

Le **développement humain** comme
MOTEUR DE COOPÉRATION
dans le **Dialogue 5+5**
Défis communs, gestion partagée

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DOSSIER D'ARTICLES ET MATÉRIELS DE L'IEMed

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**PRÉSENTATION:****DIALOGUE 5+5, de sa genèse au temps présent****Genèse, historique et fonctionnement**

Le Dialogue 5+5 est un forum sous-régional informel qui rassemble depuis 1990 cinq pays du Nord de la Méditerranée occidentale (Espagne, France, Italie, Malte et Portugal) et cinq pays du Sud (Algérie, Libye, Maroc, Mauritanie et Tunisie).

Sous initiative française, la proposition d'établir une coopération de format réduit entre les quatre grands États méditerranéens européens et les cinq États du Maghreb s'était fortement développée en 1988. Toutefois, elle prendra un nouvel élan après la création de l'Union du Maghreb Arabe en 1989 et le lancement de la Politique méditerranéenne renouvelée en 1990. L'engagement personnel des premiers ministres italien et espagnol de l'époque, Bettino Craxi et Felipe González, s'est alors avéré décisif. Ainsi, quelques mois plus tard, le 10 octobre 1990, la première réunion ministérielle officielle relevant de cette formule a eu lieu à Rome. Malte a participé à cette première réunion en tant que pays observateur, pour devenir membre à part entière l'année suivante, avec pour résultat cinq pays de chaque côté.

Dans l'ensemble, il n'y a pas eu d'obstacle majeur au renforcement de la coopération entre les deux groupes. Pour cela, huit groupes de travail ont été créés afin de favoriser la coopération régionale et d'aborder des questions spécifiques telles que la dette, le dialogue culturel ou la recherche technologique et scientifique, entre autres. Conformément à la tradition établie à Rome, une deuxième réunion ministérielle s'est tenue un an plus tard à Alger (26-27 octobre 1991) pour discuter des répercussions de la première guerre du Golfe.

Étant donné son format réduit et intergouvernemental, ce forum était censé se concentrer sur des questions spécifiques et établir une coopération dynamique. Cependant, après les deux premières réunions ministérielles, le dialogue s'est retrouvé dans une impasse de près de dix ans en raison de la crise algérienne amorcée en 1992 et de l'isolement international de la Libye à cause de son implication dans le cas Lockerbie.

Dès la fin de la crise algérienne et de la réconciliation de l'Occident avec la Libye, le dialogue a repris à Lisbonne en janvier 2001 et, depuis lors, les ministres des Affaires étrangères se réunissent régulièrement dans le cadre du Dialogue 5+5. Ainsi, parallèlement aux réunions susmentionnées, les ministres des Affaires étrangères ont tenu les réunions suivantes : Tripoli (30 mai 2002), Sainte-Maxime (9 et 10 avril 2003), Oran (23 et 24 avril 2004), La Valette (juin 2005), Rabat (20 et 21 janvier 2008), Cordoue (20 et 21 avril 2009), Tunis (15 et 16 avril 2010), Rome (20 février 2012), Nouakchott (16 avril 2013), Lisbonne (22 mai 2014), Tanger (7 octobre 2015) et Alger (21 janvier 2018).

Lors de la réunion ministérielle de Sainte-Maxime (France), il a été décidé de promouvoir, pour la première fois, un Sommet des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement qui s'est tenu le 5 et 6 décembre 2003 pour renforcer ce processus de coopération en Méditerranée occidentale. Auparavant, les 29 et 30 octobre de la même année, une réunion ministérielle extraordinaire fût organisée à Saint-Symphorien-le-Château pour commenter l'actualité régionale et, en particulier, pour préparer le Sommet des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement. Cet événement visait à consolider cette l'initiative dans le but d'encourager la paix, la stabilité et le développement dans la région.

En outre, lors de la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères tenue à Rome, dans un paysage politique pleinement réformé qui suite à l'évolution politique dans certains pays de la région, il a été formellement décidé d'organiser un deuxième Sommet des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement à La Valette les 5 et 6 octobre 2012 avec la participation de représentants des institutions européennes et régionales.

En conséquence, le Dialogue 5+5 concerne, à proprement parler, les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement, qui ne se sont réunis que deux fois jusqu'à présent, et les ministres des Affaires étrangères, dont la dernière réunion (la quatorzième après la réactivation du dialogue en 2001) s'est tenue à Alger le 21 janvier 2018. Jusqu'en 2008, la présidence du Dialogue était assurée à tour de rôle par le pays hôte de la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères. Lors de la réunion tenue à Rabat en 2008, il a été décidé qu'à partir de l'année suivante, une coprésidence serait mise en place par la présidence sortante avec le pays hôte de la réunion ministérielle, chacun d'eux devant représenter l'une des deux rives du Dialogue. Selon ce raisonnement, la coprésidence a été assurée par le Maroc et la France, suivis par l'Algérie et la France en 2017 et 2018.

Les dix pays organisent également des conférences ministérielles sectorielles périodiques. Certains secteurs, tels que les Affaires étrangères, la Défense ou encore les Transports, ont commencé par un format plus réduit et se sont ensuite étendus au 5+5. Les domaines qui ont vu se concrétiser progressivement des initiatives comprennent : intérieur (depuis 1995), migration (2002), relations parlementaires (2003), défense (2004), tourisme (2006), transport (2007), éducation (2009) ainsi qu'environnement et énergies renouvelables (2010).

Il convient de noter que 5+5 Dialogue ne dispose pas d'un Secrétariat permanent, ni de ses propres instruments ou mécanismes financiers.

Annexes

Malte, Déclaration officielle (Octobre 2012)

Tunis, Déclaration officielle (Decembre 2003)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères d'Alger (2018)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Marseille (2016)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Tanger (2015)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Lisbonne (2014)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Nouakchott (2013)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Rome (2012)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Tunis (2010)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Cordoue (2009)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Rabat (2008)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de la Valette (2005)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères d'Oran (2004)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Saint-Maxime (2003)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Tripoli (2002)

Conclusions de la Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères de Rome (1990)

Strategies Sectors | **Culture & Society**

Deconstructing Migration and Refugee “Crises” in the Mediterranean. The Need for a Broader Temporal and Geographical View for a Policy Reorientation in Europe

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During the last decade, the issue of migrant and refugee arrivals on European shores in the Mediterranean has undoubtedly been a constant key topic on European political agendas, as well as in the media and as a civil society concern.

Nevertheless, since the Arab Spring, different “crises” related to border crossings by refugees and migrants at different points of the Mediterranean (Lesbos and other islands in Greece; the islands of Lampedusa and Sicily in Italy; Ceuta and Melilla in Spain) have further increased the issue’s political relevance. The arrival of refugees, mainly Syrians, in Europe since 2015, has raised further concerns in the European capitals and also in Brussels. Critical voices in Europe and elsewhere have underlined that the “refugee crisis” of 2015 was, in reality, a political crisis of Europe, unable to deal with the limited number of arrivals, if compared to refugee figures in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan (Achilli et al., 2017), and also if considered in relation to the EU population. Therefore, it is important to note that the management of migration in the Mediterranean is being constantly developed and upgraded under the pressure of a specific border “crisis” or “emergency” (Gabrielli, 2015). This fact has serious consequences both on the policies being developed, and on peoples on the move.

Since the end of the 1990s, the main actions implemented by European countries towards migrant and

refugee arrivals in the Mediterranean have been related to the “external dimension” of migration policies, namely externalizing the task of controlling flows towards third countries (Gabrielli, 2011).

However, research into the interactions between control externalization and human flows in the Mediterranean region have already shown the flexibility and “autonomous character” of migration flows to reroute their terrestrial and maritime paths towards Europe (Gabrielli, 2011; Casas-Cortes et al., 2015), largely thanks to the journeys being so fragmented (Crawley et al., 2016). The fast adaptation of flows to migration controls in the Mediterranean push European countries to continuously extend and deepen the externalization process (Gabrielli, 2016).

The same reactive and short-term paradigm also characterizes the recent political initiatives carried out by European actors during the last few years: increased externalization of control towards neighbouring third countries, following an ubiquitous logic of providing a quick answer to a border “crisis,” without even considering alternative policies.

In this regard, we could mention the EU-Africa Valletta Summit on Migration, on 12 November 2015, where the EU Trust Fund for Africa (“EU Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa”) was launched. This framework of cooperation with 23 countries in North Africa, in the Sahel/Lake Chad region, and in the Horn of Africa, seeks to foster a larger and deeper extension of the externalization of control, even if partially disguised as development aid to enhance third countries’ “capacity building” in the field of border and mobility control. Another key piece of the European political architecture to outsource migration and, in this case,

control refugees is the “agreement”¹ between the EU and Turkey of 18 March 2016, outsourcing to Turkey the control of border crossings into Europe. A further step in this direction is represented by the EU Commission communication “Towards a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration” presented on 7 June 2016, following the proposal of the former Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi. This new partnership explicitly links the delegation of migration control toward third countries, on the one hand, and development and trade policies, on the other. The geographic focus of this framework is an attempt at bypassing cooperation with Libya, which has become more difficult due to the country’s unstable situation, developing the externalization of control for migration flows towards surrounding Sub-Saharan countries, like Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Chad, Niger, as well as towards Mali and Senegal (Gabrielli, 2016). Nevertheless, the buffering of mobility outside Europe planned in this document is not limited to Africa, but also implies cooperation with Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. We should also mention the deepening of cooperation with Tunisia, as proved by the negotiations on readmission and visa facilitation opened at the end of 2016,² following the Mobility Partnership already signed with the EU in March 2014. Moreover, in order to fully understand the policy paradigm driving European action in the Mediterranean we should recall the declaration of the German Interior Minister, Thomas de Maizière, in November 2016. He explained publicly that people intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea, be they refugees or not, must be sent to “processing centres” in North Africa, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, where they will eventually apply for asylum and wait for an answer.³ The last European initiative in this sense is the deepening of cooperation with the Libyan government of Fayeze al Sarraj, settled in the informal summit of La Valletta on 3 February 2017 and set up to provide training and equipment for Libyan coastguards in order to prevent crossings to Italy.⁴

However, as previously underlined, if we take into account long-term interactions between migration policy in the Mediterranean, on the one hand, and migratory flows and paths, on the other, a desperate need emerges to change the paradigm of current policies. Understanding the real results of such policies and underlining which of their elements are counterproductive are basic steps for developing a new proactive, evidence- and ethic-based policy framework of migration and mobility in the Mediterranean. To do so, it is crucial to consider a broader temporal and geographic framework concerning irregular crossings and human flows in the Mediterranean. Firstly, analyzing a longer time frame than the usual short-term “crisis”-based one will help to fully understand the dynamic character of migration flows and the evolution of the interactions with restrictive policies. In this regard, it will become evident that the ongoing “crisis” related to irregular border crossings in the Mediterranean is a constant, structural feature of the region, since the introduction of visa obligation for citizens of non-EU Mediterranean countries, as well as for other third-country citizens (Gabrielli, 2015). Migrant and refugee arrivals on Mediterranean shores in European countries can no longer be considered as unexpected, and even the aforementioned “crisis” related to Syrian refugees’ arrivals of 2015 was in many senses unsurprising (Spijkerboer, 2016). Secondly, considering interactions in the entire Mediterranean space will allow us to overcome the narrow analysis focused on the policies of a single European receiving country, on a specific migratory route or on a single “crisis.” This will also lead to an understanding of the limitations of current European externalization in the Mediterranean and to moving on from emergency or “crisis”-based logic (Gabrielli, 2015). Indeed, beyond apparent short-term decreases in crossings, or in the use of a single route, current political measures are incapable of stopping irregular crossings in the long term, across the entire Mediterranean (Andersson, 2016). Even in the case of the

¹ It is really simply a political statement in the form of a press release. The legal basis of the cooperation is an agreement between Greece and Turkey; see: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/. See also GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS & SÁNCHEZ-MONTIJANO (2017).

² EUROPEAN COMMISSION. “The EU and Tunisia start negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission,” *Press release*, 12 October 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3394_en.htm

³ SHALAL, A. “German ministry wants to return asylum seekers to Africa,” *Independent*, 6 November 2016, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-ministry-refugee-migrants-asylum-seekers-africa-libya-tunisia-egypt-australia-a7400681.html

⁴ Malta Declaration, see: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/03-malta-declaration/

EU-Turkey deal, the decline in arrivals came prior to the signing of the agreement (Crawley et al., 2016), and while deportation numbers have been limited, safe corridors have not been established and refugees are piling up in Greece in dire conditions (Garcés-Mascareñas & Sanchez-Montijano, 2017). This cooperation framework aimed at buffering mobility outside Europe is also amplifying the market possibilities for smugglers and traffickers (Achilli, 2016) and, at the same time, displacing migratory paths to riskier routes.

The fast adaptation of flows to migration controls in the Mediterranean push European countries to continuously extend and deepen the externalization process

Besides the ephemeral effects of these policies versus the adaptability of the flows, the current migration policies in the Mediterranean are worsening the already existing harmful consequences on human rights and physical integrity of refugees and migrants. In particular, the European externalization of migration control towards neighbouring countries has raised serious concerns about the violence to which refugees and migrants are exposed on their journeys. The aforementioned renewal of cooperation with Libya is, unfortunately, particularly illustrative of the risks this type of collaboration entails for the safety of migrants and refugees, as well as for the respect for their human rights, due to the worrying track record the Libyan authorities have in “managing” migrants and refugees in the country.⁵

At the same time, this growing exposure to violence in transit spaces is also related to the rise in deaths in the Mediterranean space. Despite the political narrative linking the reinforcement of border control and cooperation with neighbouring countries with the need to reduce the risks related to irregular crossings of migrants and refugees, the number of people dying while attempting to reach Europe is

constantly growing (Last & Spijkerboer, 2014; Fargues & Di Bartolomeo, 2015). The latest data provided by IOM on dead or missing persons in the Mediterranean clearly confirm this trend: 3,279 persons in 2014, 3,784 in 2015, 5,098 in 2016, and 666 in 2017 (by 13 April 2017).⁶

Finally, we should also remember the limitations on human rights and the right to asylum resulting from these migration control practices (Andrijasevic, 2010; Hyndman & Mountz, 2008; Gabrielli, 2014). This combination of a strengthening of policies to control flows, a growth in border fatalities and the degradation of the human rights of peoples on the move clearly indicates that there is a crucial need for a comprehensive reorientation of the paradigms and tools of the current policy framework. There is, then, a deep ethical need to reconcile state interests with the protection of humans on the move and to reverse the current European migration policy framework in order to prioritize the safety of people over that of states (Zapata-Barrero & Gabrielli, 2017).

Furthermore, to develop a new proactive, evidence- and ethic-based policy framework of migration and mobility in the Mediterranean we need to go beyond the “crisis” framework and acknowledge that irregular crossings are a structural feature of the Mediterranean. Opening “safe channels” for refugees, as well as formal channels for recruiting foreign workers in the region will, therefore, become legitimate options for reconciling the effective protection of the rights of people on the move, their safety and the effectiveness of their right to asylum, as well as becoming a factor smoothing the path towards more symmetrical relations between Mediterranean countries.

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⁵ UNSML and OHCHR. “‘Detained and Dehumanised.’ Report on Human Right Abuses against Migrants in Libya,” 13 December 2016, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf

⁶ See: <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/>

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Climate Change and Migration in the Mediterranean: Challenges for the Future

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Previously relegated to academic and policy circles, the issue of Mediterranean migration sprang dramatically to the public attention in 2015, as Europe faced an unprecedented influx of migrants¹ from the Middle East, the Maghreb, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The migrant crisis has led to widespread human suffering, severely strained European institutional capacities, and sparked tensions between and within countries across the Mediterranean and Europe. The influx of migrants continued in 2016, albeit at reduced levels, and indicators point to the possibility that the region is facing a “new normal” of human mobility. While securitized border responses were quickly cobbled together, less attention has been paid to the underlying drivers of these migratory flows, among them climate change and its complex secondary effects in migrants’ countries of origin. While climate is far from the only factor driving migration – or even the most important – it is undeniably playing a role in shaping the conditions that lead people to migrate. This article will discuss these underlying trends and sketch the contours of

what the future may look like along the Mediterranean littoral.

A “New Normal” in the Mediterranean?

The migrant crisis has become a fact of life for governments and societies throughout the Mediterranean. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) registered 363,348 migrant and refugee arrivals to Europe via the Mediterranean in 2016, down dramatically from over 1,000,000 arrivals in 2015 but still higher than previous years. The 2016 arrivals were split almost evenly between Greece and Italy - referred to as the eastern and western routes, respectively.

The reduction from 2015 is due to a large drop in migrants along the eastern route through Turkey to Greece (from 853,650 to 173,561). But this overall decline in the number of arrivals should not overshadow the fact that larger numbers of migrants attempted the more dangerous western route across the open sea to Italy and Malta. Migration along this route increased by 15% to 181,436 – with a corresponding increase in mortality rates for migrants. Italy’s 182,000 arrivals in 2016 was the highest total ever recorded, driven by an increase from West Africa and the Horn of Africa – particularly from Nigeria and Eritrea. Over 5,000 migrants died at sea in 2015, despite the efforts of Frontex – the European Border and Coast Guard Agency – which managed to rescue some 90,000 migrants.²

¹ The International Organization for Migration defines a “migrant” as “any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.” This is the definition we will use in this chapter, though with a specific focus on those migrants who have crossed the Mediterranean into Europe through one of the major international routes. THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, *Key Migration Terms*, (accessed March, 2017), available at: www.iom.int/key-migration-terms.

² THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, *Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Top 363,348 in 2016; Deaths at Sea: 5,079*, 6 January, 2017, available at: www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-top-363348-2016-deaths-sea-5079. See also: FRONTEX, *Risk Analysis for 2017*, 2017, available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf.

Frontex attributes the drop in migration along the eastern route to the EU – Turkey migrant deal – wherein Turkey agreed to do more to prevent illegal crossings into Greece in exchange for financial aid, and in which a mechanism was set up to allow for the return of migrants to Turkey from Greece – and the heavily securitized border response in the Balkans, which contributed to the partial breakdown of the Schengen Area. The legality of the EU – Turkey deal has been questioned by human rights and international law experts and has contributed to a broader crisis in EU – Turkish relations. More broadly, the political fervor around migration has contributed to the rise of far-right political parties across the continent and led to deep tensions between EU Member States. With the domestic political stakes so high around Europe and in Turkey – host to an estimated 3,000,000 refugees (2,750,000 from Syria alone) – vulnerable migrants have been essentially used by all sides as a bargaining chip.

Setting aside the legal, political, and human rights concerns – a securitized response is simply unworkable. Caught off-guard in 2015, European governments and the EU quickly expanded and strengthened enforcement efforts in a systematic way. But efforts on the enforcement side alone will never get ahead of the challenge: Frontex oversaw 10,000 returns from EU to non-EU countries in 2016, up from 3,500 in 2015, but there is no way these efforts can keep up with the pace of migration. Meanwhile, the EU-Turkey deal and other bilateral arrangements are vulnerable to shifting political currents. Put simply, these responses are unsustainable and far from ideal. The one-dimensional and regressive response is typical of crisis decision-making, but over time it should give way to a more cooperative and forward-looking response.

It would be the wrong response to focus only on building barriers to migration. The EU has begun efforts to address the root causes of migration, but not yet at the scale the problem will likely require. This is largely a problem of budgets and, therefore, of political will in a Union facing tremendous political pressure in the wake of the debt crisis and Brexit.

Examining Root Causes

The eastern and western migratory routes are often considered together; there are good reasons for this, as routes are flexible and do shift to some extent in response to conditions, including enforcement mechanisms. But looking at the countries of origin along the two routes and thinking about root causes, important distinctions emerge. The eastern route is truly a “war route” dominated by refugees and migrants from the war zones of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan (though there is a growing body of scholarship on the climatic drivers of the initial unrest in Syria³).

The western route is more varied in its composition and its causes; it is dominated by migrants from a broad swathe of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel. The primary drivers of this flow are economic underdevelopment and demography. Countries like Nigeria, Niger, and Mali are extremely poor and rank among the fastest growing populations in the world – indeed, Niger has the highest fertility rate in the world. The desire to escape extreme poverty and seek economic opportunity in North Africa and, possibly Europe, is undeniably the biggest factor driving migrants from these countries.

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But environmental change – including the effects of climate change – represents another important underlying driver among many. Wide swathes of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel – particularly northern Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Mali – face extreme water-stress and are heavily dependent on seasonal rains to maintain subsistence farming, herding, and fishing. This water scarcity and reliance on basic rural livelihoods leave these areas

³ See, for example: KELLEY, et.al., “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, Vol. 112, No.11, January, 2015, available at: www.pnas.org/content/112/11/3241

very vulnerable to climate change (as well as natural seasonal variation and non-climate change related environmental issues like contamination).

Indeed, the effects of climate change are already being felt in these areas; average temperatures across the Sahel have increased by almost 0.7 degrees Celsius since 1975. The rains on which people rely have become more unpredictable and extreme (both droughts and seasonal flooding), and Lake Chad – on which some 25 million people rely to survive – has shrunk to one-twentieth of its 1960s size. Desertification has slowly pushed the line at which rainfall and groundwater can support agriculture further south in recent decades, rendering whole villages and thousands of square kilometres unsuitable for human habitation.⁴

Undoubtedly, differentiating the exact impact of man-made climate change from natural fluctuations is extremely difficult. The causality of migratory decisions is also deeply complex, making detailed analysis of the climate's exact role difficult. But the anecdotal evidence is overwhelming, and the scholarly research is rapidly fleshing out the picture.⁵ Furthermore, climate change influences numerous other push factors and often “masquerades” under other guises – for example, a farmer's economic desperation due to unpredictable rains is the result of many factors, among them climate.⁶

Despite this complicated causality, it is clear that demography and environmental changes – including climate change – are combining with insecurity and poor governance to undermine rural livelihoods and contributing to decisions to migrate. These factors squeeze the margins of life at the family, community, and often regional level. In places with extremely weak governance and limited state capacity

to react to crises or organize adaptive responses, people are left with few good options – many turn to the ancient adaptive mechanism of migration.

These trends also interact with and are worsened by conflict. Persistent droughts have ravaged farmers and herders across the region. But it is no coincidence that the most acute food insecurity is currently found in northern Nigeria, the Lake Chad basin, Somalia, and South Sudan – areas which have faced both dire environmental conditions and persistent conflict. Indeed, conflicts across the Middle East and North Africa have left 30 million people facing food insecurity, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.

In places with extremely weak governance and limited state capacity to react to crises or organize adaptive responses, people are left with few good options – many turn to the ancient adaptive mechanism of migration

In parts of Nigeria, Mali, and Sudan (as well as Syria) the climate–migration nexus has contributed to tensions over resources and undermined the socio-economic pillars of communities, overwhelmed state responses, and exacerbated political, ethnic, and religious tensions. Neither climatic factors nor demography or migration “explain” these conflicts – there are no simple causal connections to be made in complex crises like that facing Nigeria or

⁴ For more detail see, for example: Michael WERZ and Laura CONLEY. *Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in Northwest Africa*, Center for American Progress, April, 2012, available at: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/climate_migration_nwafrica.pdf. *The New York Times* has recently published several excellent anecdotal accounts of these phenomena, as well: Somini SEN-GUPTA. “Heat, Hunger and War Force Africans Onto a ‘Road on Fire’,” *The New York Times*, 15 December, 2016, available at: www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/15/world/africa/agadez-climate-change.html?_r=0. Also: Jeffrey GETTLEMAN. “Drought and War Heighten Threat of Not Just 1 Famine, but 4,” *The New York Times*, 27 March, 2017, available at: www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/africa/famine-somalia-nigeria-south-sudan-yemen-water.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur.

⁵ An excellent recent survey: WILSON CENTER AND U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, “Navigating Complexity: Climate, Migration, and Conflict in a Changing World,” November, 2016, available at: www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/navigating-complexity-climate-migration-and-conflict-changing-world. See also the Center for American Progress' series on *Climate Change, Migration, and Security* available at www.americanprogress.org/projects/climate-migration-security/view/.

⁶ See for example: P. Krishna KRISHNAMURTHY, Kirsty LEWIS, Richard J. CHOULARTON. *Climate impacts on food security and nutrition: a review of existing knowledge*, World Food Programme and Met Office's Hadley Centre, 2012. See also: Nina VON UEXKULL; Mihai CROICU; Hanne FJELDE and Halvard BUHAUG, “Civil conflict sensitivity to growing-season drought,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, Vol. 113., No. 44, (2016), available at: www.pnas.org/content/113/44/12391.

Darfur – but these underlying trends undeniably deserve greater attention.⁷

Western Tools – Rusty and Out of Date

Unfortunately, these underlying drivers go largely unaddressed, and developed countries too often focus on managing the consequences. In fact, the tools to address the root causes of such complex crises are being weakened in many areas. The new administration of President Donald Trump has sought deep cuts to the budget of the State Department, USAID, and wants to reduce US contributions to the UN and other international organizations. Trump also has sought to reverse US commitments on carbon emissions and fuel standards and questioned continuing adherence to the Paris Climate Agreement. With the full effects of a changing climate coming to bear and the Mediterranean littoral facing unprecedented humanitarian crises, these cuts could not come at a worse time.

Of course, both the US and Europe have numerous aid efforts and pilot programmes aimed at helping vulnerable communities adapt to climate change and at providing basic economic viability in marginal areas. But even without further cuts these efforts are hampered by budget shortfalls and a complete inadequacy of scale. Without yielding to Malthusian alarmism, the demographic and climate indicators – of young and rapidly growing populations with few economic options and increasingly inhospitable rural conditions – are very concerning.

Yet the margins to alleviate the most desperate suffering, extreme poverty, and stark climate vulnerabil-

ity are actually quite small and can be addressed with a sustained devotion of resources. By focusing on root causes, coordinating programmes, and shifting to cash giving enabled by technology rather than in-kind aid, big improvements can be made. On the question of migration and Europe's response, border enforcement is not a sustainable solution. The efforts to address root causes must be bolstered by moves to improve the economic and social integration of migrants; after all, remittances far outweigh government assistance to developing countries (furthermore, these cash transfers are the most effective form of assistance).

The margins to alleviate the most desperate suffering, extreme poverty, and stark climate vulnerability are actually quite small and can be addressed with a sustained devotion of resources

In reality, given the political stakes, the EU must take an all-of-the-above approach. And, given the political context in the United States, Europe must lead the way. While governments and civil society should understand the political and security implications if these trends go unaddressed, state responses and the corresponding public discourse should be de-securitized. With luck, a coordinated response focused on root causes and integration can get ahead of the worrying trends facing the Mediterranean community.

⁷ See, for example: U.S. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, *Implications for US National Security of Anticipated Climate Change*, 21 September, 2016, available at: www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Implications_for_US_National_Security_of_Anticipated_Climate_Change.pdf. See also: Nina VON UEXKULL; Mihai CROICU; Hanne FJELDE and Halvard BUHAUG, "Civil conflict sensitivity to growing-season drought," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, Vol. 113., No. 44, 2016, available at: www.pnas.org/content/113/44/12391.

