




**EUROMED SURVEY OF
EXPERTS AND ACTORS**

ASSESSMENT OF THE
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN
PARTNERSHIP:
PERCEPTIONS AND
REALITIES

IEMed.



01



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INTRODUCTION

EUROMED SURVEY OF EXPERTS AND ACTORS “ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES”

SENÉN FLORENSA. Director General of the IEMed

Introduction

With this document, the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) presents the first results of an activity that forms part of the project “Promoting mutual awareness, understanding and cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the European Neighbourhood Region (South)”, a multi-year programme within the framework of the working dynamics of the European Commission and EuropeAid through the regional chapter of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. This activity involves four surveys to assess the progress, achievements and shortcomings of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership begun in Barcelona in 1995.

Such a project cuts across the IEMed mission as an actor in the dialogue between the EU and the Mediterranean countries and as a think tank analysing Euro-Mediterranean relations, proposing and disseminating policy options and contributing to the building of a true Euro-Mediterranean area.

This study is the result of the analysis of more than 370 extensive questionnaires answered by experts, actors and decision-makers of the countries involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona Process. Many people have contributed to generating a surprising amount of information. Now that this has been processed, analysed and presented on this report it enables the assessment and interpretation of Euro-Mediterranean policy as a whole; that is, the sum of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the southern strategy of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as well as the recently promoted Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). At the same time, it also enables an exhaustive and systematic analysis of the different actions and programmes developed within the framework of these initiatives.

In this regard it is not a simple survey of public opinion, but an exercise of assessment and identification of the main successes and difficulties, potential and shortcomings of the EMP from the point of view of the experts and actors involved. At the same time, it aims to go beyond these limits because the results must be used to create a tool to revitalise current debates as well as to provide proposals for policy action.

Assessment of the Exercise

This is a first exercise in a wider and more ambitious project that attempts to assess the progress, achievements and shortcomings of the Barcelona Process initiated 14 years ago. Thus, above all it is an effort of mobilisation and generation of opinion regarding the policies developed within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

Indeed, the word mobilisation describes an attempt to involve the maximum number of experts and decision-makers while at the same time generating opinion. Therefore, the confronting of perceptions and realities regarding the process of regional integration that has been put in place within the Euro-Mediterranean area must be used to verify what has been done. This involves the initiatives that have been developed over almost 15 years, including the way in which they are perceived and, therefore, how they are considered by the main experts and actors involved.

This particular moment is of special interest in that the implementation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) opens the door to what we could call a third phase in Euro-Mediterranean relationships. After the classic period of the EMP between 1995 and the setting up of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the second phase represented the progressive implementation of the ENP with widening perspectives of participation of the member countries, especially after the implementation of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which came into force in January 2007, to fund programmes of regional and bilateral cooperation between the European Union and its neighbouring countries.

Finally, this third phase to which we make reference adds a new institutional framework and new instruments that must have the capacity to re-launch the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in that it will benefit from institutional reinforcement, such as the creation of the General Secretariat of the UfM, which is a significant step forward.

This Survey is being carried out at a time when the creation of the UfM and the assessment of the years since 1995 have opened serious debates regarding Euro-Mediterranean regional integration. Thus, it will be of great interest to be able to find out the main lines of assessment and opinion.

In general terms, it is possible to distinguish two large blocks that are the basis of a lively and interesting debate. Firstly, there is the block related to institutional structure, meaning the initiatives implemented by institutional actors and currently being carried out in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Secondly, there are the factors that have affected the objectives of the EMP. In this case, the evaluation is fundamentally of the efficiency of the structures designed to kick-start the main objectives set out almost 15 years ago.

In regard to the elements associated with the institutional structure of the EMP, the main debate is centred on the suitability, linking and coherence of the projects and institutions of the UfM in the heart of what some authors have identified as Greater Barcelona; that is, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) itself, in terms of the policy of the EU to which the member countries of the southern Mediterranean region are closely linked, together with other ongoing strategies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the 5+5 Dialogue for the Western Mediterranean, the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue, the Mediterranean Forum, the EU sectoral strategies, the process of approval of advanced statutes, etc. In all, it is a complex scenario with a risk of dispersion, a high potential for incoherent actions and the coexistence of both a bilateral and multilateral dimension in the relations between the affected countries.

Furthermore, consideration must be given to the renewed role of the European Commission, as well as the progressive implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the new scenario of institutional weights and counterweights that this will represent.

The second block includes analysis of the factors that have influenced the evolution of the EMP. In this regard, the assessments of Euro-Mediterranean strategy and its evolution have been ambivalent. Assuming, of course, that always pivoting in the midst of the EMP will be the peace process between Israel and Palestine, which conditions development of international relations in the Mediterranean, in the assessment of the EMP we find a range of views from the pessimistic to the most encouraging, from a negative assessment based on the process as a whole to the view of positive elements of an advance at the level of partial results.

Today, the main information that we would like to find out from the Survey is whether the new institutional structure added to the others mentioned above will be able to respond to the elements that are currently considered to complicate, and could potentially complicate, the framework of Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation. The Survey therefore enables us to obtain first-hand information on positive aspects of the EMP and the ENP, which make up a series of effective partial results that will indicate where the lines of action should be reinforced and improved. Whatever the results, the exhaustive assessment of the priority action areas of the EMP, ENP programmes, as well as UfM projects, will contribute information that was unavailable up until now to enable an analysis of the scope and complexity of Euro-Mediterranean policy.

Finally, this mobilisation exercise also gathered opinions regarding medium-term outlooks, as well as the action priorities of Euro-Mediterranean policies. In the light of the exercise assessing what has been achieved so far, these opinions can now provide ideas on how to plan Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in the medium and long term, as well as which elements will enable us to consider how to improve the capacity to assume challenges and develop policy options that contribute to the construction of a true Euro-Mediterranean area.

We hope, therefore, that this first report fully meets its objectives, while at the same time we encourage you to continue following the results of the next phases of this project that will provide us with a battery of elements related to the main objective of this exercise, increase the visibility of the EMP, promote its public understanding and acceptance, and reinforce the sense of belonging and legitimacy of the countries involved.

THE EUROMED SURVEY: AN INSTRUMENT FOR ASSESSMENT AND MOBILISATION

THE EUROMED SURVEY: AN INSTRUMENT FOR ASSESSMENT AND MOBILISATION

In 2008, the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) was commissioned by the European Commission to conduct an ambitious yearly Survey of experts and actors active in the field of Euro-Mediterranean relations to assess the progress, achievements and shortcomings of the so-called Barcelona Process, i.e., a follow-up of the Euro-Mediterranean agenda. This activity is part of the project *"Promoting mutual awareness, understanding and cooperation between the EU and the European Neighbourhood Region (South)"*, co-funded by the European Union (EU) through the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) regional track.

In 2005, the IEMed had already carried out a first Survey of this kind: *"Ten Years of the Barcelona Process. Civil Society's Views. Results, Priorities and Scenarios"*.¹ Such a project cuts across the IEMed mission as an actor in the dialogue between the EU and the Mediterranean countries and a think tank analysing Euro-Mediterranean relations, proposing and disseminating policy options and contributing to the building of a true Euro-Mediterranean area.

The importance and added value of this new on-going Survey lies in the fact that it focuses on perceptions of the various actors and experts who are directly involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). So far policy-makers have not had such an instrument available to assess results, orient policies and mobilize actors and experts and, ultimately, public opinion throughout the region.

The Survey is also meant to increase the visibility of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, pointed out in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers held in Marseille in November 2008 as a vital element *"for its public understanding and acceptance, as well as its accountability and legitimacy."* Specific attention was devoted to gender issues throughout the whole process of analysis and assessment, and a significant level of participation of women in the Survey was also ensured.

Objectives

Therefore, the objectives of the Survey are threefold:

- I) To assess progress, achievements and shortcomings in the different areas of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (in a broad sense; that is, taking into account the Southern and regional dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean - UfM) in the perception of experts and actors;
- II) To create and develop an instrument for analysis and mobilization of actors, experts and policy-makers working on Euro-Mediterranean relations. The analysis and communication of the results of the Survey constitutes an integral part of the Survey, which has been designed as a policy- and mobilization-oriented tool;
- III) To identify the major Mediterranean trends with a forward-looking approach and articulate policy proposals to cope with the major challenges the region is bound to face in the coming years.

The Survey is not, in any case, an opinion poll. It does not gauge the public opinions or the perceptions of the general public about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It concentrates instead on the perceptions of experts and actors working directly on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This is the very specificity of this exercise and it must be underlined.

1 . See report at <http://www.iemed.org/documents/surveyUK.pdf>

The Sample

To achieve these objectives, the IEMed has conducted an articulated, qualitative Survey (see Questionnaire attached) among a representative sample of 371 experts and actors from the 43 countries of the Mediterranean and the European Union (the partners of the Union for the Mediterranean minus Monaco plus Libya). The respondents of the Survey have been selected according to their knowledge of and/or involvement in the Euro-Mediterranean Process from among university researchers, think tanks, media, diplomats, central and local government officials, political representatives, NGO activists, Euromed network members, trade unionists, business people, officers from international organizations directly involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (such as the EU, the Arab League or the United Nations).

The potential number of respondents was determined by the complexity of the Questionnaire of this Survey, designed to allow for a differentiated and detailed analysis of the different aspects and instruments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and for an assessment of progress and prospects in each of them. Therefore, the Survey clearly concentrates on experts and actors of Euro-Mediterranean relations with a deep knowledge and experience to be able to respond properly to the sometimes very technical questions.

In order to maximize the validity of the sample to represent the target population, a basic criteria based on the population size of each country was adopted. The resulting target number of respondents by country was corrected to factor the direct involvement of the countries in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since the beginning of the process, in 1995 (see Table). Ideally, no country should have fewer than 3 respondents.

Criteria for the definition of the Target Sample


Number of respondents by country's population	
More than 30 million	15
From 10 to 30 million	10
From 4 to 10 million	5
Less than 4 million	3
Correction factors of the number of respondents	
European countries not members of 1995 EMP	-2
MPC members of 1995 EMP	+10

Applying these criteria, the total size of the target sample was 424 (210 from MPCs and 214 from EU and non-EU European countries). The number of answered questionnaires received from the 2,820 questionnaires sent out to the universe of experts and actors identified by the IEMed was 371, slightly under the targeted number, and of course with a somewhat different composition (see table of respondents by countries in the annex). But, overall, the sample of respondents can be considered to be representative of EMP diversity and corresponding to the targeted structure by countries. It is also large enough to consider the Survey significant with a high degree of reliability for the limited universe of actors and experts in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.


It is notable that almost four fifths of the respondents come from Mediterranean countries, whether Southern or Northern (including Portugal, Jordan and Mauritania): 78.4%, well over the target of 71.8%. Roughly half of the respondents come from Mediterranean Partner Countries (49.6%), including non-EU Mediterranean Partner Countries, and half from EU Member States (50.4%). 46% of respondents come from Southern Mediterranean countries and 56% from Northern Mediterranean countries. By groups of countries, 22% of the respondents come from Maghreb countries, 15% from Arab Mashreq countries, roughly 4% each from Israel and Turkey and 3.5% from non-EU European Mediterranean Partner Countries (Croatia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro), whereas 28.8% of the respondents come from EU Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus and Greece) and 8.9% from the 9 non-Mediterranean new EU Member States.

Geographic distribution of the Sample

Regional division North-South



Regional division European Union / Mediterranean Partner Countries



By categories, the original target was: a third of policy-makers (diplomats, government and international organization officers and politicians), a third of experts (think tank and universities, but also media) and a last third of actors from civil society (NGOs, trade unions and employers).


The sample of respondents is clearly unbalanced in favour of experts (academics, researchers and the media) at the expense of civil society (53% of experts; 29% of policy-makers and only 18% of actors of civil society); this may reflect a lack of direct involvement of economic, social and political actors in the whole process. It may also incorporate a certain negative bias into the results of the Survey, as academics tend by profession to be critical of political endeavours. By countries, policy-makers (diplomats and government representatives) are over-represented among respondents in non-EU European MPCs (53.8% of respondents) and in new EU Eastern Europe Member States (50%), where there are very few academic experts in this field. Civil society actors are more present among respondents from the Mashreq than in any other group (32%). All but one of the Turkish respondents are experts from the academic world or the media.

As for the composition of the sample of respondents by gender, less than a third were women (28%), which is more than the percentage usually found in different Euro-Mediterranean fora.


The target and effective sample of the Survey, as well as details about the composition of the sample of respondents, can be seen in the Annexes.

Distribution of the Sample by categories of respondents and gender

Institutional affiliation



Men-Women



Methodology and Process

The Questionnaire of the Survey was designed over several months by the Survey team with the assistance of the two principal experts and a Survey Expert. Four team meetings were organized in Barcelona to design the Survey over the four years of the project, to discuss methodology and to formulate the questions after consultation with the members of the Advisory Committee.

The choice was made to develop a first long and quite sophisticated Questionnaire covering in detail all aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (including the ENP and the UfM), with more than 400 variables to respond to for the respondents. This assumed a thorough and encompassing knowledge by respondents of the different aspects of the Partnership. The assumed implication of this choice was to reduce the number of prospective respondents and to get a higher percentage of "Don't Know" answers for some questions (reflecting a limited knowledge of certain elements of the EMP). In the Questionnaire, a certain number of open questions were included for the respondents to develop their own analysis on the various issues (giving rise to the quotations we have included throughout this report).

The Questionnaire was sent to around 3,000 potential respondents meant to represent the universe of experts and actors of the Euro-Mediterranean area (see Annex). It was sent in several waves between early June and July 2009. The answers were collected through the website of the Survey² or by e-mail between July and the 15th September 2009. The languages used were English, French, Spanish and Catalan.

In order to provide an objective basis for analysis, the principal experts of the Survey produced a *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Status & Progress 2009*, which highlights the developments and achievements of the EMP since 2005. This analysis, available at the website of the Survey,³ intended to provide respondents with objective and neutral information on what has been done regarding the EMP from 2005 until mid-2009.

Managing of the implementation of the Survey and processing of results (statistical processing, production of graphs and tables, checking of accuracy, etc.) was assured by the Mcrit SL team with the support of the IEMed scientific team and the principal experts.

The 371 answers to the Survey received contained 160,000 elements of information, plus 1,800 text answers and comments made by respondents in response to open questions. The resulting database allows for all kinds of cross-analysis by countries or group of countries, categories of respondents, aggregation by profiles of answers or other variables (factorial analysis), and has only begun to be analysed and exploited in this report by the principal experts.

A meeting of the Advisory Committee in mid-September analysed and discussed a very preliminary report prepared by the principal experts on the basis of the partial results calculated with answers received by 30th July 2009. In November, an expanded Focus Group was convened to discuss a second draft of the Survey report based on final results and to enrich the analysis, as well as to propose possible improvements for future editions of the Survey. The Final Report of the Survey written by the principal experts was discussed and improved with the IEMed team to produce this final publication.

The selection of quotations (“verbatim”) from the 1,800 answers received to open questions included throughout this report does not pretend to be fully representative, but rather complementary and sometimes illustrative of the structured results of the Survey. They highlight the diversity of opinions about the EMP and underline certain recurrent lines of opinion or allow for a more articulate analysis of the results of the Survey. The geographical balance of those open answers has also been taken into consideration for the selection.

In the tables and graphs included throughout this report to present the results of Survey, we indicate the percentage of “Don’t know” answers over the total number of respondents answering each particular question, because we think that this is a relevant variable to interpret the results. However, for the calculation of the distribution of answers, we only take into consideration the answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers), so as to show the distribution of respondents giving a substantial answer. So percentages given throughout the report are based on the number of substantial answers, excluding “Don’t know” answers.

2. <http://www.iemed.org/euromedsurvey/>.

3. http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/10_02_25_Report_BCN_Progress_Lannon_Martin.pdf

SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS

SURVEY OF EXPERTS AND ACTORS ON THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP: SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) has experienced a marked evolution since its establishment at the Barcelona Conference in 1995 as the reference framework for political, economic and social relations between the European Union and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries. Indeed, a number of new policies, instruments and structures have been introduced, in particular since 2005, namely:

I) The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), progressively established between 2002 and 2006, and the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which entered into force in January 2007 to fund EU regional and bilateral cooperation programmes in the EU's neighbourhood;

II) The Five Year Work Programme, approved at the Barcelona Summit in November 2005 and which updated and re-defined the approach, followed by the Barcelona 1995 Work Programme;

III) The development of a new pillar of EU-MPC cooperation in the field of Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security, bringing these issues into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since November 2005;

IV) The Union for the Mediterranean launched in July 2008 at the Paris Summit with the progressive establishment of a new institutional structure (Co-Presidency, Secretariat, Joint Permanent Committee), the accession of new Mediterranean Partners and the identification of six concrete region-wide projects;

V) A set of new institutions and structures of a Euro-Mediterranean nature, such as the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and the FEMIP (2005), as well as the Euro-Mediterranean University (2008) and the Euro-Mediterranean Local and Regional Assembly, due to be created in January 2010.

According to the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, 2010 is the target date for the completion of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. A Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean is planned for the first half of that year in Barcelona in order to define the agenda for the coming years. Moreover, the economic crisis which began in 2008 and the continuing conflicts in the region impose an on-going rethinking of the EMP.

Survey. In this context, even if the diversity of interests and views of the 371 respondents of the 43 countries of the sample does not always allow for generalizations, the IEMed Survey of Experts and Actors on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, carried out between June and September 2009, allows us to establish some features and conclusions about the perceptions, assessments and trends of the EMP and the area as a whole.

A diversifying, little known Partnership. The first one is that, 14 years after its inception, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is diversifying into a set of differentiated thematic processes which are difficult to grasp even for experts and actors selected for the Survey. When commissioned to assess the progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a whole (in a wide sense, including the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean), we had to prepare a long Questionnaire including 35 articulate questions and more than 400 answer options. The relatively high percentage of "Don't know" answers (in some cases up to 50%) received in the Survey for many questions for detailed assessment of concrete instruments or progress point to the increasing difficulty, even for experts and specialized actors and policy-makers, of keeping track of all these dynamics. In many respects, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is migrating from the realm of diplomats and generalist civil

society actors to the remit of specialized ministerial experts and civil society organizations and even interest groups. This should also encourage policy- and decision-makers in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to invest more in the visibility of the EMP actions and dissemination of results, but even more so in bringing these actions closer to the interests and worries of MPCs.

A differentiated interest in the EMP. The rate of responses received to the Survey (see Annex with the sample of the Survey) already reflects a far bigger interest in the EMP in the Mediterranean coastal countries than in the EU non-Mediterranean countries, bigger in the Western Mediterranean than in the Eastern shores of the Sea (i.e., bigger in Maghreb countries than in Mashreq countries and Turkey and bigger in France, Italy and Spain than in Greece, the island Mediterranean States and the Balkans).

A different degree of commitment of EU Member States. Results of Question 1.9 on the commitment of EU Member States are not surprising, but they are revealing. The three countries most committed to the EMP, in the view of experts and actors who answered the Survey, are, in this order, Spain, France and Italy (followed by Sweden). This might reveal that the period 2008-2010 will provide a unique combination of EU Presidencies very favourable for the development and deepening of the EMP, an opportunity which might take a long time to emerge again. At the other extreme of the spectrum, the new Eastern European Member States are perceived as the least committed to the EMP (Slovenia is the only exception). Taking into account the increasing institutional weight of those countries in the EU, this puts a major question mark over the future of EU-Mediterranean relations.

A mature, nuanced general assessment of the EMP. The general assessment deriving from answers to questions on perceptions and results lead to the conclusion that the assessment of the EMP after fourteen years of operations shows a high concentration of responses (close to 50% in both cases) around the median values (4 to 6 on a 0-10 scale, not very disappointing but not very positive either) and a relatively similar distribution of the remaining answers on both sides of the spectrum (22% of respondents see the perceptions of the EMP as positive or very positive – 7 to 10 on the scale – and 26% as disappointing or very disappointing). This balanced and at the same time somewhat polarized view of the EMP emerges again in the assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean, and does not show major variations across respondent categories (i.e., response patterns are very similar across policy-makers, experts from think tanks, universities or media and civil society representatives). But the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a *trademark* seems to be in good health: all new projects and initiatives, be it new multilateral programmes within the ENP or new projects and institutions within the UfM, are welcomed by experts and actors with a vote of trust and high expectations about their future performance, revealing a widespread engagement with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a project and as a process.

A more negative perception in MPCs. This notwithstanding, perceptions about the performance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are far more negative among Southern and Eastern Mediterranean respondents than among EU ones, and more negative in the Maghreb (Algerian respondents show the most negative assessment on most of the dimensions) than for Mashreq respondents.

Difficulties and obstacles. There seems to be a wide consensus on the magnitude of the difficulties that prevent the achievement of the EMP objectives. According to the majority perception of the respondents, the EMP (including the UfM) is seriously endangered by the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict (73% of respondents). 63% of respondents consider it probable or very probable that the EMP will be paralyzed by this conflict in a mid- to long-term perspective. This should mean that either the conflict is settled in the near future (respondents are not optimistic about it) or the EU should reconsider the possibilities of success of a mul-

tilateral cooperation scheme comprising both parts of the conflict. The two other obstacles to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP most often mentioned are the weak political will for reform in Mediterranean Partner Countries (mentioned by 43% of respondents) and the lack of South-South integration (43%).

Beneficiaries. When one undertakes a more detailed analysis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership by priority areas, it is interesting to note the relative high appreciation of the EMP action in the cultural and education fields and the people-to-people programmes (once dubbed the “poor parent” of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation), but also that respondents consider that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is mainly benefiting the business climate and economic interests, but without this translating into job creation, women's integration into economic life or a convergence towards EU income levels. This should give a clue as to what should be prepared for the future, but contrasts with the very negative perceptions about progress in the field of mobility.

European Neighbourhood Policy. Answers on the assessment of the results of the ENP show a very similar assessment to that for the EMP. This seems to indicate a consolidation of the ENP as the bilateral instrument of EU cooperation with MPCs.

New ENP multilateral programmes (TAIEX, Twinning, Neighbourhood Investment Facility, Governance Facility launched) are still largely unknown (high level of “Don't know” answers, up to 40% of the answers in some cases). Assessment of their implementation is balanced to positive, with typically less than 20% of respondents considering them disappointing or very disappointing (0-3) and slightly above 25% considering them positive or very positive (the assessment of the Governance Facility is more negative).

Union for the Mediterranean. Despite all polemics about its inception and its political blockade, answers to the question about the contribution of the general objectives of the UfM to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP still show a moderate optimism, with, depending on the aspect considered, between 35% and 50% of respondents thinking that it will make a positive or very positive contribution and less than 25% attributing it with a negative or very negative contribution. Also, the contribution of the new UfM projects approved in the framework of the UfM to the achievements of the objectives of the EMP is assessed positively by most of the respondents (more than 60% see a positive or very positive contribution of the Mediterranean Solar Plan and De-pollution of the Mediterranean, and between 50% and 60% for the other four projects).

Coherence and articulation. The assessment is much less positive, however, when respondents are asked for the coherence and articulation between the different layers of EU-MPC cooperation: the EMP, ENP, UfM and EU enlargement process. Here, the results point to a clear perceived lack of coherence: 48% detect certain or total lack of coherence (0 to 3 on the scale), whereas only a meagre 11% see coherence between those different schemes.

Institutions. Concerning the **UfM Co-Presidency system**, respondents have a cautious and divided but not too negative view of how effective it has been in strengthening a true partnership and ownership. 30% of respondents think that it has been effective or very effective (7-10 on the scale), whereas 31% consider the Co-Presidency system has been ineffective or very ineffective (0-3 on the scale).

The work of the **Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly** is judged with less indulgence by the actors and experts surveyed: 30% of them consider it disappointing or very disappointing (0-3 on the scale), against only 18% who consider it positive or very positive.

As for the **Secretariat of the UfM**, expectations about its role in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are quite high, with 52% of respondents expecting it to play an

important or key role in the EMP (7-10 on the scale, 19%, 9-10), and 19% considering that it will play a negligible role (0-3 on the scale).

Resources and funds. Interestingly, in the view of many of the respondents of the Survey, the lack of financial resources is not a major obstacle for the achievement of the objectives of the EMP. 38% consider the current level of budget appropriation of the ENP insufficient or very insufficient (0-3 on the scale), but only 25% considered the insufficient budget allocation as one major obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP. At the other end of the spectrum, 21% of respondents consider them sufficient (7-10 on the scale), and often indicate that the problem is the use and effectiveness of resources, rather than their volume, as shown by the perceived lack of progress in maximizing the impact and leverage of scarce resources (71% see no progress or even regression). It is the respondents of Maghreb and Mediterranean EU countries who tend to consider resources insufficient with a higher frequency, while Mashreq and non-Mediterranean EU countries consider it sufficient.

Participation of women. Despite certain improvements, actions undertaken by the EMP and the ENP to promote the participation of women in economic, social and political life are not satisfactory: 27% consider it disappointing or very disappointing (0-3) against only 19% positive or very positive (7-10). Interestingly, the view of female respondents is slightly more positive (23% disappointing against 21% positive). The level of involvement of women in the EMP is assessed even less positively: 32% assess it as low or very low and only 18% as high or very high. The negative perception of respondents about the actions of the EMP in promoting women may explain why the only multilateral programme specifically addressed to cope with gender issues (Role of Women in Economic Life) is assessed in a very positive way.

Assessment of progress of MPCs. As for the progress and commitment of specific Mediterranean Partner Countries, overall only Morocco and Tunisia, and to a lesser extent Jordan, seem to pass the mark. Syria, Algeria and Palestine get very negative results with a very high percentage of very disappointed respondents (respectively, 25%, 15%, 21% and 23% in the 0-1 bracket). Morocco stands out in all areas (political and socio-economic, in particular), followed by Lebanon in the political field and by Tunisia in the economic and social one.

Turkey. More than 55% of respondents are very positive about the fulfilment of the political and economic criteria for the EU accession of Turkey. Logically, a high proportion of respondents expect Turkey to join the EU as a full Member State “in the next 20 years”: 55% consider it probable or very probable (7-10) and only 22% see a very low probability or no probability at all (0-3) that it will effectively happen.

Successes and failures. The Survey offers a clear picture of what has worked and what has not in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.


Successes of the Partnership:

- **Business climate.** 60% of respondents consider that there has been progress in improving the business climate for SMEs in the MPCs. And Business-to-Business contacts are considered a success (73% see “Progress”, against 27% who see “No progress” or even “Regression”). The same overly positive assessment applies to enhanced support for reforms and efforts to improve trade and the economic regulatory environment (66%-34%).
- **Multilateral programmes in the economic field:** 71% of respondents stated that there has been progress in the Technical assistance and risk capital support programme of FEMIP, 70% in transport and energy cooperation, 69% in relation to the development of the information society (Medibtikar, Innovation and Technology), and 65% in investment promotion (ANIMA and Invest in Med). 59% make the same assessment in relation to environmental programmes.

- **Increasing the awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilizations.** 59% of respondents consider that there has been progress in this area.
- **Educational, cultural, youth and research exchanges are also very positively assessed (72%-28%).** All multilateral programmes in the education and social exchanges field are considered to have experienced progress by between half and two thirds of the respondents, in particular those on dialogue between cultures and cultural heritage (Euromed Heritage, Anna Lindh Foundation) (68%), the one on Information and Communication II (68%) and Euro-Med Youth (59%, particularly appreciated by women respondents, 70%) and the one on Gender Equality (59%).
- **Programme on the Role of Women in Economic Life (2006-2008, €5 million),** with 59% of respondents stating that there has been progress in this regard.

Sucesses of the EMP

% of respondents considering that there has been progress




Failures of the Partnership:

- **Enabling citizens to participate in decision-making at local level.** Assessment of progress is rather negative in relation to all the objectives stated in the 2005 Five Year Work Programme. Indeed, 73% of respondents considered that there has been no progress or even regression as far as enabling citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level is concerned, 71% for extension of political pluralism and participation by citizens, 69% for the promotion of freedom of expression and association and 68% regarding the promotion of the implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions.
- **In the sustainable development area,** 80% see no progress or even a regression in reducing the poverty rate, 80% in reducing the prosperity gap and raising GDP growth rates to reduce the prosperity gap (even a larger percentage in Mashreq countries) and 76% see no progress or a regression in the creation of job opportunities for young people.
- **Strengthening of financial cooperation,** in particular maximizing the impact and leverage of scarce resources (i.e., the issue of efficiency, where 71% see no progress or even regression).

- **South-South regional economic integration.** Whereas regional programmes are in general very positively assessed, the multilateral programmes aimed to promote South-South regional economic integration (in particular the Agadir Agreement) must be considered as a serious failure (76% see no progress and 7% a regression).
- **In the social and cultural cooperation area,** respondents consider that there has been no progress or even regression in reducing disparities in education achievement between European and Mediterranean States (73%), in enhancing graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education (70%) and in promoting equitable access to quality education (61%).
- **Cooperation in the migration and justice and security area:** 50% of respondents consider it disappointing or very disappointing (0 to 3 on a 0-10 scale), against only 6% considering it positive or very positive (7-10).
- **Facilitating mobility and managing migration** (with 83% seeing no progress or even regression for visa facilitation, and slightly less for readmission and border management). Asked to assess progress in the justice and home affairs area, 83% see no progress or even regression in addressing the “brain drain” caused by migration, 71% in significantly reducing the level of illegal migration and trafficking of human beings and 69% in promoting legal migration opportunities.

Failures of the EMP

% of respondents considering that there has been no progress or regression



Prospects. Finally, a forward-looking analysis of trends and key factors for future scenarios in the Mediterranean shows that, according to respondents, prospects in the Mediterranean are decidedly bleak. More than 50% of respondents consider it probable or very probable that:

- the Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP (63%, with the exception of Israeli respondents, where it is only 40%),
- water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions (61%),
- population and employment pressures will create dramatic social tensions (50%), and
- political regimes in MPCs will show continuity (50%).

As a consequence, irregular migration to Europe will continue to increase (50% see it as probable or very probable), and 47% of respondents consider it probable or very probable that the increased level of irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe, so that 35% see it as improbable or not probable at all that a common Mediterranean identity will emerge (against 20% attributing some probability to it).


