314	20	334
	3%	16%	36%	28%	17%	100%	6%	
EU-28	6	54	111	153	76	400	14	414
	2%	14%	28%	38%	19%	100%	3%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should the European Neighbourhood Policy offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies?



Q.8 To what extent should the European Neighbourhood Policy offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies?


Geographic

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Maghreb	2	19	54	48	31	154	10	164
	1%	12%	35%	31%	20%	100%	6%	
Mashreq	3	14	45	25	20	107	3	110
	3%	13%	42%	23%	19%	100%	3%	
Mediterranean EU countries	4	41	63	84	42	234	10	244
	2%	18%	27%	36%	18%	100%	4%	
Rest of EU	2	13	48	69	34	166	4	170
	1%	8%	29%	42%	20%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should the European Neighbourhood Policy offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies?



Q.8 To what extent should the European Neighbourhood Policy offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies?


Institution

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Policy-makers	4	22	72	58	44	200	7	207
	2%	11%	36%	29%	22%	100%	3%	
Experts	9	59	100	125	58	351	18	369
	3%	17%	28%	36%	17%	100%	5%	
Civil society	1	25	58	61	30	175	9	184
	1%	14%	33%	35%	17%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should the European Neighbourhood Policy offer prospects for further integration with some of the EU policies?




Q.9 To what extent should the ENP be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
All survey	22	69	142	293	177	703	57	760
	3%	10%	20%	42%	25%	100%	8%	
Mediterranean Partner Countries	13	29	73	115	71	301	33	334
	4%	10%	24%	38%	24%	100%	10%	
EU-28	9	38	65	174	104	390	24	414
	2%	10%	17%	45%	27%	100%	6%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should the ENP be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?



Q.9 To what extent should the ENP be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?


Geographic

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Maghreb	3	10	38	61	40	152	12	164
	2%	7%	25%	40%	26%	100%	7%	
Mashreq	7	11	25	37	19	99	11	110
	7%	11%	25%	37%	19%	100%	10%	
Mediterranean EU countries	6	20	45	93	71	235	9	244
	3%	9%	19%	40%	30%	100%	4%	
Rest of EU	3	18	20	81	33	155	15	170
	2%	12%	13%	52%	21%	100%	9%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should the ENP be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?



Q.9 To what extent should the ENP be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?


Institution

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Policy-makers	6	17	31	83	58	195	12	207
	3%	9%	16%	43%	30%	100%	6%	
Experts	9	34	71	155	81	350	19	369
	3%	10%	20%	44%	23%	100%	5%	
Civil society	7	18	40	55	38	158	26	184
	4%	11%	25%	35%	24%	100%	14%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should the ENP be better integrated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?



BLOCK D

REDEFINING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

Q.10 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?


All survey

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
The current geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained	93	159	150	212	101	715	45	760
	13%	22%	21%	30%	14%	100%	6%	
The differentiation between East and South should be kept	133	136	110	195	150	724	36	760
	18%	19%	15%	27%	21%	100%	5%	
The definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors	91	115	108	239	159	712	48	760
	13%	16%	15%	34%	22%	100%	6%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?



Q.10 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?


EU-28

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
The current geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained	48	81	89	125	57	400	14	414
	12%	20%	22%	31%	14%	100%	3%	
The differentiation between East and South should be kept	42	68	66	127	104	407	7	414
	10%	17%	16%	31%	26%	100%	2%	
The definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors	50	69	70	123	81	393	21	414
	13%	18%	18%	31%	21%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?



Q.10 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?


MPC

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
The current geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained	43	73	58	85	44	303	31	334
	14%	24%	19%	28%	15%	100%	9%	
The differentiation between East and South should be kept	89	63	42	66	45	305	29	334
	29%	21%	14%	22%	15%	100%	9%	
The definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors	41	44	35	111	76	307	27	334
	13%	14%	11%	36%	25%	100%	8%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?



Q.10 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?


Maghreb

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
The current geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained	30	37	25	34	16	142	22	164
	21%	26%	18%	24%	11%	100%	13%	
The differentiation between East and South should be kept	55	28	18	27	17	145	19	164
	38%	19%	12%	19%	12%	100%	12%	
The definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors	17	17	16	50	47	147	17	164
	12%	12%	11%	34%	32%	100%	10%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?



Q.10 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?


Mashreq

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
The current geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained	8	25	16	41	17	107	3	110
	7%	23%	15%	38%	16%	100%	3%	
The differentiation between East and South should be kept	21	23	20	25	17	106	4	110
	20%	22%	19%	24%	16%	100%	4%	
The definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors	16	17	10	42	20	105	5	110
	15%	16%	10%	40%	19%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?



Q.10 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?


Mediterranean EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
The current geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained	30	49	53	64	39	235	9	244
	13%	21%	23%	27%	17%	100%	4%	
The differentiation between East and South should be kept	25	45	37	67	65	239	5	244
	10%	19%	15%	28%	27%	100%	2%	
The definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors	32	32	35	74	58	231	13	244
	14%	14%	15%	32%	25%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?



Q.10 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?


Rest of EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
The current geographical scope of the ENP should be maintained	18	32	36	61	18	165	5	170
	11%	19%	22%	37%	11%	100%	3%	
The differentiation between East and South should be kept	17	23	29	60	39	168	2	170
	10%	14%	17%	36%	23%	100%	1%	
The definition of neighbourhood should be extended in order to include other regional State actors	18	37	35	49	23	162	8	170
	11%	23%	22%	30%	14%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

All survey

	Yes	No	Total
Sahel countries	389	371	760
	51%	49%	100%
Horn of Africa countries	258	502	760
	34%	66%	100%
Gulf Cooperation Council countries	365	395	760
	48%	52%	100%
Iraq	373	387	760
	49%	51%	100%
Iran	339	421	760
	45%	55%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

EU-28

	Yes	No	Total
Sahel countries	196	218	414
	47%	53%	100%
Horn of Africa countries	125	289	414
	30%	70%	100%
Gulf Cooperation Council countries	198	216	414
	48%	52%	100%
Iraq	192	222	414
	46%	54%	100%
Iran	187	227	414
	45%	55%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

MPC

	Yes	No	Total
Sahel countries	187	147	334
	56%	44%	100%
Horn of Africa countries	130	204	334
	39%	61%	100%
Gulf Cooperation Council countries	158	176	334
	47%	53%	100%
Iraq	172	162	334
	51%	49%	100%
Iran	144	190	334
	43%	57%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