Défis sécuritaires, migrations, instabilité et extrémisme violent au Sahel

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Le Sahel : « le couloir de tous les dangers »

Le Sahel, qui s'étend de la Mauritanie au Soudan ¹, est une immense zone éco-climatique (située) sur la frange sud du désert du Sahara ; il compte une population disséminée de 150 millions d'habitants (OCHA, 2016). Les frontières, perméables, ont de tout temps été franchies librement par des marchands qui passaient par la ville historique de Tombouctou au nord du Mali. Dans les années 1970 et 1980, le Sahel a fait les gros titres en raison de sécheresses et de famines qui ont causé la mort de plus de 100 000 personnes et en ont touché 50 millions d'habitants, dont un million s'est retrouvé dépendant de l'aide alimentaire. Aujourd'hui, le Sahel est sur le point de subir une nouvelle tragédie, encore plus dramatique du fait de l'exacerbation de certaines conditions, particulièrement au Mali et au Niger, suite à la guerre civile en Libye et à la chute du gouvernement Kadhafi après l'intervention de l'OTAN en 2011 (Zoubir, 2012). Le Sahel, qu'un haut responsable algérien appelle le « *couloir de tous les dangers* », (interview d'un ancien Premier ministre en septembre 2011) a aussi été surnommé « le Sahelistan », (Laurent, 2013) en référence à l'Afghanistan d'avant 2001, c'est à dire une région hors de contrôle où les djihadistes pouvaient suivre un entraînement militaire et préparer

des attaques terroristes de nature transnationale, en particulier contre les intérêts occidentaux à la fois sur le sol européen et dans le voisinage du Sahel, ou contre les gouvernements de la région (par exemple le Mali et l'Algérie en janvier 2013). Aujourd'hui, le Sahel se présente sous un jour sombre, d'autant que cette étendue, a toujours constitué traditionnellement, une zone d'interaction entre « l'Afrique arabo-méditerranéenne » et « l'Afrique noire », où des échanges humains, financiers et religieux de toutes sortes ont lieu. Les activités de cette région ont maintenant été remplacées par les trafics en tout genre et les routes du terrorisme, et c'est pour cela qu'elle attire l'attention d'un grand nombre de capitales : Alger, Pékin, Berlin, Bruxelles, Londres, Paris, Madrid, Riyad, Rome, et Washington en particulier, en raison des dangers qu'elle représente pour la sécurité internationale (Zoubir, 2012a).

Le Sahel présente les symptômes de tous les maux du sous-développement, mais il souffre également de la fragilité de ses États, des conflits ethniques, de la présence d'organisations extrémistes violentes (OEV), et des activités de trafic. Même si les analystes ne s'accordent pas sur une définition de ce qui constitue le Sahel (longue bande territoriale qui pour certains englobe dix pays, de l'Atlantique au bassin de la mer Rouge), nous nous limiterons dans cet article à étudier les cas du Mali et du Niger, et de façon plus périphérique, du Burkina Faso, du Tchad, et de la Mauritanie ; nous rajouterons aussi le Nigéria en raison du rôle récent qu'il a joué à la périphérie sud du Sahel et des liens qui se renforcent entre le groupe djihadiste Boko Haram et des OEV du nord du Mali.

¹ Le Sahel comprend des parties du nord du Sénégal, du sud de la Mauritanie, du centre du Mali, du nord Burkina Faso, la région la plus méridionale de l'Algérie, le Niger, la région la plus au nord du Nigéria, le centre du Tchad, le Soudan du centre et du sud, l'extrême nord du Sud-Soudan, de l'Érythrée, du Cameroun, de la République d'Afrique Centrale, et l'extrémité nord de l'Éthiopie.

Le Sahel : état des lieux

Les États du Sahel sont parmi les plus pauvres du monde, et figurent dans la catégorie du faible développement humain du Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement. Sur l'échelle du développement humain, la Mauritanie, le Mali, le Burkina Faso, le Tchad, et le Niger se placent respectivement aux 157^e, 175^e, 185^e, 186^e et 187^e rangs. Tous les indicateurs de développement (alphabétisation, nutrition...) sont extrêmement bas (PNUD, 2016). Cette pauvreté et les conditions socio-économiques désastreuses, comme par exemple un taux de chômage important, des infrastructures éducatives et sociales faibles, et des ressources agricoles précaires, ont créé un terrain propice à l'expansion des trafics illégaux : trafics de drogue, de migrants clandestins, de cigarettes, de carburant, de médicaments, d'armes légères, de pièces détachées automobiles, et plus récemment le recrutement de jeunes gens par les OEV. Le trafic illégal d'armes, de drogues et d'êtres humains rapporterait 3,8 milliards de dollars US par an (ICG, 2015).

Le Sahel présente les symptômes de tous les maux du sous-développement, mais il souffre également de la fragilité de ses États, des conflits ethniques, de la présence d'organisations extrémistes violentes

L'instabilité générée par les différents facteurs énumérés ci-dessus empêchent le Sahel d'attirer des investissements étrangers directs ou des touristes, autrefois sources importantes de revenus. L'enlèvement d'étrangers, une des principales sources de revenu des djihadistes, a découragé les étrangers de se rendre dans la région.

Ironiquement, même si les pays du Sahel sont parmi les plus pauvres au monde, ils sont très riches en ressources naturelles : minerais de fer (Mauritanie), uranium (Niger, 4^e producteur mondial), réserves potentielles de pétrole (Tchad, Mauritanie,

et Niger). Cependant, les revenus issus des ressources naturelles, y compris le pétrole et l'uranium, sont utilisés pour permettre la militarisation et la redistribution d'une rente au profit des clans au pouvoir, créant des frustrations et des revendications de la part des groupes marginalisés. En outre, l'incapacité des États du Sahel à combattre le terrorisme et le trafic de drogue fournit des prétextes aux interventions étrangères sous couvert de sécurité, en particulier de la part des puissances désireuses de contrôler la richesse minière des États du Sahel.

De plus, le Sahel connaît une forte croissance de sa population : les taux de fertilité au Mali, en Mauritanie, au Tchad et au Niger sont de 6,4 %, 4,7 %, 6,3 % et 7,6 %, respectivement. En conséquence, la population de jeunes dans ces pays est impressionnante. Ces jeunes n'ont pas accès à l'éducation, ne peuvent pas trouver d'emploi, et ne ressentent aucune loyauté envers des États considérés comme corrompus et négligents envers leurs citoyens.

La croissance économique de ces pays est lente. Par exemple, au Niger, la croissance économique est tombée à 3,6 % en 2015 (par rapport à 7 % en 2014). (African Economic Outlook/ Perspectives économiques en Afrique, 2016). Quoique la croissance du PNB soit respectable, elle ne se traduit pas par une redistribution des richesses ou des programmes durables de lutte contre la pauvreté. En plus de toutes ces difficultés, les États du Sahel souffrent d'une mauvaise gouvernance à presque tous les niveaux. Les gouvernements autoritaires et répressifs ont souvent négligé certaines zones, par exemple le nord du Mali, qui sont devenues des refuges sûrs où le crime organisé et les trafics de toutes sortes se lient aux populations locales et finissent par se substituer aux autorités d'un État faible, souvent achetées par les criminels locaux. L'effondrement du gouvernement libyen, et ses répercussions s'est traduit par la mise en circulation d'armes légères mais aussi d'armes plus sophistiquées (Zoubir, 2012b). L'absence d'institutions politiques, des régimes inefficaces et autoritaires, l'absence de développement, la faiblesse des infrastructures, tout cela a exacerbé les conflits ethniques, comme on le voit clairement au Mali. Cet environnement a été propice à deux évolutions majeures : 1. L'émigration clandestine vers l'Europe, facilitée par les différents réseaux criminels qui ont

surgi dans la région et sur les rives méditerranéennes ; 2. La montée du salafisme et de l'extrémisme violent dans une région réputée pour son islam traditionnel et tolérant.

L'incapacité des États du Sahel à combattre le terrorisme et le trafic de drogue fournit des prétextes aux interventions étrangères sous couvert de sécurité, en particulier de la part des puissances désireuses de contrôler la richesse minière des États du Sahel

L'autre grand facteur qui va certainement contribuer aux conflits dans le Sahel et aux migrations qui vont en découler, c'est le changement climatique. Comme souligné dans une étude récente, la région « est l'un des points chauds du changement climatique. Des schémas météorologiques toujours plus imprévisibles, des sécheresses et des inondations plus fréquentes ainsi que la dégradation des sols menacent les populations en place, dont la survie dépend pour la plupart de l'agriculture. Les chocs environnementaux, l'insécurité, la famine chronique et la malnutrition ont une interdépendance dangereusement symbiotique au Sahel » (OCHA, 2016). Le changement climatique au Sahel va inévitablement avoir des implications socio-économiques et politiques et va par conséquent agir comme « démultiplicateur de menaces », étant donné qu'il va exacerber les contraintes et contradictions qui existent déjà dans les sociétés sahéniennes actuelles, notamment, celles qui sont dépendantes de ressources déclinantes (Safir, 2016). Le changement climatique va avoir des conséquences en matière d'insécurité alimentaire, aggravée par un taux de croissance démographique impressionnant ; les projections estiment que la population du Sahel atteindra plus de 230 millions d'habitants à l'horizon 2050 (ONU, département des Affaires économiques et sociales, division de la Population, 2015). Cette croissance rapide de la population dans des zones pauvres va constituer un défi redoutable pour tous les gouvernements en ce qui concerne l'élimi-

nation de la pauvreté et des disparités, la lutte contre la famine et la malnutrition, l'augmentation de la scolarisation et l'amélioration des structures médicales, ou l'amélioration de la prestation des services de base. La relation entre la sécurité alimentaire et les mouvements migratoires, quelles que soient les nuances à apporter, est un facteur déclencheur des migrations internes ou transfrontalières (Knoll, Rampa, Bizzotto et al. 2017).

Mouvements migratoires : l'échappatoire inévitable

Indéniablement, les conditions socio-économiques, climatiques, démographiques et politiques qui dominent dans la région, associées à un tarissement des ressources, jouent un grand rôle non seulement dans l'instabilité de la région, mais aussi dans le désir qu'ont les jeunes gens – et les moins jeunes – d'émigrer vers l'Europe, en passant pour cela par le désert du Sahara. Au cours des dernières années, on estime que 53 % des réfugiés parvenus en Europe avaient entre 8 et 24 ans ; parmi eux, 80 % sont des hommes (Pauwels et Parkes, 2017). Les rapports indiquent que 106 705 migrants sont arrivés en Europe en provenance d'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient (OIM, 2015). En 2014, 8 532 Maliens ont émigré en Europe (Murphy, 2014). Il est intéressant de noter que les nouvelles recherches montrent que « la plupart des migrants ayant fait l'objet d'une enquête en Libye courant 2016 ont une éducation de niveau secondaire ou professionnel. 77 % d'entre eux étaient au chômage avant de partir, et 88 % ont indiqué qu'ils ont quitté leur pays pour des raisons économiques » (OIM, 2017).

Ces recherches, ainsi que d'autres, montrent que l'immigration clandestine est un sujet compliqué, d'autant plus que l'origine des migrants n'est pas toujours clairement déterminée, pas plus que leurs motivations (victimes de l'environnement socio-économiques, demandeurs d'asile, réfugiés). Mais quelles que soient leurs motivations, ils partagent tous le même objectif, suivent les mêmes chemins de traversée, et se retrouvent souvent aux mains des mêmes trafiquants qui les exploitent. Le nombre de demandeurs d'asile est en constante augmentation, en dépit des difficultés pour emprunter les voies de passage classiques. De fait, alors que le nombre

de ceux qui empruntent les routes de Méditerranée occidentale a considérablement chuté (moins de 5 000 arrivées en 2014), les routes de la Méditerranée centrale et de la Méditerranée orientale sont devenues plus recherchées. En effet, entre 2015 et 2016, la route de la Méditerranée centrale a vu une augmentation de 16 % des passages (OIM, 2017). Entre 2013 et 2014, la route de la Méditerranée centrale a vu une augmentation de 376 % (Altai Consulting, 2015). Bien que le nombre de migrants qui ont débarqué en Italie soit tombé à 154 000 (moins qu'en 2014), la route de la Méditerranée centrale a subi une pression migratoire intense en 2015 (Frontex, 2015). La même année, cependant, la route de la Méditerranée orientale est devenue de loin la route principale pour les entrées de migrants et de demandeurs d'asile en Europe (GMDAC, 2015) ; la route de la Méditerranée orientale était pour des raisons évidentes la route privilégiée par les Syriens et autres réfugiés de la région. Mais, pour les migrations en provenance de la région Sahara-Sahel, la route de la Méditerranée centrale reste la plus utilisée, même si elle est la plus mortelle – plus de 300 000 personnes ont atteint l'Europe en provenance d'Afrique du Nord après avoir emprunté cette route, depuis la fin 2013 (GMDAC, 2016). De fait, depuis 2014, un décès sur vingt de migrant a eu lieu sur cette route de la Méditerranée centrale. Au cours de la même période, 1 migrant sur 50 ayant tenté la traversée est mort. Cette tendance s'est poursuivie, il y eut encore plus de personnes qui trouvèrent la mort en Méditerranée centrale au cours des cinq premiers mois de 2016 qu'à la même période au cours des années précédentes (GMDAC, 2016). Bien sûr, tout cela est lié à l'Afrique du Nord en général, qui est non seulement le point de départ des émigrants algériens, égyptiens, libanais, marocains et tunisiens (Sánchez-Montijano et Girona-Raventós, 2017), mais aussi le point de transit pour l'émigration africaine vers l'Europe, via le Sahel. Le flux des demandeurs d'asile en Égypte, qui a doublé entre 2011 et 2014 (Altai Consulting, 2015) n'est pas surprenant. La Libye, de son côté, sert de plaque tournante pour le trafic organisé. Sans aucun doute, l'instabilité politique et le quasi chaos en Libye a permis aux trafiquants de tirer profit des conditions et renforcer leur présence, mais également, vraisemblablement, d'attirer les émigrants qui souhaitent se rendre en Europe. L'organisation du trafic ne se traduit pas par

des conditions plus sûres pour la traversée de la mer Méditerranée. Ainsi, en 2015, plus de 5 700 migrants ont péri ou ont disparu pendant leur migration, soit une augmentation d'environ 9 % par rapport à 2014 ; parmi eux, plus de 3 770 sont morts en Méditerranée (GMDAC, 2015).

Le changement climatique au Sahel va inévitablement avoir des implications socio-économiques et politiques et va par conséquent agir comme « démultiplicateur de menaces »

Les États du Sahel servent de pays de transit non seulement pour les migrants sahéliens, (Tchad, Cameroun, Burkina Faso, etc.), mais aussi pour les émigrants d'Afrique subsaharienne (Nigeria). Par exemple, la Mauritanie est le lieu de transit principal des migrants sénégalais (Altai Consulting, 2015). Indiscutablement, l'Europe et l'Afrique du Nord perçoivent toutes deux ces migrations en expansion comme une menace politique, économique et sécuritaire. Pour la première, il est évident que cet afflux représente un danger politique en raison de la montée du populisme de droite. Les personnalités politiques européennes ont du mal à expliquer à leur électorat l'accueil d'énormes quantités de réfugiés à un moment où l'Europe doit surmonter des difficultés économiques. Même si la menace sécuritaire de la part des réfugiés est minime – il n'y a aucune preuve qu'un nombre important de terroristes aient infiltré l'Europe en passant par la voie migratoire – les craintes d'une telle pénétration persistent. Pour les États d'Afrique du Nord, la vague de migrants en provenance de la région Sahel-Sahara est également problématique car un nombre non négligeable de migrants a décidé de rester en Algérie ou en Égypte ; une telle migration représente un fardeau économique difficile à assumer en ces temps de graves défis financiers. De plus, l'exploitation sexuelle et l'exploitation de la main d'œuvre générées par cette migration est une question particulièrement difficile à maîtriser en Europe et en Afrique du Nord. Beaucoup de femmes de migrant, en par-

ticulier en provenance du Nigéria, font l'objet d'un trafic en vue de leur exploitation sexuelle (Altai Consulting, 2015). D'autres sont exploitées comme main d'œuvre. L'existence de marchés aux esclaves dont sont victimes les migrants en route pour la Libye est désormais documentée (IOM, 2017 ; Molenaar et El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017).

Pour les États d'Afrique du Nord, la vague de migrants en provenance de la région Sahel-Sahara est également problématique car un nombre non négligeable de migrants a décidé de rester en Algérie ou en Égypte ; une telle migration représente un fardeau économique difficile à assumer en ces temps de graves défis financiers

La route de la Méditerranée centrale va rester le choix principal des migrants qui passent par le Sahel et par le nord de l'Afrique. Cela est dû principalement à la fermeture de la route de la Méditerranée orientale, rendue possible par d'un côté la signature et la mise en œuvre d'un accord entre l'UE et la Turquie, et de l'autre par la relative perméabilité des frontières libyennes. Cependant, ni la fermeture de la route de la Méditerranée orientale, ni les périls mortels encourus pendant le voyage via la route de la Méditerranée centrale ne vont dissuader les futurs migrants de chercher à faire la traversée vers l'Europe. Les morts incessantes vont soulever des questions politiques et éthiques dans les États situés des deux côtés de la Méditerranée. L'UE a pris de nombreuses initiatives, la plus récente étant le Cadre de Partenariat avec l'UE pour les Migrations (juin 2016), pour trouver des solutions aux migrations clandestines. Elles comportent des dispositions comme la réinstallation des migrants, des actions militaires contre les réseaux et les navires des trafiquants mais également le lancement d'un « am-

bitieux plan d'investissement extérieur afin de contribuer à ouvrir des perspectives et à combattre les causes profondes des migrations » et pour « accroître notre soutien financier et opérationnel, et investir dans le développement économique et social à long terme, la sécurité, l'État de droit et les droits de l'homme, améliorer la vie des populations et nous attaquer aux causes de la migration », (Commission européenne, 2016). Le plan consiste à « rechercher des partenariats avec les principaux pays tiers d'origine et de transit » et à initier de nouveaux accords, appelés « pactes », avec les États sahéliens, comme le Niger, le Nigéria, le Sénégal, le Mali et l'Éthiopie. L'UE souhaite aussi étendre ses engagements avec la Tunisie et la Libye.

Être conscient du lien qui existe entre d'une part le déficit de développement et d'autre part la sécurité et les migrations est un premier pas positif pour tenter de résoudre les nombreux défis auxquels est confronté le Sahel. Cependant, augmenter « les subventions destinées à lutter contre les causes profondes de l'immigration clandestine et des déplacements forcés » restera certainement insuffisant² tant que l'UE continue à établir des partenariats avec des « pays tiers clés » qui ont une grande responsabilité dans le sous-développement persistant. Travailler avec les régimes autoritaires, répressifs et corrompus de la région Sahel-Afrique du Nord, sans un minimum de conditions à faire respecter et l'assurance vérifiable de la mise en œuvre d'une bonne gouvernance et du respect des droits de l'homme, ne permettra pas de repousser les vagues d'émigration ou d'extrémisme violent. Pire encore, les autorités publiques, comme au Mali, sont soit complices de l'émigration, par exemple en laissant les migrants passer librement en échange du paiement d'un péage sur des barrages routiers, ou en leur fournissant de faux passeports, ou en les laissant sans défense face au trafic d'êtres humains » (Molenaar et Van Damme, 2017). De plus, certains États de l'UE doivent reconnaître leur responsabilité dans l'aggravation des conditions de vie au Sahel et dans les pays voisins, à cause des interventions militaires et/ou de la collusion entre des pays européens et leurs multinationales au comportement corrompu et abusif dans ces États. Enfin, et ce n'est pas ce qui compte

² En décembre 2016, l'UE annonçait le lancement de 28 mesures destinées à traiter les causes profondes de l'émigration illégale dans le Sahel et dans le bassin du lac Tchad, pour un montant total de 381 millions d'euros. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4348_en.pdf

le moins, la coopération avec le gouvernement libyen reconnu par la communauté internationale, mais inefficace face à toute initiative pour restaurer l'ordre et la stabilité, n'engendrera aucune stabilité ni dans ce pays ni dans toute la région Sahel-Afrique du Nord.

Instabilité et extrémisme violent au Sahel

La montée d'un extrémisme violent n'est pas le fruit du hasard ; son émergence et les défis sécuritaires qu'il représente sont liés aux dynamiques politiques et socio-économiques qui évoluent dans chaque État. La corrélation entre l'extrémisme violent et l'environnement interne socio-économique et politique est indiscutable, que ce soit en Afrique du Nord (Zoubir, 2017), au Sahel (ICG, 2015) ou ailleurs. L'incapacité des États fragiles du Sahel à contrôler certaines parties de leurs territoires, associée aux conditions énumérées plus haut, laisse la possibilité à des "sanctuaires" ou des espaces hors du contrôle gouvernemental de s'instaurer, dans lesquels les OEV et les groupes criminels peuvent opérer sans contrainte. Au Sahel, les OEV se sont substituées aux autorités publiques et fournissent souvent des services de base aux communautés locales qui vivent dans la pauvreté. Les revenus engendrés par les activités illicites permettent aux OEV et à leurs alliés d'instaurer un nouveau type de gouvernance qui échappe au contrôle de l'État, comme cela est arrivé au nord du Mali ou au nord-est du Niger, par exemple. Il n'est pas étonnant que les « routes ancestrales du commerce et des migrations entre les communautés du Sahel et celles du Sahara soient souvent utilisées pour le trafic de drogue, de migrants, ou de produits illicites, et occupent l'espace laissé par les conflits, la gouvernance faible et l'absence de coopération transfrontalière » (OCHA, 2016). Ce lucratif commerce illégal donne lieu à des batailles souvent féroces et violentes pour le contrôle de ces routes de trafic. Il se traduit également par une corruption officielle où l'on voit les gouvernements utiliser le crime organisé comme ressource politique permettant à leurs alliés

de bénéficier des activités illégales (Lacher, 2012). En outre, le lien entre les OEV et les trafiquants, bien que réel, est souvent exagéré car il ne prend pas en compte la dimension religieuse de certaines de ces OEV totalement opposées à la consommation et à la diffusion des drogues³.

Les conditions de marginalisation et le désenchantement chez les jeunes du Sahel sont tels que ceux qui ne peuvent pas émigrer pour trouver une vie meilleure – parce qu'ils ne peuvent pas payer les prix exorbitants exigés par les passeurs –, finissent par rejoindre les groupes criminels ou les OEV pour pouvoir survivre. En résumé, la désillusion envers l'état laïc, nourrie par le manque d'éducation et de travail, peut conduire à la radicalisation dont les organisations islamistes ou mêmes les groupes djihadistes violents sont les vecteurs (ICG, 2015). Dans cet environnement, l'idéologie salafiste se substitue à l'islam soufi tolérant traditionnellement pratiqué dans la région.

La toile d'araignée des OEV du Sahel est si complexe qu'il est difficile de décrire avec précision qui est qui et qui fait quoi et qui est allié avec qui ; ceci s'explique par le fait que des changements d'alliance ont lieu régulièrement. Par exemple, le fameux émir Mokhtar Belmokhtar (MBM) a rompu avec Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) en 2012, puis a fusionné sa propre organisation avec le Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), donnant naissance à la puissante organisation salafiste et djihadiste al-Mourabitoun (Almoravides), dont le premier objectif est de restaurer l'unité et la suprématie perdue de la dynastie des Almoravides, qui a régné pendant des siècles sur cette région. En décembre 2015, l'organisation s'est de nouveau associée avec l'AQMI. Ce qui est notable, c'est que l'AQMI et ses affiliés ont la capacité de tisser des relations étroites avec les populations locales délaissées, Touaregs, Arabes bérabiches, et autres communautés ethniques du nord du Mali, auxquelles ils procurent des fonds et un semblant de gouvernance. Une pléthore de cellules et de brigades relativement autonomes, la plupart liées à l'AQMI, opèrent dans le

³ D'après les entretiens que j'ai eus avec des responsables de la sécurité et des journalistes, les trafiquants de drogue paient pour le droit de passage et la protection, mais les OEV en général n'autorisent pas les drogues à être vendues sur place. On ne peut pas en dire autant des responsables gouvernementaux corrompus.

⁴ Parmi ces brigades, citons : Yusaf Ibn Tashfin, Al-Ansar, Al-Furkàn, Tariq Ibn Ziyad, entre autres. Pour une information plus détaillée, voir : MÉMIER, M. « AQMI et al-Mourabitoun-Le djihad sahélien réuniifié ? », *Études de l'Ifri*, janvier 2017, www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/der.memier_aqmi-al-mourabitoun_fr_2017.compressed_0.pdf

Sahel⁴. Un des alliés les plus importants de l'AQMI est le groupe touareg Ansar-ed-Dine, dont les troupes avaient commencé à marcher vers Bamako en 2013 avant d'être arrêtées par une intervention française. Un groupe dissident de l'alliance AQMI/Al-Mourabitoun a fait allégeance à l'EI pour devenir en 2016 l'État islamique du Grand Sahara (EIGS) dirigé par Adnan Abu Walid Sahraoui (Warner, 2017).

Tous ces groupes, quelle que soit leur ligne religieuse et idéologique, opèrent dans un environnement compliqué. L'AQMI et les affiliés de l'EI posent chacun de véritables problèmes, en particulier à travers les attaques contre les personnels des Nations Unies, les civils innocents, et les troupes maliennes et françaises. Ils ont aussi lancé des attaques dans d'autres zones au Burkina Faso, au Niger, et partout où l'intervention française au Mali a réussi à affaiblir les groupes mais pas à les éradiquer. Tout ce qu'a réussi l'intervention, c'est de tuer quelques leaders locaux et de disperser les groupes, mais les causes profondes qui ont présidé à la naissance de ces groupes existent toujours. Au Mali, l'échec de la mise en œuvre d'un règlement de paix (accords d'Alger) a empiré les conditions de vie pour les civils, coincés entre différents groupes. Leur seul choix est de prêter allégeance soit aux groupes djihadistes, soit aux militaires maliens dont la brutalité n'a fait que compliquer encore davantage la situation (Sonner et Dietrich, 2015).

Les politiques de sécurisation et les interventions militaires n'apporteront pas de solution aux nombreux problèmes que connaît le Sahel. Que l'UE se soit rendue compte du lien inévitable entre le binôme sécurité/migration et le développement, et qu'elle veuille agir en conséquence à travers des programmes de développement est louable mais non suffisant. Quelques centaines de millions d'euros pour financer quelques programmes ne sont pas suffisants. Il faut absolument traiter les causes réelles de l'environnement actuel. L'une d'elle est le chômage et la marginalisation. Par conséquent, s'attaquer à ce problème à travers de vrais programmes de développement est vital pour la sécurité de la région Sahel-Afrique du Nord et de l'Europe. L'UE doit comprendre que soutenir des gouvernements répressifs qui agissent en son nom pour sa sécurité apportera encore plus d'insécurité.

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
Dossier: Mobility and Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean

The Dynamics of Migrant Smuggling in North Africa: Focus on the Central Mediterranean Route

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
North Africa is a dynamic migration region that acts as the origin, transit and destination region for the various migratory flows that pass through it. These flows were traditionally dominated by sub-Saharan Africans who either remained in the region or trans-

ited through on their way to Europe. There has also been a movement of North Africans to Libya in search of employment, and in more limited cases, to board boats to Europe. From 2012 onwards, there has also been a movement of Syrian refugees to Libya, initially to wait for an end to the conflict at home and later to board boats to Europe. The individuals that travel along these routes form a complex group of people, including migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, minors, and involuntary migrants who possess



Source: *Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean Report*, p.12 updated according to the author's own fieldwork.

* This article is based on a chapter (chapter 4: North Africa) written by the author for: McAULIFFE, M. & LACZKO, F. (eds). *Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A global review of the emerging evidence base*, International Organization for Migration: Geneva, 2016.



Source: *Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean Report*, p.84 updated according to the author's own fieldwork.

differing motivations. Yet, they all follow the same journeys and are often in the hands of the same smugglers. For this reason, and for the purposes of this article, the word 'migrant' will be used broadly to refer to all people on the move through the region, unless a distinction is otherwise made.

This article will provide an overview of the smuggling dynamics in the region by focusing particularly on movements along the Central Mediterranean route. Map 1 charts the Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes and demonstrates how the flows have evolved between 2012-2015.


Main Routes

The Central Mediterranean route refers to the mixed migratory flow coming **from Northern Africa to Italy and Malta**. Map 2 charts all of the main smuggling routes through North Africa that fall along the Central Mediterranean route.