The “probable or very probable” answers double the “improbable or not probable at all” answers regarding the probability of:

- an environmental deterioration in the Mediterranean threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States (39% against 15%),
- the current global economic crisis reducing the development prospects of the Mediterranean for a long period (38% against 17%), which of course means that respondents consider it improbable or not probable at all that MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years, and hence long-term convergence to EU income levels (40% against 13%).

The only positive development that will probably materialize in the future, according to the respondents, is the increased participation of women in economic, social and political life in MPCs (38% consider it probable or very probable against only 14% improbable). Overall, it is clear that respondents consider that current trends and the status quo are not sustainable in the mid- to long term.

Prospects

More than 50% of respondents consider it probable or very probable that:



EMP contribution to facing challenges in the region. Faced with these challenges, the answers regarding the probability that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will contribute to solving the problems in the region show that:

- 45% of respondents see low or no probability of it leading to resolution of conflicts in the region (only 19% see certain or high probability of this happening), and
- 41% think the same for a reduction of the development gap across the Mediterranean (27% are positive about that probability).

In contrast, for the whole sample the balance is clearly in favour of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership leading to:

- a greater intensity of human exchanges across the Mediterranean (39% see it as probable, against 21% improbable), and
- a greater understanding and respect between cultures and religions (43% against 18%).


Priorities. As far as priorities for the future are concerned (in particular for the 2010 Work Programme to be approved in the Summit of the UfM to be held in Barcelona in June 2010), among the 20 possible action priorities submitted to respondents, the most often mentioned amongst the five top priorities are the following:

- Conflict resolution in the region (62% of respondents),
- Promotion of democracy and political pluralism (49%),
- Water access and sustainability (41.5%), and
- Education (41%).

The least cited priorities include civil protection (only 18% of respondents mention it amongst the five top priorities), a wider free trade area, liberalisation of EU agricultural markets and food security (20% each), the fight against international terrorism and creation of an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean, as well as establishment of free movement of persons in the Mediterranean (21% each), as well as the management of migration flows and the promotion of equality between men and women (22%). This should give rise to some thoughts about the priority projects for the EMP and the UfM. However, regional differences across respondents are paramount as far as priorities are concerned.

Among the 20 possible action priorities submitted to respondents, the most often mentioned amongst the five top priorities are the following:

Priority Prospects (as % of respondents)



REALITIES, PERCEPTIONS AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

01

THE STATUS OF THE EMP


1.1. Overall Assessment

The answers to Questions 1.1 (on perceptions) and 1.10 (on results) lead to the conclusion that the assessment of the results of the EMP after fourteen years of operations are quite balanced, with a high concentration of responses (close to 50% in both cases) around the median values (4 to 6 on a 0-10 scale, not very disappointing but not very positive either) and a relatively similar distribution of the remaining answers at both ends of the spectrum (22% of respondents see the perceptions of the EMP as positive or very positive – 7-10 on the scale – and 26% as disappointing or very disappointing).

Question 1.1.

In your opinion, what is the perception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in the 2005-2009 period amongst experts and actors involved in it?

10 = Very positive



1 = Very disappointing

Answers are slightly more negative for perceived results of the EMP than for perceptions as such: 27% of 0-3 answers against only 18% of 7-10 answers (Question 1.10). This is particularly the case for Maghreb respondents, 40% of whom consider the results of the EMP disappointing or very disappointing against only 13% positive or very positive, and in particular for Algerian respondents (56.4% against 0%). This probably has to do with the higher expectations and involvement of Maghreb countries as regards EU cooperation.

Question 1.10.

What is your global assessment of the results of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the 2005-2009 period?

	Very disappointing						Very positive					Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
General Assessment	6	16	25	46	66	57	70	43	16	3	0	348	4.68
	2%	5%	7%	13%	19%	16%	20%	12%	5%	1%	0%	100%	

“Among experts and technical/operational people the opinion is relatively high since the many projects and cooperation initiatives launched have brought a lot of good results. However, among the general public the opinion is much lower first because the visibility has not been very high and because much of the information disseminated by the media relates to the failure and to the political and security problems.”

Spanish respondent

“Les avis sont partagés. Il y a des gens qui trouvaient que le PEM est une bonne chose pour le pays, la région et le monde, d'autres le trouvent incapable de changer quoi que ce soit.”

Syrian respondent

“It's easy to forget that even the creation and sustaining of this kind of process with these participants is very impressive.”

Finnish respondent

“Le PEM place le volet sécuritaire au centre de ses préoccupations, mais se préoccupe peu de la mise en œuvre des réformes politiques, des droits humains et de la démocratisation dans la rive sud. Le processus de Barcelone n'a donc pas tenu ses promesses et a provoqué chez les partenaires de la rive Sud déception, voire méfiance; le PEM est décalé par rapport aux réalités sur le terrain.”

Moroccan respondent

“Little progress has been achieved related to the goals of the EMP. No political reform process apart from perhaps Jordan and Morocco. No real development in social and economic terms. No region building.”

German respondent

“The overall perception of EMP has been quite negative given the sluggish implementation of its projects: weak commitment of the EU to genuine reforms in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and the lack of political will of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean regimes for real reform.”

Algerian respondent

“The EMP has practically disappeared from the academic radar screen since the disappointing outcome of the 10th Anniversary Summit and the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean.”

Swedish respondent

“La déception vient du fait que les résultats les plus visibles de la coopération euro-méditerranéenne se concentrent dans les domaines économique et sécuritaire.”

Tunisian respondent

Answers to Question 1.17 on the assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy show a very similar assessment to that of the EMP, which indicates a consolidation of the ENP as the bilateral instrument of EU cooperation with MPCs as well as the overcoming of the distrust or scepticism with which many actors and experts in the EMP received the ENP in its first stage (2003 to 2007). 49% of the respondents are concentrated in the 4-6 brackets. Again, Algerian respondents make the most negative assessment of the ENP (in which their country has decided not to participate), with 35% of respondents considering it very disappointing (0-1) and only 5% positive (7-10). Turkish and Israeli respondents have a much more positive view of the ENP (16% and 14% of respondents, respectively, consider it very positive, 9-10).

Question 1.17.

What is your global assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the 2005-2009 period?

	Assessments											Total	Aver.
	Very negative					Very positive							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
General Assessment	7	15	19	49	42	69	58	52	20	7	1	339	4.89
	2%	4%	6%	14%	12%	20%	17%	15%	6%	2%	0%	100%	

“Les efforts de la Politique européenne de voisinage durant la période 2005-2009 sont très significatifs et très intenses : par contre, les partenaires ne sont à la hauteur dans aucun domaine.”

Moroccan respondent

“L’approche bilatérale menée par la PEV semble mieux fonctionner que l’approche multilatérale, pour la simple raison que ce sont des pratiques de travail mieux connues par les pays voisins. L’absence de coopération Sud-Sud fait aussi que les pays se sentent souvent noyés dans le groupe et n’arrivent pas à s’investir.”

French respondent

“The main tools used during the ENP are national strategies. It is worth noting that they were not suggested in a proper manner after a real CSO participation. Moreover, the revision process lacks clarity and transparency, it is more about a formal session rather being a real consultation process.”

Lebanese respondent

“Effects are not the same as in the countries which have the possibility of joining the EU (enlargement process), which is understandable. There is widely shared opinion among the ENP countries that some form of EU membership should become the final target of the policy in the longer run.”

Croatian respondent

“Beneficiary countries are very heterogeneous: What are the similarities between Ukraine and Tunisia?”

Spanish respondent

This balanced overall assessment of the results of the EMP and the ENP gets somewhat more nuanced and positive for some fields of cooperation when we look at the answers to Questions 1.4 and particularly 1.11 (see Section 1.3 below), detailing the progress experienced in the different priority areas defined in the 2005 Barcelona Summit and the 2006 ENP European Commission Communication.

Profile of Very Negative and Very Positive Respondents

Given the high prevalence of extreme answers (0-2 or 8-10 on a 0-10 scale) in many of the questions, we undertook to identify those respondents who systematically chose the least negative or most negative answers among the 80 questions in the Survey asking for a 0-10 or a Progress-No Progress-Regression answer. The aim was to try to identify specific groups of extremely positive or extremely negative respondents.

The first conclusion of this analysis is that the number of those “extremists” is relatively small: only one respondent has answered at least 50% of the questions with a negative assessment (0-2 or regression), and even the number of respondents who answered more than a third of the questions negatively is low, only 14. 18 respondents answered more than half the questions with a positive assessment (8-10 or Progress); policy-makers, in particular diplomats and government representatives, are naturally overrepresented in this group, but no specific country group profile stands out. This confirms that most of the respondents of the Survey made rather nuanced assessments and also that the incidence in the results of extremist assessments is not significant enough to affect the general trends of the Survey.

1.2. Context and Obstacles

There seems to be a wide consensus on the magnitude of the difficulties that prevent the achievement of the EMP objectives. In this regard, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which in December 2008-January 2009 caused more than 1,300 deaths as a consequence of the Israeli campaign against the Hamas in the Gaza Strip,⁴ is cited by three in four respondents as one of the three main difficulties. Indeed, it effectively blocked the normal operation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the first half of 2009 and the convening of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs planned for November 2009.⁵ However, it is interesting to note that it is precisely in the Maghreb countries, the region farthest away from the conflict, where this is most often cited as an obstacle (82% of respondents), in particular in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia (86.8%) where arguably the main track of cooperation is bilateral (and hence not directly affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict) and not multilateral.

In any case, it is clear from the answers to the Survey that this conflict is seen increasingly as a major obstacle to any progress in EU-MPC cooperation, and the prospects as seen by respondents are far from optimistic: as indicated in the answers to Question 4.2, 63% of respondents consider as high or very high the degree of probability that it will paralyse the EMP in the mid to long term (7 to 10 on a 0-10 scale of probability).

The two other obstacles to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP most often mentioned are revealing in this respect: the weak political will for reform in Mediterranean Partner Countries (mentioned by 43% of respondents, but with wide variations: less than 25% of Maghreb respondents mention it, against 51% of EU respondents) and the lack of South-South integration among them (42%; with a peak of 52.8% for Tunisian and Moroccan respondents but only 30% in the case of Algerian and Mashreq respondents); both are deeply rooted in the political systems of MPCs. Judging by the answers to the forward-looking questions in Question 4.2, these obstacles are not going to be removed in the mid to long term either: 50% of respondents consider a high degree of continuity in the political regimes in MPCs as probable or very probable (7-10 on a 0-10 scale).

4. See Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009.
http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/10_02_25_Report_BCN_Progress_Lannon_Martin.pdf

5. Ibidem.

Question 1.2.

In your opinion, what are the main difficulties that the EMP has encountered to achieve its objectives in 2005-2009? Please indicate the three most important

Difficulties	Mentions	%
The global financial crisis	72	20%
The impact of international terrorism	54	15%
The US policy in the region (including the Iraq War)	103	29%
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict	259	73%
The surge of Islamism in the region	42	12%
The lack of South-South integration	151	42%
The lack of involvement of the EU due to its greater attention to Eastern Europe	104	29%
The weak political will for reform in Mediterranean Partner Countries	154	43%
The weak political will of EU countries for democratisation in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean	100	28%
The insufficient budget allocated to the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument	90	25%
The lack of consensus for the first proposals on the Union for the Mediterranean	77	22%
Total respondents	356	

Then we find two geopolitical factors: US policy in the region and lack of involvement of the EU due to its greater attention to Eastern Europe, each mentioned by almost one third of the respondents. This latter factor is considered as a key obstacle by Maghreb respondents (47% mention it, only second to the Arab-Israeli conflict). However, Mashreq respondents focus on US policy in the region as an obstacle (50% mention it, against only 22% in the Maghreb).

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the surge of Islamism (mentioned by only 12% of respondents, and only 8% of EU respondents) and the impact of terrorism in the region (15%) are hardly considered as major obstacles to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP, at least by the experts and actors to whom the Survey was addressed.

Among the obstacles not mentioned in the table provided in Question 1.2, respondents from the Southern Mediterranean tend to insist, in the open answers, on EU bureaucracy as an obstacle and on the structural asymmetry (both economic and political) between the EU and its Mediterranean Partner Countries.

Other Difficulties Identified by Respondents

“La burocracia y el protagonismo excesivo de la Comisión Europea.”

Spanish respondent

“La faible place accordée à la société civile.”

Tunisian respondent

“The divergent views of EU countries towards the process and how further empowerment of liberal and progressive representative government across the region can be achieved.”

British respondent

“The limited policy space for the partners to define their national priorities.”

Lebanese respondent

“The primacy given by the EU to business considerations over political and social considerations in its interactions with the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.”

Algerian respondent

“People don’t really understand what European policies are and what they really achieve!”

German respondent

“Lack of awareness of the concept of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.”

Egyptian respondent

“Les pays développés du Nord n’ont pas une volonté claire pour la défense de la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme dans le Sud de la Méditerranée ce qui les rend peu crédibles vis-à-vis des populations.”

Tunisian respondent

“There are two key issues blocking the implementation of the EMP: the Israel problem that hinders the EU-Arab world dialogue and the missing EU policy autonomy towards the US intrusion in the mesoregion.”

Danish respondent

“Les disparités entre le développement au nord et au sud de la Méditerranée sont trop importantes pour réaliser une harmonie de développement ; les politiques totalitaires au sud sont l’origine de la stagnation ; or, le PEM ne tient pas compte de l’absence de démocratie au sud sans elle, rien n’évoluera quels que soient les efforts consentis.”

Moroccan respondent

“Certains aspects sont évidemment bien mieux traités que d’autres. (...) je rappellerai le manque d’implication de la société civile et de l’opinion publique qui ne connaît que trop mal encore les affaires européennes et surtout les résultats de ses actions en euromed. Meilleure implication donc et un besoin essentiel de synergie, de concentration de l’ensemble des dispositifs existants pour davantage de clarté et d’efficacité. La multiplication des initiatives financées sans emploi ultérieur les rendent inefficaces ou stériles. Certains projets sont du coup montés plusieurs fois. Il s’agirait d’inventorier l’ensemble de ces initiatives (domaine culturel) et de les rendre cohérentes et accessibles au public. Pour les suivantes d’en valoriser la cohérence avec ce qui a déjà été fait (...)”

French respondent

1.3. Assessment by Areas and Priorities

The Survey Questionnaire allows for a detailed, fine-tuned assessment of progress and achievements in relation to the four main priority areas identified in the Barcelona 2005 Euro-Mediterranean Summit (Questions 1.3 and 1.4) and the objectives stated in the 2005 Five Year Work Programme for each of them (Question 1.4), as well as the multilateral programmes implemented in the framework of the EMP (Question 1.5). The same differentiated analysis can be carried out on the European Neighbourhood Policy and the different priorities identified in the 2006 Communication of the European Commission on strengthening the European neighbourhood policy (Question 1.11) and the new ENP multilateral programmes (Question 1.12).

The overall assessment of each of the EMP priority areas (Questions 1.3 and 1.4) is not very auspicious: achievements in Political and Security Cooperation, in Migration, Social Integration and Justice and Security and even in Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform are considered very poor. The assessment is particularly negative for cooperation in Migration and Justice and Security: 50% of the respondents consider that the achievements are disappointing or very disappointing (0 to 3 on a 0-10 scale), against only 6% considering them positive or very positive (7-10). For Maghreb respondents, this assessment is even more negative: 64%-4%. The same happens to a lesser extent in the other two areas: Political and Security Cooperation (39% consider it disappointing against 11% positive; here, paradoxically, the Maghreb respondents have a less negative view with 18% of respondents considering it positive or very positive) and Sustainable Development (30%-13%).

The assessment is slightly more positive, or at least more balanced, as regards the education and socio-cultural exchanges, in what is one of the major features of the results of the Survey. 27% of respondents grade the achievements as positive or very positive (7 to 10), against 21% considering them disappointing or very disappointing. However, this slightly positive overall assessment has no clear reflection in the assessment of progress in the achievement of the five concrete objectives stated in this field made later in the framework of Question 1.4, where again the lack of progress or regression answers largely outnumber the progress answers (see analysis below).

Question 1.3.

What are, in general terms, the achievements in the four priorities identified at the Barcelona 2005 Conference within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme?


	Very disappointing										Very positive		Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
1. Political and Security Partnership	13	23	44	54	63	64	41	29	14	3	1	349	4.13	
	4%	7%	13%	15%	18%	18%	12%	8%	4%	1%	0%	100%		
2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform	5	19	40	45	74	66	56	35	6	2	0	348	4.33	
	1%	5%	11%	13%	21%	19%	16%	10%	2%	1%	0%	100%		
3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges	5	11	22	38	61	61	61	55	28	6	3	351	5.06	
	1%	3%	6%	11%	17%	17%	17%	16%	8%	2%	1%	100%		
4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security	23	37	43	69	73	38	39	14	4	5	1	346	3.56	
	7%	11%	12%	20%	21%	11%	11%	4%	1%	1%	0%	100%		

Indeed, if we focus attention on the results of Question 1.4, adding together the answers related to all objectives stated in the 2005 Five Year Work Programme in the four priority areas, the majority of respondents consider that there was no progress or even a regression in all fields of cooperation (see graphs below). Around a third of respondents see progress across the four priority areas.


Question 1.4.

What are, in general terms, the achievements in the four priorities identified at the Barcelona 2005 Conference within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme?


1. Political and Security Partnership




2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform



3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges



2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform



1.3.1. Political Cooperation (and Priorities)

Assessment of progress in the Political and Security Partnership is rather negative in relation to all the objectives stated in the 2005 Five Year Work Programme. Indeed, 73% of respondents considered that there has been no progress or even regression as far as enabling citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level is concerned, 71% for extension of political pluralism and participation by citizens, 69% for the promotion of freedom of expression and association and 68% regarding the promotion of the implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions. The only exceptions to this very negative assessment are fostering civil society and the increase of women's participation in decision-making, where 55% of respondents see a certain progress (the same percentage for women respondents as for the latter).

Question 1.4.


Among the priorities defined in 2005, for which do you consider progress was achieved and for which do you think that there was no progress or even regression?

1. Political and Security Partnership exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens	97	191	38	326	20	346
	30%	59%	11%	100%	6%	
Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level	85	204	25	314	33	347
	27%	65%	11%	100%	10%	
Increase the participation of women in decision-making	173	125	18	316	34	350
	55%	40%	6%	100%	10%	
Ensure freedom of expression and association	100	179	46	325	23	348
	31%	55%	14%	100%	7%	
Foster the role of civil society	181	126	22	329	18	347
	55%	38%	7%	100%	5%	
Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions	86	156	24	266	82	348
	32%	59%	9%	100%	24%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1. Political and Security Partnership



The multilateral programmes launched in this field (see Question 1.5) are accordingly assessed in a rather negative manner: only 47% see progress in relation to civil protection (here there is a strong contrast between the Mashreq and Israeli respondents, where only 23% see progress, and EU respondents, where 58% see it), 38% in the Partnership for Peace (Middle East Peace Process Programme) and 39% in Justice, Security and Migration.⁶

Question 1.5.

Among the Euro-Mediterranean multilateral programmes, for which do you consider progress was achieved in their implementation and for which do you think that there was no progress between 2005 and 2009?

Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Confidence building measures: civil protection	139	144	12	295	58	353
	47%	49%	4%	100%	16%	
Confidence building measures: Partnership for Peace	112	155	31	298	52	350
	38%	52%	10%	100%	15%	
Justice, Security and Migration (JSM)	111	149	27	287	64	351
	39%	52%	9%	100%	18%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1.3.2. Economic Cooperation (and Priorities)

As far as Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Economic Reform is concerned, the balance is more positive, at least in one respect. 60% of respondents consider that there has been progress in improving the business climate for SMEs in the Mediterranean Partner countries. But 80% see no progress or even a regression in reducing the poverty rate, 80% in reducing the prosperity gap and raising GDP growth rates to reduce the prosperity gap (an even larger percentage in Mashreq countries) and 76% see no progress or a regression in the creation of job opportunities for young people. More than 50% of respondents also see no progress or regression in the integration of women in employment in partner countries or the increase in North-South and South-South cooperation. In sum, the Partnership is perceived as benefiting mainly the business climate, but without this translating into job creation, women's integration into economic life or a convergence towards EU income levels. A reflection about the transformative power of current EU-promoted reforms and about the development model being implemented in MPCs seems a necessary corollary of these perceptions.

6. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, pp. 51-52.


Question 1.4.

2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Create more job opportunities for the increasing numbers of young people across the region	79	202	45	326	21	347
	24%	62%	14%	100%	6%	
Improve business climate, in particular for SMEs	187	110	17	314	36	350
	60%	35%	5%	100%	10%	
Reduce regional poverty rates	60	194	57	311	36	347
	19%	62%	18%	100%	10%	
Reduce the prosperity gap and raise GDP growth rates	61	191	55	307	39	346
	20%	62%	18%	100%	11%	
Increase in North-South and South-South regional cooperation	157	148	20	325	21	346
	48%	46%	6%	100%	6%	
Increase in the percentage of women in employment in partner countries	131	145	14	290	55	345
	45%	50%	5%	100%	16%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform



As far as the multilateral programmes in this field are concerned, all but one of them are very positively assessed, with 71% stating that there has been progress in the Technical Assistance and Risk Capital Support programme of FEMIP (80% of Maghreb respondents, against only 57% of Mashreq respondents; but one must also point out here the important number of “Don’t know” answers, 39%), 70% in transport and energy cooperation (again, only 51% for Mashreq countries), 69% in relation to the development of the information society (Medib-tikar, Innovation and Technology) and an even higher percentage for beneficiary Maghreb and Mashreq countries, and 65% in investment promotion (ANIMA and Invest in Med). 59% make the same assessment in relation to environmental programmes. In contrast, the programmes aimed at promoting South-South regional economic integration are considered an outright failure (76% see no progress and 7% a regression; in the Maghreb, 93% see no progress).⁷

Question 1.5.

Sustainable Economic Development	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Investment promotion and reform denomination to attract investments	200	92	14	306	44	350
	65%	30%	5%	100%	13%	
Transport and energy cooperation	207	79	10	296	54	350
	70%	27%	3%	100%	15%	
South-South regional economic integration	50	234	22	306	43	349
	16%	76%	7%	100%	12%	
Environmental programmes	177	109	13	299	46	345
	59%	36%	4%	100%	13%	
Technical assistance and risk capital support from FEMIP	149	57	5	211	134	345
	71%	27%	2%	100%	39%	
Development of the information society	208	87	7	302	48	350
	69%	29%	2%	100%	14%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

1.3.3. Social and Cultural Cooperation (and Priorities)

The positive overall assessment of education and socio-cultural exchanges as a priority area of the EMP is reflected only in the clear positive assessment the respondents make of the increased awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilizations: 59% of respondents consider that there has been progress in this area (but the proportion is lower for Maghreb and Mashreq respondents: 51% and 47% respectively, against 64% for the EU). In contrast, respondents consider that there has been no progress or even regression in reducing disparities in education achievement between European and Mediterranean states (73%), in enhancing graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education (70%) and in promoting equitable access to quality education (61%). The assessment is more balanced as regards halving the number of illiterate female and male adults and children (53% see no

7. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, pp. 53-54.

progress or regression, while 47% see progress), but here there is a clear disparity between Moroccan and Tunisian respondents, 57.7% of whom see progress in this area, and Algerian and Mashreq respondents, of whom less than 40% see progress; a majority of women respondents, 59%, also see no progress in this field. Significantly, a high percentage of respondents (12% on average) considered that they could not give an answer to this question.


Question 1.4.

3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Halve the number of illiterate female and male adults and children	137	147	8	292	56	348
	47%	50%	3%	100%	16%	
Promote equitable access to quality education	120	166	20	306	41	347
	39%	54%	7%	100%	12%	
Reduce disparities in educational achievement between Euro-Mediterranean states	80	180	35	295	54	349
	27%	61%	12%	100%	15%	
Enhance graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education	90	188	23	301	46	347
	30%	62%	8%	100%	13%	
Increase awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations	197	103	34	334	18	352
	59%	31%	10%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges



Moreover, multilateral programmes in this field are considered a success. All of them are considered to have experienced progress by between half and two thirds of the respondents, in particular: on dialogue between cultures and cultural heritage (Euromed Heritage, Anna Lindh Foundation), with 68%, although here the assessment is less positive in Maghreb and Mashreq countries, where only 53% see progress, against 78% among EU respondents; the one on Information and Communication II (68%) and Euro-Med Youth (59%, particularly appreciated by women and EU respondents – 70% and 73%, respectively, see progress – and less so by Maghreb and Mashreq respondents – 42% and 35%, respectively – and the one on Gender Equality (59%, with a remarkable 68% for Maghreb respondents).⁸ The Survey does not allow us to attribute such progress in any of these fields to EU cooperation with MPCs or rather to internal dynamics in the latter.

Question 1.5.

Social Development and Cultural Exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Gender equality (participation of women in economic life)	186	119	12	317	33	350
	59%	38%	4%	100%	9%	
Civil society promotion and participation	178	130	19	327	26	353
	54%	40%	6%	100%	7%	
Information and communication II	197	88	10	295	56	351
	67%	30%	3%	100%	16%	
Euro-Med Youth	161	99	15	275	74	349
	59%	36%	5%	100%	21%	
Dialogue between cultures and cultural heritage	225	83	25	333	19	352
	68%	25%	8%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

1.3.4. Justice and Home Affairs (and Priorities)

In contrast, progress in this new field of cooperation (integrated in 2005 into the EMP) is assessed in a very negative way in all fields related to migration: 83% see no progress or even regression in addressing the “brain drain” caused by migration (96% in the case of Maghreb respondents, and only 64% for EU respondents), 71% in significantly reducing the level of illegal migration and trafficking of human beings (here the assessment is reversed: 42% of Maghreb and 40% of Mashreq respondents see progress in this area, for only 23% of EU respondents), and 69% in promoting legal migration opportunities (83% for Mashreq countries). In the field of migration, however, the assessment is more positive regarding the facilitation of the flow of remittance transfers (51% see progress in this field, but only 38% in the case of Mashreq countries and 40% in the case of Turkey).

8. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, pp. 55-56.

In the field of judicial cooperation there is a rather positive assessment of progress (57% of respondents) but, this notwithstanding, 69% consider that there has been no progress or a regression in the modernization and efficiency of the administration of justice.

In this field again, one of the most recent of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the number of “Don’t know” answers is very high, 17% on average.


Question 1.4.

4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Promote legal migration opportunities	98	153	67	318	28	346
	31%	48%	21%	100%	8%	
Facilitate flow of remittance transfers	135	108	21	264	82	346
	51%	41%	8%	100%	24%	
Address “brain drain”	50	191	62	303	45	348
	17%	63%	20%	100%	13%	
Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration and trafficking in human beings	90	158	67	315	33	348
	29%	50%	21%	100%	9%	
Promote modernisation and efficiency of administration of justice	93	176	25	294	52	346
	32%	60%	9%	100%	15%	
Reinforce judicial cooperation	156	107	13	276	68	344
	57%	39%	5%	100%	20%	
Promote the ratification/implementation of the relevant UN conventions for organised crime	125	100	12	237	110	347
	53%	42%	5%	100%	32%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security



Proposals regarding multilateral programmes

A network focusing on political reform, based on diplomats, academics and other civil society actors, potentially regional in scope but allowing for reinforced cooperation.

Programmes ayant pour implication la mixité femmes hommes.

A specific programme for enhancing the role of science and technology in Med Countries.

The implementation of Info Points in Med Countries for cooperation in S/T, studies and events for enhancing the awareness of the importance of S/T could be part of a regional Project.

Des projets qui font participer les universités de façon plus opérationnelle, stages, formations, professionnalisation, auprès des entreprises européennes.

Capacity-building for local authorities.

Create more opportunities for exchange of information, know-how and experience in the areas of art, culture and media.

Donner une haute priorité à la coopération judiciaire et à l'amélioration de la justice.

La priorité est à l'environnement, à l'éducation et au transfert de savoir et de savoir faire.

Les questions cruciales dans les pays du sud : environnement, patrimoine, éducation, micro crédit, emploi, projets culturels.

More focus on media freedom and building independent and pluralistic media; there should be a dedicated media development line in the EMP.

Getting to know each other should be the priority.

Il s'agit aussi de renforcer le financement des programmes existant, qui est absolument insuffisant.

Sensibilisation de l'opinion publique et de la société civile aux programmes euromed et à leurs résultats.

Employment and social conditions had not been the focus.

Recherche sur l'histoire commune et le patrimoine commun.

Two existing programmes are of great importance. First is the South-South regional integration programme. More financial and intellectual resources should be allocated to it. The second is that of cultural sensitization and exchanges. One of the focuses of the programme should be the common Mediterranean heritage and history.

Une agence pour le développement et la coopération touristique méditerranéenne.

Un Programme en matière d'eau, un Programme de reboisement à grande échelle, un Programme de développement agricole, tenant compte des spécificités climatiques des régions méditerranéennes.

Empowerment of women at all levels, working with youth, raising awareness and capacity-building for them.

Il est intéressant de bien mettre en œuvre les projets en cours et de les améliorer avant de lancer de nouveaux programmes.

L'alphabétisation intégrale des membres de la société ; l'apprentissage de la démocratie.

1.4. Assessment of New ENP Multilateral Programmes

As far as the European Neighbourhood Policy priority areas are concerned, assessment of progress is clearly positive ("Progress" exceeding "No progress" plus "Regression" answers) for the following areas:

- Business-to-business contacts (73% against 27%).
- Educational, cultural, youth and research exchanges (72%-28%).
- Enhanced support for reforms and efforts to improve the trade and economic regulatory environment (66%-34%, and even more positive in the case of Mashreq respondents).
- Enhanced civil society participation in the ENP (59%-41%, with a wide variation between the very positive assessment of Mashreq respondents – 73% see progress – and Mediterranean EU Member States – only 47% see progress).
- Building the thematic (in particular energy and transport) dimension of the ENP (60%-40% on average, but Mashreq respondents have a much less positive view, with only 42% seeing progress for energy and transport networks, whereas EU respondents see progress in 71% of cases).
- Exchanges between regional and local authorities (57%-43%).