Maghreb

	Yes	No	Total
Sahel countries	114	50	164
	70%	30%	100%
Horn of Africa countries	70	94	164
	43%	57%	100%
Gulf Cooperation Council countries	63	101	164
	38%	62%	100%
Iraq	61	103	164
	37%	63%	100%
Iran	60	104	164
	37%	63%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

Mashreq

	Yes	No	Total
Sahel countries	49	61	110
	45%	55%	100%
Horn of Africa countries	42	68	110
	38%	62%	100%
Gulf Cooperation Council countries	68	42	110
	62%	38%	100%
Iraq	81	29	110
	74%	26%	100%
Iran	58	52	110
	53%	47%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

Mediterranean EU

	Yes	No	Total
Sahel countries	130	114	244
	53%	47%	100%
Horn of Africa countries	86	158	244
	35%	65%	100%
Gulf Cooperation Council countries	114	130	244
	47%	53%	100%
Iraq	110	134	244
	45%	55%	100%
Iran	115	129	244
	47%	53%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

Rest of EU

	Yes	No	Total
Sahel countries	66	104	170
	39%	61%	100%
Horn of Africa countries	39	131	170
	23%	77%	100%
Gulf Cooperation Council countries	84	86	170
	49%	51%	100%
Iraq	82	88	170
	48%	52%	100%
Iran	72	98	170
	42%	58%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

Responses for Sahel countries

	Yes	No	Total
Total Survey	389	371	760
	51%	49%	100%
Mediterranean Partner Countries	187	147	334
	56%	44%	100%
EU-28	196	218	414
	47%	53%	100%
Maghreb	114	50	164
	70%	30%	100%
Mashreq	49	61	110
	45%	55%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

Responses for Horn of Africa countries

	Yes	No	Total
Total Survey	258	502	760
	34%	66%	100%
Mediterranean Partner Countries	130	204	334
	39%	61%	100%
EU-28	125	289	414
	30%	70%	100%
Maghreb	70	94	164
	43%	57%	100%
Mashreq	42	68	110
	38%	62%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

Responses for GCC countries

	Yes	No	Total
Total Survey	365	395	760
	48%	52%	100%
Mediterranean Partner Countries	158	176	334
	47%	53%	100%
EU-28	198	216	414
	48%	52%	100%
Maghreb	63	101	164
	38%	62%	100%
Mashreq	68	42	110
	62%	38%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

Responses for Iraq

	Yes	No	Total
Total Survey	373	387	760
	49%	51%	100%
Mediterranean Partner Countries	172	162	334
	51%	49%	100%
EU-28	192	222	414
	46%	54%	100%
Maghreb	61	103	164
	37%	63%	100%
Mashreq	81	29	110
	74%	26%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?




Q.11 In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?

Responses for Iran

	Yes	No	Total
Total Survey	339	421	760
	45%	55%	100%
Mediterranean Partner Countries	144	190	334
	43%	57%	100%
EU-28	187	227	414
	45%	55%	100%
Maghreb	60	104	164
	37%	63%	100%
Mashreq	58	52	110
	53%	47%	100%

In case you think that the geographical scope of the ENP should be extended, which of the following should be included?



Q.12 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?


All survey

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Deal with the countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP framework through the broader context of the CFSP	60	116	189	249	62	676	84	760
	9%	17%	28%	37%	9%	100%	11%	
Offer ways of cooperation able to accommodate present shifting interests of partner States in the region	10	39	115	376	188	728	32	760
	1%	5%	16%	52%	26%	100%	4%	
EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic	12	18	57	238	415	740	20	760
	2%	2%	8%	32%	56%	100%	3%	
EU initiatives should be issue-focused	9	17	53	248	413	740	20	760
	1%	2%	7%	34%	56%	100%	3%	
Effectively involve non-state actors on a broader basis	7	35	88	207	404	741	19	760
	1%	5%	12%	28%	55%	100%	3%	
Revitalize long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, Sahel and the Horn of Africa	41	69	178	250	183	721	39	760
	6%	10%	25%	35%	25%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?



Q.12 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?


EU-28

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Deal with the countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP framework through the broader context of the CFSP	23	64	105	149	37	378	36	414
	6%	17%	28%	39%	10%	100%	9%	
Offer ways of cooperation able to accommodate present shifting interests of partner States in the region	4	21	68	208	92	393	21	414
	1%	5%	17%	53%	23%	100%	5%	
EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic	3	13	37	144	208	405	9	414
	1%	3%	9%	36%	51%	100%	2%	
EU initiatives should be issue-focused	5	10	37	149	204	405	9	414
	1%	2%	9%	37%	50%	100%	2%	
Effectively involve non-state actors on a broader basis	3	22	41	125	217	408	6	414
	1%	5%	10%	31%	53%	100%	1%	
Revitalize long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, Sahel and the Horn of Africa	14	44	95	138	102	393	21	414
	4%	11%	24%	35%	26%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?



Q.12 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?


MPC

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Deal with the countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP framework through the broader context of the CFSP	36	49	81	95	25	286	48	334
	13%	17%	28%	33%	9%	100%	14%	
Offer ways of cooperation able to accommodate present shifting interests of partner States in the region	6	15	45	165	92	323	11	334
	2%	5%	14%	51%	28%	100%	3%	
EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic	9	5	18	90	202	324	10	334
	3%	2%	6%	28%	62%	100%	3%	
EU initiatives should be issue-focused	4	6	14	94	205	323	11	334
	1%	2%	4%	29%	63%	100%	3%	
Effectively involve non-state actors on a broader basis	3	13	44	77	184	321	13	334
	1%	4%	14%	24%	57%	100%	4%	
Revitalize long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, Sahel and the Horn of Africa	26	23	81	109	77	316	18	334
	8%	7%	26%	34%	24%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?



Q.12 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?


Maghreb

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Deal with the countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP framework through the broader context of the CFSP	24	25	40	43	11	143	21	164
	17%	17%	28%	30%	8%	100%	13%	
Offer ways of cooperation able to accommodate present shifting interests of partner States in the region	3	5	22	75	53	158	6	164
	2%	3%	14%	47%	34%	100%	4%	
EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic	5	3	6	45	100	159	5	164
	3%	2%	4%	28%	63%	100%	3%	
EU initiatives should be issue-focused	3	3	3	37	115	161	3	164
	2%	2%	2%	23%	71%	100%	2%	
Effectively involve non-state actors on a broader basis	1	4	20	29	106	160	4	164
	1%	3%	13%	18%	66%	100%	2%	
Revitalize long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, Sahel and the Horn of Africa	8	12	34	54	45	153	11	164
	5%	8%	22%	35%	29%	100%	7%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?