Libya has traditionally been a major transit point for sub-Saharan and West African migrants along this

route and the main departure point for sea journeys across the Mediterranean. However, Egypt and Tunisia have also acted as departure points at particular points in time. Chart 4 details the number of irregular arrivals in Italy between 2012-2015, according to country of departure. It demonstrates that in 2014 there was an increase in departures from Egypt and in 2015, from Tunisia. Chart 5, however, demonstrates that the departures from the Libyan coast continued to account for a greater share of the total number of departures, with 84% of all arrivals in Italy in 2015 having departed from the Libyan coast (increasing from 62% in 2013). Libya is the most attractive North African country along the Central Mediterranean route because in addition to being a departure point for Europe, it also offers a great deal of employment opportunities. Moreover, there is very little control of its borders following the 2011 Libyan Revolution and particularly after the 2014 political crisis. When migrants and asylum seekers in Egypt tried to resume direct sea crossings to Italy in 2013 and 2014 (mainly in response to increasing instability and

CHART 4 Irregular Arrivals in Italy According to Country of Departure, in Absolute Terms



Own production. Source: WB.

risks in Libya after the 2014 crisis), the Egyptian government stepped up its arrests of anyone attempting to depart irregularly and curtailed the trend. While the instability in Libya today and the consequent dangers for migrants have presumably made the country less desirable than before, the inflows remain strong, thereby confirming that the migratory routes into the country and the transit routes through the country are now well established. In 2016, the number of departures from the Egyptian coast for journeys to Italy has increased.

The Dynamics of Smuggling

As can be seen in Map 2, migrants typically make their journey in stages. This leads to a variety of smugglers being used for the different stages, and they can be found in a variety of locations (smuggling hubs are marked in blue on Map 2). Research conducted in Libya in 2013 revealed that there are generally two types of smugglers along the migratory routes through the Central Mediterranean: smugglers that facilitate the journey itself (referred to as the *muhareb* in Arabic) and smugglers who act as intermediaries and create the market for

migrants (referred to as the *samsar* in Arabic). Usually, the *samsar* will take the migrants to a holding location, and once there are enough of them, a *muhareb* will be invited to come and offer his services to the migrants. The migrants will pay the *muhareb* for the journey and the *muhareb* will give a proportion of the payment to the *samsar*.

Key Locations

Traditionally, the crossing of the Sahara, in order to move from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa, has always been facilitated by a smuggler as the harsh terrain necessitates the help of someone who is accustomed to it. This is particularly evident for journeys from Agadez to Sabha, from Dongola (Sudan) to Kufra or Sabha, and across the Algerian desert and into Libya (Tamanrasset to Djanet or Debdeb). Moreover, moving through Libya, once one has entered through one of its southern borders, is also very difficult and requires a smuggler, given that the ongoing political crisis of 2014 has led to conflict in certain parts of the country, as well as the presence of checkpoints across the country, controlled by both the State and non-state actors.

Key Actors

Members of certain Saharan tribes are known to be active in the smuggling business because of their extensive knowledge of the desert and familiarity with crossing it. The historic marginalization of such tribes under Gaddafi's regime also encouraged entry into the smuggling business for the sake of a livelihood (Reitano, 2014).


Members of the Tuareg tribe tend to dominate routes through North Niger and Algeria and into Ghat and Ghadames in Libya. Members of the Tebu tribe are thought to be active on routes through the Tibesti Mountains and on some routes through the western part of Kufra. (Police officers and bor-

der post officials in this area are often Tebu, which likely helps facilitate passage for smugglers.) Members of the Zway tribe are believed to be controlling most of the smuggling routes to the eastern part of Kufra from Sudan and Chad. There has also been some competition between the Zway and the Tebu to control the smuggling routes in and out of Kufra, particularly because the local economy has been so dependent on this business.

There are suggestions that the conflict in Libya that began in 2014 has led to more groups entering the smuggling trade as a way to fund their activities and, as such, migrant smuggling in Libya has also become an indicator for the development of the conflict in general. For example, migrants who were detained in Libya, report that detention centre guards sometimes offered to facilitate their release from detention if they purchased a boat journey to Europe from a smuggler. Others also intimated that they were sometimes put on a boat, when in detention, without having paid the smuggling fee. Moreover, in April 2014, only around 20% of detention centres in Libya were reported to be official detention centres by the Ministry of Interior (IOM, 2015). Such stories suggest that there may be state actors involved in smuggling in Libya and that non-state actors potentially establish migrant detention centres as a way to generate the market for smuggling services.

The Economics of Smuggling

Prior to 2014, journeys to North Africa and from North Africa to Europe could be categorized according to standard prices. In 2014, however, the price of a journey facilitated by a smuggler was dependent upon the nationality of the migrant (Syrian refugees paid higher prices than sub-Saharan African migrants and asylum seekers), the smuggling ring the migrant came into contact with in Libya, and the level of service that the migrant was willing to pay for (at a higher price, a migrant could secure a place on the top deck of the vessel and receive a life jacket). While in 2013, the most expensive journeys were in the vicinity of USD \$6,000, in 2014, they could be up to USD \$20,000. The potential for increased revenue came when a greater number of Syrians entered the market, as they tend to have greater economic means compared with sub-



Own production. Source: WB.

Saharan Africans, and by the general increase in traffic along North African routes in 2014. The GIT-NOC (2015) estimates the migrant trade off the coast of Libya at US \$255 – 323 million per year in Libya alone.

Libya is the most attractive North African country along the Central Mediterranean route because in addition to being a departure point for Europe, it also offers a great deal of employment opportunities

As most migrants do not have enough money for the entire journey from the outset, many work in transit countries along the way. In some cases, a smuggler might allow a migrant to continue the journey, even if they do not have the requisite funds, on the promise that they will pay off their debt to the smuggler at the destination. Such practices often lead to situations of bonded labour and this thereby demonstrates the fine line that exists between smuggling and trafficking. It is also common for smugglers to direct female migrants who are traveling from West Africa to North Africa, and who are out of money, to Arlit (Niger) to work in prostitution rings, which are quite common there, as a way to generate income for the next phase of their journey, which often makes them vulnerable to trafficking.

Also, while migrant smuggling in North Africa has traditionally been linked with trafficking in other commodities, such as weapons, drugs, and subsidized goods, USIP (2014) identifies an increase in the intermingling of migrant smuggling and drug trafficking in recent years.

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Migration in the Mediterranean: Origins and Characteristics

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In 2015, migration by sea in the Mediterranean region made the headlines due to the massive increase in the flow of mixed migrants, mostly Syrian and to a lesser extent Iraqis and Afghanis, through Turkey and on to Greece and the rest of the Balkans. This is commonly referred to as the Eastern route, which itself consists of several entry points at sea and to a lesser extent on land. However, it is important to stress that migrants and refugees also cross other land borders, such as from Syria and Iraq into Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey and from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel into the Maghreb region. Indeed most of the Mediterranean states affected by the migration phenomenon are both transit and destination countries.

This article does not enter into all the issues connected to contemporary migration such as the motivations and push-pull factors that influence migrants' decisions. Nor does it analyze the plethora of human rights issues and political controversy that migration has whipped up. Unless otherwise stated, by 'migrants' we refer to both refugees fleeing danger as well as economic migrants. These are two different categories of people on the move. This text limits itself to the facts by assessing developments across the region in 2015 to provide a 'helicopter' view of a situation which is continuously and rapidly changing. From a Mediterranean and EU standpoint, 2015 was significant due to the enormous, record surge of refugees entering the EU through the southern corridors, as compared to previous years. A total of 1,046,496 entered the EU from the Mediterranean as opposed to 229,430 the previous

year. The year will also be remembered for breaking another record in the number of fatalities at sea: IOM estimates that 3,770 people drowned trying to cross the Mediterranean as compared to the 3,279 reported in 2014 – an increase of 15%. The Central Mediterranean route was the most dangerous, accounting for 77% of fatalities. One last word of caution: any figures quoted may be inaccurate depending on which agency is reporting and the cut-off date. What is more relevant is that the figures quoted approximate to each other and point towards the same trends.

The Traditional Routes

Most of the irregular migrants living in the EU have entered the Union through airports carrying regular travel documentation but have subsequently overstayed their visas. The Mediterranean region is a maritime conduit for irregular migration (Table 1a). Migrants and refugees enter Southern Europe from three directions labelled the Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes. According to FRONTEX, last year, entry through the Western route remained stable, though slightly below the previous year's, and not far from the average annual entries and median for 2010-15. The same cannot be said of the other two routes: the Eastern one saw a dramatic increase from 50,830 to 885,386 – a fact well publicized by the media – while the Central route registered a slight decline from 170,760 in 2014 to 153,946 in 2015, probably because of a shift of movements to the much easier Eastern route. Nevertheless, the Central route is still very important.

The growth in importance of the Eastern route in 2015 is attributable to a number of factors, but pri-

TABLE 1A

Migration through the Mediterranean

Year	Mediterranean Irregular Migrant Routes			Total
	Western	Central	Eastern	
2015	7,164	153,946	885,386	1,046,496
2014	7,840	170,760	50,830	229,430
2013	6,800	40,000	24,800	71,600
2012	6,400	15,900	37,200	59,500
2011	8,450	64,300	55,700	128,450
2010	5,000	4,500	40,000	49,500
Average 2010-15 both years included	6,942	74,901	546,958	
Median	6,982	52,150	45,415	

Source: FRONTEX at <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map>

marily owes to the fact that the route through Turkey, Greece and the Balkans proved to be less hazardous and more direct for the thousands of refugees huddled in camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey who wanted to leave.

Aid to Block Migration

In 2015, the EU doubled its efforts to use its economic aid to secure the cooperation of neighbouring third countries in stopping the migratory flows. This approach is not without precedent. In the Western Mediterranean, following a slow growth in undocumented migrants from Morocco crossing into Spain (including the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla) and from there to the rest of the EU, figures increased substantially leading to an agreement in 2004 for joint naval patrols between Spain and Morocco, tied to a Spanish aid package for Morocco in the region of \$390 million. The same happened in 2009 following the Italo-Libyan Friendship Treaty signed in Benghazi in August 2008, and which provided for joint Libyan-Italian sea patrols to push refugees back to the Libyan coast.

This accord also included annual transfers of US\$200 million from Rome to Tripoli for 25 years through investments in infrastructure in Libya under the guise of a belated reparation for Italy's colonial misdeeds. Apart from providing patrol boats to the depleted Libyan navy, Italy also undertook to construct a radar system to monitor Libya's desert borders and stop migrants entering the country. The agreement reached with Turkey in March 2016 and the creation of the European Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) during the Valletta summit easily tie in to this pattern of behaviour.

Migrant arrivals in the Southern Mediterranean countries of the EU during 2015 are laid out in Table 1b.

The Eastern Route is Holding

The main assumption is that the Agreement signed between the EU and Turkey in March 2016 will have a similar effect to the 2004 Spanish-Morocco accord and the 2008 Italy-Libya Friendship Treaty. It is being anticipated that as Turkey stops migrants from reaching Greece, smugglers and human traffickers will shift to the Central Mediterranean route.

TABLE 1B

Migrant Arrivals in Southern EU Member States in 2015

Country	By Sea	By Land	Total
Greece	853,650	3,713	857,363
Bulgaria	0	31,174	31,174
Italy	153,842	0	153,842
Spain	3,845	0	3,845
Malta	106	0	106
Cyprus	269	0	269
Total	1,011,712	34,887	1,046,599

Source: IOM, *Mixed Migration flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond, Compilation of Available Data and Information*, 2015, (Cut-off date for the data 21.12.2015) at <http://doe.iom.int/docs/Flows%20Compilation%202015%20Overview.pdf>

TABLE 2

Irregular Migration in the First Five Months of 2016

	Country	Arrivals	
		1 Jan-25 May 2016	1 Jan-25 May 2015
Eastern Route	Greece	156,157	40,297
Eastern Route	Cyprus	28	269
Central Route	Italy	37,363	47,449
Western Route	Spain*	1,063	3,845
	Total	194,611	91,860

* Figures up to end of March. Source: International Organization of Migration

Austria is taking special precautions in case this were to happen by strengthening its borders around the Brenner Pass, provoking a serious dispute with Italy.

The data released so far for the first five months of 2016, shown in Table 2, indicate that the situation on both the Central and Eastern routes remains critical. However, on the Eastern route, FRONTEX reports that, “the number of migrants arriving on the Greek islands in April plunged by 90% compared to the previous month, reaching fewer than 2,700.”¹ This drop in migrant flows occurred after the EU-Turkey Agreement. The figures in Table 2 show an increasing trend in migrant movements in the first five months of 2016, but as long as the Eastern route remains locked, the pressure on the Central route will increase. IOM assessments show that the presence of Syrians in Libya is increasing and human smugglers and traffickers may take advantage of the absence of rule of law to operate with impunity. This is another crucial reason why Libya needs to be stabilized.

Fatalities in the Mediterranean

According to IOM, 3,770 fatalities were reported in the Mediterranean in 2015, a 15% increase on 2014. Of these, 2,892 or just under 77% of all fatalities, occurred in the Central Mediterranean, 806 in the Eastern part and 72 in the Western Mediterranean. April was the deadliest month of the year with 1,244 fatalities.

Composition of Migrants Arriving in the EU

The composition of the migrants arriving in the EU via Italy (Central route) and Greece (Eastern route) in 2015 are very different. Table 3 shows that the nationality of the migrants moving through both routes are very different. African migrants predominate in the Central route, particularly from the Sub-Saharan countries, while Syrians and to a lesser extent Afghanis and Iraqis predominate along the Eastern route.

As for gender, UNHCR reports that 58% of the 2015 arrivals were men, 17% women and 25% children (gender not specified). The arrival of predominantly male migrants may indicate that many of them may be blazing the trail to Europe alone, for the rest of their families to join them later. UNHCR figures appear to support this, for they show that in the first quarter of 2016 the gender composition of the flows began to change: 47% of the 130,110 arrivals by sea were men, 20% women and 34% children.

Asylum data shows that between 2014 and 2016, more men than women applied for asylum across the EU. According to UNICEF, more than one in five refugees who arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean in 2015 were children, who are considered to be the most vulnerable category in such flows. There is also a growing trend of unaccompanied and separated children (UASCs) but “it is very difficult to obtain accurate numbers for unaccompanied and separated children, as formal registration procedures in some countries in Europe do not allow for their identification.”²

¹ FRONTEX Press Release, “Number of migrants arriving in Greece dropped 90% in April,” <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/number-of-migrants-arriving-in-greece-dropped-90-in-april-6e7oBw>

² IOM and UNICEF, November 2015.

TABLE 3 Country of Origin of Migrants Arriving in the EU by Sea through Greece and Italy in 2015

ITALY		GREECE	
Country of Origin	As a Percentage of the total	Country of Origin	As a Percentage of the total
Eritrea	25.5	Libya	0.4
Nigeria	14.5	Burkina Faso	0.3
Somalia	8.1	Guinea Bissau	0.3
Sudan	5.8	Benin	0.3
Gambia	5.5	Togo	0.2
Syria	4.8	Algeria	0.2
Senegal	3.9	Sierra Leone	0.2
Mali	3.8	Comoros	0.2
Bangladesh	3.3	Chad	0.1
Morocco	3.0	Congo	0.1
Ghana	2.9	Niger	0.1
Ivory Coast	2.5	Liberia	0.1
Ethiopia	1.7	Iran	0.1
Guinea	1.7	Afghanistan	0.1
Egypt	1.7	Other (26 countries)	0.3
Pakistan	1.3	Unidentified	4.6
Occ. Palestinian T.	1.1		
Iraq	0.6		
Tunisia	0.6		
Cameroon	0.4		
Total	153,842		853,650

Source: International Organization for Migration

Where migrants' qualifications are concerned, very little is known yet about the 2015 arrivals. According to the OECD, contrary to public perception, refugees tend to have higher skill levels than the population they left behind. However, there are variations across countries of origin and destination and across migration waves. Among the recently arrived Syrian nationals, the share of people with a post-secondary diploma appears to be much higher. In 2014 in Sweden, more than 40% of Syrians had at least upper secondary education, compared to 20% of Afghans and 10% of Eritreans. Germany does not systematically record the qualifications of asylum seekers, but they are asked on a voluntary basis about their education and occupational skills during the application procedure. On average, of those who arrived in 2014, 15% had a tertiary degree, 16% had upper secondary education (*Gymnasium*), 35% lower secondary education, 24% attended only primary school and 11% had not attended school at all.

Syrian refugees, however, were on average better educated: 21% of those arriving in 2013 through to September 2014 said that they had attended university, 22% had received upper secondary education and 47% had obtained either lower secondary or primary education. Data for France (ELI-PA), in 2010, show that 14% of all refugees had attained tertiary educational level and 43% at least secondary education. The percentage of tertiary educated was slightly higher for those coming from Europe (20%) and lower for those originating from Sub-Saharan Africa (10%). From this perspective, while Europe may have gained from migration, the countries of origin have lost.³

EU Action

The 2015 migration surge raised a lot of debate in the EU, particularly after the April fatalities off the Libyan coast, which intensified in September when

³ OECD, *Migration Policy Debates*, No 7, September, 2015, www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf

the German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced her 'open door' policy. Commission Proposals for burden sharing were resisted and some Member States invested a considerable amount of energy in securing borders to stop the migrant flows, particularly secondary movements from Greece and Italy through the Western Balkans. Internal dissonance weakened consensus in the EU and undermined the Schengen Agreement. In September, Hungary sealed off its border with Serbia, and the Council of the EU approved a relocation plan for 66,000 migrants from Italy and Greece, despite opposition from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.

During the Special Meeting of the EU Council of 23 April, which met a few days after the incident off the Libyan coast and the death of around 800 migrants, a number of decisions were taken affecting the Central Mediterranean. It was decided to launch Common Security and Defence Policy - CSDP operations to disrupt smugglers' networks, to triple the budgetary aid to the Triton (started 2014) and Poseidon (started 2006) missions respectively in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean and to seek stronger cooperation with third countries and the EU's partners. An EU-Africa summit on migration was convened, which eventually met in Malta on the 11-12 November 2015. At this summit the €1.8-billion EUTF was launched to finance projects in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel in order to address the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. At the Valletta summit, the EU sought African agreement to accept returned migrants in exchange for projects financed from the Trust. This proposal was strongly criticized by the African leaders.

In line with the European Agenda on Migration, an extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted the decision on 14 September to relocate 40,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU Member States. Eight days later, another Extraordinary Home Affairs Council added a further 120,000 refugees for relocation.

These decisions followed the European Commission's May and September 2015 proposals, which for the first time were based on Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).⁴

Operation Sophia

The EU's Operation Sophia in the Central Mediterranean operates along the lines of the FRONTEX led Operation Triton which replaced the Italian Operation Mare Nostrum, (2013-14) which had become too expensive to be handled by Italy alone. Triton was launched on 1 November 2014, but the level of naval assets placed at its disposal were much lower than what Italy had deployed in Mare Nostrum. Notwithstanding this, when Triton was launched, FRONTEX declared that "We are very satisfied with the response of the Member States which contributed generously with their technical equipment and experts..."⁵

Following the April 2015 migrant tragedy off the coast of Libya, with the loss of 800 lives at sea, the EU Council decided to triple the budgets of Triton and Poseidon until 2016 to upgrade Triton to the level of Mare Nostrum.

Then, on the 18 May 2015, the EU Council decided to launch EUNAVFOR-Med or Operation Sophia. Its main objective was to disrupt smugglers and not to rescue migrants, though this was also included in its mandate. 21 countries contributed naval forces to this operation. This was the first operation that expressly linked the internal and external EU security agendas. Due to the absence of an effective government in Libya, Operation Sophia can only operate in international waters and enter Libyan territorial waters when permitted by Tripoli. Sophia has been strongly criticized in a 2016 report published by the British House of Lords as having failed to reduce the flow of migrants, and the number of arrests made have largely been of low-level operators.

⁴ Article 78(3): "In the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament."

⁵ FRONTEX Launches Joint Operation Triton, <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-launches-joint-operation-triton-JSYpL7>

TABLE 4

People of Concern and Migrant Stock in Southern Mediterranean Countries

	People of Concern 2016 (UNHCR)				Migrant Stock IOM 2015
	Refugees	Asylum Seekers	Others	Total	
Mashreq and Turkey					
Egypt	217,000	32,000	24	249,024	0.49m
Lebanon	1,368,000	29,000	7,000	1,404,000	2.0m
Iraq	3,000,000 IDPs 386,151 refugees	18,550	667,000*	4,071,701	0.35m
Jordan	730,709	48,491	0	779,200	3.11m
Syria	8,420,786 IDPs 99,252 refugees	8,569	160,000	8,969,061	0.88m
Turkey	2,794,002	314,157	1,086	3,109,245	3.0m
Maghreb					
Algeria	94,155	10,535	0	104,690	0.24m
Libya	200,000 IDPs 100,000 Returned IDPs 15,000 refugees 15,000 returned refugees	31,300	0	361,800	0.77m
Mauritania	50,980 refugees 26,000 refugee-like 1,500 returned refugees	120		78,600	0.14m
Morocco	na	na	na	na	0.09m
Tunisia	1,779	80	0	1,859	0.06m

Notes: *Stateless, Returned IDPs and Returned refugees. Source: IOM migrant stocks from DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, *International Migration Report 2015 – Highlights*, published, UN, New York, 2016 at www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015_Highlights.pdf Table in the Annex, pages 28-30; UNHCR statistics from the Agency's "Global Focus."

The Agreement with Turkey

On the 16 October 2015, the EU announced the main principles of an agreement with Turkey to seal off the Eastern borders. This was followed by a 17-point action plan for the Western Balkans, agreed by EU leaders on 25 October, which included a decision to refuse entry to third country nationals who did not qualify for or refused to apply for international protection.

The EU-Turkey agreement, eventually announced on 18 March 2016, bound Turkey to adopting measures to close sea and land routes to the EU, in return for which it would be provided with an initial €3-billion aid package for 2018 to help it cope with the pressure of migrants on its territory. The EU promised a visa liberalization roadmap for Turkish citizens by June 2016. The stalled EU-Turkey membership negotiations were reopened. From the 20 March, new irregular migrants and asylum seekers crossing from Turkey, whose applications were declared inadmissible, were to be returned to Turkey. For every Syrian returned to Turkey, another Syrian would be resettled in the EU from Turkey.

Situation in the Southern EU Neighbours

Migration strongly impacts all the EU's southern neighbours. The scale of the challenge is captured in Table 4 which shows the number of refugees and the migrant stock recorded by IOM and UNHCR in this region. UNHCR refers to people of concern while the IOM published migrant stocks in the countries. The lack of a solution to the Syrian conflict is the most important source of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. From this 'pool' of people came the migrants who reached Europe in 2015. The situation in the Maghreb is different, except for Libya where the population of concern and migrant stock remains relatively high in comparison to its population and the other countries of the Maghreb.

The link between the longer-term effects of migration and economic growth has been illustrated several times. But there is no doubt that by supporting Syrian refugees on their territories, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey are incurring huge costs in terms of the provision of essential services such as education and healthcare. The World Bank estimates

that the influx of more than 630,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan has cost it more than US\$2.5 billion a year.⁶ This amounts to 6% of GDP, and a quarter of the government's annual revenues. The Turkish government has spent an estimated €7 billion on hosting refugees since the start of the Syrian crisis. This figure does not include the refugees who live in urban areas outside government control. A World Bank study claims that the "overall costs borne by the respective governments (hosting refugees and asylum seekers) continue to be very high."⁷

The societies of the host countries feel the pressure in other ways such as increased competition in the labour and housing markets. In these societies, where unemployment rates are already high, competition in the labour market leads to lower wage rates and the exploitation of the local and migrant work force and contributes to stabilizing unemployment at a high rate. In Lebanon and Jordan, migrants find it difficult to work legally. Lebanon is reluctant to issue work permits and in Jordan a work permit can only be obtained if the applicant can produce a legal passport – which many Syrian refugees cannot. Hence, many refugees are forced to work illegally.

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⁶ WORLD BANK, *By the Numbers: The Cost of War & Peace in the Middle East*, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/02/03/by-the-numbers-the-cost-of-war-and-peace-in-mena>

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L'extrémisme violent

Les réseaux djihadistes après la chute du pseudo-califat de Daech

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« L'Etat islamique en Irak et au Levant », connu sous son acronyme arabe de Daech, a été proclamé en avril 2013 dans la ville syrienne de Raqqa, sous la direction d'Abou Bakr al-Baghdad¹. En juin 2014, Daech s'empare en quelques jours de Mossoul, la deuxième cité d'Irak, et, peu après, Baghdadi s'y arroge spectaculairement la dignité de « calife ». Daech organise son assise territoriale en différentes « provinces »², terme aussi utilisé pour désigner ses filiales en nombre croissant. Daech a perdu Mossoul, en juin 2017, après neuf mois de la plus importante bataille urbaine depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale. Cette chute a été suivie de la reconquête de Raqqa, détruite par les combats à 80 %.

Daech ne contrôle plus désormais de territoire entre la Syrie et l'Irak où avait prospéré durant trois ans son pseudo-califat. La menace djihadiste demeure cependant sérieuse, du fait des réseaux que Daech continue d'animer et d'inspirer. Afin de mieux saisir cette réalité en constante évolution, une approche en trois parties sera suivie : d'abord, le suivi des « vétérans français du jihad mondialisé »³, qui avaient été étudiés dans un article d'un précédent annuaire IEMed de la Méditerranée ; ensuite, le cas d'école de la « Province du Sinaï » de Daech, qui ne cesse de se développer depuis la chute du pseudo-califat ; enfin, la situation en Libye d'où des réseaux ont pu être organisés en direction de la Tunisie voisine, mais aussi de l'Europe.

La fin des « vétérans » français

Boubaker al-Hakim, fondateur dès 2003 de la « filière des Buttes-Chaumont », active entre la France, la Syrie et l'Irak, a été le maître à penser des frères Chérif et Saïd Kouachi, auteurs de la tuerie de *Charlie Hebdo* (12 morts), en janvier 2015 à Paris. Il avait alors intégré la hiérarchie opérationnelle de Daech⁴ sous le nom de guerre d'Abou Mouqatel. En novembre 2016, Hakim est tué dans une frappe américaine sur Raqqa. Il rejoint ainsi la désormais longue liste des « vétérans » français éliminés, les uns après les autres, dans des bombardements de la coalition anti-Daech constituée sous l'égide des Etats-Unis : Salah Gourmat, propagandiste très actif dans la jihadosphère sous le pseudonyme d'« Ichigo Turn » ; Rachid Marghich, Wissem al-Mokhtari et Walid Hamam, tous trois originaires de Trappes et proches des kamikazes du Bataclan ; Charaffe al-Mouadan, lui aussi lié aux terroristes du Bataclan ; Macreme Abrougui, inspirateur d'une tentative d'attentat, heureusement avortée, contre une église à Villejuif, en avril 2015. En revanche, Salim Benghalem, qui accueillait les « volontaires » français de Daech sous le nom d'Abou Mohammed, aurait échappé à plusieurs tentatives de liquidation. Il a été condamné par contumace, en janvier 2016 en France, à 15 ans de prison pour sa contribution à l'envoi en Syrie de djihadistes du Val-de-Marne en 2012-13. Il avait aussi été identifié comme un des geôliers des otages français détenus par Daech en 2013-14. L'enquête sur les attentats du 13 novembre 2015 à Paris et Saint-Denis (130 morts, outre les 7 terroristes) avait mis en relief son

1 Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi est le pseudonyme d'Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai, né en 1971, non loin de la ville irakienne de Samarra.

2 Le mot arabe pour « province » est *wilaya*.

3 FILIU, JEAN-PIERRE. « Les Vétérans français du jihad mondialisé », *Annuaire IEMed de la Méditerranée 2016*. Barcelone : IEMed 2016, pp.45-49. www.iemed.org/observatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2016/IEMED_MedYearBook_Veterans_djihad_mondialise_Filiu.pdf

4 La branche de Daech chargée des attentats à l'étranger est désignée sous le terme générique d'*Emni*, soit « Sécurité ».

rôle de commanditaire. De même, Fabien Clain, qui avait revendiqué ces attentats au nom de Daech, a diffusé un message audio en janvier 2018 et serait donc toujours en fuite.

Quant à Thomas Barnouin, condamné à 15 ans de prison par contumace pour sa participation à une « filière » djihadiste, il a été capturé en décembre 2017 par les milices kurdes⁵ qui contrôlent le Nord-Est de la Syrie. Son sort, comme celui de ses deux compatriotes également détenus par les YPG, Romain Garnier et Thomas Collange, pose de délicats problèmes juridiques : la France ne saurait reconnaître l'autorité, et encore moins le jugement, d'une milice, à la différence de l'Etat irakien dont elle accepte les décisions de justice (la peine de mort étant en vigueur en Irak, la ministre française de la Justice a envisagé d'intervenir si celle-ci venait à être prononcée contre un ressortissant français).