In contrast, there are some areas where assessment of progress is very negative:


- Facilitating mobility and managing migration (with 83% seeing no progress or even regression for visa facilitation, and slightly less for readmission and border management).
- Strengthening of financial cooperation, in particular maximizing the impact and leverage of scarce resources (efficiency, where 71% see no progress or even regression) and the Governance Facility (62%). In this regard, the percentage of “Don’t know” is always higher than 20%.
- Possibility of alignment with CFSP declarations (67%).
- More active EU role in regional or multilateral conflict resolution efforts (59%).

In all cases, Maghreb respondents have a less positive or more negative view of cooperation in the different fields, reflected in a typical 10-plus percentage point difference against the average in the number of respondents seeing progress in each area. Within the Maghreb, Algerian respondents have a much more negative assessment, with a typical 15 to 20 percentage point difference, sometimes even 30, against only a 5-7 point difference for Tunisian and Moroccan respondents. In some cases, however, all Maghreb respondents share a markedly more negative assessment, for instance in relation to the possibility of alignment with CFSP declarations, extension of EU transport and energy networks to neighbouring countries, participation in relevant Community agencies and programmes, maximizing the impact of scarce resources or improved coordination between Member States and EC assistance.


Question 1.11.

Among the priorities defined in 2005, for which do you consider progress was achieved and for which do you think that there was no progress or even regression?


Enhancing the economic and trade component




Facilitating mobility and managing migration




Promoting people-to-people exchanges




Building a thematic dimension to the ENP




Strengthening political cooperation



Enhancing regional cooperation



Strengthening financial cooperation



A particularly important evaluation relates to the new multilateral programmes launched in the framework of the ENP, since they have completed their first period of operations.⁹ Question 1.12 provides an assessment of their implementation. The first outstanding feature is the high level of “Don’t know” answers collected for most of these programmes, up to 40% of the answers in some cases, which is not surprising if one takes into account the fact that those programmes became operational during the last two years.

Beyond this widespread lack of knowledge, assessment of their implementation is balanced to positive, with typically less than 20% of respondents considering them disappointing or very disappointing (0-3) and slightly above 25% considering them positive or very positive (7-10 on a scale of 0-10). The exception is the Governance Facility, which provokes some scepticism: 31% judge it disappointing or very disappointing and only 18% positive or very positive. Looking at answers by groups of countries, it is worth mentioning that TAIEX has a rather negative image in Maghreb countries (30% consider it disappointing or very disappointing against 16% positive or very positive), the same as happens for twinning programmes (28% disappointing against 24% positive) and the promotion of education and student mobility (37% against 16%). Most but not all of this differentiated negative assessment is due to answers from Algerian respondents.

9. See *Report on the Status and Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, pp. 37-40.

Question 1.12.

How do you assess the implementation so far of the new multilateral programmes of the ENP?

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes (Spain-Morocco Programme, Italy-Tunisia Programme and the Mediterranean Basin Programme)	0	8	11	19	31	56	49	45	18	6	1	244	5.36	88	332	
	0%	3%	5%	8%	13%	23%	20%	18%	7%	2%	0%	100%		27%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchanges) and SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management)	3	5	9	26	28	43	50	32	10	3	0	209	5.07	124	333	
	1%	2%	4%	12%	13%	21%	24%	15%	5%	1%	0%	100%		37%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Twinning programmes	2	3	11	24	32	45	45	34	21	6	2	225	5.33	97	322	
	1%	1%	5%	11%	14%	20%	20%	15%	9%	3%	1%	100%		30%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
NIF (Trust Fund Agreement for infrastructure interconnection of transport and energy, or environmental concerns, €250 million for 2007-2010)	2	2	8	22	23	43	45	33	15	2	3	198	5.35	135	333	
	1%	1%	4%	11%	12%	22%	23%	17%	8%	1%	2%	100%		41%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Promoting higher education and student mobility (scholarship scheme)	8	9	16	37	35	49	55	41	32	9	2	293	5.16	45	338	
	3%	3%	5%	13%	12%	17%	19%	14%	11%	3%	1%	100%		13%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
"Governance Facility" (€50 million a year for 2007-10)	9	9	20	32	38	33	46	28	10	5	1	231	4.63	103	4.63	
	4%	4%	9%	14%	16%	14%	20%	12%	4%	2%	0%	100%		31%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1.5. Assessment of the UfM

The UfM inception (2007-July 2008) has been surrounded by intense polemics on its scope and structure, and in the year since it was established it has been blocked for political reasons for more than eight months.¹⁰ This means that any assessment is related, by definition, to the UfM as a *project* rather than to its implementation or progress as such. This may lend the assessment a certain positive bias, since it refers to promises and projects rather than reality and as the UfM purported precisely to address the shortcomings of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Answers to the question about the contribution of the general objectives of the UfM to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP (Question 3.2) show a moderate optimism, with, depending on the aspect considered, between 35% and 50% thinking that it will make a positive or very positive contribution and less than 25% attributing to it a negative or very negative contribution (see Table below). Up to 5% of the respondents are very positive (10 on the scale) regarding the fact that the Union for the Mediterranean is increasing the visibility of the EuroMed process (10% for EU Mediterranean countries); this is also true for the upgrading of the political level of the relations (3% at 10), the reinforcement of the institutional balance (3% at 10, 7% for Maghreb countries), the promotion of co-ownership (5% at 10, 9% for Maghreb respondents) and the concentration on some regional projects (5% at 10). On the other hand, for the same questions the level of very negative opinion (0 on the scale) is on average also at the 5% level. This shows very clearly a deep polarization in the opinions of the respondents. Mashreq respondents show a smaller incidence of very positive answers (1% on average) and Maghreb respondents a higher incidence of very negative ones (7% on average), but also of very positive ones.

Question 3.2.

In your opinion, what is the contribution of the general objectives of the Union for the Mediterranean in relation to the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

	Very negative											Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Increase the visibility of the EuroMed Process	9	12	20	28	21	37	44	66	62	13	15	327	5.79
	3%	4%	6%	9%	6%	11%	13%	20%	19%	4%	5%	100%	
Upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners	16	11	12	27	25	46	58	66	42	14	10	327	5.56
	5%	3%	4%	8%	8%	14%	18%	20%	13%	4%	3%	100%	
Reinforce the institutional balance between the EU and the MPCs	20	13	22	22	28	52	52	52	34	18	10	323	5.28
	6%	4%	7%	7%	9%	16%	16%	16%	11%	6%	3%	100%	
Promote more co-ownership within EuroMed multilateral relations	17	6	20	32	22	44	57	53	42	13	16	322	5.52
	5%	2%	6%	10%	7%	14%	18%	16%	13%	4%	5%	100%	
Concentrate on some fundamental regional projects	12	9	14	18	19	55	42	68	44	28	15	324	5.94
	4%	3%	4%	6%	6%	17%	13%	21%	14%	9%	5%	100%	

The answer is less clear when it comes (in Question 3.3) to the contribution of the new partners of the EMP (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Mauritania and Montenegro). Answers tend to point to a low expected contribution of these new partners (with the exception of Croatia, for which 30% of respondents see a low or no contribution and 25% high or very high contribution, for all other new partner countries the percentage of respondents seeing a low or no contribution exceeds 40%, more than double the number of those who see a high or very high contribution). Mauritania seems to be the new partner country from which the lowest contribution is expected by all groups of respondents (interestingly, this lack of expectations is particularly strong among Algerian respondents). The same pattern applies for the assessment of the contribution of new Mediterranean European partners to the EMP: the most negative answers (except for Croatia) come from non-Mediterranean EU Member States.

The acceptance of the League of Arab States as a Permanent Observer in 2008 is seen with divided opinions: 27% of respondents think that it will not strengthen the EMP or will do so to a very low extent and 35% are positive about its integration into the EMP. Interestingly, Maghreb respondents have a slightly less positive view (with 12% of very negative answers: 0 on the scale) despite the fact that all Maghreb countries are members of the Arab League, whereas Mashreq countries have a slightly more positive view of it.

“Las cosas iban razonablemente bien a pesar del contexto político negativo hasta que la iniciativa Sarkozy, con una evaluación excesivamente negativa y poco documentada del Proceso de Barcelona, paralizó todas las actuaciones y a partir de ahí ni funciona lo mucho o poco que ya funcionaba ni se ha puesto en marcha nada nuevo.”

Spanish respondent

“It is difficult to understand in which respect the UfM is a union.”

Egyptian respondent

“By complementing EMP policies with very practical projects, the UfM has the chance to improve the perception of the EuroMed cooperation among the southern partner states.”

Hungarian respondent

“Si un partenariat réel et équitable était vraiment mis en oeuvre, comme annoncé par l’UpM, cela pourrait apporter un progrès. Aujourd’hui l’UpM n’apporte aucun progrès dans ce domaine par rapport au PB.”

French respondent

“The move to the UFM was a decision taken randomly without any former and in depth analysis.”

Lebanese respondent

“Some achievements were associated with the 2005 summit, despite the poor attendance by leaders from the South. Renewed interest was stimulated by the Sarkozy initiative, but the delay in implementing the UfM has been demoralizing for all.”

British respondent

Question 3.3.

To what extent do you think that the new partners of the EMP will strengthen it?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Not at all					To high extent									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Albania in 2006	17	29	32	35	25	40	23	27	15	2	3	248	4	71	320
	7%	12%	13%	14%	10%	16%	9%	11%	6%	1%	1%	100%		23%	
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2006	18	23	27	36	36	41	25	29	13	3	3	254	4.13	68	322
	7%	9%	11%	14%	14%	18%	13%	11%	10%	2%	2%	100%		18%	
Croatia in 2008	11	15	27	27	36	46	34	30	25	5	5	261	4.72	58	319
	4%	6%	10%	10%	14%	18%	13%	11%	10%	2%	2%	100%		18%	
Mauritania in 2005	26	26	31	35	20	44	30	25	11	4	3	255	3.93	63	318
	10%	10%	12%	14%	8%	17%	12%	10%	4%	2%	1%	100%		20%	
Montenegro in 2008	18	20	26	32	29	40	33	26	16	5	3	248	4.3	70	318
	7%	8%	10%	13%	12%	16%	13%	10%	6%	2%	1%	100%		22%	
League of Arab States as a Permanent Observer in 2008	27	11	12	24	24	47	35	31	39	15	15	280	5.22	37	317
	10%	4%	4%	9%	9%	17%	13%	11%	14%	5%	5%	100%		12%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

The contribution of the new projects approved in the framework of the UfM to the achievements of the objectives of the EMP is assessed positively by most of the respondents (more than 60% see a positive or very positive contribution of the Mediterranean Solar Plan and De-pollution of the Mediterranean, and between 50% and 60% of the other four projects (see table of answers to Question 3.7 below). Again, one should note here a not negligible percentage of very positive opinions (up to 11% for the De-pollution of the Mediterranean and for renewable energies, for example, and 10% for the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative). This must be seen in combination with the ranking of priorities for action in 2010 derived from answers to Question 5.2 (see Section 7). It seems to indicate that any concrete initiative, even if it does not correspond exactly to action priorities, is welcomed by experts and actors, as well as the positive bias affecting future projects as against already implemented ones.

By groups of countries, it is interesting to see that Maghreb countries, and in particular Moroccan and Tunisian respondents, see the potential contribution of the UfM projects to the achievement of the EMP objectives as significantly more positive than the average, and the contrary happens for Mashreq respondents: they see it as slightly but significantly less positive.

Question 3.7.

How do you assess the possible contribution of the regional projects selected at the July 2008 Paris Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Not at all					To a high extent									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
De-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea	6	4	9	15	23	29	39	65	60	24	33	307	6.58	21	328
	2%	1%	3%	5%	7%	9%	13%	21%	20%	8%	11%	100%		6%	
Maritime and land highways	3	7	9	14	20	38	33	57	57	24	20	282	6.4	31	313
	1%	2%	3%	5%	7%	13%	12%	20%	20%	9%	7%	100%		10%	
Civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters	6	3	6	16	16	52	44	59	54	17	21	294	6.32	31	325
	2%	1%	2%	5%	5%	18%	15%	20%	18%	6%	7%	100%		10%	
Alternative energies: Mediterranean solar plan	4	6	10	8	16	32	30	49	79	31	32	297	6.83	24	321
	1%	2%	3%	3%	5%	11%	10%	16%	27%	10%	11%	100%		7%	
Higher education and research, Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia and Fez	3	6	3	14	19	48	41	60	60	28	25	307	6.57	22	329
	1%	2%	1%	5%	6%	16%	13%	20%	20%	9%	8%	100%		7%	
Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises	4	5	6	12	23	33	40	56	60	27	28	294	6.62	31	325
	1%	2%	2%	4%	8%	11%	14%	19%	20%	9%	10%	100%		10%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

In contrast, the probability that these projects will attract financial resources from outside the EU (Question 3.8), as planned in the Paris and Marseille Declarations,¹¹ is seen with slightly more scepticism and divided opinions by the experts and actors surveyed. 28% consider it improbable or very improbable, although another 27% think it is probable or very probable. Here, Mashreq respondents have a particularly optimistic view (37% think it probable or very probable against only 21% improbable or very improbable), whereas non-Mediterranean EU countries have a much more sober approach (37% see it as improbable or very improbable and only 13% as probable).

11. See *Report on the Status and Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, pp. 31-32.

Question 3.8.

How do you assess the probability that the Union for the Mediterranean projects will attract financial resources from outside the EU (i.e. from Gulf countries, international private investors, international financial institutions or other sources)?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very improbable					Very probable									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
UfM Funds	14	16	28	27	27	66	43	46	16	17	4	304	4.91	24	328
	5%	5%	9%	9%	9%	22%	14%	15%	5%	6%	1%	100%		7%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1.6. Added Value, Coherence and Articulation, Differentiation Strategies and Visibility of the EMP

This rather positive but divided view of the UfM is confirmed by the assessment of the added value of the UfM for the EMP and the ENP: 41% of respondents think it will bring a high or very high added value (7-10 on the scale), although another 27% attribute a low or very low added value (0-3 on the scale). This seems to confirm the view of the UfM as a step further in the Euro-Mediterranean Process.

Question 3.1.

Is the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) an added value for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy?

	Assessments											Total	Aver.
	Very disappointing					Very positive							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)	17	31	24	20	29	36	42	56	33	26	20	334	5.66
	5%	9%	7%	6%	9%	11%	13%	17%	10%	8%	6%	100%	

The assessment is much less positive, however, when respondents are asked about the coherence and articulation between the different layers of EU-MPC cooperation: the EMP, ENP, UfM and EU enlargement process (affecting Turkey and eventually Croatia) (Question 1.15). Here the results point to a clear perceived lack of coherence: 48% detect a partial or total lack of coherence (0 to 3 on the scale), whereas only a meagre 11% see coherence between those different schemes (7 to 10 on the scale). Only 1% see an excellent level of coherence (10/10). This assessment is even more marked among Maghreb respondents (62%-8%), in particular Algerian ones.

Question 1.15.

Do you think there is coherence and articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU enlargement process?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.
	Total lack of coherence					Excellent level of coherence							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Coherence and articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU enlargement process?	17	32	42	67	38	47	50	17	13	4	2	329	3.9
	5%	10%	13%	20%	12%	14%	15%	5%	4%	1%	1%	100%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

At the same time, this critical assessment of the coherence between the different EU strategies towards its neighbouring countries does not prevent respondents from quite positively valuing the drive to differentiation and reinforced cooperation schemes inaugurated in the Mediterranean with the agreement on the Advanced Status of Morocco in the EU (Question 1.16). 37% of respondents think that this new development is beneficial or very beneficial to the EMP and the ENP (7-10 on the scale), and only 21% think it is detrimental or very detrimental (0-3). Again, the Maghreb respondents show a differentiated approach: 43% of Tunisian and Moroccan respondents assess differentiation and reinforced cooperation as beneficial against 22.3% as detrimental. Algerians are far more sceptical, with 59% seeing it as detrimental or very detrimental and no respondent seeing it as beneficial.

Question 1.16.

Do you think there is coherence and articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU enlargement process?

	Assessments											Total	Aver.
	Very detrimental					Very beneficial							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Added value of differentiation and strengthened cooperation	14	10	16	29	25	59	51	55	36	19	11	325	5.49
	4%	3%	5%	9%	8%	18%	16%	17%	11%	6%	3%	100%	

“It does not appear that there is sufficient coordination or understanding of how the different programmes are articulated. Rather they seem to sit in different political constituencies.”

British respondent

“Ces cadres de coopération se juxtaposent plus qu’ils ne se complètent. La multiplication des cadres laissent penser que les précédents sont peu efficaces.”

Algerian respondent

“Each policy contains elements that represent differing and even competing agendas, and it is not always clear whether this is by accident or by design. Policies often torpedo each other, thereby illustrating how member states continue to come to terms with what their actual common denominator in the Mediterranean is and by which methods these goals are best achieved.”

German respondent

“The ENP is not subsidiary to the EMP but substitutive of it. The limit of the EMP relies on the limits of its engagement and the implementation forms chosen for it (top-down and political conditionality). The evil of the ENP is not in the details but in its aims and methods: to destabilize other national economies and regional approaches.”

Danish respondent

“Too many structures have been established. It will probably create problems with coherence and overlapping.”

Polish respondent

“Not only is there a lack of coherence but the rapid succession in which these constructs emerged created confusion even among those closely following Euro-Mediterranean relations. Before the association agreements concluded under the EMP had borne any fruit, the ENP emerged. The ENP had barely been understood by the very few officials directly dealing with it when the Union for the Mediterranean was born.”

Egyptian respondent

«Es difícil que haya coherencia cuando alguna de las iniciativas es totalmente improvisada y no se ha dispuesto aún del tiempo suficiente para lograr articular el conjunto. Además, la PEV y la UpM responden a filosofías de partida muy distintas y ambas han venido a sobreponerse a la AEM que, a pesar de no funcionar con toda la eficacia deseada, contaba por lo menos con unas estructuras institucionales ya muy rodadas.»

Spanish respondent

“Une inflation d’initiatives qui dénote les divergences ente les pays de l’UE.”

Algerian respondent

1.7. Institutionalization of the UfM

1.7.1. The Co-Presidency

The working of the new institutional architecture of the EMP can hardly be assessed more than a year after its establishment, due to the political paralysis the UfM has suffered for most of its period of existence. This notwithstanding, the Co-Presidency system is perhaps the

only one of the new institutions which has remained operational over most of this time, and respondents again have a polarized view of how effective it has been in strengthening a true partnership and ownership. 30% of respondents think that it has been effective or very effective (7-10 on the scale), whereas 31% consider that the Co-Presidency system has been ineffective or very ineffective (0-3 on the scale). However, a high percentage (13%) consider it very ineffective (0-1) and 9% very effective (9-10), showing a high division of opinions on this new development.

Question 3.4.

In your view, how effective is the new Co-Presidency system introduced to strengthen a true partnership and ownership of the EMP?

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very ineffective						Very effective									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Co-Presidency system	24	15	25	27	30	39	42	48	13	22	4	289	4.81	38	327	
	8%	5%	9%	9%	10%	13%	15%	17%	4%	8%	1%	100%		12%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

In the open questions, respondents reflect the dilemmas surrounding the Co-Presidency. They see it as "a first step in the right direction" (Danish respondent) and "a sign of equality among people around the Mediterranean basin" (Algerian respondent) that gives "more responsibility to southern partners" (Italian respondent). However, at the same time, they express serious doubts about its operation: "it maintains a separation between North and South, and will possibly complicate the decision-making process, as well as South-South cooperation" (Algerian respondent), as well as the fact that "this depends on the institutional support each Co-Presidency gets" (Egyptian respondent). In any case, "It is still to be tested" (Tunisian respondent). Criticism of the way France and Egypt have exerted the Co-Presidency is frequent, in particular for having "their own agenda" (Spanish respondent), and the lack of transparency of the decision-making process. Criticism comes mainly from Maghreb respondents.

"Theoretically, it is a good idea but practically it is not clear for me which is the role of each one of the Co-Presidencies, or if its role is clearly defined."

Spanish respondent

"A Co-Presidency system is a sign of equality among people around the Mediterranean basin."

Algerian respondent

"A Co-Presidency system maintains a separation between North and South, and will possibly complicate the decision-making process, as well as South-South cooperation."

Algerian respondent

"Co-Presidency will heighten responsibility and feeling of own significance for the Southern Mediterranean countries. Well, they have been endeavouring from the very beginning to do this in order to co-share the process of Euromed partnership."

Czech respondent

“Il s'agit d'un échec total. Les décisions sont prises de manière non transparente au risque de voir un désengagement des pays membres du partenariat. Il convient de définir enfin les compétences de ce système afin de restaurer la confiance.”

Luxembourg respondent

“La co-présidence nous paraît une très bonne chose à la condition d'y associer les différents experts de la société civile, mais également d'avoir des retours qualitatifs des programmes développés dans ces partenariats euro méditerranéens et des places et rôles de ces mêmes acteurs.”

French respondent

“It gives the impression that the EuroMed relation stands on an equal footing, which is essential and crucial for further development.”

Lebanese respondent

“This depends on the institutional support each Co-President will get. Obviously, the institutional capabilities of European and SEM countries differ. If the European chair of the UfM gets support from the European Commission, the gap in capabilities will be even wider.”

Egyptian respondent

The work of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), which has been in operation since 2004,¹² is judged with less indulgence by the actors and experts surveyed: 30% of them (42% for Maghreb respondents) consider it disappointing or very disappointing (0-3 on the scale), against only 18% who consider it positive or very positive (7-10 on the scale). The number of “Don't know” answers is quite high (24%) showing a clear lack of visibility of the initiatives of this institution (38% in the case of Turkey and 34% for non-Mediterranean EU countries), which is confirmed by the free comments of respondents. The latter stress the problems of democratic legitimacy, representativeness and effectiveness of the EMPA.

Question 2.2.

What is your assessment of the work achieved by the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) in 2005-2009

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative						Very positive								
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly	8	19	26	24	37	53	41	25	14	5	1	253	4.52	79	332
	3%	8%	10%	9%	15%	21%	16%	10%	6%	2%	0%	100%		24%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don't know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don't know” answers

12. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, p. 21.

“The EMPA, a lot of talk, no follow-up.”

Romanian respondent

“You rarely hear about the EMPA.”

Italian respondent

“Cette instance n’a pas assez de poids pour influencer les décisions prises par les gouvernements.”

Algerian respondent

“Agissant à titre consultatif, l’APEM n’est pas du tout visible sur la scène politique.”

French respondent

“Les parlementaires des PPM ne sont pas représentatifs ; les thèmes discutés ne reflètent pas les vraies priorités des PPM. Du moins les parlementaires du Sud prennent-ils conscience de leurs limitations à la faveur des contacts avec les confrères européens. La prise de conscience peut produire un effet positif à long terme.”

Tunisian respondent

“The European Parliament, within the clearly defined European integration process, took decades to assert for itself roles and functions. It cannot be conceivable that the Parliamentary Assembly does effective work in the EMP. An additional reason that Parliaments in many countries, of which the Parliamentary Assembly is an emanation, are only formal bodies with no real legislative or control functions.”

Egyptian respondent

In this respect, it is interesting that the assessment of the potential contribution to the EMP of the new Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (EMRLA),¹³ designed to be a channel of political representation of local and regional authorities in the EMP following the model of the EMPA, receives a more positive welcome. According to the results of Question 3.6, 40% of respondents see it as a potential major improvement in the EMP (7-10 on the scale), against 25% seeing it as little or no improvement (0-3 on the scale). Again, new projects and developments receive a vote of trust by experts and actors in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

“It is just another institution; it would be more important to make the currently existing structures work.”

German respondent

“It might improve the EMP, but it depends on the position of the local and regional authorities in their own countries (South and East Mediterranean), as well as their participation in the decision-making process.”

Polish respondent

13. See *Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Status & Progress 2009*, p. 23.

1.7.2. The Secretariat of the UfM in Barcelona

The establishment of the UfM Secretariat based in Barcelona is the most innovative institutional change in the EMP system brought about by the UfM. Because of the political paralysis of the UfM until July 2009, its actual establishment has suffered a delay, but negotiations regarding its Statutes are well on course, so that it might begin operating in early 2010. This is the only new institution to be created which seems not to have a role for the whole EMP, but only for the UfM projects. Its functions will be limited, in principle, to the identification and follow-up of UfM projects, the promotion of new projects and the search for funding and for implementation partners. The Secretariat will have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status and its mandate will be of a technical nature subject to the guidelines of Senior Officials, but it will be composed of seconded officials from participants in the process. It will have one Secretary General and six Deputy Secretary Generals.

Expectations about its role in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are quite high, with 52% of respondents expecting it to play an important or key role in the EMP (7-10 on the scale; 19%, 9-10), against 19% considering that it will play a negligible role (0-3 on the scale). This optimism about the future role of the Secretariat is stronger among Maghreb respondents (61% expect an important or key role) and Mediterranean EU country respondents (54%).

Question 3.5.

Do you expect that the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, to be established in Barcelona as approved in the Marseille Conference, will play a key, moderate or negligible role in the new institutional architecture of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

	Role of UfM in the new institutional architecture											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Negligible role						Key role								
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
The role of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean	6	11	18	22	24	32	34	50	47	38	18	300	6.07	30	330
	2%	4%	6%	7%	8%	11%	11%	17%	16%	13%	6%	100%		9%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Beyond those assigned in the Marseille Conference, the other functions respondents would attribute to the Secretariat include the following:

"Veiller à la formation et à l'émergence d'une conscience méditerranéenne."

Tunisian respondent

"To help South-South cooperation."

Italian respondent

"Tiene que llegar a ser el centro impulsor, generador de ideas, gestor de proyectos y centro visible de una incipiente organización regional mediterránea."

Spanish respondent

“The UfM is an intergovernmental process, not an integration one. Secretariats of intergovernmental processes do not play the active role that organs such as the EU Commission carry out. Their role is made more difficult when there are differences in interests, in addition to conflicts between some members.”

Egyptian respondent

“La gestión de los fondos multilaterales de vecindad europeos.”

Spanish respondent

“Very badly designed, constrained by political problems, no selection of staff with serious expertise criteria, too politically biased and controlled. No place for objectivity, transparency and substance.”

Lebanese respondent

“A la condition qu’il puisse avoir les moyens de fonctionner, d’être une institution de proposition, et aussi d’être un acteur de promotion dans ces politiques des relations euro med. Promotion au travers de rencontres régionaux, tout en associant une participation des sociétés civiles mais aussi de trouver des points relais tels que des experts locaux.”

French respondent

“Le risque est de constituer une administration de bureaucrates qui aura à gérer des projets physiques sans cohérences par rapport aux objectifs finaux de l’Union.”

Algerian respondent

“De toutes les façons tout dépend de l’envergure et de la compétence de la personnalité qui en assume la responsabilité.”

Moroccan respondent

“Aggressively pursue a policy of promoting human rights and democracy in Southern Mediterranean States.”

Italian respondent

“The real functioning of the UfM will depend on the efficiency of the Co-Presidency which needs the technical support of the Secretariat. The future Secretariat in Barcelona will have important functions in terms of technical support and the role of the link between different parties. Barcelona as a seat for the Secretariat is well chosen (symbolic meaning as a reward for the Barcelona Process).”

Croatian respondent

02

RESOURCES AND FUNDS

In the view of many of the respondents of the Survey, the lack of financial resources is not a major obstacle for the achievement of the objectives of the EMP. 38% consider that the current level of budget appropriation of the ENP is insufficient or very insufficient (0-3 on the scale), whereas in Question 1.2 on the main obstacles to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP only 25% considered the insufficient budget allocation as a major obstacle. At the other end of the spectrum, a stunning 21% of respondents consider them sufficient (7-10 on the scale) and often indicate that the problem is the use and effectiveness of resources, rather than their volume. This is consistent with the lack of progress that 71% of respondents see in the maximization of the impact and leverage of scarce resources in their answers to Question 1.11 (see section 1.4). It is the Maghreb and Mediterranean EU respondents that tend to consider resources insufficient with a higher frequency, while Mashreq (where the presence of Gulf financiers is more widespread) and non-Mediterranean EU respondents (who tend to see themselves as contributors) regard it as quite sufficient.

Question 1.14.

Do you think that the financial resources of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument are sufficient to reach the objectives of the ENP? (for 2007-2010, €2,962 million for Mediterranean Country Programmes and €343.3 million for the Regional Programme-South plus €277.1 million for Mediterranean Cross-Border Cooperation and some additional resources for thematic programmes)

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very insufficient						Sufficient									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Financial Resources of the ENP	7	26	25	53	38	45	34	24	18	10	11	291	4.56	43	334	
	2%	9%	9%	18%	13%	15%	12%	8%	6%	3%	4%	100%		13%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

"Facing the challenges is not only about increasing finances, but it is more about the political environment, governance, and modalities of their spending."

Lebanese respondent

"Les montants alloués par habitant se révèlent nettement insuffisants considérant les sommes mobilisées pour les pays de l'Est."

Portuguese respondent

Along the same lines, the assessment of the implementation of FEMIP is rather positive. 34% consider it positive or very positive (7-10 on the scale) against only 15% who consider it disappointing or very disappointing. However, 31% of respondents do not have enough information about FEMIP (41% in Mashreq countries and 44% in non-Mediterranean EU countries).

Question 1.13.

What is your assessment of the implementation of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) (€5.2 billion of loans signed in 2005-2008 and a remaining lending envelope of €7.6 billion for 2009-2013, complemented by EU budgetary resources for Risk Capital and Technical Assistance operations, as well as a Trust Fund with contributions of Member States)?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative					Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Implementation of FEMIP	1	8	11	16	31	39	44	42	24	9	5	230	5.56	102	332
	0%	3%	5%	7%	13%	17%	19%	18%	10%	4%	2%	100%		31%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

03

COUNTRIES, STATES AND GOVERNMENTS: ASSESSMENT

The Survey attempts for the first time to gauge the commitment to the goals of the process of all EU Member States and MPCs.