Q.12 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?


Mashreq

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Deal with the countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP framework through the broader context of the CFSP	7	16	25	35	8	91	19	110
	8%	18%	27%	38%	9%	100%	17%	
Offer ways of cooperation able to accommodate present shifting interests of partner States in the region	0	7	14	55	32	108	2	110
	0%	6%	13%	51%	30%	100%	2%	
EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic	3	1	5	27	72	108	2	110
	3%	1%	5%	25%	67%	100%	2%	
EU initiatives should be issue-focused	0	2	7	36	61	106	4	110
	0%	2%	7%	34%	58%	100%	4%	
Effectively involve non-state actors on a broader basis	1	4	20	27	53	105	5	110
	1%	4%	19%	26%	50%	100%	5%	
Revitalize long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, Sahel and the Horn of Africa	9	7	28	35	26	105	5	110
	9%	7%	27%	33%	25%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?



Q.12 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?


Mediterranean EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Deal with the countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP framework through the broader context of the CFSP	13	44	64	73	27	221	23	244
	6%	20%	29%	33%	12%	100%	9%	
Offer ways of cooperation able to accommodate present shifting interests of partner States in the region	3	13	30	125	61	232	12	244
	1%	6%	13%	54%	26%	100%	5%	
EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic	1	6	26	72	136	241	3	244
	0%	2%	11%	30%	56%	100%	1%	
EU initiatives should be issue-focused	3	6	22	77	130	238	6	244
	1%	3%	9%	32%	55%	100%	2%	
Effectively involve non-state actors on a broader basis	3	11	26	71	129	240	4	244
	1%	5%	11%	30%	54%	100%	2%	
Revitalize long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, Sahel and the Horn of Africa	9	22	50	82	69	232	12	244
	4%	9%	22%	35%	30%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?



Q.12 To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?


Rest of EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Deal with the countries unwilling to cooperate within the ENP framework through the broader context of the CFSP	10	20	41	76	10	157	13	170
	6%	13%	26%	48%	6%	100%	8%	
Offer ways of cooperation able to accommodate present shifting interests of partner States in the region	1	8	38	83	31	161	9	170
	1%	5%	24%	52%	19%	100%	5%	
EU initiatives should be less bureaucratic	2	7	11	72	72	164	6	170
	1%	4%	7%	44%	44%	100%	4%	
EU initiatives should be issue-focused	2	4	15	72	74	167	3	170
	1%	2%	9%	43%	44%	100%	2%	
Effectively involve non-state actors on a broader basis	0	11	15	54	88	168	2	170
	0%	7%	9%	32%	52%	100%	1%	
Revitalize long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with Gulf countries, Sahel and the Horn of Africa	5	22	45	56	33	161	9	170
	3%	14%	28%	35%	20%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you agree with the following proposals to redefine the neighbourhood?




Q.13 To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
All Survey	20	44	132	309	207	712	48	760
	3%	6%	19%	43%	29%	100%	6%	
Mediterranean Partner Countries	12	15	58	128	94	307	27	334
	4%	5%	19%	42%	31%	100%	8%	
EU-28	8	28	69	178	110	393	21	414
	2%	7%	18%	45%	28%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?



Q.13 To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?


Geographic

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Maghreb	5	3	33	58	48	147	17	164
	3%	2%	22%	39%	33%	100%	10%	
Mashreq	3	4	17	42	38	104	6	110
	3%	4%	16%	40%	37%	100%	5%	
Mediterranean EU countries	5	14	38	103	72	232	12	244
	2%	6%	16%	44%	31%	100%	5%	
Rest of EU	3	14	31	75	38	161	9	170
	2%	9%	19%	47%	24%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?



Q.13 To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?


Institution

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Policy-makers	5	15	29	73	75	197	10	207
	3%	8%	15%	37%	38%	100%	5%	
Experts	11	19	77	157	80	344	25	369
	3%	6%	22%	46%	23%	100%	7%	
Civil society	4	10	26	79	52	171	13	184
	2%	6%	15%	46%	30%	100%	7%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should the ENP facilitate more flexible ways of cooperation with neighbours of the neighbours?



BLOCK E

RELATIONS WITH PARTNER COUNTRIES

Q.14 In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?


All survey

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Association Agreements	22	54	134	347	161	718	42	760
	3%	8%	19%	48%	22%	100%	6%	
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)	26	73	134	291	192	716	44	760
	4%	10%	19%	41%	27%	100%	6%	
Issue based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis	10	37	106	333	231	717	43	760
	1%	5%	15%	46%	32%	100%	6%	
ENP Action Plans	21	45	158	310	174	708	52	760
	3%	6%	22%	44%	25%	100%	7%	
ENP Progress Reports	24	51	171	295	165	706	54	760
	3%	7%	24%	42%	23%	100%	7%	
Engage countries that are not committed to domestic reform	84	148	148	207	123	710	50	760
	12%	21%	21%	29%	17%	100%	7%	
Exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform	113	173	140	134	141	701	59	760
	16%	25%	20%	19%	20%	100%	8%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?




Q.14 In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?

EU-28

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Association Agreements	9	29	86	193	76	393	21	414
	2%	7%	22%	49%	19%	100%	5%	
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)	14	45	83	166	85	393	21	414
	4%	11%	21%	42%	22%	100%	5%	
Issue based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis	3	20	62	199	108	392	22	414
	1%	5%	16%	51%	28%	100%	5%	
ENP Action Plans	12	34	97	172	75	390	24	414
	3%	9%	25%	44%	19%	100%	6%	
ENP Progress Reports	14	39	100	162	72	387	27	414
	4%	10%	26%	42%	19%	100%	7%	
Engage countries that are not committed to domestic reform	37	97	76	122	53	385	29	414
	10%	25%	20%	32%	14%	100%	7%	
Exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform	54	120	78	72	62	386	28	414
	14%	31%	20%	19%	16%	100%	7%	

In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?




Q.14 In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?

MPC

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Association Agreements	13	21	44	150	85	313	21	334
	4%	7%	14%	48%	27%	100%	6%	
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)	11	27	49	118	106	311	23	334
	4%	9%	16%	38%	34%	100%	7%	
Issue based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis	7	16	39	131	120	313	21	334
	2%	5%	12%	42%	38%	100%	6%	
ENP Action Plans	9	10	55	134	98	306	28	334
	3%	3%	18%	44%	32%	100%	8%	
ENP Progress Reports	10	11	68	127	91	307	27	334
	3%	4%	22%	41%	30%	100%	8%	
Engage countries that are not committed to domestic reform	43	47	71	84	68	313	21	334
	14%	15%	23%	27%	22%	100%	6%	
Exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform	56	51	59	60	77	303	31	334
	18%	17%	19%	20%	25%	100%	9%	

In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?