De manière générale, la France a tout fait pour éviter le retour sur son territoire de djihadistes complices d'attentats ou auteurs de crimes de sang. Mais les cas de Bengahem et de Clain, entre autres, prouvent que des terroristes confirmés ont pu échapper à la fois aux frappes de la coalition et aux milices alliées à celle-ci. Certes, la France n'a pas connu d'attentat depuis le meurtre d'un policier sur les Champs-Élysées, le 20 avril 2017. Daech avait revendiqué cet attentat, en diffusant cependant une fausse identité du terroriste, ce qui révélait moins une responsabilité opérationnelle qu'une récupération opportuniste. Les coups terribles infligés à Daech par la coalition occidentale, et a fortiori la libération de Mossoul, puis de Raqqa, ont indéniablement affaibli les réseaux djihadistes et leur capacité à frapper la France et ses voisins européens. Cet affaiblissement très sensible n'équivaut pourtant pas à une extinction d'une telle menace terroriste.

Il convient en effet de rappeler que la « victoire » contre ce qui n'était alors que « l'Etat islamique en Irak » avait déjà été proclamée en 2011. Les politiques sectaires menées par les régimes en place à Bagdad et à Damas, à l'encontre de la population sunnite, avaient cependant permis à « l'Etat islamique » de se reconstituer en Syrie, puis en Irak, jusqu'à l'apogée de son pseudo-califat. Or ces mêmes populations sunnites sont toujours exclues et marginalisées, voire

Un retour de flamme de Daech, nourri du ressentiment sunnite et de l'absence de réelle reconstruction à Mossoul et à Raqqa, est tout à fait envisageable dans les prochaines années

réprimées, là où la coalition occidentale a choisi de s'appuyer sur des partenaires majoritairement chiites en Irak et kurdes en Syrie. Les mêmes causes produisant les mêmes effets, un retour de flamme de Daech, nourri du ressentiment sunnite et de l'absence de réelle reconstruction à Mossoul et à Raqqa, est tout à fait envisageable dans les prochaines années. D'autant que « l'Etat islamique » ne comptait plus que 700 combattants en 2011 contre dix fois plus entre la Syrie et l'Irak aujourd'hui. En outre, les filiales de Daech n'ont jamais été aussi actives, à commencer par sa « Province du Sinaï ».

Des djihadistes enracinés au Sinaï

La péninsule largement désertique du Sinaï ne compte que six cents mille habitants, dont les deux tiers sont des Bédouins rattachés à une quinzaine de tribus (le tiers restant se répartit entre « Egyptiens de la vallée du Nil » et Palestiniens). C'est le ressentiment de cette population bédouine à l'encontre d'une armée égyptienne perçue comme une troupe d'occupation qui a favorisé le développement à partir de 2011 des Partisans de Jérusalem (Ansar Beit-Maqdis / ABM). Ce groupe djihadiste, lié à la contrebande d'armes avec Gaza, s'est consolidé dans l'oasis de Sheikh Zuwayd, située entre Al-Arich et Rafah. L'extrême brutalité de la répression égyptienne, et surtout les châtiments collectifs qui l'ont accompagnée, n'ont fait qu'élargir la base de cette guérilla fondamentalement bédouine et locale. Le général Abdelfattah Sissi a renversé en juillet 2013 le seul président démocratiquement élu de l'histoire de l'Égypte, le Frère musulman Mohammed Morsi, dont la gestion calamiteuse avait jeté des millions d'Egyptiens dans les rues. Sissi, promu

⁵ Il s'agit des Unités de protection du peuple (YPG), la branche syrienne du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), elles-mêmes intégrées aux Forces démocratiques syriennes (FDS), soutenues par la coalition occidentale

ensuite maréchal, avant d'abandonner ses titres militaires lors de son accession à la présidence, en mai 2014, accuse l'ensemble de ses opposants de « terrorisme », qu'ils soient islamistes, laïcs ou nationalistes. L'escalade de la répression a, selon un processus déjà à l'œuvre dans d'autres pays arabes, nourri une poussée aux extrêmes djihadistes. Mais, à la différence du régime Assad, dont les jeux troubles ont **directement** alimenté la montée en puissance de Daech, c'est l'inefficacité patente de l'armée égyptienne qui est **indirectement** responsable de l'enracinement djihadiste dans le Sinaï.

ABM a perpétré, le 24 octobre 2014, une des plus sanglantes de ses opérations, avec trente membres des forces de sécurité tués et au moins un char M60 détruit. Le Sinaï, décrété zone militaire, est interdit à la presse, elle-même sanctionnée si elle contredit les bilans officiels de l'armée. Deux semaines plus tard, les djihadistes égyptiens prêtaient allégeance à Daech, dont ils devenaient officiellement la « Province du Sinaï ». Le régime Sissi, engagé dans une campagne tous azimuts contre le « terrorisme », s'avéra incapable de regagner le soutien d'une partie au moins des Bédouins du Sinaï pour les détourner de Daech. Bien au contraire, les destructions méthodiques d'agglomérations entières ont déraciné des milliers de personnes, devenues encore plus vulnérables au recrutement djihadiste. C'est notamment le cas dans la partie égyptienne de Rafah, une ville séparée en deux, avec une partie palestinienne de l'autre côté de la frontière, dans la bande de Gaza.

La « Province du Sinaï » a mené, le 1er juillet 2015, une vingtaine d'attaques coordonnées contre les forces de sécurité. Le bilan officiel de 21 morts était très certainement sous-évalué et des sources sur le terrain parlaient de 70 tués dans les rangs gouvernementaux. Deux semaines plus tard, un navire de la marine égyptienne était coulé en Méditerranée par un missile djihadiste. Le 31 octobre, 224 personnes périrent dans la destruction au-dessus du Sinaï d'un avion russe de la compagnie Metrojet. Malgré la revendication par la « Province du Sinaï », il faudra plusieurs jours à Moscou et plusieurs mois au Caire pour accepter la réalité de l'attaque terroriste. L'avion a de fait été piégé par Daech avant son décollage de l'aéroport de Charm al-Cheikh, une des dernières destinations touristiques encore populaires en Égypte. L'impact de cet attentat sur un secteur déjà sinistré fut terrible.

Daech se tourna ensuite contre la minorité copte du Sinaï, contrainte par une campagne d'assassinats à abandonner ses foyers pour se réfugier ailleurs en Égypte. Ce n'était pourtant que le début d'une vague de terrorisme anti-copte que Daech a poursuivie jusqu'au Caire (25 morts, le 15 décembre 2016), à Alexandrie et dans le delta du Nil (44 morts lors du Dimanche des Rameaux 2017) : des églises ont à chaque fois été frappées par des attentats-suicides, même si le patriarche copte, visé par l'explosion d'Alexandrie, en est sorti indemne. Les rododromes de Sissi et de ses généraux ne se traduisaient donc pas par un recul de Daech dans le Sinaï, mais par une extension de la violence djihadiste au reste du territoire égyptien.

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La pire tuerie de l'histoire contemporaine de l'Égypte a été perpétrée par Daech, le 24 novembre 2017, dans une mosquée du Nord-Sinaï, à Bir al-Abed. Pas moins de 311 personnes y ont été massacrées par des commandos djihadistes qui avaient encerclé le bâtiment en pleine prière du vendredi. La liberté de mouvement des bourreaux a tellement choqué que Sissi a exigé le rétablissement de la sécurité dans le Sinaï dans un délai de trois mois, un ultimatum évidemment impossible à tenir. Le bain de sang visait une communauté d'inspiration soufie, dont le mysticisme est jugé « hérétique » par Daech. Mais il frappait aussi des Bédouins apparemment tentés par une forme de collaboration avec l'armée. Daech rappelait ainsi par ce carnage que les forces de sécurité, bien en peine de se protéger elles-mêmes dans le Sinaï, étaient incapables de garantir la vie d'éventuels partenaires locaux.

La progression apparemment inexorable de la terreur djihadiste dans le Sinaï a permis à Daech de s'enraciner dans une région stratégique, au carrefour de l'Afrique et de l'Asie, alors même que son pseudo-

Le Sinaï est devenu aujourd'hui le plus dangereux abcès de fixation djihadiste au sud de la Méditerranée

califat s'effondrait en Syrie et en Irak. Un conflit autour de la bande de Gaza, comme en novembre 2012 ou à l'été 2014, risquerait cette fois de s'étendre au Sinaï en cas de provocation djihadiste. Ce scénario-catastrophe est pris suffisamment au sérieux en Israël pour entraîner d'ores et déjà une intervention discrète en soutien au régime Sissi : le « *New York Times* » a révélé que, en 2016-17, une centaine de frappes, généralement par drones, ont été menées par Israël contre des cibles djihadistes dans le Sinaï, soit un rythme moyen d'une frappe hebdomadaire⁶. Cette assistance aussi officieuse que substantielle n'a pourtant pas permis aux forces armées égyptiennes de reprendre la main dans le Sinaï, devenu aujourd'hui le plus dangereux abcès de fixation djihadiste au sud de la Méditerranée.

Le nœud libyen

La situation est paradoxalement moins préoccupante dans la Libye toujours déchirée que dans l'Égypte à la botte de Sissi. Elle reste cependant d'autant plus inquiétante que Daech compte en Libye trois « provinces » correspondant aux divisions historiques entre la Tripolitaine, la Cyrénaïque et le Fezzan. Les partisans de Baghdadi ont d'abord pris pied en 2014 à Derna, en Cyrénaïque, profitant sur place des réseaux actifs dans l'envoi de « volontaires » vers la Syrie et l'Irak. Ils ont ensuite mis en scène, avec leur sadisme habituel, la décapitation de 21 Coptes égyptiens, en février 2015, sur une plage de Tripolitaine. Ils ont alors établi un camp d'entraînement à Sabratha, non loin de la frontière tunisienne. Ce furent d'ailleurs des terroristes tunisiens formés dans ce camp qui frappèrent le musée du Bardo à Tunis (22 morts, le 18 mars 2015) et une plage de Sousse (39 morts, dont 30 Britanniques, le 26 juin 2015). Boubaker al-Hakim, dont on a vu le rôle dans les attentats de Daech en France, portait aussi une responsabilité dans ces tueries, car ce Franco-Tunisien avait en 2011-13 organisé un groupe djihadiste en

Tunisie, visée depuis la Libye par Daech comme la France l'était depuis la Syrie.

L'affrontement entre les deux gouvernements concurrents de Tripoli et de Tobrouk n'a pu que favoriser l'implantation de Daech. Le seigneur de la guerre Khalifa Haftar, maître de Tobrouk, se rêverait tellement en émule égyptien de Sissi qu'il lui a emprunté son titre de « maréchal ». Comme en Égypte, la stigmatisation de toute opposition comme « terroriste » fait le jeu des terroristes avérés. Daech parvint ainsi à s'emparer de Syrte, à mi-chemin entre Tripoli et Tobrouk, puis à contrôler une bande côtière au centre du pays. Cette emprise territoriale compensait très largement la destruction du camp de Sabratha dans un bombardement américain, en février 2016. Haftar préférait étendre son influence jusqu'au « Croissant pétrolier » du Golfe de Syrte, par où transite l'essentiel des exportations d'hydrocarbures, que d'affronter directement Daech. Ce furent donc les milices de Misrata, loyales au « gouvernement d'union nationale » mis en place par l'ONU, qui se lancèrent dans la bataille de Syrte, libérée de Daech au prix de très lourdes pertes en décembre 2016.

Les partisans de Baghdadi avaient donc perdu leur assise territoriale en Libye avant même de la perdre en Syrie et en Irak. Mais ils avaient été en mesure, dans l'intervalle, d'impulser une dynamique nouvelle à des réseaux destinés à frapper l'Europe. Des documents de Daech saisis à Syrte ont ainsi révélé l'existence d'une cellule djihadiste à Milan, la ville où le Tunisien Anis Amri a été abattu par la police, le 23 décembre 2016, quatre jours après avoir écrasé 12 personnes sur un marché de Noël à Berlin. L'incroyable cavale d'Amri, signalé, après l'attentat, à Amsterdam, Bruxelles et Lyon, n'a pas livré tous ses secrets. Il est en revanche certain qu'Amri communiquait avec des djihadistes tunisiens en Libye. La connexion libyenne est encore plus forte dans le cas de Salman Abedi, auteur d'un attentat-suicide en plein concert à Manchester (22 morts, le 22 mai 2017) : le terroriste, ressortissant britannique d'origine libyenne, avait, lors de séjours dans le pays de naissance de ses parents, noué des relations avec Daech à Tripoli et à Sabratha.

A la différence de la « Province du Sinaï », toujours encadrée par des Bédouins locaux, Daech a été en

⁶ DAVID KIRKPATRICK. « Secret alliance : Israel carries out strikes in Egypt, with Cairo's OK », *New York Times*, 3 février 2018.

Libye pris en mains par des commissaires politiques dépêchés par Baghdadi. L'internationalisation de cette branche libyenne, ainsi que les multiples facilités de transit par la côte ou par la Tunisie, expliquent ainsi l'importance des réseaux animés depuis la Libye sur le continent européen. La perte par Daech de Sabratha, et surtout de Syrte, a cependant contraint les djihadistes à se replier vers le Sud désertique de la Libye, affaiblissant d'autant leurs capacités de projection vers l'Europe. On ne peut qu'espérer que cet affaiblissement soit durable, même si toute victoire définitive contre Daech en Libye reste subordonnée à l'établissement d'autorités enfin légitimes sur l'ensemble du pays.

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Le débat actuel en Europe reste très polarisé sur la question du retour des djihadistes engagés au Moyen-Orient, d'un ordre de grandeur de 5 000 pour l'Europe occidentale, avec 1 500 déjà revenus⁷. Mais aucun des attentats de Daech qui ont frappé l'Europe en 2017 n'a été perpétré par un « vétéran » rentré de Syrie ou d'Irak. Une analyse de ces réseaux djihadistes en profonde mutation se doit de rappeler une triste

évidence : des cellules dormantes, implantées de longue date, peuvent tout autant semer la terreur que des djihadistes infiltrés ou commandités depuis le Moyen-Orient. Telle est la tragique leçon des attentats de Barcelone et de Cambrils (15 morts les 17 et 18 août 2017) qui ont mobilisé une cellule forte de douze terroristes. En outre, le fait que l'Espagne ne participe pas à la coalition anti-Daech n'a pas épargné sa population, ce qui invalide une fois de plus l'interprétation des attentats de Daech comme « représailles » à des frappes occidentales. La « campagne d'Europe » qu'a lancée Daech en mai 2014, avec l'attaque du musée juif de Bruxelles (4 morts), n'est sans doute pas close, même si le « califat de la terreur » de Baghdadi a disparu comme entité constituée. L'impératif d'une authentique politique européenne de l'anti-terrorisme n'en demeure que plus urgent.

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⁷ ERIC SCHMITT. « Thousands of ISIS fighters flee to Syria, many to fight another day », *New York Times*, 4 février 2018.

The Evolution of Terrorist Financing Methodologies and Responses

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Although the cost of an individual terrorist attack may be small, terrorist organizations rely on a steady flow of funds to support operational costs, including salaries, training, transportation, recruitment and even propaganda. Terrorist organizations are funded in a variety of ways including by wealthy backers, through crime – whether fraud, extortion or narcotics trafficking—as well as state sponsorship. As jihadist terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and more recently the so-called Islamic State (IS), have established global networks of affiliates, their methods of financing have also diversified. A number of dynamics underlie these changes, including counterterrorism efforts broadly and counterterrorist financing efforts specifically, but also the breakdown of political systems and the proliferation of weak and ungoverned spaces that have allowed terrorist organizations to increasingly hold territory, tax and extort the local population, and even control natural resource extraction and sales.

The Islamic State

When the Islamic State took over vast swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq in the spring and summer of 2014, it posed an unprecedented and nontraditional counterterrorist financing challenge, due both to the size of its budget—reportedly close to \$2 billion in 2014—and its ability to derive the vast majority of its

revenues from the territory it controls. The Islamic State did not develop this expertise overnight. Over a decade, its predecessors, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State in Iraq, developed a sophisticated system of financial management, even taking the strategic decision in 2009, according to documents recovered in Iraq¹, to derive revenues locally to avoid foreign dependence and direction. During the second part of the last decade, AQI resembled an organized-crime organization, engaging in sales of stolen goods, black market fuel sales and later, large scale extortion.

In Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State effectively took advantage of multiple preexisting dynamics to enrich itself quickly after taking territory. These included a high concentration of natural resources and established smuggling networks needed to monetize them; a sizable population and sufficient economic activity to tax and extort; and opportunities to loot valuable goods, including machinery and weapons, as well as bank branches, from which it is reported to have taken as much as \$500 million.

Despite the Islamic State's early prosperity, its considerable expenses created vulnerabilities that the US-led Counter ISIS Coalition, along with the government of Iraq, have effectively exploited. For example, in August 2015, the Iraqi government cut off salaries to employees in ISIS-controlled territories, thereby cutting ISIS revenue from the taxation of the salaries and reducing liquidity in IS-controlled territory. In late 2015, the Coalition also began to use airstrikes to target and degrade ISIS-controlled oil extraction, refining and transportation. However, perhaps the greatest impact on IS's bottom line has been, and will continue to be, territorial losses which

¹ JOHNSTON, Patrick B.; JACOB N. SHAPIRO; HOWARD SHATZ; BENJAMIN BAHNEY; DANIELLE F. JUNG; PATRICK RYAN and JONATHAN WALLACE. *Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html.

mean fewer local resources—including people—under its control to tax and extort.

As the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq loses additional territory and reverts to an insurgency, it will likely return to many of the fundraising methodologies deployed by AQI, including potentially a renewed focus on kidnapping for ransom as journalists and humanitarian workers return to recently liberated areas. Likewise, as IS backs away from the mantra of “remaining and expanding,” it encourages followers to undertake attacks locally rather than travelling to fight in the Levant. Small cells, like foreign terrorist fighters, often self-fund through legitimate sources such as employment income, social assistance or family support as well as through illicit sources such as fraudulent bank loans or other forms of fraud. Despite recognizable typologies, such transactions can be hard for law enforcement to spot with specific intelligence due to the relatively small amount of funds being moved. Likewise, exploitation of related financial intelligence can be a valuable source for network analysis.

Islamic State Provinces

The Islamic State’s recognition of franchises in eight countries across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia in November 2014, raised concerns that the so-called IS core in Syria and Iraq would share both its wealth and its fundraising expertise with its new affiliates. The groups that pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, most of which were preexisting organizations, already had pre-existing funding mechanisms. The provinces’ forerunners were primarily locally financed through crime, smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom; they generated significant revenue but were unable to support and sustain a state-building project like that of the Islamic State.

Some of the IS provinces were undoubtedly motivated to affiliate themselves with the Islamic State based on the perception (and sometimes the promise) of additional resources. There is limited public evidence that IS in Syria and Iraq has been able to share funds with such provinces. What is available points to the

important role of the IS province in Libya in acting as a regional hub, prior to IS being pushed out of Sirte in December 2016. Notably, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a suspected organizer of IS attacks in France and Belgium, is reported to have had contacts with IS members in Libya related to financial and travel issues on behalf of the “Verviers cell,” which was disrupted by Belgian police in early 2015.²

Al-Qaeda

The Taliban in Afghanistan was an important source of support and safe haven for al-Qaeda in the late 1990s. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda’s primary source of funds was external donations funnelled largely through charitable fronts. While external donations continue to play a role in financing for a number of al-Qaeda affiliates, most have pursued more diverse funding streams and are increasingly deriving funds locally. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, for example, is estimated to have received close to \$100 million in ransoms through kidnapping for ransom between 2008 and 2014.³

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The primary exception is al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as Fateh al-Sham or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has likely become more reliant on external financing since its split with what was then the Islamic State of Iraq in April 2013 and lost access to oil fields in the east and northeast of Syria when they were taken over by the Islamic State in 2014. The group’s budget could be in tens of millions of dollars a year, according to the US Treasury,⁴ with as much as a few million dollars a year coming from private networks

² BRISARD, Jean-Charles and JACKSON, Kevin. “The Islamic State’s External Operations and the French-Belgian Nexus.” *CTC Sentinel* Vol: 9, Is: 11, November/December 2016.

³ CALLIMACHI, Rukmini. “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror.” *New York Times*, 29 July, 2014.

⁴ MAGNEY, Nicole and Paul CRUICKSHANK “A View from the CT Foxhole: Adam Szubin, Acting Under-Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Dept. of Treasury.” *CTC Sentinel* Vol.9, Is.8, August 2016.

in the Gulf. In recent years, Nusra has also received millions of dollars in ransom payments, with some payments reportedly facilitated by Qatar.

Iran, Hezbollah and Crime

Iran is considered the most active state sponsor of terrorism and is estimated to provide hundreds of millions of dollars a year in support to terrorist proxies, primarily in the Levant, but increasingly across the Middle East. One line of effort of the US-led financial constriction campaign against Iran beginning in the mid-2000s involved financially sanctioning Iran's state enterprises involved in terrorism support, including banks. In 2007, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Iran's state-owned Bank Saderat for transferring "\$50 million from the Central Bank of Iran through its subsidiary in London to its branch in Beirut for the benefit of Hezbollah fronts in Lebanon that support acts of violence."⁵ More recently, in February 2017, Beirut-based QF official Hasan Dehghan Ebrahimi was called out for facilitating millions of dollars' worth of cash transfers to Hezbollah, including through the US-designated Hezbollah construction firm Wa'ad Company.⁶

In addition to substantial Iranian support, Hezbollah has for decades helped fund its terrorist and social service initiatives through a diverse portfolio of criminal and commercial activities, relying on a worldwide network not only for financial, but also logistical and even operational support.⁷ This includes from large Lebanese diaspora communities, especially in West Africa and South America. In the tri-border area of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, for example, supporters have taken advantage of loosely regulated territory to engage in a range of illicit activities including fundraising and money laundering on behalf of Hezbollah. Separately, in 2016, the US Drug Enforcement Agency announced that, in cooperation with European authorities, it had un-

covered a dedicated Hezbollah unit for drug trafficking and drug proceed money laundering, resulting in the arrest of members of the network's European cell. The consequent proceeds were used to finance arms purchases for Hezbollah use in Syria.⁸

Responses

As terrorist financing typologies evolve, responses from the international community to counter such threats must also adapt. And as we take actions, the terrorists also adapt; like squeezing a balloon, it expands elsewhere. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks in the US, counterterrorist financing efforts focused on identifying and disrupting so-called "deep-pocket" donors, primarily located in the Arab Sunni states in the Gulf, and protecting charitable organizations from exploitation and diversion of funds to support terrorist causes. Considerable efforts were made to establish and gain adoption of international best practices designed to make the international financial system a hostile environment for terrorist support and other forms of illicit finance. Part of this effort involved raising awareness of the risks of terrorist financing and facilitation; bringing governments in high-risk jurisdictions around to implementing such standards despite concerns of retaliation. Furthermore, by sharing actionable information - either confidentially or through public notification of sanctioning actions - governments strove to disrupt terrorists' means to raise, store and move funds. The rise of the Islamic State and its almost complete reliance on funding derived locally has highlighted the need to not just disrupt terrorist access to the financial system, but also find ways to cut them off from their means of raising funds. Together with the trend towards criminal sources of funds, there is also a greater focus on the role of law enforcement in disrupting terrorist financing and even the role of military in blocking terrorists' access to revenue.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism," 25 October, 2007. www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp644.aspx

⁶ U.S. Department of the Treasury "Treasury Sanctions Supporters of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force," 3 February, 2017. www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/as0004.aspx

⁷ LEVITT, Matthew. "Hezbollah's Criminal Networks: Useful Idiots, Henchmen, and Organized Criminal Facilitators." In: MATFESS, Hilary and MIKLAUCIC, Michael. ed., *Beyond Convergence: World Without Order*. Washington, DC.: Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

⁸ U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. "DEA and European Authorities Uncover Massive Hizballah Drug and Money Laundering Scheme. 1 February, 2016.

Réforme du secteur de la sécurité et lutte contre le terrorisme : État des lieux, enjeux et défis

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Expert en RSS

Les changements intervenus dans le monde arabe en 2011 étaient sans doute annonciateurs d'instabilité, et ce à plus forte raison lorsque les régimes d'essence sécuritaire n'étaient plus en mesure de réagir face aux dangers qui guettaient les transitions dans les pays dits du « printemps arabe ».

Très vite des signes de faiblesse perceptibles dans la gestion de la situation sécuritaire ont été relevés : les vagues de réfugiés, les flux migratoires irréguliers, le délitement des structures étatiques et en particulier des appareils sécuritaires, la pénétration des groupes extrémistes violents, les quantités d'armes en circulation dans la région et la porosité des frontières sont autant de marqueurs de perturbations et de dysfonctionnements des systèmes en place.

Les échecs politiques et économiques des nouvelles élites et institutions politiques portées par les révoltes de 2011 ont nourri un fort sentiment de désaffection et de frustration parmi les populations locales, en particulier les jeunes. La Tunisie, la Lybie, mais aussi l'Europe étaient devenues des terres de recrutement de l'État islamique (Daech) ou d'autres mouvements extrémistes violents. Les crises libyenne, malienne et le conflit en Syrie ont exacerbé l'insécurité dans le pourtour méditerranéen.

L'Europe elle-même n'a pas été épargnée. Sans doute les flux migratoires et les vagues de réfugiés étaient-ils transmetteurs de la menace terroriste. Les pays de l'Union européenne ont certes réagi à ces menaces par le renforcement de leurs frontières et un contrôle plus strict des flux migratoires. Toutefois, l'épicentre du terrorisme n'est plus seulement en Irak

ou en Syrie, car la tragédie a frappé au cœur de Paris, Bruxelles, Nice, Berlin ou Manchester. Des raisons profondes mettent à jour des facteurs inhibiteurs d'un extrémisme violent lié aussi au contexte européen.

Pour l'ensemble des pays de la région méditerranéenne, du nord au sud, il fallait s'adapter à la nouvelle structure de la menace terroriste, en comprendre les dynamiques, les facteurs et acteurs de sa propagation, envisager des actions et stratégies nouvelles et efficaces, vivre avec sans céder sur l'essentiel des valeurs démocratiques, sociales et culturelles. Dans cette optique, il y a lieu de se pencher sur les enjeux de la lutte globale contre le terrorisme pour la démocratie, la paix, les droits de l'homme et l'État de droit dans notre région. À la suite, nous ferons des suggestions et recommandations visant à inscrire la lutte contre le terrorisme dans le cadre des objectifs de paix et de bonne gouvernance.

Le coût élevé de la menace terroriste

Il est difficile de comptabiliser le coût réel du terrorisme, tant le coût humain est élevé pour les individus et les sociétés. L'impact est direct sur les droits de l'homme. Mais le terrorisme vise aussi à déstabiliser les gouvernements, miner la société civile, compromettre la paix et la sécurité et menacer le développement social et économique.

Outre le coût social, les mesures adoptées par les États pour lutter contre le terrorisme ont souvent posé de sérieux problèmes aux droits de l'homme et à l'État de droit (interrogatoires sommaires, torture, violations des données personnelles, procès expéditifs, etc.).

Dans l'urgence, de nouvelles lois antiterroristes sont adoptées. Du coup, le mandat, les moyens ainsi que

les techniques des services de renseignements sont renforcés. Les capacités opérationnelles des forces de sécurité sont augmentées, alors que l'outil de défense est désormais orienté vers une implication directe sur le théâtre des opérations.

Les ressources normalement allouées aux programmes sociaux, à l'éducation et au développement sont donc détournées vers le secteur de la sécurité, affectant les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, surtout dans les pays dont les capacités sont à la base rares et insuffisantes.

Ces pratiques, en particulier lorsqu'elles sont prises ensemble, ont un effet corrosif sur l'État de droit, la bonne gouvernance et les droits de l'homme. Elles sont également contre-productives aux efforts nationaux et internationaux de lutte contre le terrorisme.