Presidencies and Co-Presidencies of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

As in the EU, the political thrust and orientation of the EMP are determined by its rotating Presidency. Until 2008, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was managed, at the multilateral level, by the European Commission under the rotating Presidency of the EU (in consultation with MPCs through the Senior Officers and Euromed Committee meetings). This changed in July 2008 when the Co-Presidency system of the Union for the Mediterranean was established, giving the EMP a more inter-governmental tone. For 2008-2010, the Co-Presidency for the MPCs is run by Egypt; the EU Co-Presidency was assumed by the French EU Presidency in July-December 2008 and jointly by the EU Czech Presidency and France in January-June 2009 and by the EU Swedish Presidency and France in July-December 2009.

As seen above (Section 1.5), the appreciation of the effectiveness of the Co-Presidency system is unclear, with 30% considering that it is effective or very effective, against 31% who consider it ineffective or very ineffective (Question 3.4.). When it comes to the grading of the performance of the Egyptian and French Co-Presidencies, the assessment is equally balanced, although more favourable to the French Co-Presidency (5.09 on average, with 46% in the 6-10 bracket, but 11% grading it very poorly, 0-1) than to the Egyptian one (4.28, with 51% in the 0-4 bracket and a meagre 5% grading it 9-10). Assessment of both Co-Presidencies is much more negative in the case of Maghreb respondents (74% in the 0-4 bracket, with 32% in the 0-1 bracket for the Egyptian Co-Presidency, and 51% in the 0-4 bracket, 27% 0-1, for the French Co-Presidency), in particular Algerians.

As for the successive EU Presidencies in charge of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (in the case of the Czech one, the last considered in the Survey, jointly with the French Co-Presidency), assessment is quite clear for the two most recent ones:

- the Czech Presidency of the EU Council (January-June 2009) receives a very bad grade (3.42 on average, with 69% of answers between 0 and 4); no doubt this poor perception was influenced by the change in Government in the middle of the Presidency;
- the French Presidency of the EU Council (July-December 2008), under which the UfM was established and the Paris Summit and the Marseille Ministerial Conference took place, receives a relatively high grade (6.17, with 52% giving a 7 to 10 grade). This is clearly higher than the one given to the French Co-Presidency of the UfM, which might point to some disfunctionality in the UfM Co-Presidency system itself.

The rest of the former EU Council Presidencies receive average grades around 5, and they tend to be less and less remembered as time goes by, as shown by the percentage of "Don't know" answers.

Question 1.6.

How would you grade the action of the different Presidencies and Co-Presidencies of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

Assessment of EU Presidencies and MPC Co-Presidencies	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative					Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Austrian EU Presidency (January-June 2006)	5	16	23	41	36	48	15	18	8	4	1	215	4.163	133	348
	2%	7%	11%	19%	17%	22%	7%	8%	4%	2%	0%	100%		38%	
Finnish EU Presidency (July-December 2006)	4	10	15	23	30	56	34	38	26	8	3	247	5.219	102	349
	2%	4%	6%	9%	12%	23%	14%	15%	11%	3%	1%	100%		29%	
German EU Presidency (January-June 2007)	3	8	12	14	34	57	43	47	32	8	3	261	5.517	87	348
	1%	3%	5%	5%	13%	22%	16%	18%	12%	3%	1%	100%		25%	
Portuguese EU Presidency (July-December 2007)	3	4	11	20	40	48	55	43	25	9	1	259	5.436	86	345
	1%	2%	4%	8%	15%	19%	21%	17%	10%	3%	0%	100%		25%	
Slovenian EU Presidency (January-June 2008)	9	10	17	28	49	43	44	30	17	6	1	254	4.776	93	347
	4%	4%	7%	11%	19%	17%	17%	12%	7%	2%	0%	100%		27%	
French EU Presidency (July-December 2008)	5	10	17	11	22	41	44	64	47	34	15	310	6.174	42	352
	2%	3%	5%	4%	7%	13%	14%	21%	15%	11%	5%	100%		12%	
Czech EU Presidency (January-June 2009)	39	31	46	39	48	33	23	16	10	4	4	293	3.423	59	352
	13%	11%	16%	13%	16%	11%	8%	5%	3%	1%	1%	100%		17%	
Egyptian Co-Presidency of the EMP (July 2008-June 2009)	10	31	30	28	35	51	28	27	17	4	3	264	4.277	82	346
	4%	12%	11%	11%	13%	19%	11%	10%	6%	2%	1%	100%		24%	
French Co-Presidency of the EMP (July 2008-June 2009)	11	19	22	21	29	51	43	41	33	10	6	286	5.091	61	347
	4%	7%	8%	7%	10%	18%	15%	14%	12%	3%	2%	100%		18%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

3.1. Progress and Commitment of MPCs

Answers to Question 1.2 point clearly to the weak political will for reform of MPCs as one of the main obstacles to achieving the goals of the EMP. But the situation is not homogeneous across MPCs, and in order to guide policy choices in the future, in the framework of the principle of differentiation, it is very important to determine which countries are making more progress in reform, and exactly in which fields. Questions 1.7 and 1.8 aim to do so, based on the perceptions of experts and actors.

As far as the general progress of Mediterranean Partner Countries across all dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is concerned, only Morocco and Tunisia, and to a lesser extent Jordan, seem to pass the mark. Morocco gets a 6.09 average grade (on a 0-10 scale from very disappointing to very positive), with 47% of respondents in the 7-10 bracket and only 3% in the 0-1 bracket. As for Tunisia (5.25 average), 33% see positive or very positive progress against 8% of respondents who are very disappointed, whereas for Jordan (5.21) only 4% are very disappointed, against 26% who see positive or very positive progress.

Question 1.7. a)

How would you assess the progress of Mediterranean Partner Countries in the achievement of the objectives of the EMP in 2005-2009?

a) In general:	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**		
	Very negative					Very positive											
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10						
Mediterranean Partner Countries																	
Algeria	16	23	48	50	48	43	30	7	2	1	1	269	3.49	67	336		
	6%	9%	18%	19%	18%	16%	11%	3%	1%	0%	0%	100%		20%			
Egypt	7	19	31	34	44	56	43	33	11	4	1	283	4.46	52	335		
	2%	7%	11%	12%	16%	20%	15%	12%	4%	1%	0%	100%		16%			
Israel	42	18	32	23	28	30	33	24	19	7	2	258	3.93	73	331		
	16%	7%	12%	9%	11%	12%	13%	9%	7%	3%	1%	100%		22%			
Jordan	5	6	9	32	38	52	56	43	18	6	3	268	5.21	67	335		
	2%	2%	3%	12%	14%	19%	21%	16%	7%	2%	1%	100%		20%			
Lebanon	5	12	20	30	42	63	45	38	10	2	2	269	4.75	66	335		
	2%	4%	7%	11%	16%	23%	17%	14%	4%	1%	1%	100%		20%			
Morocco	3	6	8	16	28	46	49	61	51	22	6	296	6.08	40	336		
	1%	2%	3%	5%	9%	16%	17%	21%	17%	7%	2%	100%		12%			
Occup. Palestinian Ter.	32	24	35	36	33	37	42	20	15	1	0	275	3.78	56	331		
	12%	9%	13%	13%	12%	13%	15%	7%	5%	0%	0%	100%		17%			
Syria	30	33	36	44	48	37	19	7	4	1	1	260	4.18	73	333		
	12%	13%	14%	17%	18%	14%	7%	3%	2%	0%	0%	100%		22%			
Tunisia	7	17	20	19	25	48	52	48	36	5	4	281	5.25	52	333		
	2%	6%	7%	7%	9%	17%	19%	17%	13%	2%	1%	100%		16%			

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Syria, Algeria, Palestine and Israel get very negative results with a very high percentage of very disappointed respondents (respectively, 25%, 15%, 21% and 23% in the 0-1 bracket).

In general, Maghreb respondents tend to grade progress of MPCs slightly lower than the average, and Mashreq ones higher. Interestingly, the perception of Maghreb respondents about the progress achieved by Algeria is even more negative than the average (2.8 on average, 28% at 0-1, even 36.3% at 0-1 for Algerian respondents themselves); the perception of Maghreb respondents about progress in Morocco is also slightly lower than the average, whereas Spanish respondents grade Morocco higher than the average respondent. Israeli respondents are much more self-indulgent than the average (5.71 against 3.93 on average), and much more negative on Syria (2.1 against 3.18 averages). In any case, the results for Israel do not seem to be significant, as they are biased by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

By priority areas of the EMP, we asked respondents to name the three countries which had advanced most in each field, and the results are of course more nuanced (in any case, the high proportion of “Don’t know” answers in this question is notable, amounting typically to over 20% for the Political and Security Partnership, 35-40% for Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform, as well as for Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges, and 45-50% for Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security). When “Don’t know” answers exceeded 40%, we considered the answers not significant and they are not even mentioned in the analysis. As a rule of thumb, we underline progress of any country getting 100 mentions or more as a top performer in a particular field.

In the field of Political and Security Partnership, Morocco received more mentions for extending political pluralism and participation by citizens, followed by Lebanon and far behind Jordan and Israel. Again, Morocco and Lebanon are the top performers, according to the respondents, in relation to enabling citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level. As far as the participation of women in decision-making is concerned, Morocco again leads the field. In terms of freedom of expression and association, Lebanon and Morocco are the countries most often mentioned as having made more progress, followed by Israel. The same three countries, with Morocco standing out, lead the perceived progress in fostering civil society. Syria and Algeria are the countries mentioned least frequently for their progress in any of these regards.

In the socio-economic field, Tunisia surpasses Lebanon as the second in progress together with Morocco. The two Maghreb countries lead the ranking of progress for the following three dimensions: increase in North-South and South-South regional cooperation (this jointly with Egypt and Jordan), improving the business climate and creating more job opportunity for youths and increasing the percentage of women in employment. Tunisia is the lonely leader in reducing regional poverty rates. Syria and the Occupied Palestinian Territories are the countries least often mentioned on all dimensions, followed by Algeria.

Question 1.7. b)

In specific areas, please indicate the three countries which have made most progress in the respective thematic area.

1. Political and Security Partnership	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Occup. Palest. Territ.	Syria	Tunisia	Dkn	Total respondents
Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens	26	40	94	106	141	185	44	8	48	50	315
	8%	13%	30%	34%	45%	59%	14%	3%	15%	16%	
Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level	28	34	92	78	107	146	48	4	48	67	304
	9%	11%	30%	26%	35%	48%	16%	1%	16%	22%	
Increase the participation of women in decision-making	27	36	96	89	90	152	26	18	96	58	307
	9%	12%	31%	29%	30%	50%	9%	6%	31%	19%	
Ensure freedom of expression and association	30	33	105	83	136	137	31	6	31	70	306
	10%	11%	35%	27%	45%	45%	10%	2%	10%	23%	
Foster the role of civil society	25	43	103	88	121	141	45	12	35	61	301
	8%	14%	34%	29%	40%	47%	15%	4%	12%	20%	
Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions	27	59	23	73	60	96	23	9	49	133	297
	9%	20%	8%	25%	20%	33%	8%	3%	17%	45%	

2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Occup. Palest. Territ.	Syria	Tunisia	Dkn	Total respondents
Create more job opportunities for the increasing numbers of young people across the region	32	45	76	74	32	104	8	14	97	110	297
	11%	15%	26%	25%	11%	35%	3%	5%	33%	37%	
Improve business climate, in particular for SMEs	34	71	74	75	45	134	5	14	125	80	300
	11%	24%	25%	25%	15%	45%	2%	5%	42%	27%	
Reduce regional poverty rates	35	28	53	71	41	69	14	24	99	123	289
	12%	10%	18%	25%	14%	24%	5%	8%	34%	43%	
Reduce the prosperity gap and raise GDP growth rates	43	30	58	58	34	70	7	15	99	128	287
	15%	11%	20%	20%	12%	25%	2%	5%	35%	45%	
Increase in North-South and South-South regional cooperation	29	96	27	93	37	145	8	14	98	86	292
	10%	33%	9%	32%	13%	50%	3%	5%	34%	30%	
Increase in the percentage of women in employment in partner countries	34	34	60	53	64	91	10	15	92	117	288
	12%	12%	21%	18%	22%	31%	3%	5%	32%	41%	

In the field of Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges, the high percentage of “Don't know” answers and the dispersion of answers make it very difficult to draw conclusions on the progress of different MPCs: the only dimension in which two countries stand out is the increase of awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations, where Morocco and Jordan are perceived as the countries having made most progress. The countries least often mentioned as having experienced progress in this area are Syria, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Algeria and Egypt.

Question 1.7.b)

In specific areas. Please indicate the three countries which have made most progress in the respective thematic area.

3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Occup. Palest. Territ.	Syria	Tunisia	Dkn	Total respondents
	Halve the number of illiterate female and male adults and children	44 15%	40 14%	61 21%	64 22%	55 19%	54 18%	19 7%	32 11%		
Promote equitable access to quality education	24 8%	38 13%	90 31%	81 28%	60 21%	62 21%	15 5%	22 8%	79 27%	106 37%	290
Reduce disparities in educational achievement between Euro-Mediterranean states	16 6%	31 11%	58 20%	61 21%	51 18%	53 18%	13 5%	8 3%	60 21%	151 52%	288
Enhance graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education	24 8%	39 13%	90 31%	68 23%	56 19%	70 24%	11 4%	13 5%	73 25%	113 39%	291
Increase awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations	14 5%	78 27%	90 10%	93 32%	80 28%	108 37%	21 7%	20 7%	66 23%	93 32%	291

Concerning the issues of Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security, the high prevalence of “Don't know” answers prevents any significant conclusion to be drawn. However, Morocco again stands out as far as promoting legal migration opportunities and facilitating the flow of remittance transfers are concerned.

Question 1.7. b)

In specific areas. Please indicate the three countries which have made most progress in the respective thematic area.


4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Occup. Palest. Territ.	Syria	Tunisia	Dkn	Total respondents
	Promote legal migration opportunities	33 12%	41 15%	29 11%	40 15%	31 11%	101 37%	5 2%	10 4%		
Facilitate the flow of remittance transfers	31 11%	64 23%	25 9%	39 14%	57 20%	105 38%	5 2%	3 1%	63 23%	127 45%	280
Address "brain drain"	24 9%	40 15%	50 19%	43 16%	34 13%	64 24%	10 4%	16 6%	52 19%	138 51%	270
Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration, trafficking in human beings	54 20%	35 13%	24 9%	34 12%	14 12%	85 31%	6 2%	15 6%	70 26%	136 50%	275
Strengthen modernisation and efficiency of the administration of justice	20 7%	31 11%	38 14%	70 26%	52 19%	87 32%	9 3%	7 3%	49 18%	125 46%	273
Reinforce judicial cooperation	31 11%	44 16%	24 9%	53 19%	36 13%	89 32%	7 3%	8 3%	48 17%	137 50%	277
Promote the ratification/ implementation of the relevant UN conventions for organised crime	23 9%	38 14%	21 8%	52 19%	31 12%	60 22%	9 3%	10 4%	51 19%	150 56%	269

3.2. Turkey


Progress of Turkey in the fulfilment of political and economic criteria for the pre-accession process is judged positively overall. In terms of political criteria, progress is considered to be best in relation to regional issues and international obligations (only 17% grades 0-4, and 53% at 7 or more) and democracy and the rule of law (9% consider progress disappointing or very disappointing and 45% positive or very positive). Although progress in human rights and protection of minorities lags behind, it is also at acceptable levels (only 6% consider it very disappointing).

In relation to economic criteria, the assessment is even more positive, with more than 58% of respondents giving Turkey a grade of 7 or more in the three economic criteria.


Democracy and the rule of law



Human rights and protection of minorities




Regional issues and international obligations




10 = Very positive 0 = Very disappointing


The existence of functioning market economy



Ability to assume the obligations of membership



The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union



10 = Very positive 0 = Very disappointing

Logically, a high proportion of respondents expect Turkey to join the EU as a full Member State “in the next 20 years” (Question 4.3). 55% consider it probable or very probable (7-10) and only 22% see a very low probability or no probability at all (0-3) of this happening. This probability is assessed at the highest level by Turkish respondents themselves (83% of experts and actors who participated in the Survey consider it probable or very probable, and 25% grade the probability with a 10) and at the lowest level by Mashreq and non-Mediterranean EU Member States (for the latter, 27% consider that the probability is low or non-existent and 39% high or very high).

Question 4.3.

How do you assess the probability that Turkey will join the EU as a full Member State in the next 20 years?

	Degree of probability												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability			Very high probability												
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Turkey's prospects for accession to the EU	7	10	27	29	25	37	39	43	37	35	30	319	5.9	10	329	
	2%	3%	8%	9%	8%	12%	12%	13%	12%	11%	9%	100%		3%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

“As long as requirements for accession are met by Turkey and accession is made a priority issue by the political parties in Turkey, there is high probability that the EU members will see the benefits in further enlarging with Turkey in a not too distant future.”

Turkish respondent

“Because of several ethnic problems as well as the Cyprus problem Turkey still has little chance to be an EU member. The Islamist movement is another important obstacle.”

Cypriot respondent

“In the last half a decade the EU seemed to be less and less decided to include Turkey, regardless of the Turkish efforts; also the EU will be most likely to focus on solving internal problems rather than including new members with their own problems.”

Rumanian respondent

“It will take time but it will happen. It would be an important factor of the Euromed relations and can play a positive role in the Middle East conflict.”

German respondent

3.3. EU Member States' Commitment

Respondents were also asked to grade the degree of commitment of the EU Member States to the EMP in general on a very disappointing (0) to very positive scale (10) (Question 1.9).

Apart from the very high frequency of “Don’t know” answers for new Eastern European Member States (Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia, but also Luxembourg and Ireland), results are not surprising, but they are revealing. The four

most committed countries to the EMP, in the view of experts and actors who answered the Survey, are, in this order, Spain and France, but closely followed by Italy and surprisingly Sweden (for Spain, 69% of respondents grade its commitment in the 7-10 bracket, for France 65%, and for Italy and Sweden 46%). This might reveal that 2008-2010 provides a unique combination of EU Presidencies very favourable to the development and deepening of the EMP, an opportunity that might take a long time to emerge again. The other countries perceived as most committed to the Mediterranean are Mediterranean European countries such as Portugal, Malta and Greece, joined by Germany, Belgium and Finland.

At the other extreme of the spectrum, the new Eastern European Member States are perceived as the least committed to the EMP: nine out of the ten 2004 new Member States – leaving aside Malta and Cyprus – are graded under 4 on average (Slovenia is the only exception). Taking into account the increasing institutional weight of those countries in the EU, this puts a major question mark over the future of EU-Mediterranean relations. In any case, it seems obvious that there is an increasing divide between the Member States of the EU-27 as far as their respective commitments in EuroMed affairs is concerned.

In this respect, it is interesting to note that experts and actors originating from new Eastern European Member States tend to answer in general quite positively to the questions of the Survey. This complacency with the current situation may reflect a lower level of awareness about the challenges ahead in the Mediterranean. However, some issues, such as the potential accession of Turkey or the issue of the coherence of policies to the EU, are less positively considered. Paradoxically, the percentage of “Don't know” answers is relatively low.

“Il est bien évident que les pays de l'arc latin, notamment l'Espagne, semblent les plus impliqués.”

Syrian respondent

“Hoy, desgraciadamente, en muchas Cancillerías europeas no ribereñas parece que el Mediterráneo ya no está como tal entre sus prioridades, y vuelve a predominar la visión ‘Middle East.’”

Spanish respondent

“L'union des pays du Sud reste encore à construire, mais face à eux, les Etats membres de l'UE n'ont pas de politique étrangère commune et obéissent à la logique des relations bilatérales. Il n'y a pas de politique globale. L'engagement des Etats membres de l'UE est tributaire de leurs propres intérêts (sécurité, migration) et de leurs liens historiques (parfois ambigus) avec les Etats du Sud : La France, par exemple, oriente son aide principalement vers le Maghreb, l'Allemagne vers la Turquie. En outre, le PEM n'est pas connu des populations des 2 rives: celle du Sud, mais aussi celle du Nord.”

Moroccan respondent

“The Central European states are not deeply involved in the EMP cooperation, because their interests are situated more in the East of Europe (Ukraine, Russia, also South Caucasus and Belarus).”

Polish respondent

“The lack of interest of new member states is disappointing and that of Germany is bewildering.”

Israeli respondent

Question 1.9.

How would you assess the commitment of individual EU Member States in the achievement of the objectives of the EMP in general?

	Very disappointing						Very positive						Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Austria	4	15	29	29	42	44	33	34	23	8	3	264	4.811	71	335	
	2%	6%	11%	11%	16%	17%	13%	13%	9%	3%	1%	100%		21%		
Belgium	3	5	11	25	31	57	51	45	27	8	3	266	5.451	68	334	
	1%	2%	4%	9%	12%	21%	19%	17%	10%	3%	1%	100%		20%		
Bulgaria	14	18	31	50	36	34	16	11	3	0	0	213	3.479	114	327	
	7%	8%	15%	23%	17%	16%	8%	5%	1%	0%	0%	100%		35%		
Cyprus	14	9	19	29	30	35	47	36	20	4	3	246	4.833	83	329	
	6%	4%	8%	12%	12%	14%	19%	15%	8%	2%	1%	100%		25%		
Czech Republic	22	19	38	45	28	44	29	21	4	2	2	254	3.752	75	329	
	9%	7%	15%	18%	11%	17%	11%	8%	2%	1%	1%	100%		23%		
Denmark	12	10	17	26	29	47	46	30	23	10	4	254	5.012	75	329	
	5%	4%	7%	10%	11%	19%	18%	12%	9%	4%	2%	100%		23%		
Estonia	19	22	22	40	35	46	16	11	5	1	0	217	3.585	112	329	
	9%	10%	10%	18%	16%	21%	7%	5%	2%	0%	0%	100%		34%		
Finland	4	10	11	27	24	35	41	45	30	14	6	247	5.551	84	331	
	2%	4%	4%	11%	10%	14%	17%	18%	12%	6%	2%	100%		25%		
France	2	11	10	8	15	23	41	64	72	46	22	314	6.796	24	338	
	2%	4%	4%	11%	10%	14%	17%	18%	12%	6%	2%	100%		21%		
Germany	3	11	10	28	30	40	43	49	48	15	8	285	5.737	49	334	
	1%	4%	4%	10%	11%	14%	15%	17%	17%	5%	3%	100%		15%		
Greece	3	1	16	20	29	45	52	48	40	12	4	270	5.741	61	331	
	1%	0%	6%	7%	11%	17%	19%	18%	15%	4%	1%	100%		18%		
Hungary	13	12	33	42	31	45	18	15	10	3	0	222	3.932	104	326	
	6%	5%	15%	19%	14%	20%	8%	7%	5%	1%	0%	100%		32%		
Ireland	17	12	25	35	36	41	24	13	12	5	2	222	4.108	99	321	
	8%	5%	11%	16%	16%	18%	11%	6%	5%	2%	1%	100%		31%		
Italy	4	5	10	17	24	46	50	59	51	20	4	290	6.01	42	332	
	1%	2%	3%	6%	8%	16%	17%	20%	18%	7%	1%	100%		13%		
Latvia	21	17	31	42	31	33	11	9	5	1	0	201	3.343	123	324	
	10%	8%	15%	21%	15%	16%	5%	4%	2%	0%	0%	100%		38%		
Lithuania	22	17	28	46	33	31	11	11	7	3	0	209	3.464	115	324	
	11%	8%	13%	22%	16%	15%	5%	5%	3%	1%	0%	100%		35%		

Continues >>

	Very disappointing						Very positive						Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Luxembourg	9	8	20	31	23	45	28	20	17	13	2	216	4.81	108	324	
	4%	4%	9%	14%	11%	21%	13%	9%	8%	6%	1%	100%		33%		
Malta	3	3	13	21	27	37	37	44	41	20	4	250	5.852	76	326	
	1%	1%	5%	8%	11%	15%	15%	18%	16%	8%	2%	100%		23%		
Netherlands	4	5	25	27	28	48	50	33	23	10	0	253	5.111	72	325	
	2%	2%	10%	11%	11%	19%	20%	13%	9%	4%	0%	100%		22%		
Poland	17	20	41	38	31	45	21	14	10	2	1	240	3.738	85	325	
	7%	8%	17%	16%	13%	19%	9%	6%	4%	1%	0%	100%		26%		
Portugal	4	2	11	21	27	30	52	61	30	17	4	259	5.857	63	322	
	2%	1%	4%	8%	10%	12%	20%	24%	12%	7%	2%	100%		20%		
Romania	12	20	31	50	30	28	25	11	6	1	1	215	3.656	109	324	
	6%	9%	14%	23%	14%	13%	12%	5%	3%	0%	0%	100%		34%		
Slovakia	17	19	35	40	33	34	22	7	5	3	3	218	3.619	104	322	
	8%	9%	16%	18%	15%	16%	10%	3%	2%	1%	1%	100%		32%		
Slovenia	10	10	22	24	36	43	39	22	17	9	3	235	4.766	88	323	
	4%	4%	9%	10%	15%	18%	17%	9%	7%	4%	1%	100%		27%		
Spain	2	3	5	8	15	19	38	67	70	49	25	301	7.11	31	332	
	1%	1%	2%	3%	5%	6%	13%	22%	23%	16%	8%	100%		9%		
Sweden	4	3	13	14	26	32	48	46	38	21	12	257	6.062	72	329	
	2%	1%	5%	5%	10%	12%	19%	18%	15%	8%	5%	100%		22%		
UK	5	12	25	37	27	51	49	31	19	13	4	273	4.967	56	329	
	2%	4%	9%	14%	10%	19%	18%	11%	7%	5%	1%	100%		17%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

04

ACTORS

Question 2.1 asked about the involvement of social actors in the EMP. According to the results of the Survey, cultural institutions and foundations and NGOs are the actors most deeply involved in the EMP (45% of respondents consider that they have a high or very high involvement, 7-10 on a 0-10 scale), followed by research centres and think tanks (40%) and State Governments (37%).

In contrast, the social actors with the lowest degree of involvement according to the Survey are by far the trade unions (47% consider that they have a low or very low level of involvement, 0-3 on the scale) followed by media and economic and social committees (31-32%).

Question 2.1.

How do you assess the level of involvement in the Euro-Med Partnership achieved by the following actors?

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very low					Very high										
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Business organisations	2	12	19	27	36	49	59	47	20	5	3	279	5.15	52	331	
	1%	4%	7%	10%	13%	18%	21%	17%	7%	2%	1%	100%		16%		
Trade unions	6	35	38	49	49	36	25	21	6	1	2	268	3.76	63	331	
	2%	13%	14%	18%	18%	13%	9%	8%	2%	0%	1%	100%		19%		
Social and economic committees	2	18	26	41	35	50	49	39	16	2	0	278	4.66	51	329	
	1%	6%	9%	15%	13%	18%	18%	14%	6%	1%	0%	100%		16%		
NGOs	0	10	12	21	37	49	49	67	50	20	3	318	5.86	15	333	
	0%	3%	4%	7%	12%	15%	15%	21%	16%	6%	1%	100%		5%		
Cultural institutions and foundations	1	9	11	20	29	56	51	68	47	24	4	320	5.94	16	336	
	0%	3%	3%	6%	9%	18%	16%	21%	15%	8%	1%	100%		5%		
Youth organisations	1	18	25	36	36	47	53	39	30	11	4	300	5.08	35	335	
	0%	6%	8%	12%	12%	16%	18%	13%	10%	4%	1%	100%		10%		
Women's associations	2	14	20	30	48	41	59	48	28	9	3	302	5.19	31	333	
	1%	5%	7%	10%	16%	14%	20%	16%	9%	3%	1%	100%		9%		
Cities and local governments	1	16	19	25	43	60	61	39	23	7	3	297	5.11	35	332	
	0%	5%	6%	8%	14%	20%	21%	13%	8%	2%	1%	100%		11%		
Regional governments	3	16	23	27	38	45	54	39	19	10	3	277	5.01	52	329	
	1%	6%	8%	10%	14%	16%	19%	14%	7%	4%	1%	100%		16%		
Country (or State) governments	2	9	13	29	23	55	60	55	35	16	8	305	5.7	26	331	
	1%	3%	4%	10%	8%	18%	20%	18%	11%	5%	3%	100%		8%		
Universities	2	7	15	26	44	59	53	53	36	15	7	317	5.58	19	336	
	1%	2%	5%	8%	14%	19%	17%	17%	11%	5%	2%	100%		6%		

Continues >>

Assessments														Dkn	Total**
Very low						Very high						Total*	Aver.		
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Media	5	20	35	41	48	51	45	39	18	10	4	316	4.67	17	333
	2%	6%	11%	13%	15%	16%	14%	12%	6%	3%	1%	100%		5%	
Research centres and think tanks	2	12	15	28	27	44	53	57	43	19	4	304	5.68	26	330
	15	4%	5%	9%	9%	14%	17%	19%	14%	6%	1%	100%		8%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Reasons for the Lack of Deeper Involvement

When asked about the main reasons preventing a deeper involvement by the actors they belong to, the reasons most often quoted by respondents are the obstacles to the free circulation of persons, the administrative inefficiency and the lack of proper dissemination of information and communication of the cooperation structures. Other reasons:

"La falta de recursos y una auténtica voluntad política de la Comisión Europea."
Spanish respondent

"Les restrictions en matière de circulation des personnes."
Algerian respondent

"Dans les domaines de la recherche et des médias, il faudrait contourner les structures gouvernementales de tutelle pour mettre en place des partenariats avec les acteurs de terrain (universités, médias...)"
Tunisian respondent

"La complexité du système et la lourdeur administrative."
Moroccan respondent

"Les États du Sud empêchent les acteurs de la société de s'impliquer d'avantage dans le partenariat."
Tunisian respondent

"La nature intergouvernementale de la FAL."
Lebanese respondent

"Difficult to find a common policy approach among the trade unions in the South, misinterpretation of the social dialogue by the political actors, confusion about what is civil society, separating the economic and the social actor."
German respondent

"Financial: becoming involved requires a budget for that. All EU-related calls for funding are extremely frustrating and complicated and given that the competition is high, it is very likely for an NGO to win."
Finish respondent

"High centralized government does not help direct and concrete cooperation between cities."
Belgian respondent

“I belong to media. The main problem is fragmentation of interest groups across the region, lack of resources to be involved and probably an ignorance of what is being done. Although there is a lot of activity it is not promoted particularly effectively.”