Q.14 In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?

Maghreb

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Association Agreements	9	10	19	66	52	156	8	164
	6%	6%	12%	42%	33%	100%	5%	
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)	7	13	28	55	51	154	10	164
	5%	8%	18%	36%	33%	100%	6%	
Issue based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis	5	4	19	63	68	159	5	164
	3%	3%	12%	40%	43%	100%	3%	
ENP Action Plans	5	6	33	50	54	148	16	164
	3%	4%	22%	34%	36%	100%	10%	
ENP Progress Reports	5	5	32	56	48	146	18	164
	3%	3%	22%	38%	33%	100%	11%	
Engage countries that are not committed to domestic reform	18	15	35	40	42	150	14	164
	12%	10%	23%	27%	28%	100%	9%	
Exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform	30	23	29	22	40	144	20	164
	21%	16%	20%	15%	28%	100%	12%	

In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?




Q.14 In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?

Mashreq

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Association Agreements	2	5	16	59	25	107	3	110
	2%	5%	15%	55%	23%	100%	3%	
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)	2	10	14	37	43	106	4	110
	2%	9%	13%	35%	41%	100%	4%	
Issue based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis	1	6	15	44	37	103	7	110
	1%	6%	15%	43%	36%	100%	6%	
ENP Action Plans	3	1	11	52	36	103	7	110
	3%	1%	11%	50%	35%	100%	6%	
ENP Progress Reports	4	3	19	48	32	106	4	110
	4%	3%	18%	45%	30%	100%	4%	
Engage countries that are not committed to domestic reform	16	18	27	28	20	109	1	110
	15%	17%	25%	26%	18%	100%	1%	
Exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform	19	17	21	24	24	105	5	110
	18%	16%	20%	23%	23%	100%	5%	

In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?




Q.14 In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?

Mediterranean EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Association Agreements	5	19	39	117	52	232	12	244
	2%	8%	17%	50%	22%	100%	5%	
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)	9	29	50	93	51	232	12	244
	4%	13%	22%	40%	22%	100%	5%	
Issue based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis	2	10	34	114	73	233	11	244
	1%	4%	15%	49%	31%	100%	5%	
ENP Action Plans	4	21	44	108	54	231	13	244
	2%	9%	19%	47%	23%	100%	5%	
ENP Progress Reports	4	25	56	95	50	230	14	244
	2%	11%	24%	41%	22%	100%	6%	
Engage countries that are not committed to domestic reform	23	56	45	67	34	225	19	244
	10%	25%	20%	30%	15%	100%	8%	
Exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform	28	66	43	48	42	227	17	244
	12%	29%	19%	21%	19%	100%	7%	

In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?




Q.14 In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?

Rest of EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Association Agreements	4	10	47	76	24	161	9	170
	2%	6%	29%	47%	15%	100%	5%	
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA)	5	16	33	73	34	161	9	170
	3%	10%	20%	45%	21%	100%	5%	
Issue based cooperation agreements on an ad-hoc basis	1	10	28	85	35	159	11	170
	1%	6%	18%	53%	22%	100%	6%	
ENP Action Plans	8	13	53	64	21	159	11	170
	5%	8%	33%	40%	13%	100%	6%	
ENP Progress Reports	10	14	44	67	22	157	13	170
	6%	9%	28%	43%	14%	100%	8%	
Engage countries that are not committed to domestic reform	14	41	31	55	19	160	10	170
	9%	26%	19%	34%	12%	100%	6%	
Exclude countries that are not committed to domestic reform	26	54	35	24	20	159	11	170
	16%	34%	22%	15%	13%	100%	6%	

In developing formats, instruments and criteria of cooperation with partner countries, to what extent should the following be privileged?



BLOCK F

EXPECTATIONS OF PARTNER COUNTRIES

Q.18 To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?


All survey

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Diplomatic action involving civil society	28	70	103	305	243	749	11	760
	4%	9%	14%	41%	32%	100%	1%	
Bottom-up policy on economic entrepreneurship	13	23	80	335	282	733	27	760
	2%	3%	11%	46%	38%	100%	4%	
Greater political and resource support for actors committed to transform their societies	21	30	71	282	337	741	19	760
	3%	4%	10%	38%	45%	100%	3%	
Increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors	22	29	89	237	372	749	11	760
	3%	4%	12%	32%	50%	100%	1%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?




Q.18 To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?

EU-28

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Diplomatic action involving civil society	14	49	57	164	127	411	3	414
	3%	12%	14%	40%	31%	100%	1%	
Bottom-up policy on economic entrepreneurship	7	12	43	190	148	400	14	414
	2%	3%	11%	48%	37%	100%	3%	
Greater political and resource support for actors committed to transform their societies	10	16	36	165	179	406	8	414
	2%	4%	9%	41%	44%	100%	2%	
Increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors	16	20	53	134	186	409	5	414
	4%	5%	13%	33%	45%	100%	1%	

To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?




Q.18 To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?

MPC

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Diplomatic action involving civil society	13	20	43	137	113	326	8	334
	4%	6%	13%	42%	35%	100%	2%	
Bottom-up policy on economic entrepreneurship	6	11	33	140	131	321	13	334
	2%	3%	10%	44%	41%	100%	4%	
Greater political and resource support for actors committed to transform their societies	11	14	32	112	154	323	11	334
	3%	4%	10%	35%	48%	100%	3%	
Increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors	6	9	35	98	180	328	6	334
	2%	3%	11%	30%	55%	100%	2%	

To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?



Q.18 To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?


Maghreb

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Diplomatic action involving civil society	5	6	19	62	67	159	5	164
	3%	4%	12%	39%	42%	100%	3%	
Bottom-up policy on economic entrepreneurship	2	6	17	66	62	153	11	164
	1%	4%	11%	43%	41%	100%	7%	
Greater political and resource support for actors committed to transform their societies	6	6	16	53	75	156	8	164
	4%	4%	10%	34%	48%	100%	5%	
Increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors	4	7	22	40	87	160	4	164
	3%	4%	14%	25%	54%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?



Q.18 To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?