L'effet corrosif sur l'État de droit et la bonne gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité

Dans les sociétés exposées à des défis sécuritaires complexes et violents, la réforme du secteur de la sécurité ne correspond plus à ce concept d'élaboration des politiques publiques dans le domaine de la sécurité, de la défense et de la justice, mais devient l'outil essentiel pour renforcer les capacités opérationnelles du secteur de la sécurité, sans se préoccuper davantage des crispations démocratiques que provoquent de tels choix.

De même, les règles de fonctionnement du système démocratique sont souvent mises à mal par les choix politiques et sécuritaires des États, dès lors que la sécurité intérieure ou extérieure est menacée. À titre d'exemple, la transparence des budgets de défense et de sécurité est directement mise en cause.

La théorie du domaine réservé est un autre exemple de crispation démocratique dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Parce que « la nation est en danger », la solidarité nationale se resserre autour du gouvernement. Est-ce pour autant justifiable de remettre en question le principe de responsabilité des décideurs politiques dans ce domaine en particulier ? Nul doute qu'action politique et respect des principes démocratiques sont consubstantiels. Le principe de responsabilité est incontournable.

On conçoit bien la liberté d'action de l'exécutif dans ses choix politiques ou la nécessité de renforcement des capacités opérationnelles des structures sécuritaires.

L'exemple type est celui des programmes « *Train & Equip* » dirigés vers les pays en transition démocratique ou post-confliktuelle. Mais nous savons tous dans quelles conditions de tels programmes ont été mis en œuvre, quelles étaient leurs finalités et quels étaient surtout leurs coûts par rapport aux avantages escomptés. De l'Irak au Mali, en passant par la Tunisie, la Libye ou l'Égypte, les programmes d'assistance internationale posent toujours les mêmes questions, à savoir d'étudier les implications en termes de réforme du secteur de la sécurité et d'évaluer leur contribution à préparer des appareils sécuritaires somme toute fragiles à de véritables transformations institutionnelles.

Nul n'est en droit, donc, de faire valoir les dividendes de la paix au détriment des dividendes de la démocratie.

Inscrire la lutte contre le terrorisme dans le soutien aux processus de réforme des systèmes de sécurité

Plus que jamais les structures étatiques sont impliquées dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Les institutions les plus impliquées sont les forces armées, de sécurité intérieure, les services de renseignements ainsi que la justice. En raison des mutations politiques et sécuritaires intervenues ces dernières années, les rôles et responsabilités des pouvoirs, organes d'exécution et autres structures sont à redéfinir pour répondre aux urgences et s'adapter aux nouveaux besoins en termes de sécurité.

Dans ce contexte, les enjeux liés à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité (RSS) doivent recevoir des applications très concrètes dans le cadre de l'élaboration et la mise en place des stratégies nationales ou régionales de lutte contre le terrorisme. Celles-ci impliquent l'intégration de l'ensemble des structures, mécanismes, lois, procédures et ressources mises à disposition des forces de sécurité et de justice dans une approche globale et non dans une logique parcellaire, comme c'est malheureusement souvent le cas dans les expériences récentes.

En prenant en considération la durée nécessairement très longue pour parvenir aux changements de mentalités indispensables pour l'enracinement des réformes dans les cultures et règles institutionnelles, la réforme du secteur de la sécurité doit donc

se placer dans la perspective du respect, voire du renforcement du vouloir vivre ensemble, clairement exprimé dans les valeurs de démocratie et de liberté, plus importantes aujourd'hui que jamais. La lutte contre le terrorisme doit répondre à ces attentes, tant sur l'échelle nationale, que régionale, car l'action collective dans ce domaine est d'une importance capitale.

Certes, l'action dans ce cadre doit se constituer autour de domaines d'intervention complémentaires, tels que le renforcement des capacités opérationnelles, le soutien à la protection des données personnelles ou l'appui à l'appareil judiciaire. Cependant, les politiques et stratégies ne peuvent être efficaces que lorsqu'elles traitent à la base les vulnérabilités, fragilités et déficits de gouvernance dans les systèmes sécuritaires.

Le renforcement des institutions de l'État de droit et l'inscription dans la légalité de toute mesure de lutte contre la progression de la menace terroriste dans les démocraties doivent rester le premier pilier de l'État de droit.

Actions et domaines prioritaires de la réforme

Premièrement, les États qui sont confrontés à des menaces dont la structure est complexe doivent inscrire leurs réponses dans un cadre légal **clair et cohérent**. L'action des forces de défense et de sécurité impliquées dans la lutte anti-terroriste doit être soumise à des exigences à la fois éthiques et légales. Il convient d'adopter des mesures afin que les forces de défense et de sécurité proscrivent de leurs moyens d'intervention les détentions arbitraires, les ingérences dans la vie privée ainsi que les procédures judiciaires extra-légales.

Deuxièmement, les activités des services de renseignements doivent être strictement encadrées. Ces structures jouent un rôle central dans la lutte contre les réseaux criminels et terroristes pour n'être soumis qu'à des contrôles fermés, peu transparents. La coordination et l'échange d'information sont au cœur de la transformation des services de renseignements. Il est par conséquent essentiel d'inciter les États à veiller à ce que leurs activités soient strictement définies. Les techniques spéciales d'investigation sont les plus visées dans ce cadre, compte tenu de leur caractère intrusif, mais aussi

des risques de détournement de leur finalité sécuritaire pour servir des intérêts incompatibles avec les principes démocratiques.

Troisièmement, le défi pour les services de sécurité dans la lutte contre le terrorisme reste la gestion et le contrôle efficace des frontières. Il est donc indispensable de renforcer les capacités de gérer les frontières et les points d'accès de manière professionnelles pour lutter efficacement, non seulement contre les activités terroristes, mais aussi contre le flux des autres menaces. Notons tout de même que l'amélioration des contrôles aux frontières ne justifie pas les crispations présentes en matière de politiques migratoires et de mobilité exprimées par les États membres de l'Union européenne. Ce sont ces mêmes crispations qui ont provoqué par le passé le cloisonnement des populations du Sud, alors que l'Europe, par sa culture et son économie, était toujours une ouverture vers un monde meilleur.

Ces trois niveaux d'entrée vers ces réformes demeurent cependant identiques pour n'importe quelle autre transformation de l'appareil sécuritaire : un ordre constitutionnel civil et démocratique, des institutions soumises à la loi et une volonté politique ferme et capable de piloter le processus de réforme. Tous ces défis sont en effet liés à la construction et à la consolidation de l'État de droit, quel qu'il soit.

Il reste un dernier élément à ne pas négliger dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Il s'agit de la nécessité à **renforcer la coopération juridique et judiciaire entre les pays**, en favorisant les évolutions normatives au sein des États concernés. La lutte contre le terrorisme n'est pas une responsabilité individuelle, ni d'ailleurs résiduelle des pays exportateurs de la menace au profit des autres. Bien au contraire, elle reste une responsabilité partagée dont les termes doivent encore être définis par des accords francs et des responsabilités mutualisées.

La consolidation de la paix en Méditerranée passe par la mise en place d'un programme de gouvernance partagée de la paix et de la sécurité. Les populations ont leur mot à dire dans la conception d'un nouveau modèle de développement, de paix et de sécurité dans la région, et de sa mise en place aussi. Il s'agit seulement d'être en phase avec les engagements pris dans le cadre des objectifs du développement durable : renouveler les termes de la sécurité humaine.

Deradicalization: Experiences in Europe and the Arab World

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Deradicalization, as we know it today, first emerged in the Arab world in the late 20th century. In particular, it emerged in Egypt and Algeria² before later spreading to other countries and regions of the world, including Europe and Asia. According to a survey conducted by the author for the United Nations in 2009, at least 34 out of 192 UN Member States claimed to have some sort of deradicalization and/or counter-radicalization policies in place during the first decade of the 21st century.³ Out of those 34 states, six were Arab states (Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE and Yemen), and, ironically, ten were European countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK). Since then, the number of countries claiming to resort to deradicalization policies and measures has evolved. The new emphasis given to deradicalization was part of a larger effort by Member States to undermine appeal to violent extremism and limit the pool of potential recruits by terrorist organizations and groups. With regards to deradicalization, as opposed to counter-radicalization which seeks to counter the appeal of radical ideology in society, it

focuses on the prevention of radicalization and recruitment inside incarceration centres. The rise in the number of individuals arrested and charged with terrorist-related activities has increased apprehension about the possibility of turning prisons into a recruitment arena for the terrorist activities and turning incarceration centres into “universities of terrorism” or “universities of Jihadism.” Deradicalization, in theory, therefore seeks to prevent that through a battery of policies that seeks to provide religious rehabilitation for radical prisoners, to facilitate their reintegration back into society, and to create an environment conducive to such a process inside prisons.

However, despite the considerable attention deradicalization policies have received and continue to receive, they are still underresearched, not fully understood and remain controversial. Little is known about how they are being designed, implemented and practiced in the real world and “their effectiveness has not undergone independent scrutiny and its degree is largely a matter of opinion.”⁴

Due to time and space limitations, this paper will not only provide a background to the evolution of deradicalization programmes in recent years, but will also focus mainly on why they have not delivered what has been expected of them in terms of countering violent extremism (VE) and preventing prison radicalization. The former will be discussed in the next section, while the latter in section three. The final section outlines the author’s conclusions.

¹ All ideas and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author’s alone. Professor El-Said can be contacted at the following email: h.elsaid@mmu.ac.uk

² ASHOUR, Omar. *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements*, London, Routledge, 2009.

³ COUNTERTERRORISM IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE. *First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes*, UNCTITF, New York, P. 3, 2009. <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=10129>

⁴ KRUGLANSKI, Arie W.; GELFAND Michele J.; BÉLANGER, Jocelyn J. et al. “The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism,” in *Advances in Political Psychology*, Vol. 35, Suppl. 1, 2014.

Deradicalization in Perspective

Egypt and Algeria started such programmes in the late 1990s, albeit in different contexts, places and with different objectives. In Egypt, for example, the process was spontaneous, occurring from within and launched by the top brass of the movement's intellectual leadership, which had in the past provided justification for violence. It also started from inside the prison system. It began when the two then major Egyptian groups, *al-Gamma al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Group or IG) and *al-Jihad Islami* (AJ) denounced violence and announced their repentance in 1997 and 2007, respectively. During the process, the leaders of the IG published no less than 25 volumes of exhortations to their followers inside and outside the wire in order to convince them to abandon violence.⁵ Initially, the Egyptian government played little or no role in this process. Only when Egyptian security officials became convinced of the sincerity of the repentance process did they start to support and facilitate it among the group, by allowing its leaders to conduct a tour of prisons to convince other members to denounce violence on both moral and effectiveness grounds. The Algerian Reconciliation programme, on the other hand, started in the mountains, when more than 5,000 members of the Islamic Salvation Army (ISA), then the largest and most organized fighting group, accepted the reconciliation process after almost 10 years of "dirty war." During this period, key civil society organizations and community members played a crucial role in convincing the State and society to accept reconciliation, which was achieved in 1997.

While the Egyptian repentance process included ideological debate between the key ideologues of the IG and AJ, on the one hand, and members of various groups on the other, the Algerian Reconciliation process was devoid of any ideological debate. It was understood from the very beginning that the Algerian conflict was not over religion, but rather over politics.

Finally, both the Egyptian repentance and the Algerian Reconciliation processes were judged as "successful."⁶ Although IG and AJ prisoners were

subsequently released into Egyptian society, not a single terrorist act has been committed by any individual associated with these two groups since 1997. The Algerian Reconciliation process also ended almost 10 years of "dirty war," during which time between 100-200,000 Algerians lost their lives. It also succeeded in decommissioning the weapons of more than 5,000 former fighters and allowed them to be reintegrated into society. Although some fighting continued, this no longer represented a major security threat to the Algerian State or society.

The first decade of the 21st century saw the emergence of three waves of the so-called deradicalization efforts, between 2002-2004, 2005-2010, and post 2010. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia were the first to introduce such programmes under different titles. All, however, included extensive religious rehabilitation as a key component.

Despite the considerable attention deradicalization policies have received and continue to receive, they are still underresearched, not fully understood and remain controversial

During the third wave, the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands were among the first European countries to experiment with deradicalization policies in 2005-2007. The last three countries to introduce such policies during this wave were Jordan, Kuwait and UAE around 2009-2010. The fourth, and final wave started around 2011, following the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, which attracted a large number of Foreign Fighters (FFs), more than 30,000 from over 100 countries around the world. This took place mainly in Germany, with the introduction of the Hayat Programme in January 2012 and the expansion of the Aarhus Programme in the same year in order to accommodate FFs returning from Syria and/or would-be FFs planning on de-

⁵ ASHOUR, 2009, op cit.

⁶ KRUGLANSKI et al., op. cit, 2014, p. 85.

parting to Syria. It also witnessed the review and introduction of the second version of Prevent in the UK, following the disappointing outcomes of the previous phase.

The Outcome of Deradicalization

Academics, researchers and even policymakers seem to have less confidence in most of the deradicalization efforts implemented since the beginning of the 21st century.⁷ In fact, one is tempted to argue that they seem to have made things worse. For example, the Institute for Economics and Peace concluded in its latest 2016 report (p.14) that, despite seemingly large efforts to counter radicalization and introduce deradicalization policies, “there has been only a ten per cent decline in terrorism in 2015,” and “this decline was driven by reductions in Iraq and Nigeria” following the weakening of Boko Haram and ISIL in these countries in recent years.⁸ More alarmingly, the decline in the level of terrorism in Iraq and Nigeria has been at the expense of a rise in terrorism in many formerly “moderately affected countries,” which have “experienced record levels of terrorism.” (p.2). Those formerly moderate countries include France, Belgium, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Germany, Sweden and the UK, following the Manchester May 2017 attacks. If Iraq and Nigeria are excluded, terrorism in “53 moderate countries has worsened,” especially in countries, which have experienced very “moderate” levels of terror attacks in the past. This includes many countries known for designing and implementing deradicalization programmes, as mentioned above.

Also, several individuals who were involved in some of the most brutal attacks in recent years in Europe and the Arab world have actually spent some time in prison before committing their terrorist acts. Some even attended and graduated from

some of these deradicalization programmes discussed earlier in this paper. According to one source, no less than a third of FFs in Syria and Iraq were well known to prison and security officials before departure.⁹

Several individuals who were involved in some of the most brutal attacks in recent years in Europe and the Arab world have actually spent some time in prison before committing their terrorist acts

Why have the outcomes of the so-called deradicalization policies been so disappointing in Europe and the Arab world? The next section attempts to shed light on the answer to these questions.

What is Wrong with Deradicalization?

Time and space do not permit a thorough examination of each programme. Such an exercise has been carried out elsewhere, so as not to warrant repetition here. Suffice it to say that the literature distinguishes between two types of deradicalization programmes: explicit (or ideological) and implicit (non-ideological), or conservative and secular deradicalization. Over time, the differences between the two tapered to almost emerge as one factor: whether they believe ideology is the culprit or not. Secular deradicalization shows more interest in the behaviour of individuals and seeks to disengage individuals from violence, while accepting the fact that being radical in itself is not illicit. Explicit deradicalization, on the other hand, seeks to bring about a change in ideology (cognitive change), re-

⁷ For more information on the outcomes of such programmes, see HANNAH, Greg; CLUTTERBUCK, Lindsay and RUBIN, Jennifer. *Radicalisation or Rehabilitation? Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners*, Rand Corporation, 2008. www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR571.pdf, and EL-SAID, H. and HARRIGAN, J. *Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and Deradicalization Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States*, Routledge, 2013, and EL-SAID, Hamed. *New Approaches to Countering Terrorism*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

⁸ INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND PEACE. *Global Terrorism Index 2016*, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, 2016. <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf>

⁹ MEHRA, T. *Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Trends, Dynamics and Policy Responses*, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), p. 8, The Hague, 2016. <https://icct.nl/publication/foreign-terrorist-fighters-trends-dynamics-and-policy-responses/>

flecting its basic premise which views ideology as the main cause of radicalization. The argument here is that changing the behaviour of an individual requires changing his/her ideology that motivates that behaviour in the first place.

The debate over whether deradicalization should confine itself to the behavioural and/or the cognitive side remains contentious and unresolved. But deradicalization is not confined to ideological rehabilitation only. In addition to the ideological element, deradicalization policies generally experimented with a wide range of other components. These ranged from providing psychological support to vocational training and education, family rehabilitation, physical and sports programmes, art, and a post-release scheme to facilitate reintegration of released prisoners back into society. The latter also includes an additional battery of incentives, such as financial support, health insurance, assisting released individuals (graduates) finding jobs or return to education. Some even go as far as assisting the graduates in getting married.

Explicit deradicalization, seeks to bring about a change in ideology reflecting its basic premise which views ideology as the main cause of radicalization. The argument is that changing the behaviour of an individual requires changing his/her ideology that motivates that behaviour in the first place

Not all programmes employ the entire battery of incentives or carry the same degree of extensiveness. The most extensive and sustained programme is the Saudi deradicalization programme, known as the Counselling Programme. It includes most of the elements discussed above. The least extensive is the Jordanian programme, which revolves around a

newly established and embryonic dialogue policy. Until the time of this writing, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Egypt have no deradicalization policies whatsoever. The rest of the programmes lie somewhere between the Saudi and Jordanian programmes.

Only the Algerian Reconciliation and Danish Aarhus policies can be described as secular or liberally oriented. Most other programmes in the Arab world and Europe are of the explicit type, the type that views ideology as the culprit and where everything revolves around ideological rehabilitation. It is here where the Achilles heel of these programmes lies. Sageman (2015)¹⁰ argues that there is a knowledge gap. We still don't know what causes an individual to become a terrorist. He explains this stalemate in terms of a lack of cooperation between academics and researchers, which have the methodical rigour and skills to conduct sophisticated analysis but lack access to sensitive premises (like prison, prisoners or deradicalized individuals) and information on them which government security agencies possess. The upshot has been an "unbridgeable gap between academia and the intelligence community" on the one hand, and "an explosion of speculations with little empirical grounding in academia," on the other. One such assumption relates to the basic foundation of most explicit deradicalization programmes regarding the role of ideology.

Most European leaders and politicians seem to believe that ideology is the culprit. Rik Coolsaet (2016, p. 47) cites clear examples of statements made by several European leaders openly acknowledging the Islamic ideology as the number one cause of terrorism. From Cameron in London to Manuel Valls in Paris, to the Belgian Prime Minister, Charles Michel, to the ongoing vigorous public debate in the Netherlands on the relationship between Salafism and jihadism, they all endorse the same approach that goes along the following lines:

"The root cause of this threat to our security is quite clear. It is a poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism, which is condemned by all faiths and faith leaders."¹¹

¹⁰ SAGEMAN, Marc. "The Stagnation in Terrorism Research," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Volume 26, Issue 4, pp. 565-80, 2014.

¹¹ COOLSAET, Rik. "Facing the Fourth Foreign Fighters Wave: What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to Islamic State? Insights from the Belgian Case." *Egmont Paper 81*, EGDMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, March 2016.

Equally, most Arab officials also believe the culprit is ideology. In fact, it was Arab officials who promoted the idea that “these individuals are simply misled, they misinterpreted the Islamic religion.”¹² Not surprisingly, most deradicalization policies in Europe and the Arab world start from the same premise: ideology is the culprit. This explains why religious and ideological rehabilitation is the most important and common component of most deradicalization policies.

However, the recent empirical evidence shows very clearly that this particular wave of terrorism, which was inspired and revived by the outbreak of conflict in Syria since 2011, is “even less influenced by religion or ideology” than any other wave in the past, that “it is not the narrative (i.e., the ideology) that eventually lures them into terrorism,” but that terrorists are rather influenced “more by personal motivations and motives.”¹³ The role of ideology, known in some European official circles as the conveyor belt, has been declining over time since the 1980s. Tightly knit “social networks” that evolve more around social and personal ties replace ideology as the main conveyor belt.

It is a well-known and long-established fact in medical science that if the treatment is wrong, the disease will spread and the patient’s condition will worsen. The problem with treating ideology as the culprit in deradicalization policies, when it is not the root cause, is that not only does it fail to provide a proper solution to individuals who have already crossed the line and become radicalized enough to commit or attempt to commit a terrorist act, but it also fails to prevent others from following the same path. This is mainly because such an approach de-emphasizes and ignores the environment that breeds radicalization and extremism in the first place and fails to take into account the context where the kind of radicalization and extremism that could lead to terrorism is taking place. Deradicalization, in other words, is delinked from its own context and environment. It focuses only on the individual, the symptom, and not the disease, the root cause. It also pins the blame on individuals simply “misinterpreting the

Quran” and “misunderstanding Islam,” and absolves the State, state institutions and the environment where these groups and individuals live, grow up and try to thrive, rather unsuccessfully, from any responsibility.

Most deradicalization policies in Europe and the Arab world start from the same premise: ideology is the culprit. This explains why religious and ideological rehabilitation is the most important and common component of most deradicalization policies

Moreover, given the fact that most information regarding the threat of VE and prison radicalization is monopolized by security apparatuses, there is a tendency to exaggerate the role and influence of deradicalization policies for obvious reasons. Most officials describe their deradicalization efforts as successful!¹⁴ Although it is never clear what criteria this evaluation is based on.

Such a description is actually problematic for several reasons. First, most academics and researchers have access to neither incarceration centres, nor incarcerated or “deradicalized” individuals, which makes it very difficult to conduct an independent study on the effectiveness of such programmes. It is also problematic because most European and Arab states do not actually have fully fledged deradicalization programmes, but rather small processes and measures inside the prison system, evolving mostly around ideological debates and discussions, which they describe as deradicalization programmes.

It is a well-known fact that inmates arrested for terrorist-related charges in Western, including most European, countries are placed in individual cells for a very long time, sometimes without any activi-

¹² This observation is based on my many conversations with state officials and counter radicalization personnel during my regular visits to the Arab World over the past few years.

¹³ COOLSAET, *op. cit.*, 2016, p. 12.

¹⁴ Again, I noticed this observation during my many conversations with state officials in the Arab World, Europe and Asia during my recent travels there.

ties whatsoever. The belief seems to be that since most of these individuals will be spending very long time in prison, 20-30 years if not life, why should we worry about deradicalizing them in the first place? Not surprising, many European countries do not have any deradicalization policies in place. France, Norway, Switzerland, Romania and Austria are among those countries.

The problem is not dissimilar in the Arab world, except it is ten times worse. Not only do countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon have no deradicalization policies whatsoever, but their prisoners are also incarcerated in largely overcrowded prisons with extremely poor living conditions, characterized by a lack of proper hygiene and medical services, widespread diseases, high crime and drug rates, and corruption among prison staff. In many cases, radical prisoners are left to socialize with other prisoners without any control or mechanism to organize such a socialization process and without any rehabilitation, reintegration or deradicalization process. "We don't know what to do with them," I am often reminded by some prison authorities in these countries, and "we do not have the resources anyway." Such an environment is not only not conducive to any successful deradicalization programme, but is in itself very radicalizing and could end up further radicalizing already radicalized individuals.

Even Jordan's now widely touted programme, is very small and embryonic, restarted only in January 2016 after a very brief experiment in 2009. It is composed of no more than a simple dialogue process that continues to be rejected by more than 60-70% of inmates. The latter refuse to even speak to the scholars chosen by the government to conduct the dialogue process with the prisoners. Credibility, it seems, is lacking.

To put it another way, very few, if any European or Arab states have fully fledged deradicalization programmes, save Saudi Arabia perhaps! Their efforts, where they have existed, have amounted to no more than processes and measures that are totally delinked from the local context and are not incorporated into a holistic approach based on a good understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization, terrorism or even deradicalization. Proper and well-designed and executed deradicalization programmes not only facilitate rehabilitation of individu-

als who have already crossed the line, but also facilitate the management of the entire prison system, overcome prison radicalization and recruitment, and prevent incarceration centres from becoming schools and universities for terrorism and "jihadism."

Very few, if any European or Arab states have fully fledged deradicalization programmes. Their efforts amounted to no more than processes and measures that are totally delinked from the local context and are not incorporated into a holistic approach based on a good understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization, terrorism or even deradicalization

Equally important, is the idea that deradicalization cannot and should not be seen as independent of developments in society. The continued incarceration of individuals on terrorist-related charges suggests that the root causes lie elsewhere; largely in society. After they spend their time in prison and are assumed to have repented, "deradicalized" individuals will eventually be released and will return back to their families, communities and societies. If any of these people remain radical, the chances of recidivism increase.

In other words, what happens inside the wire affects what happens outside the wire and vice versa. To be effective, deradicalization requires equally good and "soft" counter-radicalization policies and programmes that can stem the appeal of VE in society in the first place.

Such an approach requires reframing the entire debate on radicalization, based on a good understanding for the real factors that motivate individuals to become radicalized. It also requires deepening engagement with society and community members, as well as shifting away from the current top-down formats that characterize most, if not all, de-

radicalization policies in Europe and the Arab world. Such policies and approaches are designed, implemented and in most cases managed by the State and its repressive institutions. Cooperation with some civil society organizations, a prerequisite for success, does exist but on a very selective basis and with conditions determined by the State. Such conditions do not build trust between the State and the different communities. On the contrary, they undermine trust and give the impression that counter-radicalization and deradicalization efforts seek infiltration and even corruption in communities. Such an impression played a key role in undermining most deradicalization policies in Europe and the Arab world, including the UK's prevent strategy, which:

“received mixed responses as many experts termed it too narrow, partially transparent, being used for monitoring the immigrant community, and which they believe is counter-productive. Muslim communities also have concerns about it. Transparency is another major issue and it is believed that local authorities misuse funds particularly for corrupting the local communities and building human intelligence networks.”¹⁵

Conclusion

Deradicalization policies in Europe and the Arab world have failed to deliver the expected outcomes of reducing the appeal of terrorism and dealing effectively with prison radicalization and recruitment. On the contrary, they seem to have inflamed and exacerbated the situation. They are built on incorrect

assumptions and premises, obsessed with intelligence gathering and take the form of a top-down approach that is highly selective in its dealings with communities. They also seem to lack credibility and competent personnel with sufficient knowledge of the process and able to detect real signs of radicalization. Seen as such, deradicalization divides rather than unites communities. The programmes lack a holistic vision and are perceived with pessimism and suspicion by various community members.

The challenge lies in developing a holistic approach to the phenomenon of violent extremism and terrorism, one that includes all stakeholders from the State, society and even beyond

There is no one-size-fits-all. Deradicalization policies and programmes need not always look identical, as the early Egyptian and Algerian cases in the late 20th century demonstrated. But they must be based on a good understanding for the motivations for radicalizing groups and individuals in each society. They must also deal with those factors, not only with apprehended individuals and groups.

In other words, deradicalization and prevention at the society level are strongly linked and intertwined. The absence of one undermines the other. The challenge lies in developing a holistic approach to the phenomenon of VE and terrorism, one that includes all stakeholders from the State, society and even beyond.

¹⁵ FARHAN, Zahid. “Analysing the counter radicalization and de-radicalization models,” *Foreign Analysis* n°43, Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement, 2016. www.cf2r.org/images/stories/foreign_analyzes/fa-43.pdf

La transition agricole et alimentaire dans la région méditerranéenne

Vicent Garcés. Président de la Fondation Assemblée des Citoyens et Citoyennes de la Méditerranée

Une soixantaine d'associations et d'institutions adhèrent à la proposition faite par la Fondation Assemblée des Citoyens et Citoyennes de la Méditerranée (FACM). Lors d'un exercice de prospective conduit par l'Institut national de la Recherche agronomique (INRA) et Pluriagri pour la région Afrique du Nord et Moyen-Orient, qui a montré une forte progression de l'insécurité alimentaire dans la zone méditerranéenne, ces associations et institutions ont signé la déclaration « L'heure de la transition agricole et alimentaire a sonné. Réveillons-nous ! ». Le but de cette déclaration est de travailler ensemble afin de promouvoir des initiatives d'alimentation responsable et durable qui puissent changer la prédominance du modèle agro-industriel, lequel constitue une menace pour la diversité et la richesse alimentaire historique en Méditerranée.