UK respondent

“I work at the University of Warsaw. There is no information about possible involvement. No actions either.”

Polish respondent

“Lack of sufficient funds.”

Turkish respondent

4.1. Institutional Actors

Regarding the level of activity of the different institutional actors (second part of Question 2.1), the most outstanding results are the high or very high level of activity attributed to the Anna Lindh Foundation by 42% of respondents (against 20% who consider that its activity is low or very low), FEMISE (36% against 17%), the EuroMed Non-Governmental Platform (34% against 18%) and EuroMeSCO (31% against 18%). In contrast, respondents tend to attribute a low or very low level of activity to the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (29% against 21%) and to Economic and Social Councils (25% to 19%).

4.1.1. Anna Lindh Foundation

As for the assessment of the work of the different Euro-Mediterranean institutions, the Anna Lindh Foundation receives a relatively positive assessment of its work (39% consider it positive or very positive, 7-10 on the scale, against only 18% disappointing or very disappointing, 0-3 on the scale).

On the Anna Lindh Foundation: “After initial disaster, last year it began a new life under a new direction which is fighting hard for cultural understanding despite political difficulties.”

Italian respondent

On the Anna Lindh Foundation: “It is necessary to strengthen national networks, which suffer from lack of support on the part of national governments and their partial financing has not been solved.”

Czech respondent

“Positivo pero lejos de las expectativas creadas en su momento.”

Spanish respondent

A propos de la Fondation Anna Lindh: “Des actions qui peuvent manquer de pertinence. Un travail en réseau pousse mais qui prend trop de leur charge de travail au détriment des actions de terrain et des projets. Une logique par projet à repenser pour plus de développement et de cohérence.”

French respondent

A propos de la fondation Anna Lindh: “Depuis sa création la fondation n’a pas cessé de fournir le plus grand effort possible pour développer le dialogue entre les cultures du bassin et à la constitution d’un pont culturel entre les pays de la région.”

Tunisian respondent

Question 2.3.

What is your assessment of the work achieved by the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures in 2005-2009?

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between	4	12	14	23	25	37	60	54	31	21	7	288	5.691	51	339	
	1%	4%	5%	8%	9%	13%	21%	19%	11%	7%	2%	100%		15%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

4.1.2. EMUNI

In the case of the Euro-Mediterranean University, since its work cannot yet be reasonably assessed (it began operations only one year ago), we asked respondents about what their priorities should be. Interestingly, the three most often mentioned priorities ("to support cooperation among Euro-Mediterranean universities and stimulate mobility of students and professors", "to promote research on the Mediterranean societies and issues" and "to support universities from MPCs to improve the quality of their programmes") do not correspond to the activities it has undertaken in its first stage, mainly focused on organizing seminars and conferences and hosting courses and activities organized by affiliated Euro-Mediterranean universities.¹⁴

Other proposals regarding the Euro-Mediterranean University

Améliorer le programme d'enseignement qui permettrait une diffusion plus efficace de la connaissance l'AUTRE et de dissiper les stéréotypes;

Favoriser des liens directs, visibles et durables avec les universités du sud;

Constituer une base de données sur les universités euro-méditerranéennes, avec une évaluation qualitative si possible;

Créer un réseau d'experts indépendants pour participer aux études et recherches concernant les domaines concernant l'espace euro-méditerranéen;

Faciliter la mobilité des étudiants de la région en leur aidant, après avoir été retenus pour des masters, à l'obtention des visas qui reste le plus grand handicap et soucis des jeunes étudiants de la région;

Il conviendrait d'abord d'assurer à cette université les moyens et l'autonomie nécessaires à une intervention efficace et utile;


The first priority of the EMUNI should be to help create a Euro-Mediterranean higher education and research community in different disciplines. This should help in bringing out the common Mediterranean heritage and in drawing cultures on both sides of the Mediterranean closer together;

Undertake joint research on relevant matters.

14. See Report on the Status and Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, p. 11.

Question 2.4.

In your opinion, what should be the priorities of the EMUNI (Euro-Mediterranean University)? please choose two of them:

Q.2.4: Priorities of EMUNI**4.2. Women as Actors and Beneficiaries of the EMP**

According to the respondents, the actions undertaken by the EMP and the ENP to promote the participation of women in economic, social and political life are not satisfactory: 27% consider it disappointing or very disappointing (0-3) against only 19% positive or very positive (7-10). Interestingly, the view of female respondents is marginally more positive (23% disappointing against 21% positive). In Algeria this view is clearly more negative than the average and in Turkey it is clearly more positive (27% see it as positive against only 9% as disappointing).

Question 2.5.

How do you assess the actions undertaken by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy to promote the participation of women in social, economic and political life?

	Very disappointing											Total	Aver.	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Total answers														
Promotion of women's involvement	6	12	26	43	43	65	70	42	14	8	1	330	4.84	
	2%	4%	8%	13%	13%	20%	21%	13%	4%	2%	0%	100%		

	Very disappointing										Very positive	Total	Aver.	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Female respondents														
Promotion of women's involvement	1	2	6	11	11	19	19	11	4	3	0	87	5.01	
	1%	2%	7%	13%	13%	22%	22%	13%	5%	3%	0%	100%		

The level of women's involvement in the EMP is assessed even less positively. 32% assess it as low or very low and only 18% as high or very high. Again, women assess their own involvement slightly more positively, Algerian (and this time also Mashreq) respondents more negatively and Turkish respondents most positively (27%-27%).

Question 2.5.

How do you assess the level of involvement of women in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

	Very low										Very high	Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Women's involvement in EMP	3	16	32	54	55	53	56	38	17	6	1	331	4.62
	1%	5%	10%	16%	17%	16%	17%	11%	5%	2%	0%	100%	

In Question 2.1, in contrast, the involvement of women's associations is considered high or very high (7-10) by 29% of respondents, and even 36% of female respondents, against 23% low or very low (0-3).

And in Question 1.4, 55% of respondents consider that there has been progress in the participation of women in decision-making (against 46% who see no progress or even regression), and 45% think the same for the labour participation of women in partner countries (against 55% who see no progress or even regression); in both cases the differences are too low to be significant, and the category of think tank, university and media experts make a clearly more negative assessment of progress (42% and 31% respectively). Maghreb respondents assess this progress in this respect even more positively (61% against 39%), in contrast to Mashreq respondents (50%-50%).

The negative perception of respondents about the actions of the EMP in promoting women's participation in economic, social and political life and their involvement in the EMP may explain why the only multilateral programme specifically addressed to cope with gender issues (Role of Women in Economic Life, 2006-2008, € million) is assessed in a very positive way, with a 59% of respondents stating that there has been progress in this regard (Question 1.5).

As for the assessment of progress achieved in this field by different MPCs, Question 1.7 shows that Morocco, Tunisia and Israel are the MPCs where actors and experts see most progress concerning the participation of women in decision-making.

A Selection of Proposals to Improve Women's Participation in the EMP

“L'UE doit choisir ses partenaires pour les programmes ou du moins l'imposer dans les conventions passées avec les Etats. Lancer une étude sérieuse sur les compétences Gender dans les pays membres, à établir par des Expertes du Sud et non comme il est accoutumé, les faire établir par des expertes du Nord qui se perdent dans les dédales des black out.”

Portuguese respondent

“Renforcer et encourager la participation des femmes aux centres de décisions dans le Sud de la méditerranée»; «Encourager et faciliter l'accès des femmes chercheuses et des femmes qui ont un niveau d'enseignement supérieur à l'emploi.”

Moroccan respondent

“Design more projects that enhance the role of women in political, economic, and cultural life. Increase the participation of women in all programmes and proposals through making this participation an obligatory one. Lead Applicants proposing for any call should have at least one partner woman within their consortium, or partners should include women within their teams.”

Syrian respondent

“The level of women's participation reflects the structure of society. In my opinion, they take part in many projects and they are involved in organizing meetings, implementing international networks, giving information on EU opportunities of cooperation and co-financing. At the same time there is not enough visibility of their work because they often refer to a “boss”, who is a man. My proposal is to ask that a certain percentage of people involved in projects are women and give more emphasis to those activities where their level of participation is high.”

Italian respondent

“Ces programmes n'ont pas pris en considération les spécificités culturelles des sociétés de la rive sud. Ce qui a provoqué la méfiance des gouvernements de ces pays.”

Algerian respondent

“De momento convendría conseguir que asistieran muchas más mujeres del sur (y no siempre las mismas) a los seminarios, encuentros, debates, etc. que organiza el IEMed y otras instancias. Será muy útil contar con la participación de mujeres procedentes de la emigración.”

Spanish respondent

“There is a slight improvement made on the ground. But I have to admit there is a still a long way to go concerning real women's involvement, especially in the South.”

Egyptian respondent

05

PROSPECTS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE FUTURE CONTEXT OF THE EMP

The Survey included a question aimed at gauging the degree of probability attributed by respondents to a series of key factors, strategic risks and policy challenges regarding the future of the Mediterranean (Question 4.2) assuming that the current level and framework of cooperation remains unchanged. Combined with the analysis within the Focus Group, this should allow for the construction of future scenarios for the Mediterranean and the design of alternative cooperation policies.

According to the results of the Survey, the prospects in the Mediterranean are decidedly bleak (see answers in Table below). More than 50% of respondents consider it probable or very probable that:

- the Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP (63%, with the exception of Israeli respondents where it is only 40%),
- water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions (61%),
- population and employment pressures will create dramatic social tensions (50%) and
- political regimes in MPCs will show continuity (50%).

As a consequence, irregular migration to Europe will continue to increase (50% see it as probable or very probable) and 47% of respondents consider it probable or very probable that the increased level of irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe. 35% see it as improbable or not probable at all that a common Mediterranean identity will emerge (against 20% that attribute some probability to it). Answers are generally even more negative in the case of Maghreb countries.

The “probable or very probable” answers double the “improbable or not probable at all” answers regarding the probability of:

- an environmental deterioration in the Mediterranean threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States (39% against 15%),
- the current global economic crisis reducing the development prospects of the Mediterranean for a long period (38% against 17%), which of course means that respondents consider it improbable or not probable at all that MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, hence, long-term convergence at the EU levels of income (40% against 13%).

The only positive development that will probably materialize in the future, according to the respondents, is the increased participation of women in economic, social and political life in MPCs (38% consider it probable or very probable against only 14% improbable).

Overall, it is clear that respondents consider that the current trends and status quo are not sustainable over the mid to long term. But expectations about the probability that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will contribute to facing those challenges and solving the problems in the region (Question 4.1) are very limited, which should pose the question of the need for a change in paradigm in EU-MPC cooperation. 45% see a low or no probability of it leading to resolution of conflicts in the region (19% see a high probability of this happening), and 41% think the same for a reduction of the development gap across the Mediterranean (27% are positive about that probability).

Question 4.2.

What degree of probability do you attribute to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean under the present level and framework of cooperation?

	Degree of probability											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability				Very high probability										
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP	6	3	14	19	27	26	20	43	67	46	41	312	6.75	4	316
	2%	1%	4%	6%	9%	8%	6%	14%	21%	15%	13%	100%		1%	
Political regimes in MPCs will show a high degree of continuity	3	5	9	13	20	44	54	62	47	20	17	294	6.28	28	322
	1%	2%	3%	4%	7%	15%	18%	21%	16%	7%	6%	100%		9%	
The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period	3	7	20	26	36	62	50	39	41	26	11	321	5.68	5	326
	1%	2%	6%	8%	11%	19%	16%	12%	13%	8%	3%	100%		2%	
Gulf Cooperation Council members will facilitate a higher degree of South-South economic cooperation in the Mediterranean	12	14	25	43	41	62	48	38	16	6	2	307	4.64	15	322
	4%	5%	8%	14%	13%	20%	16%	12%	5%	2%	3%	100%		5%	
Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States.	2	8	13	22	41	56	53	41	52	21	11	320	5.83	10	330
	3%	3%	4%	7%	13%	18%	17%	13%	16%	7%	3%	100%		3%	
Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean	3	5	6	9	23	35	45	51	81	43	23	324	6.8	5	329
	1%	2%	2%	3%	7%	11%	14%	16%	25%	13%	7%	100%		2%	
Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs	2	5	16	18	30	49	77	52	55	13	4	321	5.85	6	327
	1%	2%	5%	6%	9%	15%	24%	16%	17%	4%	1%	100%		2%	
MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income	7	24	45	49	44	64	38	21	10	5	4	311	4.17	19	330
	2%	8%	14%	16%	14%	21%	12%	7%	3%	2%	1%	100%		6%	
Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions	1	4	9	11	34	52	49	69	41	37	14	321	6.32	9	330
	0%	1%	3%	3%	11%	16%	15%	21%	13%	12%	4%	100%		3%	
Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose	4	9	5	18	31	35	55	62	51	30	20	320	6.29	8	328
	1%	3%	2%	6%	10%	11%	17%	19%	16%	9%	6%	100%		2%	

Continues >>

	Degree of probability											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability					Very high probability									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean	11	16	21	33	36	53	47	29	39	18	16	319	5.28	9	328
	3%	5%	7%	10%	11%	17%	15%	9%	12%	6%	5%	100%		3%	
Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe	3	11	10	18	19	51	60	53	49	31	15	320	6.15	8	328
	1%	3%	3%	6%	6%	16%	19%	17%	15%	10%	5%	100%		2%	
The increased level of migration, economic and human exchanges will give way to the emergence of a common Mediterranean identity	23	18	30	39	50	43	45	23	25	10	7	313	4.48	13	326
	7%	6%	10%	12%	16%	14%	14%	7%	8%	3%	2%	100%		4%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

However, for the whole sample the balance is clearly in favour of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership leading to a greater intensity of human exchanges across the Mediterranean (39% see it as probable, against 21% improbable) and, in particular, to a greater understanding and respect between cultures and religions (43% against 18%). But perceptions are clearly less positive in Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries, in particular in the Maghreb (where only 31% see an increase in human exchanges as probable against 33% improbable and only 33% see a greater understanding between cultures as probable, against 24% improbable). In this context, the answers to Question 4.2 consider how far these contributions will manage to counter the negative trends identified by respondents (in particular, the increase in xenophobia in Europe; see above). Opinions are divided over the contribution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to improving employment and living conditions of people or the strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights.

“L’essentiel n’est pas dans l’émergence d’une nouvelles identités mais dans le respect des identités existantes et les synergies rendues possibles par une politique d’intérêts mutuels.”

Tunisian respondent

“Le conflit arabe-israélien paralysera à jamais le PEM. Il est impératif que la politique des pays européens par rapport à ce conflit (particulièrement la cause palestinienne) soit juste.”

Algerian respondent

“Ce n’est pas les textes qui créent l’échange et l’idée d’entité, ce sont les hommes, par leurs déplacements et les liens qu’ils tissent.”

French respondent

“Si l’immigration n’est pas bien contrôlée/accompagnée, les risques seront réels. Les échanges culturels, campagnes... entre le nord et le sud sont essentiels pour permettre aux citoyens des deux rives de mieux se connaître et pour ainsi éviter les dérives (notamment xénophobes) qui pourraient en résulter par manque d’information. Les immigrés devront également être accompagnés dans leur pays d’accueil pour éviter qu’ils se retrouvent dans des situations précaires.”

Belgian respondent

“Lamento el pessimisme, però l’actual situació amaga des del meu punt de vista un proper lustre poc donat a l’expansió econòmica, i és previsible l’augment progressiu de les tensions.”

Spanish respondent

“The long-running effort for greater economic and societal interdependence is in line with global pressures and likely to bear fruit. The ‘macro-political’ outlook remains poor and this could wreck the broader societal project.”

Irish respondent

“Je prévois une évolution linéaire avec maintien de la configuration des rapports de forces entre les deux rives. La situation dans les PTM risque de ne pas évoluer, les régimes en place favoriseront le statu quo pour assurer leur survie.”

Algerian respondent

“La question de l’immigration constitue l’un des soucis majeurs de l’UE. L’une de ses préoccupations essentielles est de contenir l’immigration en provenance des pays du Sud et de l’Est de la Méditerranée vers l’UE. Ce fléau tend à s’accroître devant l’aggravation des conditions politiques, économiques et sociales dans les PPM.”

Moroccan respondent

“Internal factors are more important than external ones.”

Egyptian respondent

Question 4.1.

What degree of probability do you attribute to the prospect that current Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (within the frameworks of the EMP, ENP and UfM) is leading, in the long term, to:

	Degree of probability											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability					Very high probability									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
The resolution of conflicts in the region	29	23	40	51	35	37	44	31	16	7	6	319	4.12	7	326
	9%	7%	13%	16%	11%	12%	14%	10%	5%	2%	2%	100%		2%	
The strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights in the Mediterranean Partner Countries	13	9	35	50	43	35	47	51	25	9	5	322	4.8	5	327
	4%	3%	11%	16%	13%	11%	15%	16%	8%	3%	2%	100%		2%	
A higher level of employment, an improvement in living conditions and a reduction of poverty in Mediterranean Partner Countries	7	9	25	40	49	60	65	46	20	4	5	330	4.95	5	335
	2%	3%	8%	12%	15%	18%	20%	14%	6%	1%	2%	100%		1%	
A reduction of the development gap between the North and the South of the Mediterranean	12	10	29	50	51	60	35	53	10	13	5	328	4.73	5	333
	4%	3%	9%	15%	16%	18%	11%	16%	3%	4%	2%	100%		2%	
A greater intensity of human exchanges between the North and the South of the Mediterranean	6	6	20	36	43	38	55	74	29	15	9	331	5.5	5	336
	2%	2%	6%	11%	13%	11%	17%	22%	9%	5%	3%	100%		1%	
A greater understanding and respect between cultures and religions in the Mediterranean	7	11	15	27	28	52	48	61	38	29	14	330	5.8	5	335
	2%	3%	5%	8%	8%	16%	15%	18%	12%	9%	4%	100%		1%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

06

PRIORITIES FOR ACTION

The action fronts identified in the forward-looking analysis of Question 4.2 (see Section 5) are so many that respondents seem to appreciate all initiatives taken in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This is the conclusion that can be drawn from answers to Question 5.1 on the priorities identified in the Ministerial Conference in Marseille in November 2008. Of the total of 30 priority fields of action of the EMP identified by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Marseille, all of them are considered important or very important, and the average grade (on a 0-10 scale) is 6 or higher for all of them and 7 or higher for most of them. The top ranked priorities are water (8.11) and the Middle East Peace Process (8.02). Among the identified priorities, the less highly ranked are deepening of dialogue on the ESDP and crisis management (6.16), statistics cooperation (6.2) and terrorism (6.6; this is a more important priority in Maghreb countries – 7 – and less so in Mashreq countries – 5.9).

As far as priorities for the future are concerned (in particular for the 2010 Work Programme to be approved in the Summit of the UfM to be held in Barcelona in June 2010, Question 5.2), among the 20 possible priorities of action submitted to respondents, the most often mentioned amongst the five top priorities are the following:

- Promotion of democracy and political pluralism (49%),
- Water access and sustainability (41.5%),
- Education (41%),
- Human rights and intolerance (38.5%),
- Sustainable development (36%), and
- Promoting dialogue between cultures and cultural diversity (34.8%).

The least cited priorities include civil protection (only 18% of respondents mention it amongst the five top priorities); a wider free trade area, liberalisation of EU agricultural markets and food security (20% each); the fight against international terrorism and creation of an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean, as well as establishment of free movement of persons in the Mediterranean (21% each); and the management of migration flows and the promotion of equality between men and women (22%). This should give rise to some thoughts about the priority projects for the EMP and the UfM.

However, regional differences are paramount as far as priorities are concerned: conflict resolution is mentioned by 73% and 77% of Maghreb and Mashreq respondents and only 55% of EU countries and 58% in Turkey. Meanwhile, the creation of an area free of weapons of mass destruction is a priority only for 16% of EU respondents, but for 37% of Mashreq and 27% of Maghreb respondents. The increase in funds allocated for the EMP is a priority for only 20% of EU respondents (15% in non-Mediterranean EU Member States), but for 44% of Maghreb, 33% of Mashreq and 42% of Turkish respondents. Energy is a priority for 32% of EU respondents, but only for 20% of Maghreb and Mashreq countries, whereas employment promotion and employment policies are mentioned as a priority by 28% of EU respondents and 31% of Mashreq respondents, but 41% of Maghreb respondents (see Table below).

Question 5.2.

In your opinion, what should be the main priorities for the Spanish Co-Presidency of the UfM (and the Euro-Mediterranean Summit Barcelona 2010)? Please choose five from the whole list.

	TOTAL		MAGHREB		MASHREQ		EU 27		EU Med		Rest of Europe		TURKEY		ISRAEL	
		% of 342		% of 71		% of 52		% of 176		% of 102		% of 74		% of 12		% of 14
Political and Security Cooperation																
Conflict resolution in the region	211	62%	52	73%	40	77%	96	55%	54	53%	42	57%	7	58%	7	50%
Fight against international terrorism	72	21%	22	31%	13	25%	21	12%	8	8%	13	18%	4	33%	8	57%
Creation of an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean	73	21%	19	27%	19	37%	28	16%	11	11%	17	23%	2	17%	4	29%
Civil protection and prevention of man-made disasters	62	18%	19	27%	10	19%	26	15%	13	13%	13	18%	1	8%	3	21%
Human rights and intolerance	132	39%	20	28%	20	38%	76	43%	43	42%	33	45%	6	50%	4	29%
Promoting democracy and political pluralism	167	49%	37	52%	32	62%	84	48%	51	50%	33	45%	2	17%	5	36%
Total answers	717		169		134		331		180		151		22		31	
Total respondents	342		71		52		176		102		74		12		14	
	TOTAL		MAGHREB		MASHREQ		EU 27		EU Med		Rest of Europe		TURKEY		ISRAEL	
		% of 342		% of 71		% of 52		% of 176		% of 102		% of 74		% of 12		% of 14
Economic and Financial Cooperation																
Increasing the funds allocated to the EMP	99	29%	31	44%	17	33%	35	20%	24	24%	11	15%	5	42%	5	36%
Wider Free Trade Area	71	21%	15	21%	10	19%	40	23%	26	25%	14	19%	2	17%	2	14%
Energy	91	27%	15	21%	10	19%	56	32%	32	31%	24	32%	3	25%	2	14%
Water access and sustainability	142	42%	32	45%	20	38%	75	43%	41	40%	34	46%	1	8%	6	43%
Food security	71	21%	18	25%	16	31%	32	18%	14	14%	18	24%	1	8%	1	7%
Environmental issues and sustainable development	123	36%	29	41%	15	29%	65	37%	37	36%	28	38%	6	50%	2	14%
Liberalisation of EU agricultural markets	71	21%	14	20%	9	17%	39	22%	22	22%	17	23%	3	25%	1	7%
Total answers	668		154		97		342		196		146		21		19	
Total respondents	342		71		52		176		102		74		12		14	

	TOTAL		MAGHREB		MASHREQ		EU 27		EU Med		Rest of Europe		TURKEY		ISRAEL	
Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation		% of 342		% of 71		% of 52		% of 176		% of 102		% of 74		% of 12		% of 14
Employment promotion and employment policies	102	30%	29	41%	16	31%	50	28%	26	25%	18	24%	1	8%	2	14%
Education	140	41%	27	38%	24	46%	74	42%	32	31%	29	39%	7	58%	2	14%
Promoting equality between men and women	78	23%	17	24%	7	13%	44	25%	41	40%	15	20%	4	33%	2	14%
Promoting the participation of civil society and social partners in the EMP	79	23%	16	23%	12	23%	39	22%	26	25%	13	18%	2	17%	4	29%
Promoting dialogue between cultures and cultural diversity	119	35%	21	30%	15	29%	67	38%	32	31%	34	46%	4	33%	3	21%
Management of migration flows	76	22%	13	18%	8	15%	52	30%	41	40%	22	30%	1	8%	2	14%
Establishment of free movement of persons in the Mediterranean	71	21%	15	21%	10	19%	40	23%	26	25%	11	15%	4	33%	2	14%
Total answers	665		138		92		366		224		142		23		17	
Total respondents	342		71		52		176		102		74		12		14	

ANNEXES

I LIST OF RESPONDENTS

II TARGET AND EFFECTIVE SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY

III COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE BY CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS

IV QUESTIONNAIRE

V SET OF ALL RESULTS

VI SURVEY FOLLOW-UP 2010-2012

VII SURVEY TEAM



LIST OF RESPONDENTS

LIST OF RESPONDENTS

- ESA AALLAS, Yle Radio 1, Finland
- HASSAN ABBAS, Cultural Centre (Damascus), Syria
- NUHAD ABDALLAH, Tishreen University, Academic Unit for Scientific Researches, Syria
- ZABDEL SAMAD, Arab NGO Network for Development, Lebanon
- MAHDI ABDUL HADI, Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), Occupied Palestinian Territories
- GEORGES ABI SALEH, Steering Committee, Euromed Civil Platform, Lebanon
- NAIM ABU TAIR, Union of Health Work Committees, Occupied Palestinian Territories
- KHALED ABU-ZEID, Centre for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe, Egypt
- RANDA ACHMAWI, Hebdo Ahram, Egypt
- SAKI ACIMAN, Centro de Estudios de Transporte para el Mediterráneo Occidental (CETMO), Spain
- WADIA AIT HAMZA, Euro-Mediterranean Youth Parliament (EMYYP), Morocco
- OKTAY AKSOY, Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Turkey
- CENGİZ AKTAR, Bahcesehir University, Turkey
- RIAD AL KHOURI, Middle East Business Associates, Amman, Jordan
- ORAIH AL RANTAWI, Al Quds Centre for Political Studies, Occupied Palestinian Territories
- SERGIO ALESSANDRINI, Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Italy
- ROBERTO ALIBONI, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy
- MOURAD ALLAL, Forum des Citoyens de la Méditerranée, Tunisia
- GHISLAINE ALLEAUME, Association française pour l'étude du monde arabe et musulman (AFEMAM), France
- YOSSI ALPHER, bitterlemons, Israel
- JAMIL AL-SBENATY, Institut Blizkovychodnych Studii (IBS) / Institute for Middle East, Slovakia
- ANDREA AMATO, Istituto per il Mediterraneo, Italy
- MOULAY HAFID AMAZIRH, PDG of Intercontrol, Morocco
- VITOR AMBROSIO, Escola Superior de Hotelaria e Turismo do Estoril, Portugal
- BRUNO AMOROSO, Roskilde University, Denmark
- AUDE ARENBERK, Euromed Cinemas, France
- SAMAR ATTAR, Independent scholar, Syria
- FULVIO ATTINÀ, University of Catania, Italy
- GEMMA AUBARELL, Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, Spain
- IBRAHIM AWAD, International Migration Programme, International Labour Organization (ILO) Egypt
- JORDI BACARIA, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Spain
- HUSSEYIN BAGCI, Middle East Technical University, Turkey
- ZINE BARKA, University of Tlemcen, Algeria
- MILOUD BARKAOU, Université Badji Mokhtar, Annaba, Algeria
- ISAÍAS BARREÑADA, Casa Árabe, Spain
- GERSHON BASKIN, Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI), Israel
- VINCENT BATTESTI, Centre d'Etude et de Documentation Economiques, Juridiques et Sociales (CEDEJ), Cairo, Egypt
- MICHAEL BAUER, Center for Applied Policy Research, Germany
- OUTI BEHM, Finn Church Aid, Finland
- FATIHA BELABBAH, Université Mohamed V, Agdal-Rabat. Centre d'études doctorales Homme et Espace dans le Monde Méditerranéen, Morocco
- MONDHÉR BEN AYED, World Summit on the Information Society, Tunisia
- KARIM BEN KAHLA, École supérieure de commerce de Tunis, Tunisia
- MAHMOUD BEN MAHMOUD, Filmmaker, Tunisia
- HOSNI BEN REJEB, Comité des Initiatives de Développement Euro-Méditerranéen (CIDEM), France
- JAMILA BENADDI, Association Amal pour un avenir meilleur, Morocco
- ABDESSLAM BENBRAHIM, Organisation Démocratique du Travail, Morocco
- GILBERT BENHAYOUN, Université Paul Cézanne, France
- BADRANE BENLAHCENE, Universiti Putra Malaysia, Algeria
- AZIZA BENNANI, Professor at the Faculty of Literature and Humanities at the Hassan II University Mohammedia. Ambassador of Morocco to UNESCO, Morocco
- KARIMA BENYAICH, Ambassador of Morocco to Portugal, Morocco
- ROLLA BEYDOUN, *An-Nahar*, daily political independent, Lebanon
- DIDIER BILLION, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), France
- HANDE A. BIRKALAN, Yeditepe University, Istanbul, Turkey
- JOHANNA BIRKSTEDT, Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU, Finland
- MOHAMMED BLINDA, Blue Plan for the Mediterranean, Morocco
- GORAN BLOMBERG, National Museums of World Culture, Sweden
- LENA-KOLARSKA BOBINSKA, President of the Institute of Public Affairs, Poland
- PATRIZIA BONELLI, Scholé Futuro, MIO-ECSDE, Italy
- ALEKSANDRA BOSKOVIC, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Media, Montenegro
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- ALBERT MORENO, Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain
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- HANIA MROUÉ, Beirut DC, Lebanon
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TARGET AND EFFECTIVE SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY

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Country	Sent invitations to cover the target	Target number of respondents	% of country group	% of total survey	Answers on October 1st	% of target	% of total survey
Morocco	160	25	11.3%	5.9%	31	124.0%	8.4%
Algeria	160	25	11.3%	5.9%	26	104.0%	7.0%
Turkey	160	25	11.3%	5.9%	14	56.0%	3.8%
Egypt	160	25	11.3%	5.9%	13	52.0%	3.5%
Tunisia	120	20	9.0%	4.7%	24	120.0%	6.5%
Syria	120	20	9.0%	4.7%	7	35.0%	1.9%
Israel	80	15	6.8%	3.5%	16	106.7%	4.3%
Occupied Palestinian Territory	80	15	6.8%	3.5%	16	106.7%	4.3%
Lebanon	80	15	6.8%	3.5%	14	93.3%	3.8%
Jordan	80	15	6.8%	3.5%	7	46.7%	1.9%
Mauritania	20	5	2.3%	1.2%	2	40.0%	0.5%
Libya	40	5	2.3%	1.2%	1	20.0%	0.3%
Croatia	20	3	1.4%	0.7%	5	166.7%	1.3%
Albania	20	3	1.4%	0.7%	4	133.3%	1.1%
Bosnia Herzegovina	20	3	1.4%	0.7%	2	66.7%	0.5%
Montenegro	20	3	1.4%	0.7%	2	66.7%	0.5%
Total MPCs	1340	222		52%	184	83%	49.6%
France	120	15	7.4%	3.5%	35	233.3%	9.4%
Spain	120	15	7.4%	3.5%	33	220.0%	8.9%
Italy	120	15	7.4%	3.5%	19	126.7%	5.1%
Germany	120	15	7.4%	3.5%	13	86.7%	3.5%
United Kingdom	120	15	7.4%	3.5%	3	20.0%	0.8%
Belgium	80	10	5.0%	2.4%	5	50.0%	1.3%
Portugal	80	10	5.0%	2.4%	5	50.0%	1.3%
Greece	80	10	5.0%	2.4%	3	30.0%	0.8%
Netherlands	80	10	5.0%	2.4%	3	30.0%	0.8%
Poland	60	13	6.4%	3.1%	8	61.5%	2.2%
Romania	60	8	4.0%	1.9%	2	25.0%	0.5%
Denmark	40	5	2.5%	1.2%	8	160.0%	2.2%
Czech Republic	40	8	4.0%	1.9%	5	62.5%	1.3%
Finland	40	3	1.5%	0.7%	5	166.7%	1.3%
Sweden	40	5	2.5%	1.2%	5	100.0%	1.3%
Austria	40	5	2.5%	1.2%	2	40.0%	0.5%
Ireland	40	5	2.5%	1.2%	2	40.0%	0.5%
Hungary	20	8	4.0%	1.9%	7	87.5%	1.9%
Cyprus	20	3	1.5%	0.7%	6	200.0%	1.6%
Slovakia	20	3	1.5%	0.7%	4	133.3%	1.1%
Slovenia	20	3	1.5%	0.7%	3	100.0%	0.8%
Lithuania	20	3	1.5%	0.7%	3	100.0%	0.8%
Malta	20	3	1.5%	0.7%	3	100.0%	0.8%
Latvia	20	3	1.5%	0.7%	2	66.7%	0.5%
Bulgaria	20	3	1.5%	0.7%	1	33.3%	0.3%
Estonia	20	3	1.5%	0.7%	1	33.3%	0.3%
Luxembourg	20	3	1.5%	0.7%	1	33.3%	0.3%
Total EU	1480	202		48%	187	93%	50.4%
TOTAL	2820	424		100%	371	87.5%	100.0%




COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE BY CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS

COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE BY CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS

Type of Organisation	Answers
Governmental	49
EU Institution	17
Diplomatic	19
Other int'l org	24
Policy-makers	109
Think tanks	37
Media	24
Academic	133
Experts	193
NGOs	48
Trade unions	7
Company	13
Civil society	68
Total	371

Distribution of the Sample by categories of respondents and gender

Institutional affiliation



IV

QUESTIONNAIRE

01

MONITORING OF PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

Q.1.1. General perception

In your opinion, what is the perception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in the 2005-2009 period amongst experts and actors involved in it?