Mashreq

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Diplomatic action involving civil society	6	8	17	50	28	109	1	110
	6%	7%	16%	46%	26%	100%	1%	
Bottom-up policy on economic entrepreneurship	2	4	7	48	49	110	0	110
	2%	4%	6%	44%	45%	100%	0%	
Greater political and resource support for actors committed to transform their societies	4	6	10	37	53	110	0	110
	4%	5%	9%	34%	48%	100%	0%	
Increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors	1	1	8	32	68	110	0	110
	1%	1%	7%	29%	62%	100%	0%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?



Q.18 To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?


Mediterranean EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Diplomatic action involving civil society	11	27	38	91	75	242	2	244
	5%	11%	16%	38%	31%	100%	1%	
Bottom-up policy on economic entrepreneurship	4	5	24	114	92	239	5	244
	2%	2%	10%	48%	38%	100%	2%	
Greater political and resource support for actors committed to transform their societies	7	12	18	93	111	241	3	244
	3%	5%	7%	39%	46%	100%	1%	
Increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors	10	13	26	78	114	241	3	244
	4%	5%	11%	32%	47%	100%	1%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?



Q.18 To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?


Rest of EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Diplomatic action involving civil society	3	22	19	73	52	169	1	170
	2%	13%	11%	43%	31%	100%	1%	
Bottom-up policy on economic entrepreneurship	3	7	19	76	56	161	9	170
	2%	4%	12%	47%	35%	100%	5%	
Greater political and resource support for actors committed to transform their societies	3	4	18	72	68	165	5	170
	2%	2%	11%	44%	41%	100%	3%	
Increased capacities of the EU officials on the ground to understand the needs and to better support local actors	6	7	27	56	72	168	2	170
	4%	4%	16%	33%	43%	100%	1%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent can these measures make the ENP structures more cooperative and inclusive to civil society actors across Southern Neighbourhood partner countries?



BLOCK G

PROPOSED AREAS OF FOCUS

Q.19 To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?


All survey

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development	13	14	68	330	327	752	8	760
	2%	2%	9%	44%	43%	100%	1%	
Improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy	11	19	104	349	262	745	15	760
	1%	3%	14%	47%	35%	100%	2%	
Address security threats	16	33	104	220	369	742	18	760
	2%	4%	14%	30%	50%	100%	2%	
Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights	15	23	91	231	390	750	10	760
	2%	3%	12%	31%	52%	100%	1%	
Enhance orderly migration and promote mobility	22	33	94	254	344	747	13	760
	3%	4%	13%	34%	46%	100%	2%	
Increase engagement with youth and women	13	16	77	244	396	746	14	760
	2%	2%	10%	33%	53%	100%	2%	
Address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change	11	27	86	283	338	745	15	760
	1%	4%	12%	38%	45%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?



Q.19 To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?


EU-28

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development	7	7	37	195	164	410	4	414
	2%	2%	9%	48%	40%	100%	1%	
Improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy	6	12	67	193	127	405	9	414
	1%	3%	17%	48%	31%	100%	2%	
Address security threats	9	18	60	124	191	402	12	414
	2%	4%	15%	31%	48%	100%	3%	
Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights	11	12	51	141	195	410	4	414
	3%	3%	12%	34%	48%	100%	1%	
Enhance orderly migration and promote mobility	12	22	51	131	191	407	7	414
	3%	5%	13%	32%	47%	100%	2%	
Increase engagement with youth and women	8	13	42	139	206	408	6	414
	2%	3%	10%	34%	50%	100%	1%	
Address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change	7	22	50	166	158	403	11	414
	2%	5%	12%	41%	39%	100%	3%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?



Q.19 To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?


MPC

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development	6	7	29	128	160	330	4	334
	2%	2%	9%	39%	48%	100%	1%	
Improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy	5	7	35	151	130	328	6	334
	2%	2%	11%	46%	40%	100%	2%	
Address security threats	7	14	42	92	173	328	6	334
	2%	4%	13%	28%	53%	100%	2%	
Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights	3	11	38	87	189	328	6	334
	1%	3%	12%	27%	58%	100%	2%	
Enhance orderly migration and promote mobility	8	11	42	121	146	328	6	334
	2%	3%	13%	37%	45%	100%	2%	
Increase engagement with youth and women	4	1	33	102	187	327	7	334
	1%	0%	10%	31%	57%	100%	2%	
Address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change	4	5	33	113	175	330	4	334
	1%	2%	10%	34%	53%	100%	1%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?



Q.19 To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?


Maghreb

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development	2	3	11	65	81	162	2	164
	1%	2%	7%	40%	50%	100%	1%	
Improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy	2	2	17	79	61	161	3	164
	1%	1%	11%	49%	38%	100%	2%	
Address security threats	2	3	16	39	101	161	3	164
	1%	2%	10%	24%	63%	100%	2%	
Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights	0	3	13	39	105	160	4	164
	0%	2%	8%	24%	66%	100%	2%	
Enhance orderly migration and promote mobility	3	6	15	58	78	160	4	164
	2%	4%	9%	36%	49%	100%	2%	
Increase engagement with youth and women	1	1	16	56	84	158	6	164
	1%	1%	10%	35%	53%	100%	4%	
Address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change	0	3	14	59	86	162	2	164
	0%	2%	9%	36%	53%	100%	1%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?



Q.19 To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?


Mashreq

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development	3	3	11	34	59	110	0	110
	3%	3%	10%	31%	54%	100%	0%	
Improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy	1	2	12	39	55	109	1	110
	1%	2%	11%	36%	50%	100%	1%	
Address security threats	3	8	17	35	47	110	0	110
	3%	7%	15%	32%	43%	100%	0%	
Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights	1	5	16	35	53	110	0	110
	1%	5%	15%	32%	48%	100%	0%	
Enhance orderly migration and promote mobility	2	4	16	40	48	110	0	110
	2%	4%	15%	36%	44%	100%	0%	
Increase engagement with youth and women	1	0	11	27	71	110	0	110
	1%	0%	10%	25%	65%	100%	0%	
Address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change	2	2	12	36	58	110	0	110
	2%	2%	11%	33%	53%	100%	0%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?



Q.19 To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?


Mediterranean EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development	5	5	20	106	105	241	3	244
	2%	2%	8%	44%	44%	100%	1%	
Improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy	4	9	35	110	80	238	6	244
	2%	4%	15%	46%	34%	100%	2%	
Address security threats	5	11	33	73	112	234	10	244
	2%	5%	14%	31%	48%	100%	4%	
Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights	6	9	29	78	118	240	4	244
	3%	4%	12%	33%	49%	100%	2%	
Enhance orderly migration and promote mobility	6	14	27	73	119	239	5	244
	3%	6%	11%	31%	50%	100%	2%	
Increase engagement with youth and women	4	8	25	77	126	240	4	244
	2%	3%	10%	32%	53%	100%	2%	
Address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change	5	11	29	98	94	237	7	244
	2%	5%	12%	41%	40%	98%	3%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?