La riche histoire agricole et la diversité des systèmes et des modèles alimentaires ont permis que de multiples civilisations surgissent et fleurissent autour de la Méditerranée. Les oasis, les jardins, le pastoralisme, les techniques d'accès et de gestion de l'eau, la domestication et l'exploitation d'une biodiversité originale, animale et végétale ont permis aux peuples méditerranéens de se développer dans des milieux naturels très diversifiés et des conditions climatiques parfois peu propices au développement de l'agriculture et de l'établissement humain. La diversité gastronomique et la cuisine méditerranéenne jouissent encore aujourd'hui d'une grande reconnaissance.

Cependant, ce patrimoine, constitué par les produits et les pratiques agricoles et alimentaires méditerranéennes, est loin d'être suffisamment reconnu et mis en valeur. Les produits agricoles et alimentaires mondialisés

et standardisés, issus de l'agro-industrie et des grandes chaînes de distribution, ont gagné du terrain. Dans le système alimentaire des peuples méditerranéens la composante « mondialisée » dépasse aujourd'hui la composante « régionalisée ». Cette avancée du mondialisé est une défaite pour les économies locales et nationales : le système alimentaire actuel détruit plus d'emplois qu'il n'en crée. Il distribue localement peu de revenus. Il affaiblit le développement au lieu de le promouvoir. Il appauvrit et endette les pays méditerranéens au lieu de les enrichir.

Le contexte

Un exercice de prospective conduit par l'Institut national de la Recherche agronomique (INRA)

et Pluriagri pour la région Afrique du Nord et Moyen-Orient montre une forte progression de l'insécurité alimentaire dans cette zone à l'horizon 2050 dans un scénario tendanciel prenant en compte les effets du changement climatique. Dans ces conditions critiques, les auteurs du rapport préconisent d'agir sur trois leviers en les combinant :

- l'innovation technique en agronomie et zootechne (marge de progrès des rendements de l'ordre de 20 %) ;
- la réduction des pertes et gaspillages (gisement de mobilisation supplémentaire de 10 à 20 % de la production) ;
- la réhabilitation de la diète méditerranéenne (limitation de la consommation de produits animaux, de sucres et d'huiles végétales).

Or, avec la sécurité alimentaire en Méditerranée, on est en présence d'un métaproblème, d'envergure macro-régionale, de caractère polysémique et systémique. En effet, le secteur agricole et agroalimentaire présente une situation préoccupante en Méditerranée. Tous les pays de la région sont déficitaires à l'exception de la France, de l'Espagne et de la Turquie, ce qui traduit un potentiel productif faible dans les autres pays et/ou des politiques publiques peu stimulantes, s'accompagnant d'importations massives de produits alimentaires (40 % de la consommation dans les pays du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée). La dépendance externe ne cesse de s'aggraver et la facture alimentaire extérieure des pays méditerranéens s'élevait, en 2014, à 212 milliards de dollars au Nord (16 pays européens riverains) et 75 milliards au Sud et à l'Est (11 pays).

À cette fragilité économique s'ajoutent des problèmes de malnutrition (expansion rapide des maladies chroniques d'origine alimentaire telles que l'obésité, les pathologies cardio-vasculaires, certains cancers et le diabète de type 2),

avec la disparition de la diète méditerranéenne au profit d'une alimentation industrielle de type occidental. De plus, la déprise agricole foncière, la dégradation des ressources en eau et le changement climatique compromettent l'augmentation de la production locale.

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Dans la région méditerranéenne, le modèle agroindustriel de production des aliments (monocultures, forte mécanisation agricole et consommation d'énergies fossiles, transport longue distance des produits...) s'est imposé et occupe une grande partie de son espace agricole et ses meilleures terres. Il n'a pas cherché à s'adapter aux conditions spécifiques des environnements naturels ni aux habitudes alimentaires des peuples méditerranéens. La prédominance de ce modèle agro-industriel dans l'espace méditerranéen se traduit par l'asphyxie des agriculteurs traditionnels. Elle a des effets négatifs sur le plan social (disparition des emplois dans les économies locales), environnemental (pollution, régression de la fertilité des sols et de la biodiversité) et culturel (perte de la diversité des aliments et des cuisines).

Une proposition nécessaire

L'alimentation, et tout le système agricole et alimentaire, doit redevenir un moteur central du développement durable et inclusif de nos pays. Il nous faut à la fois retrouver et revaloriser les savoirs et les pratiques agricoles et alimentaires de nos pays et répondre aux grandes questions contemporaines : la création d'emplois et la lutte contre la pauvreté, la gestion durable des ressources naturelles et

la lutte contre le changement climatique, la préservation du patrimoine culturel. Autant de questions que nous devons résoudre si nous voulons laisser aux générations futures un patrimoine matériel et immatériel qui leur permettra de vivre décemment.

Si nous voulons atteindre tous ces objectifs à la fois, il nous faut d'urgence engager une véritable « transition alimentaire ». Pour ce faire, il est nécessaire de mener deux batailles articulées l'une à l'autre :

- la bataille de la « reterritorialisation » de la consommation, qui se manifeste par la construction de circuits courts et le développement d'« économies circulaires » ;
- la bataille contre les effets négatifs, aussi bien sociaux qu'environnementaux et culturels, de la production et de la distribution agroindustrielle des aliments.

Ces batailles sont synonymes de changement de modèle agricole, de « révolution agro-écologique », et, pour l'agriculture familiale et paysanne, d'un possible accès aux semences, à la terre, aux ressources naturelles, aux marchés, au crédit, aux technologies et aux services agricoles. Ce scénario ne nous ramène pas au passé, il nous projette vers l'avenir et vers des modèles agricoles et des systèmes alimentaires territorialisés, productifs et à haute valeur sociale, environnementale, culturelle et pédagogique.

L'engagement de la FACM

La Fondation Assemblée des Citoyens et Citoyennes de la Méditerranée (FACM) invite ses membres à travailler dans ce sens et à le faire savoir dans les forums nationaux et internationaux. Elle a exprimé ses positions, ses propositions et ses demandes en matière de transition alimentaire, spécialement à l'occasion de la 22^e Conférence des Parties (COP22)

de la Convention sur le changement climatique, qui s'est tenue en novembre 2016 à Marrakech et, précédemment, à la MEDCOP de Tanger, où les régions méditerranéennes se sont rencontrées en juillet pour préparer la COP22.

Nous souhaitons participer à la recherche de solutions, en collaboration avec tous ceux qui travaillent à promouvoir la transition alimentaire dans les pays méditerranéens

Nous souhaitons participer à la recherche de solutions, en collaboration avec tous ceux qui travaillent à promouvoir la transition alimentaire dans les pays méditerranéens. En effet, dans tous nos pays il existe des acteurs pionniers qui mettent en place des initiatives d'alimentation responsable et durable (IARD), et qui sont déjà engagés sur les chemins de la transition.

Nous proposons de :

- Détecter, analyser et valoriser les initiatives IARD et, à cette fin, collaborer avec des organisations paysannes, des organisations de la société civile, des partenaires scientifiques et universitaires engagés dans un même combat pour la transition alimentaire.
- Présenter un grand échantillon méditerranéen de plusieurs centaines d'initiatives IARD, susceptibles de montrer la créativité et la diversité des « solutions » locales, et de contribuer à identifier les « chemins de la transition » vers de nouveaux systèmes agricoles et alimentaires.
- Construire un manifeste de la « transition agricole et alimentaire » issu de l'analyse de ces solutions locales et leur donnant une perspective macro-géographique.
- Mettre en marche des collaborations qui permettent d'étendre la base d'initiatives et de solutions pour les prochaines réunions de la COP et d'autres forums internationaux.

Water Challenges in the Mediterranean

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One of the most pressing issues of the 21st century is the management and allocation of limited freshwater resources in the world, as they become increasingly scarce. OECD projections show that 40 percent of the world's population currently lives in water-stressed river basins, and that water demand will rise by 55 percent by 2050 (OECD, 2012). The degree of water scarcity and its political, economic and social implications are felt much more severely in regions like the Mediterranean. Almost every factor linked with water crises globally is present in the region, including: scarcity and variability of freshwater resources; rapidly growing population; changing levels of economic development; misuses as well as poor water management and allocation practices; and burgeoning uncertainties coupled with climate change. An important number of these water resources, particularly in the southern rim of the region, are transboundary in that they cross political boundaries of more than one nation. This increases the complexity of the problem, as it has now become an issue at an international level (Kibaroglu, 2016). Hence, in order to fully comprehend the water situation in the Mediterranean region, it is necessary to review water challenges at national and regional levels, and set a priority ranking for the problems of a physical, technical, institutional, social and economic nature, which affect the development, management and use of water resources.

Water Quantity and Quality Challenges

The Mediterranean region displays significant contrasts in its demographic and hydrological features, which have shaped the water management policies of its regional countries. The population of the Basin is 427 million; this accounts for seven percent of the world's total population. Water stress is a high concern, where a large portion of the world's "water-poor" population lives in the region (Benoit and Comeau, 2006).

Water resources are unevenly distributed in the Mediterranean region with 72 percent of resources in the north, 23 percent in the east, and five percent in the south.¹ Thus, the shortage of water is mainly focused in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. However, the severe droughts experienced between 1990 and 2005 have marked the vulnerability of the water supply even in the industrialized northern Mediterranean countries (Burak, 2008).

Water availability will decrease, particularly in the southern Mediterranean countries, since the regulating capacity of dam reservoirs has decreased under the effect of siltation. Moreover, permanent flow from upstream riparian countries may not be ensured due to drought conditions.

The shortfall in quantity has been compounded by a decrease in quality due to the contamination of surface and groundwater resources in the region (Hamdy, 2001). In the last 50 years, the total water demand has doubled as a result of demographic pressure and from the development of water-intensive activities, such as tourism and manufacturing. Indeed, most of the water is used in the agricultural

¹ Northern Mediterranean countries are Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Monaco, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Cyprus and Malta. Southern Mediterranean countries are Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Eastern Mediterranean countries are Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

sector, which presents high rates of inefficiency. In the near future, availability of water will be the “main constraint to agricultural development of arid” and semi-arid countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Without efficient control and proper water management, self-sufficiency in food and energy will continue to be a challenge for most countries in the region.

Impacts of Climate Change

The shortage of water in the region has been affected by the impact of climate change through increasing temperatures and variations in precipitation. Once again, the impacts have different consequences in the region: the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries are exposed to desertification, increasing soil aridity and exhaustion of water sources. Meanwhile, due to the lack of an efficient soil management policy, the northern shores of the Mediterranean appear more vulnerable to the increase in floods and landslides, as well as the resulting damage to infrastructure.

In the last 50 years, the total water demand has doubled as a result of demographic pressure and from the development of water-intensive activities, such as tourism and manufacturing.

Under the impacts of climate change, there will be less water available for irrigation, energy production, and domestic and industrial use. Less water in the rivers will also increase the stress on riverside ecosystems. Recent severe droughts in the region convey important messages about what could happen in the region in the future. Such events, which could become more frequent and intense, could threaten water availability and food security, and may cause conflicts in the region.

Climatic change will also alter the marine environment, with an expected rise in sea levels modifying several shores of Mediterranean countries. The

most striking effects will be the submersion of land in delta areas (the Nile, Po and Rhone rivers), in the coastal zones and in the densely populated cities and suburbs close to the Mediterranean Sea (Ferragina, 2009).

Challenges for Sustainable and Integrated Water Management

The questions of demand versus supply with regard to water management are important issues that require special attention in a water-scarce zone such as that of the southern countries of the Mediterranean. For a long time the supply management concept has dominated actions in the region. During the last century, the region witnessed major water supply projects including large impoundments, long distance transfer and the mining of fossil water. These projects are met with many social and environmental limitations that require a combination of supply and demand management actions, such as minimizing waste, improving efficiency and conservation works.

Under the impacts of climate change, there will be less water available for irrigation, energy production, and domestic and industrial use

In many parts of the region, agriculture will continue to be the main consumer of water resources. In terms of food security for the developing countries of the region, the water gap will be around 50 percent; the result of a growing population and deterioration of productivity due to poor water management. For sustainable agricultural development, large amounts could be made available to meet new agricultural demands by improving efficiency in this sector through better systems of on-farm water management, reducing irrigation water-distribution losses, changing cropping patterns, improving irrigation scheduling, and adopting irrigation-efficient technologies. These policies should be supported

by participative irrigation management and water use practices, whereby equitable irrigation water charges are introduced (Hamdy, 2001).

Technical solutions alone cannot provide the increasing population with a safe water supply and proper environmental protection

Technical solutions alone cannot provide the increasing population with a safe water supply and proper environmental protection. Integrated water-resources management including technical, managerial, institutional, social and economic aspects constitute the first priority among the range of actions included in the adopted strategy. New dams, river diversions and overexploitation of groundwater resources rarely offer sustainable solutions. The key challenges are to establish priorities and policies for allocating water among competing uses and users, to encourage more efficient and productive use of water, and to reshape institutions to better suit the water constraints. Increasing efficiency by reducing losses and wasteful use is expected to help stabilize water demand in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (Burak and Margat, 2016).

Challenges of Transboundary Water Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean

The transboundary water resources shared among the countries of the region or with countries outside the region constitute the majority of the water resources, including both surface and groundwater bodies. Moreover, major transboundary river basins in the Mediterranean, namely the Jordan, Nile and the Euphrates-Tigris are in sub-regions that have experienced severe political tensions. These political circumstances have aggravated past water disputes, which otherwise might have been solved had the political climate been more favourable. In other words, water disputes were overlaid, or at

least influenced, by multifaceted interstate conflicts involving other disputes over security, borders, and other issues.

In this context, the water dispute in the Jordan basin is a distribution conflict embedded in a protracted political (Arab-Israeli) conflict, displaying all the characteristics of a zero-sum game, whereas the water dispute in the Nile basin is intimately related to unfair clauses in historical, bilateral sharing agreements. Additionally, the increasing ability and desire of the upstream states, namely Ethiopia, to challenge Egypt's status as hydro-hegemon and the overall status quo constitute contemporary reasons for tensions over water. In the Euphrates-Tigris basin, the water dispute arose from the competitive, uncoordinated and unilateral water development projects of the riparians, however the political linkages established between transboundary water issues and non-riparian security issues also exacerbated the disagreements over water sharing and allocation.

Despite the numerous water sources disputed between different countries, no conflict in the area has been exclusively caused by water, although this natural resource has played a crucial role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the disputes around the Tigris-Euphrates and Nile basins.

Major transboundary river basins in the Mediterranean are in sub-regions that have experienced severe political tensions

The competing demands for water in the absence of a conflict resolution mechanism may lead to severe consequences in the water-scarce zone. There is an obvious and urgent need for regional water cooperation in the region. Concerned countries should realize that without cooperation they cannot address the issues of each country and the only way out is through cooperation. This can only be achieved through recognition of the interests and the concerns of all riparians through the comprehensive, integrated and environmentally-sound water management of the entire water basin.

In this respect, one productive approach to the cooperative development of transboundary waters in the region should be to take a regional view of the benefits to be derived from the river basins. When negotiations focus solely on water sharing, upstream and downstream differences will be exacerbated, thereby giving greater prominence to water gains and losses. This has regularly required the riparian states to see water as more than just a commodity to be divided—a zero-sum, rights-based view. Instead, they need to develop a positive-sum, integrative approach that ensures the equitable allocation not of the water but of the benefits derived from it. Adding development opportunities in other sectors may enlarge the area of possible agreement and make implementation more manageable. In addition, inter-sectoral linkages may offer more opportunities for the generation of creative solutions, allowing for greater economic efficiency through a basket of benefits.

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Le Maghreb face aux défis de l'Agenda 2030

Larabi Jaidi

Atteindre des modèles de croissance plus performants, des sociétés plus inclusives et faire face aux défis environnementaux sont les enjeux de la stratégie 2030

La réussite de l'Agenda nécessite une réponse collective. Il faut relancer le processus d'intégration maghrébine sur de nouvelles bases

Les ressources nationales publiques et privées sont appelées à participer davantage à la réalisation des ODD. L'aide internationale ne peut y contribuer que faiblement

Dans les 15 prochaines années, les efforts déployés au niveau mondial en faveur du développement durable s'appuieront sur les 17 objectifs et 169 cibles connexes formulés dans le nouvel Agenda 2030. Après un processus de négociation intense mené pendant trois ans par les 193 États membres de l'ONU et au cours duquel les pays du Maghreb ont pu faire valoir leurs préoccupations, l'Agenda 2030 est entré en application au niveau national et international cette année. Quels challenges représente-t-il pour les pays du Maghreb ?

Les pays de la région ont dressé le bilan des réalisations des Objectifs de Millénaire pour le développement (OMD). Ils font prévaloir d'avoir été en mesure d'honorer leurs engagements au titre des OMD, à quelques indicateurs près, plus particulièrement dans les domaines de la santé, de l'égalité de genre et de l'environnement. Des rapports ont procédé à des évaluations des acquis que ces pays doivent consolider, des atouts qu'ils doivent valoriser et des défis qu'ils doivent relever, au regard des objectifs fixés par les nouveaux agendas internationaux de développement. Les 17 Objectifs de développement durable (ODD) de l'Agenda 2030, d'une portée universelle, joueront un rôle prépondérant dans la politique de développement des pays du Maghreb au cours des prochaines années. Intégrés, interconnectés et

indissociables, ces ODD visent à concilier les trois dimensions du développement durable : économique, sociale et environnementale. Les Objectifs de développement durable vont au-delà des secteurs sociaux sur lesquels étaient centrés les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le développement, en incluant également des objectifs tels que le défi climatique et environnemental, la transition énergétique ou la croissance. Ces différences d'approche des ODD par rapport aux OMD font ressortir toute leur spécificité : l'interconnectivité, la globalité, l'universalité et la transversalité.

Les pays du Maghreb abordent l'Agenda international de développement durable dans un contexte marqué par une instabilité économique, des attentes sociales et des perturbations environnementales. Les pouvoirs publics cherchent à impulser des inflexions aux modèles de croissance avec une volontariste diversification des structures productives, le renforcement des bases infrastructurelles et institutionnelles d'attractivité des territoires et le rééquilibrage, au profit d'un mode plus endogène du financement des investissements requis, à cet effet. Les perspectives post-2015 ont fait l'objet des consultations nationales tenues à travers tous les pays, à l'initiative d'institutions gouvernementales et non gouvernementales avec une participation des institutions représentatives élues et de la société

civile et avec l'appui des organismes relevant des Nations unies.

Les grandes priorités économiques, sociales et environnementales

À l'exception de la Libye, paralysée par le dramatique imbroglio politique, les pays de la région ont inscrit des objectifs et des principes du développement durable dans leurs politiques et programmes de développement. En écho aux protocoles et conventions internationaux sur le développement durable ratifiés par les États, des processus de réformes institutionnelles et réglementaires ont été engagés. L'arsenal juridique s'adapte progressivement aux principes de l'égalité homme-femme et aux exigences environnementales. Des mécanismes institutionnels se renforcent par la mise en place de structures et d'agences dédiées au développement durable. Des stratégies, des programmes et des projets ciblés sont identifiés. Les progrès enregistrés varient au gré des contraintes propres à chaque pays, d'une part, et du degré d'appropriation des enjeux par l'ensemble des acteurs, de l'autre.

■ Des modèles de croissance plus performants

En dépit des nouveaux paliers de croissance, la dynamique économique

de la région reste tributaire de la conjoncture internationale ou de la clémence de la nature. La demande externe fluctuante ou en décroissance (hydrocarbures pour l'Algérie, matières premières pour la Mauritanie, produits manufacturés pour la Tunisie et le Maroc) imprègne le profil de la croissance. L'instabilité de la pluviométrie aggrave la volatilité de la croissance et impacte défavorablement les conditions de revenus et de vie des ménages ruraux. La performance économique est accrochée aux comportements de secteurs primaires (agriculture et mines) ou tertiaire (tourisme, services). Le taux de croissance économique annuel moyen qui flirtait avec les 5 % pendant la période allant de 2000 à 2012, s'est ralenti pour naviguer autour des 3 %. La plupart des pays de la région souffrent des déficits jumeaux qui sont l'expression à la fois d'une compétitivité en mal d'affermissement et de difficultés à contrôler la dépense publique en fonction du cycle économique. Certaines économies de la région sont majoritairement dépendantes de l'exploitation des ressources naturelles (Algérie, Mauritanie). D'autres pays, comme le Maroc et la Tunisie, ont franchi quelques étapes dans l'industrialisation, mais les branches restent peu diversifiées et spécialisées dans des activités à faible valeur ajoutée. Les priorités sont clairement affichées : réduire la volatilité de la croissance, rompre avec la vulnérabilité aux aléas climatiques et la dépendance des cours des produits de base, améliorer la productivité agricole pour faire face à l'insécurité alimentaire, diversifier le système productif et l'insérer dans la chaîne de valeur mondiale.

L'enjeu de la stratégie 2030 au niveau du Maghreb est d'engager les économies de la région dans un nouveau modèle de croissance respectueux des principes de la viabilité environnementale, du développement économique et le bien-être social. La mise en œuvre de cette vision suppose d'intégrer les principes d'une croissance verte inclusive dans les politiques, programmes et plans de développement existants. Le choix d'un modèle de pro-

Les 17 objectifs de développement durable (ODS)

1. Éliminer la pauvreté sous toutes ses formes et partout dans le monde.
2. Éliminer la faim, assurer la sécurité alimentaire, améliorer la nutrition et promouvoir l'agriculture durable.
3. Permettre à tous de vivre en bonne santé et promouvoir le bien-être de tous à tout âge.
4. Assurer l'accès de tous à une éducation de qualité, sur un pied d'égalité et promouvoir les possibilités d'apprentissage tout au long de la vie.
5. Parvenir à l'égalité des sexes et autonomiser toutes les femmes et les filles.
6. Garantir l'accès de tous à l'eau et à l'assainissement et assurer une gestion durable des ressources en eau.
7. Garantir l'accès de tous à des services énergétiques fiables, durables et modernes à un coût abordable.
8. Promouvoir une croissance économique soutenue, partagée et durable, le plein emploi productif et un travail décent pour tous.
9. Bâtir une infrastructure résiliente, promouvoir une industrialisation durable qui profite à tous et encourager l'innovation.
10. Réduire les inégalités dans les pays et d'un pays à l'autre.
11. Faire en sorte que les villes et les établissements humains soient ouverts à tous, sûrs, résilients et durables.
12. Établir des modes de consommation et de production durables.
13. Prendre d'urgence des mesures pour lutter contre les changements climatiques et leurs répercussions (prenant en compte les accords de la Convention-cadre des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques).
14. Conserver et exploiter de manière durable les océans, les mers et les ressources marines aux fins du développement durable.
15. Préserver et restaurer les écosystèmes terrestres, en veillant à les exploiter de façon durable, gérer durablement les forêts, lutter contre la désertification, enrayer et inverser le processus de dégradation des terres et mettre fin à l'appauvrissement de la biodiversité.
16. Promouvoir des sociétés pacifiques et ouvertes à tous aux fins du développement durable, assurer l'accès de tous à la justice et mettre en place, à tous les niveaux, des institutions efficaces, responsables et ouvertes à tous.
17. Renforcer les moyens de mettre en œuvre le Partenariat mondial pour le développement durable et le revitaliser.

Source: Résolution de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, 25 septembre 2015.

duction à base d'énergie propre et d'adaptation des stratégies sectorielles aux effets des changements climatiques constitue pour tous les pays de la région la voie de reconversion de leurs modèles de croissance dans une perspective de durabilité. À cet effet, les plans de développement nationaux (Algérie, Tunisie, Mauritanie) ou sectoriels (Maroc) comptent déployer des stratégies d'amorce d'une croissance verte dans les secteurs de l'énergie, du transport, de l'industrie, du bâtiment et des déchets solides.

■ Des sociétés plus inclusives

La priorité majeure dans tous les pays est l'emploi. Le contenu en emploi de la croissance économique dans la région demeure faible. Le chômage élevé demeure un motif de préoccupation. Il concerne en particulier les jeunes, les femmes et les diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur. Le secteur

informel est le principal pourvoyeur d'emplois précaires, peu rémunérateurs et faiblement protégés. Les progrès réalisés par la sous-région dans la perspective de l'atteinte des OMD en matière de santé et d'éducation, se sont traduits par un allongement de l'espérance de vie. Mais l'augmentation sensible de la population âgée entraîne de nouvelles et coûteuses prises en charge médicales et sociales.

Les pays du Maghreb ont réalisé des progrès importants en matière d'atteinte des OMD et notamment de la lutte contre la pauvreté et de l'accès à l'eau et aux services essentiels. L'Algérie, le Maroc et la Tunisie ont atteint une grande partie des OMD en 2015. Toutefois, ces performances cachent des inégalités importantes (taux de pauvreté allant de 42 % en Mauritanie à moins de 1 % en Algérie). L'indice de développement humain (IDH) varie de 0,724 pour la Libye (94ème rang

L'évolution de l'IDH ajusté aux inégalités

Pays	Indice de développement humain (IDH)	IDH ajusté aux inégalités (IDH)	Perte globale de développement humain due aux inégalités (%)	Espérance de vie à la naissance (années)	Durée attendue de scolarisation (années)	Durée moyenne de scolarisation (années)	RNB par habitant (dollars de 2011 en PPA)	Croissance annuelle moyenne de l'IDH (%)	
	Valeur	Valeur						2000-2010	2010-2014
Algérie	0,736	-	-	74,8	14,0	7,6	13,054	1,26	0,35
Libye	0,724	-	-	71,6	14,0	7,3	14,911	0,34	-1,07
Tunisie	0,721	0,562	22,0	74,8	14,6	6,8	10,404	0,88	0,26
Égypte	0,690	0,524	24,0	71,1	13,5	6,6	10,512	0,90	0,33
Maroc	0,628	0,441	29,7	74,0	11,6	4,4	6,850	1,48	0,69
Mauritanie	0,506	0,337	33,4	63,1	8,5	3,8	3,560	0,98	0,92

Source : Rapport sur le développement humain en Afrique 2016.

mondial) à 0,628 pour le Maroc (126e). Les indicateurs de la pauvreté multidimensionnelle révèlent les déficits et privations dans l'accès aux besoins sociaux. La vulnérabilité prend des dimensions nouvelles et s'étend à des couches moyennes et aux personnes à besoins spécifiques. Des disparités existent entre les territoires au sein d'un même pays. Elles concernent le développement économique, l'insécurité alimentaire, l'accès aux services de santé de base, à l'eau, à l'énergie ou encore à l'assainissement. Les discriminations à l'égard des femmes en matière de salaire, d'emploi et de prise de décisions sont des sujets de préoccupation majeurs. Grâce à des mesures de discrimination positive, des progrès ont été réalisés en matière de représentation des femmes dans les institutions, mais les acquis ne sont pas encore parfaitement intégrés par la société. Aussi, le double processus de baisse des inégalités de situation et des inégalités des chances devrait trouver son expression dans un mode équitable de répartition des fruits de la croissance et un fonctionnement démocratique du dialogue social.

Le processus de réalisation des ODD a vocation à s'inscrire dans un contexte marqué par l'émergence dans les sociétés maghrébines de nouveaux besoins matériels et culturels, exprimés en particulier par les jeunes, les femmes et la société civile. Les systèmes de valeurs et les comportements sociétaux changent sous l'effet d'une urbanisation croissante, de nouveaux

modes de consommation, de la nucléarisation des familles, d'une forte mobilité interne et externe de la population, d'une tension entre le conservatisme et la modernité. Dans ce contexte, les aspirations au bien-être recherchent de nouveaux cadres d'expression. Répondre à l'émergence de cette forte demande sociale exige d'instaurer un cadre institutionnel de participation et de proposition pour réguler démocratiquement les formes d'expression de ces attentes.