Very disappointing										Very positive
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Comments:

Q.1.2. General context

In your opinion, what are the main difficulties that the EMP has encountered to achieve its objectives in 2005-2009?

Please indicate the three most important.

- The global financial crisis
- The impact of international terrorism
- The US policy in the region (including the Iraq War)
- The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- The surge of Islamism in the region
- The lack of South-South integration
- The lack of involvement of the EU due to its greater attention to Eastern Europe
- The weak political will for reform in Mediterranean Partner Countries
- The weak political will of EU countries for democratisation in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean
- The insufficient budget allocated to the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
- The lack of consensus for the first proposals on the Union for the Mediterranean

Others (specify):

Q.1.3. Assessment by areas of cooperation

What are, in general terms, the achievements in the four priorities identified at the Barcelona 2005 Conference within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme?

	Very disappointing										Very positive	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
1. Political and Security Partnership												
2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform												
3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges												
4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security												

Q.1.4. Assessment by priorities

Among the priorities defined in 2005, for which do you consider progress was achieved and for which do you think that there was no progress or even regression?

Progress	No progress	Regression	Don't know
----------	-------------	------------	------------

1. Political and Security Partnership

Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens				
Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level				
Increase the participation of women in decision-making				
Ensure freedom of expression and association				
Foster the role of civil society				
Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions				

Progress	No progress	Regression	Don't know
----------	-------------	------------	------------

2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform

Create more job opportunities for the increasing numbers of young people across the region				
Improve business climate, in particular for SMEs				
Reduce regional poverty rates				
Reduce the prosperity gap and raise GDP growth rates				
Increase in North-South and South-South regional cooperation				
Increase in the percentage of women in employment in partner countries				

Progress	No progress	Regression	Don't know
----------	-------------	------------	------------

3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges

Halve the number of illiterate female and male adults and children				
Promote equitable access to quality education				
Reduce disparities in educational achievement between Euro-Mediterranean states				
Enhance graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education				
Increase awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations				

4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security

Promote legal migration opportunities				
Facilitate the flow of remittance transfers				
Address "brain drain"				
Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration and trafficking in human beings				
Promote the modernisation and efficiency of the administration of justice				
Reinforce judicial cooperation				
Promote the ratification/implementation of the relevant UN conventions for organised crime				

Q.1.5. Assessment of Euro-Med multilateral programmes

Among the Euro-Mediterranean multilateral programmes, for which do you consider progress was achieved in their implementation and for which do you think that there was no progress between 2005 and 2009?

	Progress	No progress	Regression	Don't know
Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation				
Confidence building measures: civil protection				
Confidence building measures: Partnership for Peace				
Justice, security and migration (JSM)				

Sustainable Economic Development

Investment promotion and reform denomination to attract investments				
Transport and energy cooperation				
South-South regional economic integration				
Environmental programmes				
Technical assistance and risk capital support from FEMIP				
Development of the information society				

Social Development and Cultural Exchanges

Gender equality (participation of women in economic life)				
Civil society promotion and participation				
Information and communication II				
Euro-Med Youth				
Dialogue between cultures and cultural heritage				

What other regional programmes should in your view be launched in the framework of the EMP?

Q.1.6. Assessment of EU Presidencies and MPC Co-Presidency

How would you grade the action of the different Presidencies and Co-Presidencies of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

	Very negative											Very positive											Don't know			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Austrian EU Presidency (January-June 2006)																										
Finnish EU Presidency (July-December 2006)																										
German EU Presidency (January-June 2007)																										
Portuguese EU Presidency (July-December 2007)																										
Slovenian EU Presidency (January-June 2008)																										
French EU Presidency (July-December 2008)																										
Czech EU Presidency (January-June 2009)																										
Egyptian Co-Presidency of the EMP (July 2008-June 2009)																										
French Co-Presidency of the EMP (July 2008-June 2009)																										

Q.1.7. Mediterranean Partner Countries progress

How would you assess the progress of Mediterranean Partner Countries in the achievement of the objectives of the EMP in general and in specific areas in 2005-2009?

a) In general

	Very negative											Very positive											Don't know			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Algeria																										
Egypt																										
Israel																										
Jordan																										
Lebanon																										
Morocco																										
Occupied Palestinian Territory																										
Syria																										
Tunisia																										

c) In specific areas. Please indicate the three countries which have made most progress in the respective thematic area.

Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Occupied Palestinian Territories	Syria	Tunisia
DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN

Don't know

1. Political and Security Partnership

Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Increase the participation of women in decision-making	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Ensure freedom of expression and association	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Foster the role of civil society	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	

2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform

Create more job opportunities for the increasing numbers of young people across the region	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Improve business climate, in particular for SMEs	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Reduce regional poverty rates	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Reduce the prosperity gap and raise GDP growth rates	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Increase in North-South and South-South regional cooperation	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Increase in the percentage of women in employment in partner countries	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	

Don't
know**3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges**

Halve the number of illiterate female and male adults and children	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Promote equitable access to quality education	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Reduce disparities in educational achievement between Euro-Mediterranean states	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Enhance graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Increase awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	

4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security

Promote legal migration opportunities	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Facilitate the flow of remittance transfers	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Address "brain drain"	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration, trafficking in human beings	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Strengthen modernisation and efficiency of the administration of justice	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Reinforce judicial cooperation	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	
Promote the ratification/implementation of the relevant UN conventions for organised crime	DZ	EG	IL	JO	LB	MA	PS	SY	TN	

Q.1.8. Turkey's progress

How would you assess the progress achieved by Turkey in fulfilling the political and economic criteria of the pre-accession process in 2005-2009?

Very negative											Very positive				Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					

Political criteria

Democracy and the rule of law														
Human rights and the protection of minorities														
Regional issues and international obligations														

Economic criteria

The existence of a functioning market economy														
Ability to assume the obligations of membership														
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union														
French Co-Presidency of the EMP (July 2008-June 2009)														

MONITORING OF PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Q.1.11. European Neighbourhood Policy

Among the priorities identified in the 2006 Communication of the European Commission “on strengthening the European neighbourhood policy”, how would you assess progress?

	Progress	No progress	Regression	Don't know
Enhancing the economic and trade component				
Pursuit of a “deep and comprehensive FTA (Free Trade Area)” approach				
Enhanced support for reforms and efforts to improve trade and economic regulatory environment and the investment climate				
Strengthened economic integration and cooperation in key sectors				
Facilitating mobility and managing migration				
Visa facilitation, removing obstacles to legitimate travel				
Address readmission and effective and efficient border management				
Promoting people-to-people exchanges				
Educational, cultural, youth and research exchanges				
Enhanced civil society participation in ENP				
Exchanges between regional and local authorities				
Training the regulators of tomorrow				
Business-to-business contacts				
Business-to-business contacts Visibility and information activities				
Building a thematic dimension to the ENP				
Consideration of additional multilateral agreements in energy and transport				
Work for the extension of the EU transport and energy networks to neighbouring countries, as well as interoperability.				
Participation of neighbours in relevant Community agencies and programmes				

Progress	No progress	Regression	Don't know
----------	-------------	------------	------------

Strengthening political cooperation

More active EU role in regional or multilateral conflict-resolution efforts, including participation as appropriate in civil and military peace-keeping missions				
Possibility of alignment with CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) declarations offered to all ENP partners				
Intensified parliamentary cooperation				
Strengthening of EU diplomatic presence in all ENP partners				

Enhancing regional cooperation

Strengthened cooperation with "the neighbours of our neighbours", e.g. on energy, transport, the fight against illegal immigration				
--	--	--	--	--

Strengthening financial cooperation

Maximising impact and leverage of scarce resources				
Governance Facility				
Neighbourhood Investment Fund				
Improved coordination between Member State and EC assistance				

In your view what other priorities should the ENP have ?

Q.1.12. ENP multilateral programmes

How do you assess the implementation so far of the new multilateral programmes of the ENP?

	Very negative											Very positive											Don't know
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes (Spain-Morocco Programme, Italy-Tunisia Programme and the Mediterranean Basin Programme)																							
TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchanges) and SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management)																							
Twinning programmes																							
NIF (NIF (Neighbourhood Investment Facility - financing facility aimed at mobilizing additional funding for projects in the transport, energy, environment and social sectors as well as for SMEs).																							
Promoting higher education and student mobility (scholarship scheme)																							
"Governance Facility" (€50 million a year for 2007-10)																							

Q.1.13. FEMIP

What is your assessment of the implementation of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) (€ 5.2 billion of loans signed in 2005-2008 and a remaining lending envelope of €7.6 billion for 2009-2013, complemented by EU budgetary resources for Risk Capital and Technical Assistance operations, as well as a Trust Fund with Member States contributions)?

Very disappointing										Very positive	Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Comments:

Q.1.14. Funds

Do you think that the financial resources of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument are sufficient to reach the objectives of the ENP? (for 2007-2010, €2,962 million for Mediterranean Country Programmes and €343.3 million for the Regional Programme-South plus €277.1 million for Mediterranean Cross-Border Cooperation and some additional resources for thematic programmes)

Very insufficient										Sufficient	Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Comments:

Q.1.15. Coherence and articulation

Do you think there is coherence and articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU enlargement process?

Total lack of coherence							Excellent level of coherence			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Comments:

Q.1.16. Added value of differentiation and strengthened cooperation (including advanced status)

Do you think that the development of differentiation and reinforced cooperation (including Advanced Status and other types of preferential partnerships) are detrimental or beneficial to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy?

Very detrimental						Very beneficial				
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Comments:

Q.1.17. General assessment

What is your global assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the 2005-2009 period?

Very disappointing						Very positive				
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Comments:

02

MONITORING OF INVOLVEMENT OF ACTORS

Q.2.1. General assessment of the involvement of different actors

How do you assess the level of involvement in the Euro-Med Partnership achieved by the following actors?

	Very low											Very high											Don't know			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Business organisations																										
Trade unions																										
Social and economic committees																										
NGOs																										
Cultural institutions and foundations																										
Youth organisations																										
Women's associations																										
Cities and local governments																										
Regional governments																										
Country (or State) governments																										
Universities																										
Media																										
Research centres and think tanks																										

And the level of activity in the Euro-Med Partnership achieved by the following actors?

	Very low											Very high											Don't know			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly																										
Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures																										
Economic and Social Committees																										
EuroMed NGO Platform and Civil Forum																										
EuroMeSCo (Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission)																										
FEMISE (Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Research Institutes)																										

Explain the main reasons preventing a deeper involvement by the actors you belong to:

Q.2.2. Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly

What is your assessment of the work achieved by the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) in 2005-2009?

Very disappointing										Very positive		Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

Comments:

Q.2.3. Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures

What is your assessment of the work achieved by the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures in 2005-2009?

Very disappointing										Very positive		Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

Comments:

Q.2.4. Euro-Mediterranean University

In your opinion, what should be the priorities of the EMUNI (Euro-Mediterranean University)?

To organise Masters and Post-graduate programmes on Euro-Mediterranean Affairs

To promote research on Mediterranean societies and issues

To host courses and activities organised by affiliated Euro-Mediterranean universities

To organise seminars, conferences and other meetings

To offer diplomas in different disciplines recognised in the EU and in the Mediterranean countries

To support universities from MPCs to improve the quality of their programmes

To support cooperation among Euro-Mediterranean universities and to stimulate mobility of students and professors

Others (specify):

--

Q.2.5. Women's involvement

How do you assess the actions undertaken by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy to promote the participation of women in social, economic and political life?

Very disappointing										Very positive
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Comments:

--

How do you assess the level of involvement of women in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

Very low										Very high
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Do you have specific proposals to improve this participation?

--

03

THEMATIC DOSSIER:
FOCUS ON THE UNION FOR
THE MEDITERRANEAN

Each year, the Survey will include a thematic dossier highlighting the opinion of experts and actors on a specific area of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This year, it will focus on the project of the Union for the Mediterranean, which stirred a lively public and diplomatic debate in 2008 and introduced wide-ranging innovations as regards the number of partners, the institutional framework and the methodology of cooperation.

Q.3.1 General assessment and value added

Is the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) an added value for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy?

Very low										Very high
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Comments:

Q.3.2 Objectives, expectations and contents of the UfM

In your opinion, what is the contribution of the general objectives of the Union for the Mediterranean in relation to the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

Very negative								Very positive			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Increase the visibility of the EuroMed Process											
Upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners											
Reinforce the institutional balance between the EU and the MPCs											
Promote more co-ownership within EuroMed multilateral relations											
Concentrate on some fundamental regional projects											

Q.3.3. Contribution of new Mediterranean Partner Countries

To what extent do you think that the new partners of the EMP will strengthen it? (Mauritania in 2005, Albania in 2006 and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco, Montenegro and the League of Arab States as Permanent Observer in 2008)

	Not at all										To a high extent										Don't know			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		9	10	
Albania																								
Bosnia and Herzegovina																								
Croatia																								
Mauritania																								
Montenegro																								
League of Arab States																								

Comments:

Q.3.4. Co-Presidency system

In your view, how effective is the new Co-Presidency system introduced to strengthen a true partnership and ownership of the EMP?

Very ineffective										Very effective										Don't know				
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		9	10		

Comments:

Q.3.5. Secretariat

Do you expect that the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, to be established in Barcelona as approved in the Marseille Conference, will play a key, moderate or negligible role in the new institutional architecture of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

Negligible role										Key role	Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Beyond those assigned to it in the Marseille Conference, what other functions do you think that the Secretariat should perform?

Q.3.6. Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly

Do you think that the proposal of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly could be a major improvement of the EMP?

No improvement										Major improvement	Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Comments:

Q.3.7. Projects

How do you assess the possible contribution of the regional projects selected at the July 2008 Paris Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP?

	Very negative										Very positive		Don't know
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
De-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea													
Maritime and land highways													
Civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters													
Alternative energies: Mediterranean solar plan													
Higher education and research, Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia and Fez													
Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises													

Which other projects would seem to be a priority for you?

Q.3.8. UfM Funds

How do you assess the probability that the Union for the Mediterranean projects will attract financial resources from outside the EU (i.e. from Gulf countries, international private investors, international financial institutions or other sources)?

Very improbable										Very probable		Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

Comments:

04

MEDITERRANEAN TRENDS: FORWARD-LOOKING ANALYSIS

Q.4.1. What degree of probability do you attribute to the prospect that current Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (within the frameworks of the EMP, ENP and UfM) is leading, in the long term, to:

	No probability										Very high-probability	Don't know	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
The resolution of conflicts in the region													
The strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights in the Mediterranean Partner Countries													
A higher level of employment, an improvement in living conditions and a reduction of poverty in Mediterranean Partner Countries													
A reduction of the development gap between the North and the South of the Mediterranean													
A greater intensity of human exchanges between the North and the South of the Mediterranean													
A greater understanding and respect between cultures and religions in the Mediterranean													

Q.4.2. What degree of probability do you attribute to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean under the present level and framework of cooperation?

	No probability										Very high probability	Don't know	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP													
Political regimes in MPCs will show a high degree of continuity													
The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period													
Gulf Cooperation Council members will facilitate a higher degree of South-South economic cooperation in the Mediterranean													
Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States.													
Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean													
Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs													
MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income													
Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions													
Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose													
Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean													
Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe													
Increased level of migration will push for political reforms in the Mediterranean Partner Countries													
The increased level of migration, economic and human exchanges will give way to the emergence of a common Mediterranean identity													

Comments:

Q.4.3. Turkey's prospects for accession to the EU

How do you assess the probability that Turkey will join the EU as a full Member State in the next 20 years?

Very improbable										Very probable		Don't know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

Comments:

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05

POLICY PROPOSALS

Q.5.1. Priorities of the Marseille Declaration

Which priorities identified at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Marseille on 3rd-4th November 2008 are the most important in your opinion for 2010-2013?

Please indicate the degree of importance for each dimension.

Less important							Very important					
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

Political and security dialogue

Middle East Peace Process (regular review of the political situation in the Middle East)											
Terrorism (implementation of the Code of Conduct on countering terrorism)											
Deepening of the dialogue on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and crisis management											
Democracy and political pluralism (strengthen democracy and political pluralism through expansion of participation in political life and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms)											
Deepening of regional dialogue on joint cooperation, best practices and exchange of experience in the area of elections											
Laying foundations for a Long-Term Programme, the EuroMed Programme for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters – PPRD (2008-2011)											

Maritime Safety											
-----------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Economic and Financial Partnership

Energy											
Transport											
Agriculture											
Urban development											
Water											
Environment											
Information Society											
Tourism											
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area											
Economic dialogue											
Industrial cooperation											
Ongoing work on statistics cooperation											

Less important							Very important					
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

Social, human and cultural cooperation

Developing a genuine social dimension												
Health												
Human development												
Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Research Area												
Promoting dialogue between cultures, cultural diversity												
Justice and law												
Strengthening the role of women in society												
EuroMed Youth												
Cooperation with civil society and local actors												
Enhancing the visibility of the Partnership												
Migration												

Q.5.2. Priorities of the Spanish Presidency

In your opinion, what should be the main priorities for the Spanish Co-Presidency of the UfM (and the Euro-Mediterranean Summit Barcelona 2010)?

Please choose five from the whole list.

Political and Security Cooperation

- Conflict resolution in the region
- Fight against international terrorism
- Creation of an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean
- Civil protection and prevention of man-made disasters
- Human rights and intolerance
- Promoting democracy and political pluralism

Economic and Financial Cooperation

- Increasing the funds allocated to the EMP
- Wider Free Trade Area
- Energy
- Water access and sustainability
- Food security
- Environmental issues and sustainable development
- Liberalisation of EU agricultural markets

Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation

- Employment promotion and employment policies
- Education
- Promoting equality between men and women
- Promoting the participation of civil society and social partners in the EMP
- Promoting dialogue between cultures and cultural diversity
- Management of migration flows
- Establishment of free movement of persons in the Mediterranean

Additional concrete proposals for the Spanish Co-Presidency:

In order to facilitate the data processing, and to improve the statistical analysis, we would be very pleased if you facilitate us the following information:

Gender

Man

Woman

Nationality

Institution/organisation

Type of organisation

- Governmental
- Diplomatic
- EU Institution
- Other international organisations
- Think tanks
- Academic
- Media
- NGO
- Trade unions
- Company (Business sector)

V

SET OF ALL RESULTS

Q.1


MONITORING OF PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

Question 1.1.

In your opinion, what is the perception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in the 2005-2009 period amongst experts and actors involved in it?

	Very disappointing											Very positive		Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
General Assessment	4	14	23	50	56	70	51	40	28	9	3	348	4.9		
	1%	4%	7%	14%	16%	20%	15%	11%	8%	3%	1%	100%			

10 = Very positive




0 = Very negative

Question 1.2.

In your opinion, what are the main difficulties that the EMP has encountered to achieve its objectives in 2005-2009? Please indicate the three most important

Difficulties	Mentions	%
The global financial crisis	72	20%
The impact of international terrorism	54	15%
The US policy in the region (including the Iraq War)	103	29%
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict	259	73%
The surge of Islamism in the region	42	12%
The lack of South-South integration	151	42%
The lack of involvement of the EU due to its greater attention to Eastern Europe	104	29%
The weak political will for reform in Mediterranean Partner Countries	154	43%
The weak political will of EU countries for democratisation in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean	100	28%
The insufficient budget allocated to the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument	90	25%
The lack of consensus for the first proposals on the Union for the Mediterranean	77	22%
Total respondents	356	

Q. 1.2. Main difficulties that the EMP has encountered to achieve its objectives in 2005-2009


Question 1.3.

What are, in general terms, the achievements in the four priorities identified at the Barcelona 2005 Conference within the framework of the 2005 Five Year Work Programme?

	Very disappointing										Very positive		Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
1. Political and Security Partnership	13	23	44	54	63	64	41	29	14	3	1	349	4.13	
	4%	7%	13%	15%	18%	18%	12%	8%	4%	1%	0%			100%
2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform	5	19	40	45	74	66	56	35	6	2	0	348	4.33	
	1%	5%	11%	13%	21%	19%	16%	10%	2%	1%	0%			100%
3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges	5	11	22	38	61	61	61	55	28	6	3	351	5.06	
	1%	3%	6%	11%	17%	17%	17%	16%	8%	2%	1%			100%
4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security	23	37	43	69	73	38	39	14	4	5	1	346	3.56	
	7%	11%	12%	20%	21%	11%	11%	4%	1%	1%	0%			100%


1. Political and Security Partnership

10 = Very positive




0 = Very disappointing


2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform



3. Educational and Socio-Cultural Exchanges



4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security



Question 1.4.


Among the priorities defined in 2005, for which do you consider progress was achieved and for which do you think that there was no progress or even regression?

1. Political and Security Partnership exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens	97	191	38	326	20	346
	30%	59%	12%	100%	6%	
Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level	85	204	25	314	33	347
	27%	65%	8%	100%	10%	
Increase the participation of women in decision-making	173	125	18	316	34	350
	55%	40%	6%	100%	10%	
Ensure freedom of expression and association	100	179	46	325	23	348
	31%	55%	14%	100%	7%	
Foster the role of civil society	181	126	22	329	18	347
	55%	38%	7%	100%	5%	
Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions	86	156	24	266	82	348
	32%	59%	9%	100%	24%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1. Political and Security Partnership Exchanges




2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Create more job opportunities for the increasing numbers of young people across the region	79	202	45	326	21	347
	24%	62%	14%	100%	6%	
Improve business climate, in particular for SMEs	187	110	17	314	36	350
	60%	35%	5%	100%	10%	
Reduce regional poverty rates	60	194	57	311	36	347
	19%	62%	18%	100%	10%	
Reduce the prosperity gap and raise GDP growth rates	61	191	55	307	39	346
	20%	62%	18%	100%	11%	
Increase in North-South and South-South regional cooperation	157	148	20	325	21	346
	48%	46%	6%	100%	6%	
Increase in the percentage of women in employment in partner countries	131	145	14	290	55	345
	45%	50%	5%	100%	16%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform




3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Halve the number of illiterate female and male adults and children	137	147	8	292	56	348
	47%	50%	3%	100%	16%	
Promote equitable access to quality education	120	166	20	306	41	347
	39%	54%	7%	100%	12%	
Reduce disparities in educational achievement between Euro-Mediterranean states	80	180	35	295	54	349
	27%	61%	12%	100%	15%	
Enhance graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education	90	188	23	301	46	347
	30%	62%	8%	100%	13%	
Increase awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations	197	103	34	334	18	352
	59%	31%	10%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges




4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Promote legal migration opportunities	98	153	67	318	28	346
	31%	48%	21%	100%	8%	
Facilitate flow of remittance transfers	135	108	21	264	82	346
	51%	41%	8%	100%	24%	
Address "brain drain"	50	191	62	303	45	348
	17%	63%	20%	100%	13%	
Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration and trafficking in human beings	90	158	67	315	33	348
	29%	50%	21%	100%	9%	
Promote modernisation & efficiency of administration of justice	93	176	25	294	52	346
	32%	60%	9%	100%	15%	
Reinforce judicial cooperation	156	107	13	276	68	344
	57%	39%	5%	100%	20%	
Promote the ratification/implementation of the relevant UN conventions for organised crime	125	100	12	237	110	347
	53%	42%	5%	100%	32%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security



Question 1.5.


Among the Euro-Mediterranean multilateral programmes, for which do you consider progress was achieved in their implementation and for which do you think that there was no progress between 2005 and 2009?

1. Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Confidence building measures: civil protection	139	144	12	295	58	353
	47%	49%	4%	100%	16%	
Confidence building measures: Partnership for Peace	112	155	31	298	52	350
	38%	52%	10%	100%	15%	
Justice, security and migration (JSM)	111	149	27	287	64	351
	39%	52%	9%	100%	18%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

1. Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation




2. Sustainable Economic Development	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Investment promotion and reform denomination to attract investments	200	92	14	306	44	350
	65%	30%	5%	100%	13%	
Transport and energy cooperation	207	79	10	296	54	350
	70%	27%	3%	100%	15%	
South-South regional economic integration	50	234	22	306	43	349
	16%	76%	7%	100%	12%	
Environmental programmes	177	109	13	299	46	345
	59%	36%	4%	100%	13%	
Technical assistance and risk capital support from FEMIP	149	57	5	211	134	345
	71%	27%	2%	100%	39%	
Development of the information society	208	87	7	302	48	350
	69%	29%	2%	100%	14%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

2. Sustainable Economic Development




3. Social Development and Cultural Exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Gender equality (participation of women in economic life)	186	119	12	317	33	350
	59%	38%	4%	100%	9%	
Civil society promotion and participation	178	130	19	327	26	353
	54%	40%	6%	100%	7%	
Information and communication II	197	88	10	295	56	351
	67%	30%	3%	100%	16%	
Euro-Med Youth	161	99	15	275	74	349
	59%	36%	5%	100%	21%	
Dialogue between cultures and cultural heritage	225	83	25	333	19	352
	68%	25%	8%	100%	5%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

3. Social Development and Cultural Exchanges



Question 1.6.