Q.19 To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?


Rest of EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Promote trade and inclusive sustainable economic development	2	2	17	89	59	169	1	170
	1%	1%	10%	53%	35%	100%	1%	
Improve connectivity in sustainable transport and energy	2	3	32	83	47	167	3	170
	1%	2%	19%	50%	28%	100%	2%	
Address security threats	4	7	27	51	79	168	2	170
	2%	4%	16%	30%	47%	100%	1%	
Face governance challenges such as the rule of law and human rights	5	3	22	63	77	170	0	170
	3%	2%	13%	37%	45%	100%	0%	
Enhance orderly migration and promote mobility	6	8	24	58	72	168	2	170
	4%	5%	14%	35%	43%	100%	1%	
Increase engagement with youth and women	4	5	17	62	80	168	2	170
	2%	3%	10%	37%	48%	100%	1%	
Address transnational challenges such as health security, threats to environment and climate change	2	11	21	68	64	166	4	170
	1%	7%	13%	41%	39%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent do you think the following areas should be prioritized in the new ENP framework?



Q.20 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?


All survey

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Working with partners on the prevention of radicalisation, the fight against terrorism and organised crime	14	33	55	222	412	736	24	760
	2%	4%	7%	30%	56%	100%	3%	
Placing the EU as the first-line security provider in its own neighbourhood	39	100	232	190	153	714	46	760
	5%	14%	32%	27%	21%	100%	6%	
Assuming EU potential need to carry out more autonomous military operations in the future	97	142	226	138	92	695	65	760
	14%	20%	33%	20%	13%	100%	9%	
Identifying differentiated initiatives on a country-by-country basis	15	22	87	306	303	733	27	760
	2%	3%	12%	42%	41%	100%	4%	
Enhancing Security Sector Reform	19	40	137	285	219	700	60	760
	3%	6%	20%	41%	31%	100%	8%	
Improving civil society capacity to monitor state's security forces	24	44	127	236	289	720	40	760
	3%	6%	18%	33%	40%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?



Q.20 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?


EU-28

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Working with partners on the prevention of radicalisation, the fight against terrorism and organised crime	9	16	31	135	209	400	14	414
	2%	4%	8%	34%	52%	100%	3%	
Placing the EU as the first-line security provider in its own neighbourhood	22	63	138	104	64	391	23	414
	6%	16%	35%	27%	16%	100%	6%	
Assuming EU potential need to carry out more autonomous military operations in the future	51	66	132	89	42	380	34	414
	13%	17%	35%	23%	11%	100%	8%	
Identifying differentiated initiatives on a country-by-country basis	7	8	42	173	169	399	15	414
	2%	2%	11%	43%	42%	100%	4%	
Enhancing Security Sector Reform	12	22	74	157	115	380	34	414
	3%	6%	19%	41%	30%	100%	8%	
Improving civil society capacity to monitor state's security forces	10	21	71	138	156	396	18	414
	3%	5%	18%	35%	39%	100%	4%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?



Q.20 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?


MPC

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Working with partners on the prevention of radicalisation, the fight against terrorism and organised crime	5	17	22	84	197	325	9	334
	2%	5%	7%	26%	61%	100%	3%	
Placing the EU as the first-line security provider in its own neighbourhood	17	35	88	84	88	312	22	334
	5%	11%	28%	27%	28%	100%	7%	
Assuming EU potential need to carry out more autonomous military operations in the future	45	72	90	48	49	304	30	334
	15%	24%	30%	16%	16%	100%	9%	
Identifying differentiated initiatives on a country-by-country basis	8	14	42	130	129	323	11	334
	2%	4%	13%	40%	40%	100%	3%	
Enhancing Security Sector Reform	7	18	61	123	100	309	25	334
	2%	6%	20%	40%	32%	100%	7%	
Improving civil society capacity to monitor state's security forces	14	23	53	94	130	314	20	334
	4%	7%	17%	30%	41%	100%	6%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?



Q.20 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?


Maghreb

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Working with partners on the prevention of radicalisation, the fight against terrorism and organised crime	2	4	9	35	108	158	6	164
	1%	3%	6%	22%	68%	100%	4%	
Placing the EU as the first-line security provider in its own neighbourhood	8	17	40	42	44	151	13	164
	5%	11%	26%	28%	29%	100%	8%	
Assuming EU potential need to carry out more autonomous military operations in the future	24	29	50	21	22	146	18	164
	16%	20%	34%	14%	15%	100%	11%	
Identifying differentiated initiatives on a country-by-country basis	4	7	25	60	61	157	7	164
	3%	4%	16%	38%	39%	100%	4%	
Enhancing Security Sector Reform	2	8	34	54	48	146	18	164
	1%	5%	23%	37%	33%	100%	11%	
Improving civil society capacity to monitor state's security forces	5	8	31	52	54	150	14	164
	3%	5%	21%	35%	36%	100%	9%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?



Q.20 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?


Mashreq

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Working with partners on the prevention of radicalisation, the fight against terrorism and organised crime	1	11	10	29	57	108	2	110
	1%	10%	9%	27%	53%	100%	2%	
Placing the EU as the first-line security provider in its own neighbourhood	4	11	34	26	27	102	8	110
	4%	11%	33%	25%	26%	100%	7%	
Assuming EU potential need to carry out more autonomous military operations in the future	14	26	26	20	13	99	11	110
	14%	26%	26%	20%	13%	100%	10%	
Identifying differentiated initiatives on a country-by-country basis	1	7	12	44	44	108	2	110
	1%	6%	11%	41%	41%	100%	2%	
Enhancing Security Sector Reform	2	7	15	48	34	106	4	110
	2%	7%	14%	45%	32%	100%	4%	
Improving civil society capacity to monitor state's security forces	5	14	15	26	45	105	5	110
	5%	13%	14%	25%	43%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?



Q.20 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?


Mediterranean EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Working with partners on the prevention of radicalisation, the fight against terrorism and organised crime	5	7	19	73	130	234	10	244
	2%	3%	8%	31%	56%	100%	4%	
Placing the EU as the first-line security provider in its own neighbourhood	16	36	72	67	40	231	13	244
	7%	16%	31%	29%	17%	100%	5%	
Assuming EU potential need to carry out more autonomous military operations in the future	24	34	81	57	25	221	23	244
	11%	15%	37%	26%	11%	100%	9%	
Identifying differentiated initiatives on a country-by-country basis	5	3	24	93	111	236	8	244
	2%	1%	10%	39%	47%	100%	3%	
Enhancing Security Sector Reform	7	14	40	90	73	224	20	244
	3%	6%	18%	40%	33%	100%	8%	
Improving civil society capacity to monitor state's security forces	5	13	46	71	95	230	14	244
	2%	6%	20%	31%	41%	100%	6%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?