■ Des priorités environnementales

Les pays de la région partagent certaines problématiques environnementales similaires : désertification, raréfaction des ressources en eau, dégradation des terres, des forêts et des pâturages, fortes pressions sur le milieu marin, changements climatiques ou encore les pollutions industrielle, urbaine et agricole. Le Maghreb se caractérise par un déficit hydrique des plus élevés au monde (disponibilités en eau inférieures à 1 000 m³/an), une désertification qui affecte environ 85 % des terres, lesquelles sont de plus en plus menacées par l'érosion et la salinisation, une agriculture à dominante pluviale très sensible aux variations climatiques. Les oasis, piliers économiques de la sous-région, sont de plus en plus menacés par les effets du changement climatique sur la disponibilité des ressources en eau. Huit cent soixante-dix espèces de plantes sont classées rares, menacées ou endémiques fragilisant ainsi la riche biodiversité des milieux et les équilibres

des écosystèmes. La surexploitation de certaines pêcheries (poulpes et sardinelles) au Maroc et en Mauritanie compromet la reproduction à long terme des ressources halieutiques. La pression croissante liée à l'urbanisation et la concentration des activités économiques de plus en plus importantes sur les zones côtières et les villes littorales ont des conséquences désastreuses sur les plans économique (pauvreté), social (chômage) et environnemental (pollution). Le coût de la dégradation de l'environnement varie entre 2 % et 5 % du PIB pour les quatre pays (Algérie, Égypte, Maroc et Tunisie), alors qu'il est estimé à près de 17 % du PIB pour la Mauritanie.

Tous ces facteurs font que cette sous-région a été qualifiée par le Groupe d'experts intergouvernemental sur l'évolution du climat (GIEC) comme l'une des régions les plus sensibles au changement climatique. Un risque qui ne manquerait pas d'impacter les conditions de vie de ses populations (pertes de productivité, baisse des revenus agricoles, migrations, etc.). Les émissions de gaz à effet de serre, les modifications de la pluviométrie et des températures, les risques d'élévation du niveau de la mer (Égypte, Maroc, Mauritanie et Tunisie) et la recrudescence des épisodes climatiques extrêmes sont, aujourd'hui, autant de signes visibles et de défis à relever pour cette région.

La prise en compte de toutes ces questions à l'échelle de la sous-région est, à l'heure actuelle, insuffisante, mais de-

meure un défi majeur. Aussi, la durabilité des acquis en termes de croissance économique, d'accumulation du capital physique, d'amélioration du capital humain et de réduction des inégalités et de la pauvreté, dans le cadre d'une préservation sur la durée des équilibres macro-économiques devient une ardente obligation. Tous les pays de la région cherchent à mettre en œuvre des stratégies et des politiques adaptées, conformément aux priorités nationales et aux dispositions des différents accords et instruments multilatéraux majeurs sur l'environnement auxquels ils ont adhéré. Un certain nombre de contraintes devront être levées pour infléchir les tendances actuelles et mettre la préservation de l'environnement et des ressources naturelles au service du développement durable de la sous-région. Les ODD sont très ambitieux : il faut se poser dès maintenant la question de leur mise en œuvre. Les pays du Maghreb dans leur individualité, la région dans sa globalité, sont face à un nouveau challenge. Plusieurs questions restent encore en suspens. La réussite du pari est conditionnée par la maîtrise de sept défis importants.

Sept défis pour relever le challenge

Le premier défi consiste en l'appropriation et la mise en cohérence des Objectifs de développement avec les priorités nationales, l'intégration harmonieuse des objectifs de développement durable dans les plans stratégiques sectoriels en sont la clé. C'est ce à quoi se sont attelés les Plans de développement de la Tunisie, de l'Algérie, de la Mauritanie et les plans sectoriels au Maroc.

Le second défi est la maîtrise de la coordination des politiques publiques. Pour mettre en œuvre les ODD de manière efficace et respecter l'Agenda 2030, il faut sortir de la logique de la croissance quantitative et opter pour une approche multidimensionnelle et de convergence des agendas sectoriels. Cela passe par trois approches, qui supposent une appropriation des ODD

à tous les niveaux : une approche territoriale et multidimensionnelle ; une approche multi-acteurs ; une approche processus. Les ODD entraînent non seulement un véritable changement de paradigme, mais aussi un vrai changement d'échelle, à travers notamment l'aspect multidimensionnel et les partenariats multi-acteurs.

Le troisième défi est relatif à la question de l'information statistique. Malgré l'existence d'organismes statistiques nationaux qui jouent un rôle central dans la production de l'information statistique à l'échelle de chaque pays et qui garantissent ainsi un minimum de cohérence d'ensemble, ne serait-ce que par l'expertise et l'ampleur des données qu'ils produisent, il n'en demeure pas moins que le résultat final est l'existence de données dispersées, peu homogènes et difficilement exploitables dans leur totalité. Ces systèmes d'information sont finalement insuffisamment intégrés par rapport à la conception d'une nouvelle vision des stratégies de développement et de ses enjeux : l'environnement, le genre, les territoires. Le relèvement de ce défi passe par la consolidation du dispositif de l'information statistique et de ses outils (concepts, nomenclatures, répertoires) sur des thèmes cruciaux : les inégalités, le genre, les échelles territoriales, l'environnement.

Le quatrième défi crucial est celui du suivi et de l'évaluation de la mise en œuvre. Les politiques publiques gagnent en visibilité et s'expriment aujourd'hui dans de nouvelles stratégies nationales et sectorielles. Or, force est de constater que le défaut de suivi systématique des politiques publiques ne plaide pas toujours en faveur de la crédibilité de ces stratégies. L'un des apports du suivi-évaluation des politiques publiques peut précisément consister à prévenir ou corriger les effets des contraintes financières ou institutionnelles insuffisamment appréhendées.

Le cinquième défi est celui du financement : pour être menés à bien, les 17 Objectifs de développement durable doivent être dotés d'une solide assise financière. L'aide internationale ne peut

contribuer que faiblement. Les ressources nationales publiques et privées sont appelées à participer davantage, notamment par une plus grande souplesse et efficacité dans l'affectation des moyens et par le développement du rôle joué par les financements innovants. Le nouvel agenda comporte des objectifs ambitieux et intègre aussi bien le développement économique et social que la durabilité écologique. L'heure est maintenant à son appropriation et à sa mise en œuvre.

Le sixième défi est la promotion de la bonne gouvernance. Du point de vue économique, elle s'est améliorée dans certains pays de la région, comme en témoignent l'amélioration du climat des affaires au Maroc ou en Tunisie. Du point de vue politique, la transition démocratique en Tunisie, les espoirs de la nouvelle Constitution marocaine, la promotion de processus électoraux libres et transparents en Mauritanie et en Algérie augurent de nouvelles perspectives pour l'État de droit dans la région. Il s'agit de renforcer ces processus institutionnels par une plus grande transparence dans la gestion des affaires publiques ; un combat ferme et efficace contre la corruption et une amélioration de l'efficacité des services publics.

Le septième défi est de relancer le processus d'intégration maghrébine sur de nouvelles bases. L'Agenda 2030 nécessite une réponse collective à des défis communs. La gestion des biens publics comme ceux de l'environnement ou de la santé appellent des réponses négociées et coordonnées. Aussi faudrait-il redéfinir un projet politique mobilisateur dessinant les contours d'un avenir commun. Cette vision d'un « avenir commun » s'impose d'autant plus que l'intégration plus poussée des pays maghrébains dans un ensemble géopolitique est la condition quasi incontournable de leur insertion efficace dans l'économie mondiale. Cela suppose la mise en œuvre de mécanismes de solidarité forts, capables de compenser les effets déstabilisateurs, au niveau social et des restructurations économiques rendues nécessaires par la libéralisation des échanges et de l'économie. ■

Agriculture et alimentation, domaines prioritaires de la coopération euroméditerranéenne

José María G. Álvarez-Coque, Víctor Martínez

Les pressions climatiques et démographiques, la pénurie des ressources en eau ou les migrations font de l'insécurité alimentaire une source de vulnérabilité dans la région

Le déficit de la balance commerciale agro-alimentaire est toujours élevé et la dépendance alimentaire des pays du Sud ne fait qu'augmenter

Le soutien de l'UE peut s'avérer pertinent, non seulement par des fonds, mais aussi avec l'expérience en formation, l'élévation et la gestion des réseaux locaux

Le secteur agricole et le milieu rural restent essentiels dans la société et dans l'économie des pays du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée (PSEM). Ce secteur n'est pas très souvent évoqué dans les analyses géopolitiques de la région, dans lesquelles on mentionne généralement comme causes d'instabilité, le contrôle des sources d'énergie, le conflit israélo-palestinien, le choc des religions et la crise des réfugiés. Mais, bien au-delà de ces problèmes, la zone est soumise à de fortes pressions alimentaires, parmi lesquelles les pressions climatiques, la pénurie des ressources en eau, la dégradation des ressources naturelles, la pression démographique, les changements dans les habitudes alimentaires, les migrations, la vulnérabilité de la population rurale pauvre, contribuent à classer l'insécurité alimentaire en tête des principales sources de vulnérabilité dans la région. Soit nous prenons le problème au sérieux, soit il ne cessera d'augmenter. Curieusement, il ne semble pas que l'agriculture soit une priorité de la coopération euroméditerranéenne.

La plupart des pays du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée maintiennent une position d'importateurs nets d'aliments de base, qui s'aggrave avec le temps. Dans certains cas, comme en Syrie, l'aide alimentaire est une source principale d'alimentation, attendu la situation alarmante de conflit armé. L'Afrique du Nord qui représente 2 % de la popula-

tion mondiale, concentre entre 16 % et 19 % des importations mondiales de blé. La question est de savoir si l'intégration euroméditerranéenne peut faire quelque chose pour encourager le développement agricole de la région.

Politique de libéralisation commerciale

C'est l'éternelle question, toujours présente après le lancement du Processus de Barcelone, il y a 20 ans. La réponse a été depuis lors de miser sur une libéralisation contrôlée de l'échange de produits alimentaires, dans l'espoir, probablement illusoire, qu'en fin de compte l'intégration commerciale permettrait de réduire les inégalités entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée. Le Processus de Barcelone a invité les gouvernements des pays du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée à négocier des concessions commerciales concernant l'accès au marché européen de certains produits agricoles présentant, soi-disant, des avantages comparatifs, en échange des concessions sur l'accès aux marchés domestiques de produits déficitaires. Dans ce processus, de nombreux fruits et légumes et autres produits méditerranéens, comme l'huile d'olive, ont obtenu un accès préférentiel au marché européen, ce qui leur permettait d'être fortement concurrentiels

en termes de coûts, ouvrant ainsi une logique agro-exportatrice en tant que moteur de croissance. Dans cette stratégie commerciale, les devises obtenues à l'exportation permettraient de financer les importations de denrées alimentaires – principalement les céréales, les produits laitiers et le sucre.


Il s'agit d'une logique optimiste qui compenserait largement les risques du processus pour l'Union européenne (UE). En 1995 on ne pensait pas que des risques, comme les conflits religieux et les migrations, s'aggravaient, mais que les seuls perdants en Europe seraient les secteurs économiques en concurrence avec les produits d'exportation des PSEM. Ces produits seraient en concurrence avec les productions méditerranéennes européennes et les préférences accordées par l'UE seraient parfois vues comme un désavantage comparatif du point de vue de certaines régions européennes. Mais dans l'équation, l'UE sortirait nettement gagnante car ses marchés d'exportation industrielle seraient ouverts aux pays émergents comme le Maroc, la Tunisie ou l'Égypte. Dans le secteur agricole, la croissance de ces pays favoriserait les importations de céréales, de sucre et de lait dans les PSEM, du fait de la réciprocité des concessions, procurant ainsi un avantage aux productions européennes de ces produits.

Vingt-ans après, les attentes n'ont pas produit les résultats escomptés. L'analyse de l'évolution exportatrice des

PSEM montre que, même si les préférences commerciales ont permis d'accroître les exportations vers le marché européen et sont en train de consolider des chaînes de valeur agro-exportatrices modernes et capables de satisfaire aux exigences de la distribution européenne, ces hausses ne se sont pas avérées spectaculaires, car elles ont été très souvent limitées par des contingents ou des quotas ou bien par la saturation et la concurrence sur le marché. En conséquence, le déficit de la balance commerciale agro-alimentaire se maintient élevé et la vulnérabilité et la dépendance alimentaire ne fait qu'augmenter.

Le modèle agro-exportateur basé sur les coûts et les préférences arrive donc à sa fin, au moins partiellement et est en cours de révision. Tant que l'avantage des PSEM à l'exportation soit la main d'œuvre bon marché, le modèle basé sur le commerce donnera des signes de fragilité, dans la mesure où les consommateurs européens donnent de plus en plus d'importance aux services ajoutés au produit, filtrés à travers des stratégies de la grande distribution. Par exemple, certains travaux discutent que les politiques portant uniquement sur la réduction des coûts de production peuvent se révéler contre-productives pour la chaîne de valeur globale car, bien souvent, les attributs exigés par les consommateurs dans les marchés de destination concernent davantage la qualité du produit et des opérations d'après récolte que le prix. Donc, les mesures destinées à la diffusion d'informations sur le marché, à favoriser l'adoption variétale adéquate, et à la fourniture d'un certificat et d'un contrôle de qualité seraient des politiques qui permettraient d'améliorer durablement les avantages d'accès au fil des années. Dans cette tendance à la sophistication des chaînes de valeur, des aspects comme la logistique, la régularité des approvisionnements et la technologie importent davantage que de disposer d'une réserve de main d'œuvre abondante et peu qualifiée.

Dans ce sens, des obstacles pour participer aux marchés internationaux ont été relevés, affectant particulièrement les exploitations de moindre taille. Ces obstacles sont l'accès limité à l'information sur le marché, le manque de ca-



Source : élaboration des auteurs à partir de FAOSTAT.

pacités techniques des producteurs, la faible organisation, le manque d'infrastructures et les coûts élevés d'accès aux standards privés. Certains obstacles pourraient être surmontés moyennant une extension et des recherches au niveau local, mises en place par les administrations nationales avec l'appui d'acteurs locaux et, comme il est examiné ci-dessous, avec l'appui financier de l'UE.


En plus de tout ce qui précède, la volatilité et la flambée des prix des aliments survenues depuis 2007 ont remis de plus en plus en cause l'approche exclusive agro-exportatrice dans ces pays importateurs nets d'aliments. Ainsi, la dépendance alimentaire n'est pas gratuite et requiert non seulement des devises, mais aussi d'infrastructures. Les coûts logistiques supportés par les chaînes d'agro-importation de céréales dans de nombreux pays de la région sont substantiels et, en fait, la part du lion du coût final de céréales importées est due aux frais de stockage et de transport. Ainsi, une amélioration de l'efficacité des services logistiques amoindrirait la lourde facture des importations de la région.

Un autre élément de pression sont les changements dans les habitudes alimentaires, entraînant une consommation d'aliments dont le contenu calorique et riche en matières grasses

augmente dans les pays de la région, associé à un modèle de consommation agro-industrielle qui s'étend dans les zones urbaines. Paradoxalement, la région méditerranéenne s'écarte de la diète méditerranéenne et touche plus particulièrement les pays émergents.

L'élément essentiel du discours actuel sur l'agriculture, l'alimentation et le milieu rural dans les PSEM, est la durabilité. Les pressions climatiques provoquant une détérioration des précipitations et une plus grande consommation d'eau dans la région, mettent gravement en danger la production alimentaire dans le Sud de la Méditerranée. On connaît bien la situation de dégradation des ressources naturelles dans les PSEM. Par exemple, la perte de la couche arable et l'érosion des sols réduisent la fertilité des productions. Ce qui est particulièrement vrai dans les zones les plus sèches et reculées, où la croissance de la population implique une exploitation du sol. Sans connaissances ni capacité financière pour cultiver de façon plus prudente, la détérioration est manifeste.

Le changement climatique finit par être un facteur de pauvreté et d'émigration des zones rurales qui ne contribue pas à la durabilité sociale. La région est connue pour ses limites concernant la disponibilité des ressources en eau, non

Ressources en eau renouvelable totales par habitant en 2014 (m³/an)

Source : AQUASTAT.

seulement pour l'agriculture. L'irrégularité et la rareté des précipitations sont courantes dans les PSEM, la disponibilité en eau par habitant allant d'une situation de « stress » dans le meilleur des cas (comme au Maroc, en Syrie ou en Égypte) à une situation de « pénurie » (comme en Algérie, en Tunisie ou en Libye), situation qui contraste clairement avec les pays de la rive nord de la Méditerranée. Et bien plus encore, les prévisions laissent entrevoir un accroissement de l'exploitation des ressources pour la prochaine décennie dans toute la région. Toute stratégie pour le milieu rural et l'agriculture dans les PSEM doit nécessairement envisager un allègement de la pression sur les ressources.

La coopération euroméditerranéenne

La nécessité de renforcer la coopération agricole entre l'UE et les pays du Sud de la Méditerranée est urgente. Mais il est vrai que ni

la situation géopolitique dans la région ni la crise budgétaire ne favorisent un climat de coopération. Au printemps 2011, la Commission européenne avait lancé un Plan d'action de la Politique européenne de voisinage incluant un programme pour l'agriculture et le développement rural (ENPAR, selon l'acronyme anglais). Il s'agissait de fournir un outil offrant une vision stratégique à la coopération, d'un point de vue de la transformation démocratique, de la participation des populations locales et de la croissance inclusive et durable. Malheureusement, les gouvernements de l'UE ont fait très peu d'autocritique et si l'on admet que l'environnement politique n'a rien arrangé, le gouvernement espagnol a manifestement délaissé son rôle de médiateur et d'initiateur des relations euroméditerranéennes.

Il est temps de reconnaître que l'on a peut-être attaché excessivement d'importance, par le passé, aux politiques de libéralisation commerciale, ce qui a détourné l'attention d'autres éléments fondamentaux pour le dé-

veloppement agricole et rural. En particulier, on n'a pas eu le courage suffisant ni l'idée d'examiner les opportunités de coopération où les risques, existants sans aucun doute, ne peuvent ignorer les avantages politiques et économiques que le développement dans la région méditerranéenne peut représenter pour l'UE. Cette coopération pourrait contribuer à renforcer les organisations de la société civile et d'autres institutions locales, comme les coopératives agricoles, les institutions de microcrédit locales ou les associations d'usagers de l'eau. Dans ce domaine, le soutien de l'UE peut s'avérer très pertinent, non seulement en apportant des fonds moyennant l'initiative ENPAR, mais aussi grâce à l'expérience dans le domaine de la formation, de l'élévation et de la gestion des réseaux locaux en amont. C'est dans les alliances que se forge l'avenir, en partant du principe que les besoins et les aspirations des populations ne sont pas si différents entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée. ■

From Oil Subsidies to Social Benefits

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Energy subsidies have traditionally played an important role in Middle Eastern and North African economies. Subsidies still represent a major component of social protection in the majority of Southern Mediterranean countries where low prices for energy and food play a significant role in reducing poverty and protecting vulnerable households. However, subsidies present a number of important shortcomings, both in terms of efficiency and equity. The need for a drastic reduction in subsidies became clear during the first years of the century, when oil prices rapidly increased triggering debt accumulation and pressure on public budgets, especially on energy-importing countries. In the last decade a number of countries have been able to start a gradual phasing out of subsidies, in some cases replaced by more efficient forms of social protection. However, subsidy removal and the introduction of more sophisticated social protection measures represent a complex process, which in many cases is implemented in a highly unstable political context, and it is still far from being concluded.

Subsidies Have a Role in Fighting Poverty and Mitigating the Adverse Effects of Price Fluctuation

Although a system of subsidies is common to the large majority of Southern Mediterranean countries, the mechanisms, entities, and products involved

differ across countries.¹ In Algeria for example the energy products subsidy is large, but implicit in the government energy pricing, while in Tunisia, the food subsidy system absorbs a larger share of the government budget than energy subsidies. In Egypt, in contrast, around 70% of subsidy spending is used to lower oil and gas prices.

Energy subsidies have been introduced to meet a number of objectives. The first is to protect vulnerable households from rising prices. To achieve this, subsidies are often concentrated on types of good typically consumed by the poor such as food, kerosene or diesel. However, in many cases subsidies have involved a vast range of energy goods including electricity, fuel, and gas. The rationale for universal subsidies is to offset temporary commodity price fluctuations. Energy is a fundamental input for the vast majority of economic sectors, as higher prices here have repercussions on all markets and trigger inflationary pressures. This issue is particularly relevant for countries that are unable to anchor inflation expectations. Finally, energy subsidies have been defended on the grounds of their ability to facilitate the development of energy-intensive industries such as petrochemicals and cement. Despite all the above-mentioned desirable effects, subsidies have been roundly criticised.

Energy Subsidies Have Wide-Ranging Negative Economic Consequences on Southern Mediterranean Economies

Subsidies have been criticised on equity grounds because of their targeting inefficiencies. Del Granado et al. (2010) show that richer households

¹ In what follows, a subsidy is defined as any measure that keeps prices for consumers below the market level.

Subsidy removal and the introduction of more sophisticated social protection measures represent a complex process, which in many cases is implemented in a highly unstable political context

systematically reap more benefits from subsidies than poorer households in 20 developing economies. In urban Egypt, for example, the top quintile of the income distribution receives eight times as much in energy subsidies as the bottom quintile (Roach, 2013). In Morocco, households in the top quintile of the income distribution are shown to get more than 75% of diesel subsidies (Vaglasindi, 2013).


From an efficiency standpoint, the subsidisation of fuel and gas encourages wasteful consumption of polluting, exhaustible resources. Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012) show how total primary energy consumption per dollar of GDP over the last 30 years has declined in all parts of the world, with the exception of the Arab world. The highest rates of increase in energy intensity are recorded in Gulf countries, but energy intensity is also increasing in some Mediterranean countries, namely Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Syria. Low energy pricing contributes to distor-

tions of relative prices, which, in turn, lead to underinvestment in non-subsidised energy sectors. Moreover, the low prices of fuel and gas discourage the development of alternative energies and encourage smuggling. Therefore a realistic estimate of subsidy costs is much higher than the sum of financial subsidies explicitly recorded in the public budget, and should also include all economic distortions caused by artificially low energy prices.

The years before the 2008 financial crisis were characterised by increasingly high food and energy prices. This sharp increase in prices directly affected the population's well-being, especially in food and oil-importing countries. Moreover, soaring prices worsened the sustainability of public budgets in all countries where food and energy prices were subsidised. Today the need to remove subsidies is one of the big issues on the political agenda in most Middle Eastern and North African countries. Chart 15 shows how the total government expenditure on oil subsidies is shared, as estimated by Elbers and Peeters (2011). Note, however, that this chart does not include implicit subsidies for energy such as the pricing policy in Algeria.

Other countries have been threatened by similar explosive trends in subsidy expenditure. The IMF (2012) estimated that in Libya, subsidies and transfers have increased from 11.7% of GDP before the

CHART 15 Share of Total Government Expenditure in Oil Subsidies (2002-2008)



Source: Elbers and Peeters (2011).

revolution, to 15.9% of GDP in 2012, close to a quarter of the government's total expenditure.

Subsidy Reforms Have Historically Been Very Unpopular: the Area's Current Political Instability Is Jeopardising Ongoing and Planned Reforms

The budget sustainability of food and energy subsidies led to an initial wave of reforms in the 1980s, which were often included in structural adjustment programmes and linked to credit lines agreed with the IMF and World Bank. Morocco is one of the first countries in the region that attempted to reform its subsidies scheme in the mid-1980s. More recently, Morocco started to phase out all energy subsidies – with the exception of LPG – to reflect international prices. The subsequent price hikes met with strong political opposition, and today the government has only partially indexed energy prices to international market levels. Jordan moved toward an automatic fuel pricing mechanism between 2005 and 2008. However, in January 2011, the country temporarily suspended the mechanism because of popular opposition. In Lebanon, fuel price subsidies were eliminated in 2008 with the reintroduction of fuel excise taxes. However, because of increasing international market prices and political pressure, the government reduced excise taxes in 2011. Tunisia is another country struggling to reform its subsidy system. After a number of gradual increases (2005-2009) and the fall of the Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali government, the complete removal of subsidies was programmed. However, the government recently decided to suspend the increase in energy prices planned for the 2014 budget. Reforms have also been suspended or delayed due to conflicts and political instability in Egypt, Syria and Libya. In Egypt, the government increased petrol prices, cut subsidies on electricity and natural gas between 2004 and 2008 and then, in 2010, introduced a quota system for LPG. Nevertheless, fuel prices in Egypt remain among the cheapest in the world. In recent months, the government has delayed the implementation of an electronic-card-based quota system, initiated by the former President Mohamed Morsi. Libya is expected to

remove all kinds of subsidies in the next three years and has started to advertise its intention to compensate citizens with cash handouts. Finally, Syria also planned a broad reform of its subsidy scheme and fuel prices started to increase gradually in 2008. The subsidy cuts were interrupted in 2011 due to the ongoing conflicts in most areas of the country. However, in 2013, after two years of war, Syria has doubled the price of diesel fuel to reduce the cost of maintaining universal subsidies for the population.

To Be Politically Viable, Phasing out Subsidies Should Be Accompanied by the Introduction of a Modern System of Social Protection

The large number of recipients explains why, since the late 1970s, attempts to reform subsidy systems have been challenged by strong popular reactions in Egypt (1977), Morocco (1984), and Tunisia (1984). More recently, in reaction to the protests and riots of the 'Arab Spring,' most Arab countries increased their subsidies or suspended planned subsidy cuts. To prevent political opposition, a successful subsidy reform should be accompanied by a series of complementary reforms to neutralise the negative effects of higher energy prices. A safety net is often suggested as the best substitute for subsidies. However, cash transfers are often not feasible because governments lack the capacity to implement complex social protection mechanisms. In such cases, governments can implement packages of short-term measures to mitigate the impact of price increases. Moreover, subsidies can be improved by inducing self-targeting mechanisms.

All the Southern Mediterranean countries, including Gaza and West Bank territories, have some form of cash transfers for low-income households. In many cases these social benefits have been reinforced alongside the phasing out of subsidies. However, social benefits often remain unsystematic in the region and in some cases their scale and coverage are limited.²

In Jordan the government introduced a number of programmes to counterbalance the negative effects of subsidy removal, such as tax exemptions on basic

² Marcus et al. (2011) present a review of policies implemented in the area with a focus on child-sensitive social protection.

food products and an increase in the role of the National Aid Fund, a well developed social safety net scheme which is estimated to reach between 8% and 9% of the population. In Jordan, total spending on the safety net is estimated to be above 1% of GDP (Vagliasindi, 2013).

Conditional cash transfers represent an alternative to subsidies and have been adopted to achieve social protection together with other objectives such as improvements in school attendance. The Tayssir programme in Morocco made cash payments to parents with children in primary school resulting in substantial improvements in education attendance in more than 300 rural school districts between 2008 and 2010. Similarly, in Algeria the school meal programme has a twofold objective: to promote primary education and to target malnutrition and extreme poverty. The programme covers more than three million children attending primary school and is planned to achieve universal coverage by the end of 2014. In this case, school meals are complementary to a system of allowances that target particular groups (e.g. people with disabilities, widows, orphans, low-income households), which covers over 670,000 households (Marcus et al, 2011).

In areas of conflict, especially Syria and Libya, the growing number of refugees has put pressure on national social protection systems. The Syrian conflict is considered the world's largest refugee crisis in recent decades, with more than seven million refugees, two and half of them displaced in neighbouring countries. Syrian refugees are targeted by a number of emergency actions to guarantee basic necessities. However, more comprehensive policies are needed, especially in Jordan and Lebanon.

The Way Forward

In the last decade, Southern Mediterranean countries have embarked on comprehensive reforms of their subsidies. Despite a long list of adverse effects, energy subsidies represent an important social safety net for poor and vulnerable households. Any attempt to eliminate or cut subsidies in absence of some form of compensatory programmes would lead to a decline in households' welfare. Del Granado et al. (2010), for example, show that a \$0.25 per litre increase in fuel

prices in Jordan could reduce real consumption of the poorest 20% of households by more than 5%. There are some key ingredients that are likely to ease the process of reform, among others: public awareness, gradual phase out, and targeted social benefits to compensate 'losers.' However, there is not a single formula. Each country has to find the most suitable tools taking into account its socioeconomic and political context and traditional mechanisms of social protection. Efficiency gains from subsidy removals are very high, and reforms have the potential to be a source of political support rather than a source of political opposition and instability.