How would you grade the action of the different Presidencies and Co-Presidencies of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

Assessment of EU Presidencies and MPC Co-Presidencies	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative					Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Austrian EU Presidency (January-June 2006)	5	16	23	41	36	48	15	18	8	4	1	215	4.163	133	348
	2%	7%	11%	19%	17%	22%	7%	8%	4%	2%	0%	100%		38%	
Finnish EU Presidency (July-December 2006)	4	10	15	23	30	56	34	38	26	8	3	247	5.219	102	349
	2%	4%	6%	9%	12%	23%	14%	15%	11%	3%	1%	100%		29%	
German EU Presidency (January-June 2007)	3	8	12	14	34	57	43	47	32	8	3	261	5.517	87	348
	1%	3%	5%	5%	13%	22%	16%	18%	12%	3%	1%	100%		25%	
Portuguese EU Presidency (July-December 2007)	3	4	11	20	40	48	55	43	25	9	1	259	5.436	86	345
	1%	2%	4%	8%	15%	19%	21%	17%	10%	3%	0%	100%		25%	
Slovenian EU Presidency (January-June 2008)	9	10	17	28	49	43	44	30	17	6	1	254	4.776	93	347
	4%	4%	7%	11%	19%	17%	17%	12%	7%	2%	0%	100%		27%	
French EU Presidency (July-December 2008)	5	10	17	11	22	41	44	64	47	34	15	310	6.174	42	352
	2%	3%	5%	4%	7%	13%	14%	21%	15%	11%	5%	100%		12%	
Czech EU Presidency (January-June 2009)	39	31	46	39	48	33	23	16	10	4	4	293	3.423	59	352
	13%	11%	16%	13%	16%	11%	8%	5%	3%	1%	1%	100%		17%	
Egyptian Co-Presidency of the EMP (July 2008-June 2009)	10	31	30	28	35	51	28	27	17	4	3	264	4.277	82	346
	4%	12%	11%	11%	13%	19%	11%	10%	6%	2%	1%	100%		24%	
French Co-Presidency of the EMP (July 2008-June 2009)	11	19	22	21	29	51	43	41	33	10	6	286	5.091	61	347
	4%	7%	8%	7%	10%	18%	15%	14%	12%	3%	2%	100%		18%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Average



Question 1.7. a)


How would you assess the progress of Mediterranean Partner Countries in the achievement of the objectives of the EMP in 2005-2009?

a) In general:	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Mediterranean Partner Countries																
Algeria	16	23	48	50	48	43	30	7	2	1	1	269	3.49	67	336	
	6%	9%	18%	19%	18%	16%	11%	3%	1%	0%	0%	100%		20%		
Egypt	7	19	31	34	44	56	43	33	11	4	1	283	4.46	52	335	
	2%	7%	11%	12%	16%	20%	15%	12%	4%	1%	0%	100%		16%		
Israel	42	18	32	23	28	30	33	24	19	7	2	258	3.93	73	331	
	16%	7%	12%	9%	11%	12%	13%	9%	7%	3%	1%	100%		22%		
Jordan	5	6	9	32	38	52	56	43	18	6	3	268	5.21	67	335	
	2%	2%	3%	12%	14%	19%	21%	16%	7%	2%	1%	100%		20%		
Lebanon	5	12	20	30	42	63	45	38	10	2	2	269	4.75	66	335	
	2%	4%	7%	11%	16%	23%	17%	14%	4%	1%	1%	100%		20%		
Morocco	3	6	8	16	28	46	49	61	51	22	6	296	6.08	40	336	
	1%	2%	3%	5%	9%	16%	17%	21%	17%	7%	2%	100%		12%		
Occup. Palestinian Ter.	32	24	35	36	33	37	42	20	15	1	0	275	3.78	56	331	
	12%	9%	13%	13%	12%	13%	15%	7%	5%	0%	0%	100%		17%		
Syria	30	33	36	44	48	37	19	7	4	1	1	260	4.18	73	333	
	12%	13%	14%	17%	18%	14%	7%	3%	2%	0%	0%	100%		22%		
Tunisia	7	17	20	19	25	48	52	48	36	5	4	281	5.25	52	333	
	2%	6%	7%	7%	9%	17%	19%	17%	13%	2%	1%	100%		16%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Average




Question 1.7. b)


In specific areas, please indicate the three countries which have made most progress in the respective thematic area.

1. Political and Security Partnership	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Occup. Palest. Territ.	Syria	Tunisia	Dkn	Total respondents
Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens	26	40	94	106	141	185	44	8	48	50	315
	8%	13%	30%	34%	45%	59%	14%	3%	15%	16%	
Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level	28	34	92	78	107	146	48	4	48	67	304
	9%	11%	30%	26%	35%	48%	16%	1%	16%	22%	
Increase the participation of women in decision-making	27	36	96	89	90	152	26	18	96	58	307
	9%	12%	31%	29%	30%	50%	9%	6%	31%	19%	
Ensure freedom of expression and association	30	33	105	83	136	137	31	6	31	70	306
	10%	11%	35%	27%	45%	45%	10%	2%	10%	23%	
Foster the role of civil society	25	43	103	88	121	141	45	12	35	61	301
	8%	14%	34%	29%	40%	47%	15%	4%	12%	20%	
Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions	27	59	23	73	60	96	23	9	49	133	297
	9%	20%	8%	25%	20%	33%	8%	3%	17%	45%	


Extended political pluralism and participation by citizens




Enable citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level




Increase the participation of women in decision-making




Ensure freedom of expression and association



Foster the role of civil society




Enable the further implementation of UN and Regional Charters and Conventions




2. Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Occup. Palest. Territ.	Syria	Tunisia	Dkn	Total respondents
	Create more job opportunities for the increasing numbers of young people across the region	32 11%	45 15%	76 26%	74 25%	32 11%	104 35%	8 3%	14 5%	97 33%	110 37%
Improve business climate, in particular for SMEs	34 11%	71 24%	74 25%	75 25%	45 15%	134 45%	5 2%	14 5%	125 42%	80 27%	300
Reduce regional poverty rates	35 12%	28 10%	53 18%	71 25%	41 14%	69 24%	14 5%	24 8%	99 34%	123 43%	289
Reduce the prosperity gap and raise GDP growth rates	43 15%	30 11%	58 20%	58 20%	34 12%	70 25%	7 2%	15 5%	99 35%	128 45%	287
Increase in North-South and South-South regional cooperation	29 10%	96 33%	27 9%	93 32%	37 13%	145 50%	8 3%	14 5%	98 34%	86 30%	292
Increase in the percentage of women in employment in partner countries	34 12%	34 12%	60 21%	53 18%	64 22%	91 31%	10 3%	15 5%	92 32%	117 41%	288


Create more job opportunities for the increasing numbers of young people across the region




Improve business climate




Reduce regional poverty rates




Reduce the prosperity gap and raise GDP growth rates



Increase in North-South and South-South regional cooperation




Increase in the percentage of women in employment in partner countries




3. Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Occup. Palest. Territ.	Syria	Tunisia	Dkn	Total respondents
	Halve the number of illiterate female and male adults and children	44 15%	40 14%	61 21%	64 22%	55 19%	54 18%	19 7%	32 11%	85 29%	120 41%
Promote equitable access to quality education	24 8%	38 13%	90 31%	81 28%	60 21%	62 21%	15 5%	22 8%	79 27%	106 37%	290
Reduce disparities in educational achievement between Euro-Mediterranean states	16 6%	31 11%	58 20%	61 21%	51 18%	53 18%	13 5%	8 3%	60 21%	151 52%	288
Enhance graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education	24 8%	39 13%	90 31%	68 23%	56 19%	70 24%	11 4%	13 5%	73 25%	113 39%	291
Increase awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations	14 5%	78 27%	90 10%	93 32%	80 28%	108 37%	21 7%	20 7%	66 23%	93 32%	291


Halve the number of illiterate female and male adults and children




Promote equitable access to quality education




Reduce disparities in educational achievement between Euro-Mediterranean states



Enhance graduate employment through efficient, high quality higher education




Increase awareness and understanding of the different cultures and civilisations




4. Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Occup. Palest. Territ.	Syria	Tunisia	Dkn	Total respondents
	Promote legal migration opportunities	33 12%	41 15%	29 11%	40 15%	31 11%	101 37%	5 2%	10 4%	73 27%	125 46%
Facilitate the flow of remittance transfers	31 11%	64 23%	25 9%	39 14%	57 20%	105 38%	5 2%	3 1%	63 23%	127 45%	280
Address "brain drain"	24 9%	40 15%	50 19%	43 16%	34 13%	64 24%	10 4%	16 6%	52 19%	138 51%	270
Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration, trafficking in human beings	54 20%	35 13%	24 9%	34 12%	14 12%	85 31%	6 2%	15 6%	70 26%	136 50%	275
Strengthen modernisation and efficiency of the administration of justice	20 7%	31 11%	38 14%	70 26%	52 19%	87 32%	9 3%	7 3%	49 18%	125 46%	273
Reinforce judicial cooperation	31 11%	44 16%	24 9%	53 19%	36 13%	89 32%	7 3%	8 3%	48 17%	137 50%	277
Promote the ratification/ implementation of the relevant UN conventions for organised crime	23 9%	38 14%	21 8%	52 19%	31 12%	60 22%	9 3%	10 4%	51 19%	150 56%	269


Promote legal migration opportunities




Facilitate the flow of remittance transfers




Address "brain drain"




Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration, trafficking human beings




Strengthen modernisation and efficiency of the administration of justice



Reinforce judicial cooperation



Promote the ratification/implementation of the relevant UN conventions for organised crime



Question 1.8.

How would you assess the progress achieved by Turkey in fulfilling the political and economic criteria of the pre-accession process in 2005-2009?


Political criteria	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative					Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Democracy and the rule of law	2	7	8	14	29	49	69	71	47	20	7	323	6.08	21	344
	1%	2%	2%	4%	9%	15%	21%	22%	15%	6%	2%	100%		6%	
Human rights and the protection of minorities	12	7	20	42	48	56	62	44	19	7	4	321	4.92	22	343
	4%	2%	6%	13%	15%	17%	19%	14%	6%	2%	1%	100%		6%	
Regional issues and international obligations	7	3	6	19	19	40	53	61	56	38	13	315	6.39	25	340
	2%	1%	2%	6%	6%	13%	17%	19%	18%	12%	4%	100%		7%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Democracy and the rule of law


10 = Very positive



0 = Very negative

Human rights and protection of minorities


10 = Very positive



0 = Very negative

Regional issues and international obligations

10 = Very positive



0 = Very negative

How would you assess the progress achieved by Turkey in fulfilling the political and economic criteria of the pre-accession process in 2005-2009?


Economic criteria	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative					Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
The existence of a functioning market	1	1	4	3	11	22	54	69	85	45	16	311	7.15	27	338
	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	7%	17%	22%	27%	14%	5%				
Ability to assume the obligations of membership	1	4	8	9	27	32	51	63	71	30	14	310	6.58	30	340
	0%	1%	3%	3%	9%	10%	16%	20%	23%	10%	5%				
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market within the Union	1	3	5	7	22	41	50	61	72	33	12	307	6.67	35	342
	0%	1%	2%	2%	7%	13%	16%	20%	23%	11%	4%				

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

The existence of functioning market economy


10 = Very positive



0 = Very negative

Ability to assume the obligations of membership


10 = Very positive



0 = Very negative

The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union

10 = Very positive



0 = Very negative

Question 1.9

How would you assess the commitment of individual EU Member States in the achievement of the objectives of the EMP in general?


	Very disappointing											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Austria	4	15	29	29	42	44	33	34	23	8	3	264	4.811	71	335
	2%	6%	11%	11%	16%	17%	13%	13%	9%	3%	1%	100%		21%	
Belgium	3	5	11	25	31	57	51	45	27	8	3	266	5.451	68	334
	1%	2%	4%	9%	12%	21%	19%	17%	10%	3%	1%	100%		20%	
Bulgaria	14	18	31	50	36	34	16	11	3	0	0	213	3.479	114	327
	7%	8%	15%	23%	17%	16%	8%	5%	1%	0%	0%	100%		35%	
Cyprus	14	9	19	29	30	35	47	36	20	4	3	246	4.833	83	329
	6%	4%	8%	12%	12%	14%	19%	15%	8%	2%	1%	100%		25%	
Czech Republic	22	19	38	45	28	44	29	21	4	2	2	254	3.752	75	329
	9%	7%	15%	18%	11%	17%	11%	8%	2%	1%	1%	100%		23%	
Denmark	12	10	17	26	29	47	46	30	23	10	4	254	5.012	75	329
	5%	4%	7%	10%	11%	19%	18%	12%	9%	4%	2%	100%		23%	
Estonia	19	22	22	40	35	46	16	11	5	1	0	217	3.585	112	329
	9%	10%	10%	18%	16%	21%	7%	5%	2%	0%	0%	100%		34%	
Finland	4	10	11	27	24	35	41	45	30	14	6	247	5.551	84	331
	2%	4%	4%	11%	10%	14%	17%	18%	12%	6%	2%	100%		25%	
France	2	11	10	8	15	23	41	64	72	46	22	314	6.796	24	338
	2%	4%	4%	11%	10%	14%	17%	18%	12%	6%	2%	100%		21%	
Germany	3	11	10	28	30	40	43	49	48	15	8	285	5.737	49	334
	1%	4%	4%	10%	11%	14%	15%	17%	17%	5%	3%	100%		15%	
Greece	3	1	16	20	29	45	52	48	40	12	4	270	5.741	61	331
	1%	0%	6%	7%	11%	17%	19%	18%	15%	4%	1%	100%		18%	
Hungary	13	12	33	42	31	45	18	15	10	3	0	222	3.932	104	326
	6%	5%	15%	19%	14%	20%	8%	7%	5%	1%	0%	100%		32%	
Ireland	17	12	25	35	36	41	24	13	12	5	2	222	4.108	99	321
	8%	5%	11%	16%	16%	18%	11%	6%	5%	2%	1%	100%		31%	
Italy	4	5	10	17	24	46	50	59	51	20	4	290	6.01	42	332
	1%	2%	3%	6%	8%	16%	17%	20%	18%	7%	1%	100%		13%	
Latvia	21	17	31	42	31	33	11	9	5	1	0	201	3.343	123	324
	10%	8%	15%	21%	15%	16%	5%	4%	2%	0%	0%	100%		38%	
Lithuania	22	17	28	46	33	31	11	11	7	3	0	209	3.464	115	324
	11%	8%	13%	22%	16%	15%	5%	5%	3%	1%	0%	100%		35%	

	Very disappointing										Very positive		Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Luxembourg	9	8	20	31	23	45	28	20	17	13	2	216	4.81	108	324	
	4%	4%	9%	14%	11%	21%	13%	9%	8%	6%	1%	100%		33%		
Malta	3	3	13	21	27	37	37	44	41	20	4	250	5.852	76	326	
	1%	1%	5%	8%	11%	15%	15%	18%	16%	8%	2%	100%		23%		
Netherlands	4	5	25	27	28	48	50	33	23	10	0	253	5.111	72	325	
	2%	2%	10%	11%	11%	19%	20%	13%	9%	4%	0%	100%		22%		
Poland	17	20	41	38	31	45	21	14	10	2	1	240	3.738	85	325	
	7%	8%	17%	16%	13%	19%	9%	6%	4%	1%	0%	100%		26%		
Portugal	4	2	11	21	27	30	52	61	30	17	4	259	5.857	63	322	
	2%	1%	4%	8%	10%	12%	20%	24%	12%	7%	2%	100%		20%		
Romania	12	20	31	50	30	28	25	11	6	1	1	215	3.656	109	324	
	6%	9%	14%	23%	14%	13%	12%	5%	3%	0%	0%	100%		34%		
Slovakia	17	19	35	40	33	34	22	7	5	3	3	218	3.619	104	322	
	8%	9%	16%	18%	15%	16%	10%	3%	2%	1%	1%	100%		32%		
Slovenia	10	10	22	24	36	43	39	22	17	9	3	235	4.766	88	323	
	4%	4%	9%	10%	15%	18%	17%	9%	7%	4%	1%	100%		27%		
Spain	2	3	5	8	15	19	38	67	70	49	25	301	7.11	31	332	
	1%	1%	2%	3%	5%	6%	13%	22%	23%	16%	8%	100%		9%		
Sweden	4	3	13	14	26	32	48	46	38	21	12	257	6.062	72	329	
	2%	1%	5%	5%	10%	12%	19%	18%	15%	8%	5%	100%		22%		
UK	5	12	25	37	27	51	49	31	19	13	4	273	4.967	56	329	
	2%	4%	9%	14%	10%	19%	18%	11%	7%	5%	1%	100%		17%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

**How would you assess the commitment of individual EU Member States in the achievement of the objectives of the EMP in general?
Average**




Question 1.10.

What is your global assessment of the results of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the 2005-2009 period?

	Very disappointing										Very positive		Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
General Assessment	6	16	25	46	66	57	70	43	16	3	0	348	4.68	
	2%	5%	7%	13%	19%	16%	20%	12%	5%	1%	0%			100%

General Assessment of the EMP in the 2005-2009 period

10 = Very positive



0 = Very disappointing

Question 1.11.


Among the priorities identified in the 2006 Communication of the European Commission “on strengthening the European neighbourhood policy”, how would you assess progress?

Enhancing the economic and trade component	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Pursuit of a “deep and comprehensive FTA (Free Trade Area)” approach	141	140	11	292	47	339
	48%	48%	4%	100%	14%	
Enhanced support for reforms and efforts to improve trade and economic regulatory environment and the investment climate	197	94	8	299	41	340
	66%	31%	3%	100%	12%	
Strengthened economic integration and cooperation in key sectors	147	138	12	297	43	340
	49%	46%	4%	100%	13%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Enhancing the economic and trade component




Facilitating mobility and managing migration	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Visa facilitation, removing obstacles to legitimate travel	54	171	91	316	26	342
	17%	54%	29%	100%	8%	
Address readmission and effective and efficient border management	94	159	43	296	40	336
	32%	54%	15%	100%	12%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Facilitating mobility and managing migration




Promoting people-to-people exchanges	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Educational, cultural, youth and research exchanges	231	75	16	322	19	341
	72%	23%	5%	100%	6%	
Enhanced civil society participation in ENP	185	113	16	314	26	340
	59%	36%	3%	100%	8%	
Exchanges between regional and local authorities	166	111	15	292	42	334
	57%	38%	5%	100%	13%	
Training the regulators of tomorrow	117	133	8	258	81	339
	45%	52%	3%	100%	24%	
Business-to-business contacts	205	73	3	281	57	338
	73%	26%	1%	100%	17%	
Visibility and information activities	149	125	25	299	37	336
	50%	42%	8%	100%	11%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Promoting people-to-people exchanges




Building a thematic dimension to the ENP	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Consideration of additional multilateral agreements in energy and transport	148	97	5	250	85	335
	59%	39%	2%	100%	25%	
Work for the extension of the EU transport and energy networks to neighbouring countries, as well as interoperability	161	90	6	257	79	336
	63%	35%	2%	100%	24%	
Participation of neighbours in relevant Community agencies and programmes	151	102	7	260	73	333
	58%	39%	3%	100%	22%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Building a thematic dimension to the ENP




Strengthening political cooperation	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
More active EU role in regional or multilateral conflict-resolution efforts, including participation as appropriate in civil and military peace-keeping missions	127	144	39	310	27	337
	41%	46%	13%	100%	8%	
Possibility of alignment with CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) declarations offered to all ENP partners	80	150	18	248	88	336
	32%	60%	7%	100%	26%	
Intensified parliamentary cooperation	152	114	9	275	57	332
	55%	41%	3%	100%	17%	
Strengthening of EU diplomatic presence in all ENP partners	174	89	13	276	60	336
	63%	32%	5%	100%	18%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Strengthening political cooperation




Enhancing regional cooperation	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Strengthened cooperation with "the neighbours of our neighbours", e.g. on energy, transport, the fight against illegal immigration	150	114	9	273	60	333
	55%	42%	3%	100%	18%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Enhancing regional cooperation

Strengthened cooperation with “the neighbours of our neighbours”, e.g. on energy, transport, the fight against illegal immigration




Strengthening financial cooperation	Consideration/Evolution				Dkn	Total**
	P	NP	R	Total*		
Maximising impact and leverage of scarce resources	71	160	9	240	92	332
	30%	67%	4%	100%	28%	
Governance Facility	99	145	18	262	72	334
	38%	55%	7%	100%	22%	
Neighbourhood Investment Fund	119	111	13	243	87	330
	49%	46%	5%	100%	26%	
Improved coordination between Member State and EC assistance	136	112	11	259	74	333
	53%	43%	4%	100%	22%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

Strengthening financial cooperation



Question 1.12.


How do you assess the implementation so far of the new multilateral programmes of the ENP?

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes (Spain-Morocco Programme, Italy-Tunisia Programme and the Mediterranean Basin Programme)	0	8	11	19	31	56	49	45	18	6	1	244	5.36	88	332	
	0%	3%	5%	8%	13%	23%	20%	18%	7%	2%	0%	100%		27%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Cross-Border Cooperation Programme




	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchanges) and SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management)	3	5	9	26	28	43	50	32	10	3	0	209	5.07	124	333	
	1%	2%	4%	12%	13%	21%	24%	15%	5%	1%	0%	100%		37%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding “Don’t know” answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including “Don’t know” answers

TAIEX and SIGMA

10 = Very positive




0 = Very disappointing

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Twinning programmes	2	3	11	24	32	45	45	34	21	6	2	225	5.33	97	322	
	1%	1%	5%	11%	14%	20%	20%	15%	9%	3%	1%	100%		30%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Twinning programmes




	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
NIF (Trust Fund Agreement for infrastructure interconnection of transport and energy, or environmental concerns, €250 million for 2007-2010)	2	2	8	22	23	43	45	33	15	2	3	198	5.35	135	333	
	1%	1%	4%	11%	12%	22%	23%	17%	8%	1%	2%	100%		41%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

NIF

10 = Very positive




0 = Very disappointing

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very disappointing						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Promoting higher education and student mobility (scholarship scheme)	8	9	16	37	35	49	55	41	32	9	2	293	5.16	45	338	
	3%	3%	5%	13%	12%	17%	19%	14%	11%	3%	1%	100%		13%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Promoting higher education and student mobility




	Very disappointing						Very positive						Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
"Governance Facility" (€50 million a year for 2007-10)	9	9	20	32	38	33	46	28	10	5	1	231	4.63	103	334	
	4%	4%	9%	14%	16%	14%	20%	12%	4%	2%	0%	100%		31%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Governance Facility

10 = Very positive



0 = Very disappointing


Question 1.13.

What is your assessment of the implementation of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) (€5.2 billion of loans signed in 2005-2008 and a remaining lending envelope of €7.6 billion for 2009-2013, complemented by EU budgetary resources for Risk Capital and Technical Assistance operations, as well as a Trust Fund with Member States contributions)?

	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative					Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Implementation of FEMIP	1	8	11	16	31	39	44	42	24	9	5	230	5.56	102	332
	0%	3%	5%	7%	13%	17%	19%	18%	10%	4%	2%	100%		31%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Implementation of the facility for FEMIP

Question 1.14.


Do you think that the financial resources of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument are sufficient to reach the objectives of the ENP? (for 2007-2010,€2,962 million for Mediterranean Country Programmes and €343.3 million for the Regional Programme-South plus €277.1 million for Mediterranean Cross-Border Cooperation and some additional resources for thematic programmes)

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very insufficient						Sufficient									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Financial Resources of the ENP	7	26	25	53	38	45	34	24	18	10	11	291	4.56	43	334	
	2%	9%	9%	18%	13%	15%	12%	8%	6%	3%	4%	100%		13%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Financial resources for the ENP




Question 1.15.

Do you think there is coherence and articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU enlargement process?

	Assessments											Total	Aver.
	Total lack of coherence					Excellent level of coherence							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Coherence and articulation between the EMP, the ENP, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU enlargement process?	17	32	42	67	38	47	50	17	13	4	2	329	3.9
	5%	10%	13%	20%	12%	14%	15%	5%	4%	1%	1%	100%	

Coherence between the EMP, the ENP, the UfM and the EU enlargement process

10 = Excellent level of coherence



0 = Total lack of coherence


Question 1.16.

Do you think that the development of differentiation and reinforced cooperation (including Advanced Status and other types of preferential partnerships) are detrimental or beneficial to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy?

	Assessments											Total	Aver.
	Very beneficial					Very detrimental							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Added value of differentiation and strengthened cooperation	14	10	16	29	25	59	51	55	36	19	11	325	5.49
	4%	3%	5%	9%	8%	18%	16%	17%	11%	6%	3%	100%	

Added value of differentiation and strengthened cooperation (including advanced status)

10 = Very beneficial



0 = Very detrimental


Question 1.17.

What is your global assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the 2005-2009 period?

	Assessments											Total	Aver.
	Very negative					Very positive							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
General Assessment	7	15	19	49	42	69	58	52	20	7	1	339	4.89
	2%	4%	6%	14%	12%	20%	17%	15%	6%	2%	0%	100%	

Results of the ENP in the 2005-2009 period

10 = Very positive



0 = Very negative

Q.2

MONITORING OF INVOLVEMENT OF ACTORS

Question 2.1.

How do you assess the level of involvement in the Euro-Med Partnership achieved by the following actors?

	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very low						Very high									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Business organisations	2	12	19	27	36	49	59	47	20	5	3	279	5.15	52	331	
	1%	4%	7%	10%	13%	18%	21%	17%	7%	2%	1%	100%		16%		
Trade unions	6	35	38	49	49	36	25	21	6	1	2	268	3.76	63	331	
	2%	13%	14%	18%	18%	13%	9%	8%	2%	0%	1%	100%		19%		
Social and economic committees	2	18	26	41	35	50	49	39	16	2	0	278	4.66	51	329	
	1%	6%	9%	15%	13%	18%	18%	14%	6%	1%	0%	100%		16%		
NGOs	0	10	12	21	37	49	49	67	50	20	3	318	5.86	15	333	
	0%	3%	4%	7%	12%	15%	15%	21%	16%	6%	1%	100%		5%		
Cultural institutions and foundations	1	9	11	20	29	56	51	68	47	24	4	320	5.94	16	336	
	0%	3%	3%	6%	9%	18%	16%	21%	15%	8%	1%	100%		5%		
Youth organisations	1	18	25	36	36	47	53	39	30	11	4	300	5.08	35	335	
	0%	6%	8%	12%	12%	16%	18%	13%	10%	4%	1%	100%		10%		
Women's associations	2	14	20	30	48	41	59	48	28	9	3	302	5.19	31	333	
	1%	5%	7%	10%	16%	14%	20%	16%	9%	3%	1%	100%		9%		
Cities and local governments	1	16	19	25	43	60	61	39	23	7	3	297	5.11	35	332	
	0%	5%	6%	8%	14%	20%	21%	13%	8%	2%	1%	100%		11%		
Regional governments	3	16	23	27	38	45	54	39	19	10	3	277	5.01	52	329	
	1%	6%	8%	10%	14%	16%	19%	14%	7%	4%	1%	100%		16%		
Country (or State) governments	2	9	13	29	23	55	60	55	35	16	8	305	5.7	26	331	
	1%	3%	4%	10%	8%	18%	20%	18%	11%	5%	3%	100%		8%		
Universities	2	7	15	26	44	59	53	53	36	15	7	317	5.58	19	336	
	1%	2%	5%	8%	14%	19%	17%	17%	11%	5%	2%	100%		6%		
Media	5	20	35	41	48	51	45	39	18	10	4	316	4.67	17	333	
	2%	6%	11%	13%	15%	16%	14%	12%	6%	3%	1%	100%		5%		
Research centres and think tanks	2	12	15	28	27	44	53	57	43	19	4	304	5.68	26	330	
	1%	4%	5%	9%	9%	14%	17%	19%	14%	6%	1%	100%		8%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Question 2.1.

And the level of activity in the Euro-Med Partnership achieved by the following actors?



	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative						Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly	8	16	28	26	47	45	43	30	16	7	2	268	4.63	61	329	
	3%	6%	10%	10%	18%	17%	16%	11%	6%	3%	1%	100%		19%		
Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures	3	14	19	19	25	34	52	61	30	22	9	288	5.72	44	332	
	1%	5%	7%	7%	9%	12%	18%	21%	10%	8%	3%	100%		13%		
Economic and Social Committees	2	9	26	25	45	51	42	38	6	5	1	250	4.77	74	324	
	1%	4%	10%	10%	18%	20%	17%	15%	2%	2%	0%	100%		23%		
EuroMed NGO Platform and Civil Forum	4	10	15	25	29	55	53	58	27	11	2	289	5.42	40	329	
	1%	3%	5%	9%	10%	19%	18%	20%	9%	4%	1%	100%		12%		
EuroMeSCo (Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission)	2	8	22	12	30	37	52	36	22	15	2	238	5.41	85	323	
	1%	3%	9%	5%	13%	16%	22%	15%	9%	6%	1%	100%		26%		
FEMISE (Euro-Mediterra- nean Forum of Economic Research Institutes)	5	8	10	20	19	46	43	40	26	15	4	236	5.57	90	326	
	2%	3%	4%	8%	8%	19%	18%	17%	11%	6%	2%	100%		27%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Question 2.1.

How do you assess the level of involvement in the Euro-Med Partnership achieved by the following actors?

**And the level of activity in the Euro-Med Partnership achieved by the following actors?**

Question 2.2.

What is your assessment of the work achieved by the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) in 2005-2009?


	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative					Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly	8	19	26	24	37	53	41	25	14	5	1	253	4.52	79	332
	3%	8%	10%	9%	15%	21%	16%	10%	6%	2%	0%	100%		24%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q. 2.2. Work achieved by the EMPA

10 = Very positive



0 = Very negative

Question 2.3.

Work achieved by Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures in 2005-2009?


	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very negative					Very positive									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures	4	12	14	23	25	37	60	54	31	21	7	288	5.691	51	339
	1%	4%	5%	8%	9%	13%	21%	19%	11%	7%	2%	100%		15%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q 2.3. Work achieved by Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures in 2005-2009

10 = Very positive




0 = Very negative

Question 2.4.

In your opinion, what should be the priorities of the EMUNI (Euro-Mediterranean University)? Please choose two of them:

Priorities	Mentions	% over respondents
To organise Masters and Post-graduate programmes on Euro-Mediterranean Affairs	129	38%
To promote research on Mediterranean societies and issues	168	49%
To host courses and activities organised by affiliated Euro-Mediterranean universities	60	18%
To organise seminars, conferences and other meetings	75	22%
To offer diplomas in different disciplines recognised in the EU and in the Mediterranean countries	70	21%
To support universities from MPCs to improve the quality of their programmes	153	46%
To support cooperation among Euro-Mediterranean universities and to stimulate mobility of students and professors	253	74%
Total respondents	350	

Q. 2.4. What should be the priorities of the EMUNI


Question 2.5.

How do you assess the actions undertaken by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy to promote the participation of women in social, economic and political life?

	Very disappointing										Very positive		Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Promotion of women's involvement	6	12	26	43	43	65	70	42	14	8	1	330	4.84	
	2%	4%	8%	13%	13%	20%	21%	13%	4%	2%	0%	100%		

Q. 2.5. Assessment on EMP and ENP actions to promote participation of women in social, economic and political life

10 = Very positive




0 = Very disappointing

Q. 2.5. How do you assess the level of involvement of women in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

	Very low											Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Women's involvement in EMP	3	16	32	54	55	53	56	38	17	6	1	331	4.62
	1%	5%	10%	16%	17%	16%	17%	11%	5%	2%	0%	100%	

Q. 2.5. Level of involvement of women in the EMP

10 = Very high



0 = Very low

Female respondents

	Very disappointing										Total	Aver.	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			10
Promotion of women's involvement	1	2	6	11	11	19	19	11	4	3	0	87	5.01
	1%	2%	7%	13%	13%	22%	22%	13%	5%	3%	0%	100%	

Maghreb respondents

	Very disappointing										Total	Aver.	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			10
Promotion of women's involvement	1	6	7	10	8	15	12	7	1	4	0	71	4.54
	1%	8%	10%	14%	11%	21%	17%	10%	1%	6%	0%	100%	

Turkish respondents

	Very disappointing										Total	Aver.	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			10
Promotion of women's involvement	0	0	0	1	2	3	2	2	0	1	0	11	5.55
	0%	0%	0%	9%	18%	27%	18%	18%	0%	9%	0%	100%	

Q.3

THEMATIC DOSSIER :
FOCUS ON THE UNION FOR
THE MEDITERRANEAN


Question 3.1.