Q.20 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats focus on?


Rest of EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Working with partners on the prevention of radicalisation, the fight against terrorism and organised crime	1	5	5	28	28	67	1	68
	1%	7%	7%	42%	42%	100%	1%	
Placing the EU as the first-line security provider in its own neighbourhood	3	14	19	19	11	66	2	68
	5%	21%	29%	29%	17%	100%	3%	
Assuming EU potential need to carry out more autonomous military operations in the future	5	20	19	14	7	65	3	68
	8%	31%	29%	22%	11%	100%	4%	
Identifying differentiated initiatives on a country by country basis	0	1	7	30	28	66	2	68
	0%	2%	11%	45%	42%	100%	3%	
Enhancing Security Sector Reform	2	4	8	30	21	65	3	68
	3%	6%	12%	46%	32%	100%	4%	
Improving civil society capacity to monitor state's security forces	4	5	10	16	31	66	2	68
	6%	8%	15%	24%	47%	100%	3%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to address security threats should focus on?



Q.21 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?


All survey

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Ensuring rule of law in terms of legal certainty	8	19	78	318	321	744	16	760
	1%	3%	10%	43%	43%	100%	2%	
Guaranteeing good governance and fighting corruption	8	12	49	247	431	747	13	760
	1%	2%	7%	33%	58%	100%	2%	
Promoting human rights: civil rights and liberties	11	20	69	242	406	748	12	760
	1%	3%	9%	32%	54%	100%	2%	
Promoting human rights: socio-economic rights	9	17	65	241	415	747	13	760
	1%	2%	9%	32%	56%	100%	2%	
Improving public finance management	11	11	86	287	349	744	16	760
	1%	1%	12%	39%	47%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?



Q.21 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?


EU-28

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Ensuring rule of law in terms of legal certainty	3	13	44	177	169	406	8	414
	1%	3%	11%	44%	42%	100%	2%	
Guaranteeing good governance and fighting corruption	3	6	34	153	213	409	5	414
	1%	1%	8%	37%	52%	100%	1%	
Promoting human rights: civil rights and liberties	4	14	43	140	210	411	3	414
	1%	3%	10%	34%	51%	100%	1%	
Promoting human rights: socio-economic rights	3	11	45	147	205	411	3	414
	1%	3%	11%	36%	50%	100%	1%	
Improving public finance management	5	10	53	188	151	407	7	414
	1%	2%	13%	46%	37%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?



Q.21 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?


MPC

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Ensuring rule of law in terms of legal certainty	4	6	32	137	147	326	8	334
	1%	2%	10%	42%	45%	100%	2%	
Guaranteeing good governance and fighting corruption	4	6	12	90	214	326	8	334
	1%	2%	4%	28%	66%	100%	2%	
Promoting human rights: civil rights and liberties	6	5	24	99	191	325	9	334
	2%	2%	7%	30%	59%	100%	3%	
Promoting human rights: socio-economic rights	5	5	17	92	205	324	10	334
	2%	2%	5%	28%	63%	100%	3%	
Improving public finance management	5	1	30	95	194	325	9	334
	2%	0%	9%	29%	60%	100%	3%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?



Q.21 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?


Maghreb

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Ensuring rule of law in terms of legal certainty	1	0	16	66	77	160	4	164
	1%	0%	10%	41%	48%	100%	2%	
Guaranteeing good governance and fighting corruption	1	1	5	31	120	158	6	164
	1%	1%	3%	20%	76%	100%	4%	
Promoting human rights: civil rights and liberties	2	2	9	44	100	157	7	164
	1%	1%	6%	28%	64%	100%	4%	
Promoting human rights: socio-economic rights	2	4	5	35	112	158	6	164
	1%	3%	3%	22%	71%	100%	4%	
Improving public finance management	2	0	11	44	102	159	5	164
	1%	0%	7%	28%	64%	100%	3%	

(* Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(** Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers)

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?



Q.21 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?


Mashreq

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Ensuring rule of law in terms of legal certainty	1	5	10	44	48	108	2	110
	1%	5%	9%	41%	44%	100%	2%	
Guaranteeing good governance and fighting corruption	1	3	5	37	64	110	0	110
	1%	3%	5%	34%	58%	100%	0%	
Promoting human rights: civil rights and liberties	2	3	13	35	57	110	0	110
	2%	3%	12%	32%	52%	100%	0%	
Promoting human rights: socio-economic rights	1	1	9	33	64	108	2	110
	1%	1%	8%	31%	59%	100%	2%	
Improving public finance management	2	0	9	26	71	108	2	110
	2%	0%	8%	24%	66%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?



Q.21 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?


Mediterranean EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Ensuring rule of law in terms of legal certainty	2	10	26	104	96	238	6	244
	1%	4%	11%	44%	40%	100%	2%	
Guaranteeing good governance and fighting corruption	2	4	20	74	140	240	4	244
	1%	2%	8%	31%	58%	100%	2%	
Promoting human rights: civil rights and liberties	2	8	22	76	133	241	3	244
	1%	3%	9%	32%	55%	100%	1%	
Promoting human rights: socio-economic rights	2	8	19	83	129	241	3	244
	1%	3%	8%	34%	54%	100%	1%	
Improving public finance management	3	9	31	99	97	239	5	244
	1%	4%	13%	41%	41%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?



Q.21 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?


Rest of EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Ensuring rule of law in terms of legal certainty	1	3	18	73	73	168	2	170
	1%	2%	11%	43%	43%	100%	1%	
Guaranteeing good governance and fighting corruption	1	2	14	79	73	169	1	170
	1%	1%	8%	47%	43%	100%	1%	
Promoting human rights: civil rights and liberties	2	6	21	64	77	170	0	170
	1%	4%	12%	38%	45%	100%	0%	
Promoting human rights: socio-economic rights	1	3	26	64	76	170	0	170
	1%	2%	15%	38%	45%	100%	0%	
Improving public finance management	2	1	22	89	54	168	2	170
	1%	1%	13%	53%	32%	100%	1%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to face governance challenges focus on?



Q.22 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?