Is the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) an added value for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy?

	Very disappointing						Very positive						Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)	17	31	24	20	29	36	42	56	33	26	20	334	5.66	
	5%	9%	7%	6%	9%	11%	13%	17%	10%	8%	6%	100%		

Q. 3.1. Is the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) an added value for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy

10 = Very positive




0 = Very disappointing

Question 3.2.

In your opinion, what is the contribution of the general objectives of the Union for the Mediterranean in relation to the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

	Very negative										Very positive		Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Increase the visibility of the EuroMed Process	9	12	20	28	21	37	44	66	62	13	15	327	5.79	
	3%	4%	6%	9%	6%	11%	13%	20%	19%	4%	5%	100%		
Upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners	16	11	12	27	25	46	58	66	42	14	10	327	5.56	
	5%	3%	4%	8%	8%	14%	18%	20%	13%	4%	3%	100%		
Reinforce the institutional balance between the EU and the MPCs	20	13	22	22	28	52	52	52	34	18	10	323	5.28	
	6%	4%	7%	7%	9%	16%	16%	16%	11%	6%	3%	100%		
Promote more co-ownership within EuroMed multilateral relations	17	6	20	32	22	44	57	53	42	13	16	322	5.52	
	5%	2%	6%	10%	7%	14%	18%	16%	13%	4%	5%	100%		
Concentrate on some fundamental regional projects	12	9	14	18	19	55	42	68	44	28	15	324	5.94	
	4%	3%	4%	6%	6%	17%	13%	21%	14%	9%	5%	100%		

Q.3.2. Contribution of the general objectives of the UfM in relation to the objectives of the EMP



Question 3.3


To what extent do you think that the new partners of the EMP will strengthen it?


	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Not at all					To a high extent										
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Albania in 2006	17	29	32	35	25	40	23	27	15	2	3	248	4	72	320	
	7%	12%	13%	14%	10%	16%	9%	11%	6%	1%	1%	100%		23%		
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2006	18	23	27	36	36	41	25	29	13	3	3	254	4.13	68	322	
	7%	9%	11%	14%	14%	16%	10%	11%	5%	1%	1%	100%		21%		
Croatia in 2008	11	15	27	27	36	46	34	30	25	5	5	261	4.72	58	319	
	4%	6%	10%	10%	14%	18%	13%	11%	10%	2%	2%	100%		18%		
Mauritania in 2005	26	26	31	35	20	44	30	25	11	4	3	255	3.93	63	318	
	10%	10%	12%	14%	8%	17%	12%	10%	4%	2%	1%	100%		20%		
Montenegro in 2008	18	20	26	32	29	40	33	26	16	5	3	248	4.3	70	318	
	7%	8%	10%	13%	12%	16%	13%	10%	6%	2%	1%	100%		22%		
League of Arab States as a Permanent Observer in 2008	27	11	12	24	24	47	35	31	39	15	15	280	5.22	37	317	
	10%	4%	4%	9%	9%	17%	13%	11%	14%	5%	5%	100%		12%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q.3.3. To what extent do you think that the new partners of the EMP will strengthen it?





Question 3.4.

In your view, how effective is the new Co-Presidency system introduced to strengthen a true partnership and ownership of the EMP?


	Assessments													Dkn	Total**	
	Very ineffective						Very effective						Total*			Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Co-Presidency system	24	15	25	27	30	39	42	48	13	22	4	289	4.81	38	327	
	8%	5%	9%	9%	10%	13%	15%	17%	4%	8%	1%	100%		12%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q.3.4. How effective is the new Co-Presidency system to strengthen a true partnership and ownership of the EMP?

10 = Very effective



0 = Very ineffective

Question 3.5.

Do you expect that the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, to be established in Barcelona as approved in the Marseille Conference, will play a key, moderate or negligible role in the new institutional architecture of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?


	Role of UfM in the new institutional architecture												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Negligible role						Key role									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
The role of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean	6	11	18	22	24	32	34	50	47	38	18	300	6.07	30	330	
	2%	4%	6%	7%	8%	11%	11%	17%	16%	13%	6%	100%		9%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q.3.5. The role of the Secretariat of the UfM in the new institutional architecture of the EMP

10 = Key role



0 = Negligible role

Question 3.6.

Do you think that the proposal of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly could be a major improvement of the EMP?


	Opinion													Dkn	Total**	
	No improvement						Major improvement						Total*			Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly	14	16	21	18	19	45	33	47	31	23	11	278	5.41	49	327	
	5%	6%	8%	6%	7%	16%	12%	17%	11%	8%	4%	100%		15%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q.3.6. Do you think that the proposal of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly could be a major improvement of the EMP?

10 = Major improvement



0 = No improvement

Question 3.7.


How do you assess the possible contribution of the regional projects selected at the July 2008 Paris Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP?


	Assessments											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Not at all					To a high extent									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
De-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea	6	4	9	15	23	29	39	65	60	24	33	307	6.58	21	328
	2%	1%	3%	5%	7%	9%	13%	21%	20%	8%	11%	100%		6%	
Maritime and land highways	3	7	9	14	20	38	33	57	57	24	20	282	6.4	31	313
	1%	2%	3%	5%	7%	13%	12%	20%	20%	9%	7%	100%		10%	
Civil protection initiatives to combat natural and man-made disasters	6	3	6	16	16	52	44	59	54	17	21	294	6.32	31	325
	2%	1%	2%	5%	5%	18%	15%	20%	18%	6%	7%	100%		10%	
Alternative energies: Mediterranean solar plan	4	6	10	8	16	32	30	49	79	31	32	297	6.83	24	321
	1%	2%	3%	3%	5%	11%	10%	16%	27%	10%	11%	100%		7%	
Higher education and research, Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia and Fez	3	6	3	14	19	48	41	60	60	28	25	307	6.57	22	329
	1%	2%	1%	5%	6%	16%	13%	20%	20%	9%	8%	100%		7%	
Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing on micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises	4	5	6	12	23	33	40	56	60	27	28	294	6.62	31	325
	1%	2%	2%	4%	8%	11%	14%	19%	20%	9%	10%	100%		10%	

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q.3.7. How do you assess the possible contribution of the regional projects selected at the July 2008 Paris Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean to the achievement of the objectives of the EMP?





Question 3.8.

How do you assess the probability that the Union for the Mediterranean projects will attract financial resources from outside the EU (i.e. from Gulf countries, international private investors, international financial institutions or other sources)?


	Assessments												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	Very improbable						Very probable									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
UfM Funds	14	16	28	27	27	66	43	46	16	17	4	304	4.91	24	328	
	5%	5%	9%	9%	9%	22%	14%	15%	5%	6%	1%	100%		7%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q.3.8. How do you assess the probability that the Union for the Mediterranean projects will attract financial resources from outside the EU?

10 = Very probable



0 = Very improbable

Q.4

MEDITERRANEAN TRENDS: FORWARD-LOOKING ANALYSIS

Question 4.1.


What degree of probability do you attribute to the prospect that current Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (within the frameworks of the EMP, ENP and UfM) is leading, in the long term, to:


	Degree of probability												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability						Very high probability									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
The resolution of conflicts in the region	29	23	40	51	35	37	44	31	16	7	6	319	4.12	7	326	
	9%	7%	13%	16%	11%	12%	14%	10%	5%	2%	2%	100%		2%		
The strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights in the Mediterranean Partner Countries	13	9	35	50	43	35	47	51	25	9	5	322	4.8	5	327	
	4%	3%	11%	16%	13%	11%	15%	16%	8%	3%	2%	100%		2%		
A higher level of employment, an improvement in living conditions and a reduction of poverty in Mediterranean Partner Countries	7	9	25	40	49	60	65	46	20	4	5	330	4.95	5	335	
	2%	3%	8%	12%	15%	18%	20%	14%	6%	1%	2%	100%		1%		
A reduction of the development gap between the North and the South of the Mediterranean	12	10	29	50	51	60	35	53	10	13	5	328	4.73	5	333	
	4%	3%	9%	15%	16%	18%	11%	16%	3%	4%	2%	100%		2%		
A greater intensity of human exchanges between the North and the South of the Mediterranean	6	6	20	36	43	38	55	74	29	15	9	331	5.5	5	336	
	2%	2%	6%	11%	13%	11%	17%	22%	9%	5%	3%	100%		1%		
A greater understanding and respect between cultures and religions in the Mediterranean	7	11	15	27	28	52	48	61	38	29	14	330	5.8	5	335	
	2%	3%	5%	8%	8%	16%	15%	18%	12%	9%	4%	100%		1%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q.4.1. What degree of probability do you attribute to the prospect that current Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (within the frameworks of the EMP, ENP and UfM) is leading, in the long term, to:





Question 4.2.

What degree of probability do you attribute to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean under the present level and framework of cooperation?

	Degree of probability											Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability					Very high probability									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP	6	3	14	19	27	26	20	43	67	46	41	312	6.75	4	316
	2%	1%	4%	6%	9%	8%	6%	14%	21%	15%	13%	100%		1%	
Political regimes in MPCs will show a high degree of continuity	3	5	9	13	20	44	54	62	47	20	17	294	6.28	28	322
	1%	2%	3%	4%	7%	15%	18%	21%	16%	7%	6%	100%		9%	
The current global economic and financial crisis will reduce development prospects in the Mediterranean for a long period	3	7	20	26	36	62	50	39	41	26	11	321	5.68	5	326
	1%	2%	6%	8%	11%	19%	16%	12%	13%	8%	3%	100%		2%	
Gulf Cooperation Council members will facilitate a higher degree of South-South economic cooperation in the Mediterranean	12	14	25	43	41	62	48	38	16	6	2	307	4.64	15	322
	4%	5%	8%	14%	13%	20%	16%	12%	5%	2%	1%	100%		5%	


>> Continues

	Degree of probability												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability				Very high probability											
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Environment deterioration in the Mediterranean will reach a level threatening the living conditions and economic activities of riparian States.	2	8	13	22	41	56	53	41	52	21	11	320	5.83	10	330	
	1%	3%	4%	7%	13%	18%	17%	13%	16%	7%	3%	100%		3%		
Water scarcity will become a source of conflicts and social tensions in the Mediterranean	3	5	6	9	23	35	45	51	81	43	23	324	6.8	5	329	
	1%	2%	2%	3%	7%	11%	14%	16%	25%	13%	7%	100%		2%		
Women will increasingly participate in the economic, social and political life of MPCs	2	5 ⁰	16	18	30	49	77	52	55	13	4	321	5.85	6	327	
	1%	2%	5%	6%	9%	15%	24%	16%	17%	4%	1%	100%		2%		
MPCs will sustain the increased level of economic growth achieved in the last three years and, in the long term, converge to EU levels of income	7	24	45	49	44	64	38	21	10	5	4	311	4.17	19	330	
	2%	8%	14%	16%	14%	21%	12%	7%	3%	2%	1%	100%		2%		
Population and employment pressures in MPCs will intensify and create dramatic social tensions	1	4	9	11	34	52	49	69	41	37	14	321	6.32	9	330	
	0%	1%	3%	3%	11%	16%	15%	21%	13%	12%	4%	100%		3%		
Irregular migration from originating MPCs to Europe will continue to increase whatever control mechanisms the EU may impose	4	9	5	18	31	35	55	62	51	30	20	320	6.29	8	328	
	1%	3%	2%	6%	10%	11%	17%	19%	16%	9%	6%	100%		2%		
Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity and development in the Mediterranean	11	16	21	33	36	53	47	29	39	18	16	319	5.28	9	328	
	3%	5%	7%	10%	11%	17%	15%	9%	12%	6%	5%	100%		3%		
Increased level of legal and irregular migration will intensify social tensions and xenophobia in Europe	3	11	10	18	19	51	60	53	49	31	15	320	6.15	8	328	
	1%	3%	3%	6%	6%	16%	19%	17%	15%	10%	5%	100%		2%		
The increased level of migration, economic and human exchanges will give way to the emergence of a common Mediterranean identity	23	18	30	39	50	43	45	23	25	10	7	313	4.48	13	326	
	7%	6%	10%	12%	16%	14%	14%	7%	8%	3%	2%	100%		4%		


(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)


(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q.4.2. What degree of probability do you attribute to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean under the present level and framework of cooperation?



>> Continues





Question 4.3.

How do you assess the probability that Turkey will join the EU as a full Member State in the next 20 years?


	Degree of probability												Total*	Aver.	Dkn	Total**
	No probability						Very high probability									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
Turkey's prospects for accession to the EU	7	10	27	29	25	37	39	43	37	35	30	319	5.9	10	329	
	2%	3%	8%	9%	8%	12%	12%	13%	12%	11%	9%	100%		3%		

(*) Total number of answers expressing a particular assessment or opinion (i.e., excluding "Don't know" answers)

(**) Total number of respondents including "Don't know" answers

Q.4.3. How do you assess the probability that Turkey will join the EU as a full Member State in the next 20 years?

10 = Very high probability



0 = No probability

Q.5


POLICY PROPOSALS

Question 5.1.


Which priorities identified at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Marseille in Nov. 2008 are the most important in your opinion for 2010-13? Indicate the degree of importance for each dimension.

	Less important										Total*	Aver.	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			10
Political and security dialogue													
Middle East Peace Process (regular review of the political situation in the Middle East)	3	3	2	11	6	16	23	35	67	52	110	328	8.021
	1%	1%	1%	3%	2%	5%	7%	11%	20%	16%	34%	100%	
Terrorism (implementation of the Code of Conduct on countering terrorism)	4	3	11	17	19	45	45	55	51	32	39	321	6.598
	1%	1%	3%	5%	6%	14%	14%	17%	16%	10%	12%	100%	
Deepening of the dialogue on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and crisis management	3	8	11	20	22	49	51	58	61	23	14	320	6.156
	1%	3%	3%	6%	7%	15%	16%	18%	19%	7%	4%	100%	
Democracy and political pluralism (strengthen democracy and political pluralism through expansion of participation in political life and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms)	2	3	4	7	8	26	35	52	65	52	67	321	7.558
	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	8%	11%	16%	20%	16%	21%	100%	
Deepening of regional dialogue on joint cooperation, best practices and exchange of experience in the area of elections	2	6	6	11	14	37	53	54	68	35	33	319	6.824
	1%	2%	2%	3%	4%	12%	17%	17%	21%	11%	10%	100%	
Laying foundations for a Long-Term Programme, the EuroMed Programme for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters – PPRD (2008-2011)	2	5	8	3	19	39	63	56	65	34	32	326	6.801
	1%	2%	2%	1%	6%	12%	19%	17%	20%	10%	10%	100%	

Q.5.1. Importance of the Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation priorities identified at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Marseille in Nov. 2008 for the period 2010-2013



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


Question 5.1.

Which priorities identified at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Marseille in Nov. 2008 are the most important in your opinion for 2010-13? Indicate the degree of importance for each dimension.

	Less important											Very important											Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Maritime Safety	1	3	4	12	12	45	47	51	53	16	26	270	6.619											
	0%	1%	1%	4%	4%	17%	17%	19%	20%	6%	10%	100%												

Q.5.1. Importance of the Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation priorities identified at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Marseille in Nov. 2008 for the period 2010-2013




Question 5.1.

Which priorities identified at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Marseille in Nov. 2008 are the most important in your opinion for 2010-13? Indicate the degree of importance for each dimension.


	Less important										Total	Aver.	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			10
Economic and Financial Partnership													
Energy	2	1	5	6	11	29	32	60	69	60	46	321	7.421
	1%	0%	2%	2%	3%	9%	10%	19%	21%	19%	14%	100%	
Transport	1	2	5	16	10	41	46	59	69	31	35	315	6.905
	0%	1%	2%	5%	3%	13%	15%	19%	22%	10%	11%	100%	
Agriculture	1	4	5	13	12	41	29	56	76	39	43	319	7.088
	0%	1%	2%	4%	4%	13%	9%	18%	24%	12%	13%	100%	
Urban development	1	2	7	14	23	33	53	50	78	28	29	318	6.758
	0%	1%	2%	4%	7%	10%	17%	16%	25%	9%	9%	100%	
Water	1	1	3	8	6	9	30	34	75	58	97	322	8.106
	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%	3%	9%	11%	23%	18%	30%	100%	
Environment	2	0	4	7	10	16	33	39	82	55	73	321	7.791
	1%	0%	1%	2%	3%	5%	10%	12%	26%	17%	23%	100%	
Information Society	0	2	6	10	11	38	59	53	70	46	26	321	6.969
	0%	1%	2%	3%	3%	12%	18%	17%	22%	14%	8%	100%	
Tourism	0	3	8	13	18	32	52	51	73	32	37	319	6.9
	0%	1%	3%	4%	6%	10%	16%	16%	23%	10%	12%	100%	
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area	2	4	6	15	15	35	45	51	70	34	40	317	6.905
	1%	1%	2%	5%	5%	11%	14%	16%	22%	11%	13%	100%	
Economic dialogue	1	5	9	9	20	41	48	58	62	38	28	319	6.73
	0%	2%	3%	3%	6%	13%	15%	18%	19%	12%	9%	100%	
Industrial cooperation	0	5	13	11	16	45	44	57	66	39	21	317	6.64
	0%	2%	4%	3%	5%	14%	14%	18%	21%	12%	7%	100%	
Ongoing work on statistics cooperation	0	2	20	13	26	57	52	52	48	27	19	316	6.212
	0%	1%	6%	4%	8%	18%	16%	16%	15%	9%	6%	100%	

Q.5.1. Importance of the Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation priorities identified at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Marseille in Nov. 2008 for the period 2010-2013




0 Less important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 More important

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Policy Proposals




Question 5.1.


Which priorities identified at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Marseille in Nov. 2008 are the most important in your opinion for 2010-13? Indicate the degree of importance for each dimension.

	Less important											Total	Aver.
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Social, human and cultural cooperation													
Developing a genuine social dimension	7	5	12	16	14	34	41	51	66	38	38	322	6.7
	2%	2%	4%	5%	4%	11%	13%	16%	20%	12%	12%	100%	
Health	3	3	12	8	15	20	46	58	54	54	47	320	7.1
	1%	1%	4%	3%	5%	6%	14%	18%	17%	17%	15%	100%	
Human development	1	4	8	9	13	18	27	57	77	52	54	320	7.5
	0%	1%	3%	3%	4%	6%	8%	18%	24%	16%	17%	100%	
Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Research Area	2	5	3	8	9	32	39	63	63	49	47	320	7.2
	1%	2%	1%	3%	3%	10%	12%	20%	20%	15%	15%	100%	
Promoting dialogue between cultures, cultural diversity	1	5	6	10	11	25	33	51	62	53	66	323	7.4
	0%	2%	2%	3%	3%	8%	10%	16%	19%	16%	20%	100%	
Justice and law	1	4	6	10	11	28	30	81	57	41	49	318	7.2
	0%	1%	2%	3%	3%	9%	9%	25%	18%	13%	15%	100%	
Strengthening the role of women in society	1	1	6	10	15	19	37	55	67	49	61	321	7.5
	0%	0%	2%	3%	5%	6%	12%	17%	21%	15%	19%	100%	
EuroMed Youth	3	4	3	12	19	26	43	50	57	46	55	318	7.2
	1%	1%	1%	4%	6%	8%	14%	16%	18%	14%	17%	100%	
Cooperation with civil society and local actors	0	2	9	8	5	30	46	52	70	43	53	318	7.3
	0%	1%	3%	3%	2%	9%	14%	16%	22%	14%	17%	100%	
Enhancing the visibility of the Partnership	5	8	4	8	11	28	42	57	68	34	54	319	7.1
	2%	3%	1%	3%	3%	9%	13%	18%	21%	11%	17%	100%	
Migration	3	1	6	8	14	25	29	62	70	47	57	322	7.4
	1%	0%	2%	2%	4%	8%	9%	19%	22%	15%	18%	100%	


Q.5.1. Importance of the Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation priorities identified at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Marseille in Nov. 2008 for the period 2010-2013



>> Continues



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

Question 5.2.

In your opinion, what should be the main priorities for the Spanish Co-Presidency of the UfM (and the Euro-Mediterranean Summit Barcelona 2010)? Please choose five from the whole list.


Priorities	Mentions	% of respondents*
Political and Security Cooperation		
Conflict resolution in the region	211	64%
Fight against international terrorism	72	22%
Creation of an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean	73	22%
Civil protection and prevention of man-made disasters	62	19%
Human rights and intolerance	132	40%
Promoting democracy and political pluralism	167	51%
Economic and Financial Cooperation		
Increasing the funds allocated to the EMP	99	30%
Wider Free Trade Area	71	22%
Energy	91	28%
Water access and sustainability	142	43%
Food security	71	22%
Environmental issues and sustainable development	123	37%
Liberalisation of EU agricultural markets	71	22%
Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation		
Employment promotion and employment policies	102	31%
Education	140	43%
Promoting equality between men and women	78	24%
Promoting the participation of civil society and social partners in the EMP	79	24%
Promoting dialogue between cultures and cultural diversity	119	36%
Management of migration flows	76	23%
Establishment of free movement of persons in the Mediterranean	91	28%
Total respondents	329	

Question 5.2.

Political and Security Cooperation Priorities for the Spanish Co-Presidency of the UfM (and the Euro-Mediterranean Summit Barcelona 2010)

Political and Security Cooperation**Economic and Financial Cooperation**

Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation



Question 5.2.

In your opinion, what should be the main priorities for the Spanish Co-Presidency of the UfM (and the Euro-Mediterranean Summit Barcelona 2010)? Please choose five from the whole list.

	TOTAL		MAGHREB		MASHREQ		EU 27		EU Med		Rest of Europe		TURKEY		ISRAEL	
		% of 342		% of 71		% of 52		% of 176		% of 102		% of 74		% of 12		% of 14
Political and Security Cooperation																
Conflict resolution in the region	211	62%	52	73%	40	77%	96	55%	54	53%	42	57%	7	58%	7	50%
Fight against international terrorism	72	21%	22	31%	13	25%	21	12%	8	8%	13	18%	4	33%	8	57%
Creation of an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean	73	21%	19	27%	19	37%	28	16%	11	11%	17	23%	2	17%	4	29%
Civil protection and prevention of man-made disasters	62	18%	19	27%	10	19%	26	15%	13	13%	13	18%	1	8%	3	21%
Human rights and intolerance	132	39%	20	28%	20	38%	76	43%	43	42%	33	45%	6	50%	4	29%
Promoting democracy and political pluralism	167	49%	37	52%	32	62%	84	48%	51	50%	33	45%	2	17%	5	36%
Total answers	717		169		134		331		180		151		22		31	
Total respondents	342		71		52		176		102		74		12		14	
	TOTAL		MAGHREB		MASHREQ		EU 27		EU Med		Rest of Europe		TURKEY		ISRAEL	
		% of 342		% of 71		% of 52		% of 176		% of 102		% of 74		% of 12		% of 14
Economic and Financial Cooperation																
Increasing the funds allocated to the EMP	99	29%	31	44%	17	33%	35	20%	24	24%	11	15%	5	42%	5	36%
Wider Free Trade Area	71	21%	15	21%	10	19%	40	23%	26	25%	14	19%	2	17%	2	14%
Energy	91	27%	15	21%	10	19%	56	32%	32	31%	24	32%	3	25%	2	14%
Water access and sustainability	142	42%	32	45%	20	38%	75	43%	41	40%	34	46%	1	8%	6	43%
Food security	71	21%	18	25%	16	31%	32	18%	14	14%	18	24%	1	8%	1	7%
Environmental issues and sustainable development	123	36%	29	41%	15	29%	65	37%	37	36%	28	38%	6	50%	2	14%
Liberalisation of EU agricultural markets	71	21%	14	20%	9	17%	39	22%	22	22%	17	23%	3	25%	1	7%
Total answers	668		154		97		342		196		146		21		19	
Total respondents	342		71		52		176		102		74		12		14	

	TOTAL		MAGHREB		MASHREQ		EU 27		EU Med		Rest of Europe		TURKEY		ISRAEL	
		% of 342		% of 71		% of 52		% of 176		% of 102		% of 74		% of 12		% of 14
Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation																
Employment promotion and employment policies	102	30%	29	41%	16	31%	50	28%	26	25%	18	24%	1	8%	2	14%
Education	140	41%	27	38%	24	46%	74	42%	32	31%	29	39%	7	58%	2	14%
Promoting equality between men and women	78	23%	17	24%	7	13%	44	25%	41	40%	15	20%	4	33%	2	14%
Promoting the participation of civil society and social partners in the EMP	79	23%	16	23%	12	23%	39	22%	26	25%	13	18%	2	17%	4	29%
Promoting dialogue between cultures and cultural diversity	119	35%	21	30%	15	29%	67	38%	32	31%	34	46%	4	33%	3	21%
Management of migration flows	76	22%	13	18%	8	15%	52	30%	41	40%	22	30%	1	8%	2	14%
Establishment of free movement of persons in the Mediterranean	71	21%	15	21%	10	19%	40	23%	26	25%	11	15%	4	33%	2	14%
Total answers	665		138		92		366		224		142		23		17	
Total respondents	342		71		52		176		102		74		12		14	

VI

SURVEY FOLLOW-UP
2010-2012

SURVEY FOLLOW-UP 2010-2012

The survey will be repeated annually, with some of the same core panel actors and experts, to cover a whole spectrum of policy issues and monitor developments in Euro-Mediterranean situations, perceptions and policies. Over four years, the survey will cover all the major fields of Euro-Mediterranean relations, through its thematic dossiers and policy proposals sections.

In the first and the last years, the survey will have the same format, that is, the questions will address five main concerns: monitoring the progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy, monitoring the involvement of actors in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the thematic dossier, Mediterranean trends (a forward-looking analysis of key factors, strategic challenges and risks) and policy proposals. In the intermediate years, 2010 and 2011, it will be smaller and will mainly be centred on the thematic dossier.

The thematic dossiers on the different dimensions of the EMP will have the following schedule; for this year's survey, the questions are centred on the assessment and prospects of the Union for the Mediterranean. In 2010, the thematic dossier will tackle the economic and financial dimension (Euromed Free Trade Area, including services and agriculture, and sustainable development, energy, water, and so on), with a focus on economic and financial cooperation in view of the Financial Perspectives 2014-2020. In the following year, 2011, questions will deal with the social, human and cultural dimension, and in particular migration flows and migration policies, gender issues, employment, education and culture. The last survey in 2012 will monitor the political and security dimension: conflict prevention and crisis management, political dialogue, cooperation in the field of democratisation and human rights promotion.

VII

SURVEY TEAM

SURVEY TEAM

The team put together by the IEMed has designed and prepared the Survey (questionnaire, sample, reference documents) and processed and analysed the results of the Survey. This team benefitted from the assistance of an Advisory Council and of a Focus Group specifically convened for analysing the results of the Survey.

Direction

Senén Florensa, Director General of the IEMed

Josep Ferré, General Manager, IEMed

Principal experts and editors of the Survey Report

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(Bruges & Natolin), Associate Researcher at the EU Institute of Security Studies

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Elena Sintes, Survey Expert, Barcelona Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies – Barcelona City Council's Uses of Time Department Research Group

IEMed Scientific Team

Xavier Aragall, Technical Advisor on Euromed Policy, IEMed

Jordi Padilla, Mediterranean Yearbook and Euromed Documentary Sources Coordinator, IEMed

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Abla M. Abdel-Latif, Professor of Economics, American University in Cairo

Ahmed Driss, Professor Director of the Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies, Tunis

Larbi Jaidi, Professor at Mohamed V University, Rabat

Bichara Khader, Professor and Director of the Centre for Studies and Research on the Contemporary Arab World (CERMAC), Louvain la Neuve

Pasqualina Napoletano, Member of the European Parliament (1989 to 2009), Rome

Veronika Stabej, President of the Board of Governors of the Anna Lindh Foundation Government Communication Office, Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana


Focus Group

The Focus Group has been composed by the members of the Advisory Committee and the following invited participants:

Andrea Amato, Director Istituto per il Mediterraneo, Rome

Eduard Soler, Coordinator of the Mediterranean and Middle East Programme, Fundació CIDOB Barcelona

Randa Achmawi (Ahram Hebdo), Cairo



THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN (IEMED) IS CONDUCTING A YEARLY SURVEY OF ACTORS AND EXPERTS IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS TO ASSESS THE PROGRESS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS. THIS ACTIVITY IS PART OF THE PROGRAMME "PROMOTING MUTUAL AWARENESS, UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD REGION (SOUTH)" (EUROPEAID/125411/ACT/C/MULTI- LOT3), CO-FUNDED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION THROUGH THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD AND PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT (ENPI) REGIONAL TRACK.

SUCH A PROJECT CUTS ACROSS THE IEMED MISSION AS AN ACTOR IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE EU AND THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES AND A THINK TANK ANALYSING EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS, PROPOSING AND DISSEMINATING POLICY OPTIONS AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE BUILDING OF A TRUE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AREA.

THE SURVEY FOCUSES ON PERCEPTIONS OF THE EXPERTS WHO ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (EMP). SO FAR POLICY-MAKERS DO NOT HAVE SUCH AN INSTRUMENT AVAILABLE TO ASSESS RESULTS, ORIENT POLICIES AND MOBILISE ACTORS AND EXPERTS AND ULTIMATELY PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT THE REGION. THE SURVEY IS ALSO MEANT TO INCREASE THE VISIBILITY OF THE EMP, POINTED OUT IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS HELD IN MARSEILLES IN NOVEMBER 2008 AS A VITAL ELEMENT "FOR ITS PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTANCE, AS WELL AS ITS ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY." SPECIFIC ATTENTION WILL BE DEVOTED TO GENDER ISSUES THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PROCESS OF ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT, AND A SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN THE SURVEY WILL BE ENSURED.

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