All survey

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Creating bilateral labour market information systems as stepping stone of a future regional (EU-Med) labour market information system	20	32	120	301	257	730	30	760
	3%	4%	16%	41%	35%	100%	4%	
Opening the access to labour market to asylum seekers and refugees	29	47	186	234	238	734	26	760
	4%	6%	25%	32%	32%	100%	3%	
Promoting and concluding effective Mobility Package agreements	18	35	107	273	304	737	23	760
	2%	5%	15%	37%	41%	100%	3%	
Support sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin	7	15	54	208	459	743	17	760
	1%	2%	7%	28%	62%	100%	2%	
Tackling environmental degradation in the country of origin	17	29	113	248	337	744	16	760
	2%	4%	15%	33%	45%	100%	2%	
Addressing state fragility and conflict in the country of origin	10	26	95	203	398	732	28	760
	1%	4%	13%	28%	54%	100%	4%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?



Q.22 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?


EU-28

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Creating bilateral labour market information systems as stepping stone of a future regional (EU-Med) labour market information system	13	20	74	168	121	396	18	414
	3%	5%	19%	42%	31%	100%	4%	
Opening the access to labour market to asylum seekers and refugees	15	24	90	133	141	403	11	414
	4%	6%	22%	33%	35%	100%	3%	
Promoting and concluding effective Mobility Package agreements	9	26	70	153	144	402	12	414
	2%	6%	17%	38%	36%	100%	3%	
Support sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin	4	10	28	129	237	408	6	414
	1%	2%	7%	32%	58%	100%	1%	
Tackling environmental degradation in the country of origin	10	16	72	142	167	407	7	414
	2%	4%	18%	35%	41%	100%	2%	
Addressing state fragility and conflict in the country of origin	7	16	48	122	212	405	9	414
	2%	4%	12%	30%	52%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?



Q.22 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?


MPC

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Creating bilateral labour market information systems as stepping stone of a future regional (EU-Med) labour market information system	7	10	43	130	132	322	12	334
	2%	3%	13%	40%	41%	100%	4%	
Opening the access to labour market to asylum seekers and refugees	13	21	93	98	94	319	15	334
	4%	7%	29%	31%	29%	100%	4%	
Promoting and concluding effective Mobility Package agreements	8	8	35	117	155	323	11	334
	2%	2%	11%	36%	48%	100%	3%	
Support sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin	3	4	23	76	217	323	11	334
	1%	1%	7%	24%	67%	100%	3%	
Tackling environmental degradation in the country of origin	7	10	38	103	167	325	9	334
	2%	3%	12%	32%	51%	100%	3%	
Addressing state fragility and conflict in the country of origin	3	9	44	77	182	315	19	334
	1%	3%	14%	24%	58%	100%	6%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?



Q.22 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?


Maghreb

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Creating bilateral labour market information systems as stepping stone of a future regional (EU-Med) labour market information system	3	5	20	56	75	159	5	164
	2%	3%	13%	35%	47%	100%	3%	
Opening the access to labour market to asylum seekers and refugees	4	10	46	50	45	155	9	164
	3%	6%	30%	32%	29%	100%	5%	
Promoting and concluding effective Mobility Package agreements	3	4	12	52	88	159	5	164
	2%	3%	8%	33%	55%	100%	3%	
Support sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin	2	2	10	37	109	160	4	164
	1%	1%	6%	23%	68%	100%	2%	
Tackling environmental degradation in the country of origin	4	5	12	43	97	161	3	164
	2%	3%	7%	27%	60%	100%	2%	
Addressing state fragility and conflict in the country of origin	2	5	21	30	95	153	11	164
	1%	3%	14%	20%	62%	100%	7%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?



Q.22 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?


Mashreq

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Creating bilateral labour market information systems as stepping stone of a future regional (EU-Med) labour market information system	2	2	12	48	45	109	1	110
	2%	2%	11%	44%	41%	100%	1%	
Opening the access to labour market to asylum seekers and refugees	4	5	32	31	36	108	2	110
	4%	5%	30%	29%	33%	100%	2%	
Promoting and concluding effective Mobility Package agreements	3	2	13	38	52	108	2	110
	3%	2%	12%	35%	48%	100%	2%	
Support sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin	0	1	6	26	76	109	1	110
	0%	1%	6%	24%	70%	100%	1%	
Tackling environmental degradation in the country of origin	1	5	17	35	51	109	1	110
	1%	5%	16%	32%	47%	100%	1%	
Addressing state fragility and conflict in the country of origin	1	3	13	28	63	108	2	110
	1%	3%	12%	26%	58%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?



Q.22 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?


Mediterranean EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Creating bilateral labour market information systems as stepping stone of a future regional (EU-Med) labour market information system	8	12	36	92	86	234	10	244
	3%	5%	15%	39%	37%	100%	4%	
Opening the access to labour market to asylum seekers and refugees	5	14	52	77	89	237	7	244
	2%	6%	22%	32%	38%	100%	3%	
Promoting and concluding effective Mobility Package agreements	5	14	34	89	97	239	5	244
	2%	6%	14%	37%	41%	100%	2%	
Support sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin	2	5	18	71	143	239	5	244
	1%	2%	8%	30%	60%	100%	2%	
Tackling environmental degradation in the country of origin	3	9	41	86	101	240	4	244
	1%	4%	17%	36%	42%	100%	2%	
Addressing state fragility and conflict in the country of origin	5	10	35	60	129	239	5	244
	2%	4%	15%	25%	54%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?



Q.22 To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?

Rest of EU

	Very low extent	Low extent	Neither low nor high extent	High extent	Very high extent	Total*	Dkn	Total**
Creating bilateral labour market information systems as stepping stone of a future regional (EU-Med) labour market information system	5	8	38	76	35	162	8	170
	3%	5%	23%	47%	22%	100%	5%	
Opening the access to labour market to asylum seekers and refugees	10	10	38	56	52	166	4	170
	6%	6%	23%	34%	31%	100%	2%	
Promoting and concluding effective Mobility Package agreements	4	12	36	64	47	163	7	170
	2%	7%	22%	39%	29%	100%	4%	
Support sustainable livelihoods in the country of origin	2	5	10	58	94	169	1	170
	1%	3%	6%	34%	56%	100%	1%	
Tackling environmental degradation in the country of origin	7	7	31	56	66	167	3	170
	4%	4%	19%	34%	40%	100%	2%	
Addressing state fragility and conflict in the country of origin	2	6	13	62	83	166	4	170
	1%	4%	8%	37%	50%	100%	2%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e. excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

To what extent should ENP actions/policies to enhance orderly migration and promote mobility focus on?