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Secteurs stratégiques | **Économie et territoire**

L'intégration régionale et la création d'un marché de l'emploi pour les jeunes en région Méditerranée

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
Le défi du chômage des jeunes

Au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord, région qui englobe plusieurs pays du sud et de l'est de la Méditerranée, le chômage est un des plus élevés au monde. Même avant la crise, la courbe de croissance des offres d'emploi était à la traîne, loin derrière la croissance économique. Le chômage dans cette région concerne essentiellement les jeunes gens entre 15 et 24 ans et plus particulièrement les femmes (Organisation internationale du Travail, 2015). La pression démographique est une des causes principales du taux élevé d'inactivité dans cette région : au cours des cinquante dernières années, le fort déclin de la mortalité infantile et le niveau de fertilité élevé expliquent les taux importants de croissance de la population. De tels taux se sont traduits par une forte croissance de la population active, qui se manifeste dès le début des années soixante-dix dans les pays du nord de la Méditerranée, mais qui atteint actuellement un point critique dans les pays du sud de la Méditerranée. Cette pression démographique fait entrer de plus en plus de jeunes sur le marché du travail, lequel s'avère incapable de fournir suffisamment d'offres d'emploi pour absorber cet afflux de nouveaux entrants.

Le graphique n° 1 donne le ratio en 2015 entre le taux de chômage des jeunes et celui des adultes pour les pays de l'UpM du sud de la Méditerranée. Les lignes représentent le nombre de fois où le taux de chômage des jeunes dépasse celui des adultes. À quelques exceptions près, le chômage des jeunes est trois fois supérieur à celui des adultes. Au moment où ils passent de l'école au monde du travail, les jeunes éprouvent plus de difficultés à trouver un emploi que la population adulte. La raison principale est leur manque d'expérience (ce que la littérature spécialisée appelle le « déficit d'expérience »), mais il existe plusieurs facteurs qui peuvent rendre plus facile ou plus difficile cette transition (Fondation européenne pour la Formation - ETF, 2015a).

Ces taux très élevés de chômage, particulièrement chez les jeunes, ont des conséquences économiques et sociales importantes. D'une part, les conditions du marché du travail sont un des facteurs incitatifs qui explique le mieux les flux migratoires en provenance de certains pays vers d'autres disposant de meilleures perspectives de travail, non seulement en direction de l'Union européenne mais aussi vers d'autres parties du monde. En fait, l'émigration des jeunes est clairement en expansion et les régions de destination changent par rapport aux destinations traditionnelles, les pays de l'UE n'étant plus la destination principale (Nations Unies, 2016). D'autre part, les forts taux de chômage découragent aussi les jeunes de participer au marché du travail (Fondation européenne pour la Formation - ETF, 2015b) et de fait, les jeunes « ni en emploi, ni en formation », ou NEET (Not in Employment, Education or Training) représentent égale-

¹ Cet article résume une partie des conclusions du prochain rapport de l'IEMED-EMEA intitulé « Youth Employment and Regional Integration in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. Qualitative and Quantitative Economic Analysis on Whether and How Regional Integration Could Lead to Youth Employment » de AYADI, R. ; KOSTAS, F. ; PAROUSSOS, L. ; PANAGIOTIS, K. ; RAMOS, R. ; SESSA, C. ; SESSA, E. ; APPRIOUAL, A. et ALBINAYA, R.



Source : élaboration personnelle à partir des données de l'OIT (les codes pays à trois lettres sont ceux de l'OIT).

ment un taux très élevé dans la région. Par exemple, selon les dernières estimations de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail, obtenues avec les statistiques d'Eurostat disponibles pour 2014, le taux des NEET pour le groupe d'âge des 15-24 ans est de 23 % en Algérie, de 28 % en Égypte, de 16 % en Israël et de 25 % en Jordanie et en Tunisie, alors que dans l'Union européenne il est d'environ 12,5 %.

Inadéquation des compétences et insuffisance de la demande de travail

Une caractéristique frappante de ce phénomène, spécifique à la région, est que l'éducation n'est pas une garantie contre le chômage. Les données suggèrent que le taux de chômage dans la région augmente de pair avec le niveau d'éducation atteint. Dans des pays comme l'Égypte, la Jordanie ou la Tunisie, les jeunes qui ont terminé un cycle éducatif tertiaire se retrouvent deux à trois fois plus en situation de ne pas être employé par rapport à ceux qui n'ont qu'un niveau d'éducation primaire ou inférieur (OIT, 2015). Cela contraste avec la situation des régions des pays les plus développées ou en déve-

loppement où le chômage baisse à mesure que le niveau d'éducation augmente. La raison principale de ces forts taux de chômage pour les travailleurs les plus éduqués est l'inadéquation des compétences par rapport au marché du travail dans toute la région. Pour améliorer cette situation, les gouvernements devraient réformer le système éducatif et les systèmes de formation afin de développer les compétences adéquates (UNESCO, 2016). De plus, des dispositifs d'intermédiation pourraient également être améliorés pour aboutir à une meilleure correspondance avec l'offre d'emploi.

Mis à part les facteurs décrits ci-dessus, qui sont surtout liés à l'offre de travail, la demande de travail est ce qui détermine principalement le nombre et le type des emplois créés, sachant que la plupart des pays du nord et du sud de la région Méditerranée ont des contraintes importantes du côté de la demande. En premier lieu, les conditions macro-économiques et les cadres institutionnels n'apportent pas le soutien nécessaire au développement des affaires et à la création d'emplois, comme le soulignent régulièrement les rapports « Doing Business » de la Banque mondiale ou le Forum économique mondial (2016). Les régulations du marché du travail sont identifiées comme un frein important

à la création d'emplois, et plus généralement comme une contrainte majeure à l'expansion des affaires. Les effets négatifs d'un cadre rigide de régulations et en conséquence la réticence des employeurs à prendre des risques sont particulièrement graves pour ceux qui recherchent un emploi pour la première fois. Ensuite, la part importante que représente le secteur public en matière d'emplois (Behar et Mok, 2013) et l'omniprésence d'entreprises et d'emplois informels (OCDE, 2009) constituent également une limite importante à la création d'emplois de bonne qualité et à une croissance plus importante de la productivité, comme cela a déjà été remarqué.

Intégration régionale et création d'emplois

Comme a pu le souligner un groupe de travail ad hoc de l'UpM consacré à la création d'emplois (2016), les politiques du marché de l'emploi ne devraient pas se concentrer uniquement sur l'aspect offre, mais devraient être conçues comme des ensembles cohérents de mesures incluant une politique de l'offre et une politique de la demande, et recherchant les synergies positives entre ces deux facettes. L'objectif premier de toute politique devrait être d'améliorer l'employabilité des travailleurs et de parvenir à une meilleure corrélation entre l'offre et la demande, et de créer davantage et de meilleures possibilités de travail par une croissance soutenue et inclusive de la demande. Les gouvernements devraient accroître les ressources dédiées à une meilleure efficacité des politiques actives du marché du travail (PAMT), et centrer leurs efforts sur la formation professionnelle et l'éducation, l'orientation, l'intermédiation et les choix professionnels.

En ce qui concerne la création d'emplois, il pourrait y en avoir davantage et de meilleure qualité si on améliorerait la concurrence entre les produits présents sur le marché grâce à la dérégulation, mais aussi si on investissait dans les infrastructures et qu'on adoptait des stratégies de spécialisation intelligente qui permettraient de mieux tirer profit d'une intégration régionale plus poussée. De fait, une plus grande coordination entre les pays de cette région grâce à une intégration régionale approfondie pourrait tirer l'emploi vers le haut de plu-

sieurs façons. On sait très bien que fournir un meilleur accès aux marchés grâce à l'élimination des barrières douanières pourrait créer de nouvelles opportunités pour les entreprises compétitives qui, à leur tour, feraient croître la demande de travail et contribueraient à générer de nouveaux emplois dans la région. La disparition des droits de douane pourrait faire baisser les prix à l'intérieur du pays au niveau des prix les plus bas de la région. Au départ, certes, la production domestique chute, mais la consommation intérieure augmente et les importations totales également. Des marchés plus vastes résultant d'une intégration régionale peuvent permettre aux entreprises d'exploiter des économies d'échelle, provoquant une chute des coûts, et des prix pour les consommateurs locaux. Cela peut aussi conduire à un plus grand choix et une plus grande diversité de produits disponibles pour le consommateur. La diminution des tarifs douaniers permet de créer de l'activité commerciale entre les participants de la région exposée à la libéralisation.

Une plus grande coordination entre les pays de cette région grâce à une intégration régionale approfondie pourrait tirer l'emploi vers le haut de plusieurs façons

Les effets de la réduction des tarifs douaniers sur le bien-être économique sont de trois sortes : un gain pour le consommateur en raison des prix plus bas sur le marché intérieur, une perte de profits pour les producteurs, et une perte de profits douaniers pour le gouvernement. On estime habituellement que les gains pour le consommateur dépassent les pertes subies par le producteur et pour le gouvernement lorsqu'on réduit les tarifs douaniers, et que ce changement de politique aboutit à un gain total pour le bien-être national. Des résultats similaires sont obtenus dans le cas de barrières non tarifaires. Associée à la création d'activités commerciales, une réorientation des échanges a également lieu : des importations d'un pays tiers sont remplacées par des importations de partenaires, désormais moins chères en termes re-

latifs, et cela contribue également à la création d'emplois.

Cependant, bien que les effets d'une intégration plus poussée doivent être positifs à moyen et long terme, il pourrait y avoir au début des déplacements de travailleurs. En particulier, si la libéralisation du commerce implique une expansion du secteur de l'import-export, il y a en même temps une diminution de la demande locale pour les secteurs concurrentiels de l'import, dont les travailleurs vont être déplacés vers des activités non commerciales ou vers des secteurs nouvellement créés. En fait, une intégration économique plus poussée peut générer des gains de productivité évidents. Importer crée en théorie plus de concurrence, ce qui oblige les entreprises du pays à devenir plus efficaces pour ne pas disparaître, et procure également un meilleur accès aux nouvelles technologies et un transfert de savoir-faire. Les entreprises qui surfent sur la vague d'une transition continue vers une meilleure productivité dans les activités commerciales offrent habituellement de meilleurs salaires à leurs employés, dont les compétences tendent à s'améliorer et qui sont affectés à des tâches moins routinières ; mais les employés peu qualifiés et ceux qui travaillent sur des tâches routinières peuvent pâtir de cette situation. C'est pourquoi les politiques mises en place doivent comprendre ces dynamiques et s'efforcer de minimiser les effets négatifs de la transition.

Si une intégration plus étroite par le biais de la concurrence améliore l'efficacité avec laquelle ces facteurs se combinent, elle implique aussi des investissements plus importants. Pendant que ces nouveaux investissements se mettent en place, les pays concernés peuvent connaître un effet de croissance à moyen terme. Si de tels investissements sont associés à un progrès technique plus rapide ou à une accumulation de capital humain, des taux de croissance à long terme peuvent aussi être améliorés. Enfin, il existe d'autres aspects économiques qui peuvent aussi s'ajouter aux effets commerciaux déjà décrits. En particulier, le développement des infrastructures peut être amélioré et permettre un meilleur accès aux marchés, grâce à des réseaux de transports plus efficaces qui pourraient attirer davantage d'investissements directs étrangers, lesquels renforceraient les effets positifs de l'intégration sur les marchés du travail.

À l'aide d'un modèle général d'équilibre calculable (MEGC), Ayadi et al. (2017) ont quantifié l'impact de la création d'emploi pour les jeunes dans le cadre d'une plus grande intégration des pays de la région Méditerranée. Si le statu quo de l'intégration régionale est maintenu, et que les pays prennent des mesures pour réduire les déficits des budgets publics pour améliorer leur balance commerciale et leurs infrastructures, le taux de chômage des jeunes peut, selon les prévisions, passer de 25,7 % en 2015 à 17,6 % en 2040 (cela signifie la création d'au moins 4,4 millions d'emplois). Cette situation est à comparer à celle d'un scénario d'intégration régionale plus poussée où l'on considère deux niveaux différents : l'abolition progressive des droits de douanes et barrières non tarifaires, et un processus d'harmonisation entre les pays avec une gouvernance accrue. Avec ce scénario alternatif, on a un gain net de 570 000 emplois additionnels pour les jeunes par rapport au scénario d'intégration superficiel. Cet impact positif est dû à l'amélioration de l'activité économique générale (réduire le risque d'investissement donne un meilleur soutien à la croissance économique que le retrait des barrières tarifaires) et à une meilleure conjonction de la force de travail qualifiée avec le capital.

L'hypothèse principale qui sous-tend cette vision des choses est que renforcer la position des pays de la région Méditerranée nécessiterait un processus d'intégration renforcé et accéléré, faisant appel à un programme d'action complet, nouveau et multidimensionnel en matière d'infrastructures, d'innovation et de politique industrielle (appuyé par une stratégie de co-développement) mis en place dans différents secteurs : le transport, l'énergie et la décarbonisation, l'eau, l'économie digitale, l'économie bleue, le développement urbain durable, ainsi qu'une coopération renforcée sur l'innovation, la R&D, l'éducation, l'emploi et les programmes d'employabilité des jeunes, et les programmes sociaux (par exemple, le renforcement de l'autonomie des jeunes et des femmes). Les principes de base et les objectifs de cette nouvelle politique au bénéfice de la région permettraient le développement d'une nouvelle dynamique constructive, qui décuplerait l'investissement, les projets régionaux et le développement des infrastructures. Un effet démultiplicateur serait généré en matière de croissance économique et de création d'emplois.

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Promoting Entrepreneurship: a Growing Instrument of Soft-diplomacy in the MENA Region

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Understanding the influence of globalization and technology on North Africa and the Middle East requires an optimistic approach to a puzzle with infinite solutions, to which pieces are continuously being added. Constant and quick transformations trigger systemic and interconnected challenges on the political, economic and social levels. Given this complex context, any foreign policy towards the region must be endowed with tools that can respond effectively to new challenges as well as to the speed with which they spread.

The *Arab Spring* has shown us that promoting political reforms and human rights must be accompanied by a strategy aimed at improving the living conditions of the population, and in particular, offering prospects of progress and prosperity. One of the keys lies in acting on the 60% of the population of North Africa and the Middle East that are under 30 years of age. The increasingly educated and trained swath of young people aged between 15 and 29 make up more than 30% of the working-age population, amounting to over 105 million people.¹ The accumulation of uncertainty, frustration and social discontent resulting from a job market incapable of offering enough quality employment in uncompetitive economic systems constitutes a threat to the stability of these countries. It is estimated that the

region will need to create more than 100 million jobs between now and 2020, both to respond to this demographic challenge and to address the issue of a large part of the population being trapped in the informal economy or suffering from the effects of thousands of jobs eventually disappearing due to the impact of technology. The United Nations have warned that the number of people in Arab countries at risk of suffering conflict will increase from 250 million in 2010 to 350 million in 2020.

The digitalization of the economy and support for entrepreneurs and innovation is a means and an opportunity for the region to board the train of economic modernization in a competitive global market characterized by a complex system of interdependence.² An approach to Arab and Muslim countries in terms of assistance and cooperation that does not contemplate this situation is overlooking an increasingly key factor. With this vision, a strategy of promoting entrepreneurship as one of the available diplomatic instruments raises a country or multilateral organization's foreign policy to the level of effort and sophistication called for in the North Africa and Middle East context. Its mainstreaming of fundamental issues like empowerment, sustainable and sustained economic growth and democratization leads to fair and stable societies. It fosters collaborative relations and trust and strengthens social capital by creating opportunities and through effort and merit-based recognition. It favours the inclusion of women in the workforce,³ the attraction of human capital, talent and investment. It brings with it the legal reforms needed to allow com-

¹ UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, *Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality*, 2016.

² Ver SCHROEDER, Christopher M. and Kamel SHERIF. *Economic Recovery and Revitalization*, Middle East Strategy Task Force. Washington, D.C., Atlantic Council, 2016.

³ ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. *Women in Business 2014: Accelerating entrepreneurship in the Middle East and North Africa Region*. OECD Publishing, 2014.

panies emerging from the technological revolution to establish themselves and grow; companies which, because of their disruptive nature, require a streamlined and efficient public administration.

Data on the potential entrepreneur from the MENA region portray an encouraging dynamic that contrasts with the perception of disorder and chaos we have come to associate with the region after decades of unending conflicts. As an open global platform for innovation, trade and the exercise of human rights, the Internet is used on a daily basis by 83% of young people in the region. According to the International Telecommunications Union, mobile phone subscriptions have increased from 26.8% in 2005 to 109.9% in 2016. Between 2010 and 2015 the number of entities supporting ecosystems of entrepreneurship at the regional, national or local levels, such as *Wamda* or the *Palestine Internship Program*, have increased fivefold. In 2016 more than 200 events have been organized with entrepreneurs, 50% more than in the previous year – in some, such as *Start-up Istanbul* in 2016, up to 500 start-ups competed with the number of attendees reaching 4,000. The *MIT Enterprise Forum Arab Competition* alone has brought together 80,000 individuals in its nine calls –. In March 2017, *Amazon* bought *souq.com*, the region's largest *e-commerce* platform, an investment estimated at around 800 million dollars, a similar figure to the 759 million dollars invested in 480 startups between 2013 and 2015. In addition, cities from all over the region are being transformed into smart cities or technological hubs and open spaces that foster collaboration are growing (*Collaborative Open Innovation*, *Innovation Spaces*, *Living Labs*, *Digital Fabrication Laboratories* or *FabLabs*) where children, young people or adults can turn up and learn new skills for making products with 3D printers, for example, or the basics of robotics. Traditional gas and oil exporting countries like the United Arab Emirates, Qatar or Saudi Arabia are looking to diversify their economies, attract better talent and bring their education systems into line with the needs of the market.⁴ It is estimated that a 10% improvement in its *Global Entrepreneurship Index*, will enable the Mediterranean region to increase its Gross Domestic Product by 592 million dollars.

It is true that neither military force nor entrepreneurship can resolve the problems North Africa and the Middle East are currently suffering. Nor can young people be forced to be entrepreneurial and not all can have the capacity or the skills to achieve success. However, as Barack Obama warned, a foreign policy towards the region aimed solely at isolating and controlling destructive and murderous fanatics and which is not capable of listening and helping individuals who want to create value, is losing perspective.⁵ Today, no government, by itself, has the knowledge or the capacity to respond to major global challenges, such as climate change, poverty, water scarcity, food security, pandemics, growing urban agglomerations, inequality or terrorism. On the contrary, they have to cooperate and seek alliances with other stakeholders – states, international organizations, the private sector – and allow and encourage the creativity, imagination and ambition of young people empowered by technology, so they can become disruptive agents of change. Each war that breaks out reduces the chance of an individual's innate talent being put to an innovative and creative use and thereby having a positive impact on their country or community's welfare.

The Obama Administration's interpretation of the world and the situation in North Africa and the Middle led Washington to placing the entrepreneur in the centre of its foreign policy, as a driver of prosperity and freedom. During his term, Obama followed a strategy grounded in the transformative power of technology and in the culture of entrepreneurship as a factor of national power that is more relevant than ever in the knowledge era. The US administration banked on the appeal and need for Arab and Muslim countries to learn from its successful technological sector to reform and diversify their economies. This has been its initial aim. Thanks to its experience, credibility and prestige – thereby making it better connected – the United States occupies a central position in the structure of transnational networks of productive enterprise. By themselves, these networks have the capacity to promote and expand positive narratives and behaviour that counters messages of violence and despair. The *centrality* of the United States allows it to *influence*

⁴ ELMASRY, Tarek; BENNI, Enrico; PATEL, Jigar et al. *Digital Middle East: Transforming the region into a leading digital economy*. McKinsey, 2016.

⁵ GOLDBERG, Jeffrey. *The Obama Doctrine*, The Atlantic, 2016. www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/

– using a form of *soft power* – the social connections that form these networks, both to right the region's image and detect and capture talent there. Entrepreneurship is also a way to internationalize a country's economy and open new growth markets. The US is, therefore, involved in the exponential growth of the digital economy in the MENA region – 30 billion dollars in 2018 – and the data and information flows generated by the region – a 33% growth since 2012 in e-commerce – as an increasingly educated population with greater purchasing power, has access to broadband and mobile technology. The economic impact and creation of quality jobs in the region may lead to better expectations regarding these countries' political and financial stability. With this goal in mind, the promotion of entrepreneurship would be a modern and transparent *bottom-up, positive-sum* instrument of public diplomacy (*attraction*) and economic diplomacy (*digital economy*), which is strategic, inclusive and long-term in its outlook (*strategic patience*).

The United States occupies a central position in the structure of transnational networks of productive enterprise. These networks have the capacity to promote and expand positive narratives and behaviour that counters messages of violence and despair

One of the keys to the design of this strategy is that it has not been improvised nor decided on without collaborating with countries in the region. Instead, it has emerged from a broad reflection among different political, economic and social spheres from the United States on the root causes of what is happening in the MENA region, the impact of its foreign policy and diplomatic action, the overall situation and the potential of communication and information technologies. During George W. Bush's second term, the deterioration of the US' image in the eyes

of Muslim countries and communities following the former's response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to the development of a new concept of diplomacy known as *transformational diplomacy*, which followed on from the vision outlined in the *Middle East Partnership Initiative* (MEPI). This put forward a non-paternalistic way of doing diplomacy, focused on empowerment and improving the lives of the citizens, to whom the decisions regarding their countries' futures falls. Stability in the region could not be achieved at the cost of sacrificing democratic progress in the countries there. Moreover, the essence of a report by the Council on Foreign Relations⁶ was recovered, which emphasized the demands of young Arabs and Muslims for help from the United States in reforming their legal, health and education systems and modernizing their economies, only without political meddling. Finally, during Hillary Clinton's time as State Secretary, further efforts were made to adapt US diplomacy to a world in continual change, with multiple actors and where the technological revolution facilitates instant and free access to information for thousands of young people, wherever they live. The first and second *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (QDDR) and the economic strategy known as *21st Century Statecraft* – foreign policy as economic policy – have defined the fundamental pillars upon which Barack Obama based his presidency, i.e., people-focused, idealist and without excessive interference, providing clear support for entrepreneurship and innovation. The fact that this vision was included in the last US National Security Strategy⁷ demonstrates the firm resolve behind this policy. Barack Obama's speech at the University of Cairo in 2009 (*A New Beginning*) was a display of this new constructive form of commitment with Muslim countries and communities. It was also the moment chosen to announce the first summit on entrepreneurship, aimed at and at the request of the countries in the region.

There is widespread consensus that the political and institutional reforms in the MENA region must be accompanied by the transformation and modernization of their economies, with an oversized public sector, bureaucracy, labour market rigidity, monop-

⁶ Craig CHARNEY and Nicole YAKATAN: *A New Beginning: Strategies for a More Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World*, Council on Foreign Relations 2005

⁷ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 2015.

lies of power and excessive dependence on fossil fuels. However, there are limits to how much an economy can expand within national borders in a globalized world. It will only continue to grow if it opens to the outside. And this can be done by: allowing entrepreneurs to access networks of global knowledge, education or funding (*venture capital, private equity, business angels...*); creating forums and competitions that inspire, mobilize and promote collaboration, make ideas visible and celebrate success stories; facilitating access to broadband networks and freedom of information; and creating a labour force with skills adapted to the demands of the market, with quality education in the sciences, technology, engineering or mathematics (STEM).

With this vision, the foreign policies of both the US and the European Union have set up different instruments that follow the specific aim of supporting and connecting entrepreneurs from Arab and Muslim countries and communities with each other and with interlocutors from outside the region.

The United States has launched *Partners for a New Beginning* (NPB), *Global Innovation Through Science and Technology* (GIST), *Women's Entrepreneurial Centers of Resources, Education, Access, and Training for Economic Empowerment* (WECREATE), *Presidential Ambassadors for Global Entrepreneurship* (PAGE), *Partnering to Accelerate Entrepreneurship* (PACE) Initiative, *Development Innovation Ventures* (DIV), *Entrepreneurship & Innovation Programs* (EIP), *Global Entrepreneurship Program* (GEP), *Stevens Initiative*, *The Resilient, Entrepreneurial, And Dynamic Youth* (READY) and the *Global Entrepreneurship Summit*, with annual editions in Washington (2010), Istanbul (2011), Dubai (2012), Kuala Lumpur (2013), Marrakech (2014), Nairobi (2015) and Silicon Valley (2016). The European Union, through the Union for the Mediterranean, has launched programmes such as the *Mediterranean Initiative for Jobs* or *Med4Jobs*. The ministerial declaration of the *Union for the Mediterranean on the Digital Economy* (2014) and the subsequent creation of the *Working Group on the Digital Economy and Internet Access* are signs of the readiness to further enhance this strategy.

Today, foreign policy is synonymous with economic policy, just as the economy increasingly means the digital economy. While it waits to see how the new US administration will act, Europe is in a privileged

position for positively influencing the region's vibrant ecosystem of entrepreneurship. Without doubt, a security and foreign policy strategy towards North Africa and the Middle East that brings development, diplomacy and defence up to the same levels is the right track to be on. However, this strategy must be adapted to a world of fast-spreading networks with positive and negative interactions that mutate between the physical and the virtual. Moreover, we must cease to measure the region's future through the prism of terrorist alerts. It will be determined by the capacity and creative talent of its human capital. Promoting constructive and collaborative spaces and synergies through instruments that support entrepreneurs – validated by the United Nations' *Agenda 2030* – is a useful effort with a real impact; something demanded today by millions of young people in a region where things are already starting to happen. As the main commercial, investment and cooperation partner in the area, the European Union has to contemplate the eventual structuring of a policy that incentivizes entrepreneurship, with an emphasis on innovation and digital technologies.

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Fuite des cerveaux venant du sud de la méditerranée

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La question de la fuite des cerveaux (*brain drain*) a connu une nouvelle lecture par les analystes de trois pays du sud de la Méditerranée (Algérie, Maroc et Tunisie). Cette révision provenant du Maghreb prend appui sur les données diffusées par l'OCDE (2014) sur les migrations internationales ainsi que sur celles de l'INSEE (2014) et sur des enquêtes menées récemment au Maghreb. Il est observé une progression des migrants ayant un niveau supérieur provenant du Maghreb central à l'étranger. D'où vient cette progression ? S'agit-il d'une fuite des cerveaux ? Si oui, que faire ? Les analystes maghrébins divergent dans leurs approches et empruntent aussi des méthodes distinctes pour démontrer que la fuite est persistante, tirée plus par les politiques de migration actives des pays du Nord. Ces analystes révèlent un gaspillage des cerveaux (*brain waste*) dans ces pays bien qu'on espère aussi un gain en retour (*brain gain*) des migrants scientifiques.

Vue d'ensemble de la migration provenant des pays du Maghreb central

Les pays du Maghreb central (Algérie, Maroc et Tunisie) enregistrent en 2015 un peu plus de 80 millions de résidents, soit plus du double (UNDESA,

2015) qu'en 1960, où ils étaient à peine 27 millions. Ces pays sont aussi connus pour être des pays d'émigration. Il y a un stock de 5 millions de migrants à l'étranger, dont près de 90 % en Europe selon les données onusiennes (UNDESA, 2015), soit 6,2 % de la population résidente maghrébine. Le volume de migrants maghrébins de niveau supérieur est estimé autour de 800 000 dans les pays de l'OCDE, soit un taux moyen de 20 % en 2010 contre 10 % en 1990 (OCDE, 2014).


Comme on peut l'observer, le rythme de progression n'est pas identique selon les trois pays. L'Algérie accuse la croissance la plus forte, passant d'un taux de 5 % en 1990 à 21 % en 2010, soit un effet multiplicateur de 4,2 comparé à 2 pour la Tunisie et 1,5 pour le Maroc. Quelques questions s'imposent. Cette progression est-elle une fuite des diplômés « formés » dans le pays d'origine ? Si oui, quel est le taux de fuite observé ? Les données de l'OCDE sont limitées pour trouver les réponses. On fera usage des statistiques françaises pour tenter une estimation.

Analyses des compétences maghrébines en France

Le volume de migrants maghrébins actifs de niveau supérieur, âgés de 25 ans et plus, en France est estimé à environ 324 000 selon les données de l'enquête Emploi (INSEE, 2012).

Ces données permettent d'aller dans certains détails jusqu'ici peu connus. On s'intéressera en particulier aux ingénieurs et aux médecins. Le stock de ces

¹ Eric GOBE, et al. *Les ingénieurs maghrébins dans les systèmes de formation. Systèmes de formation. Filières coloniales et pratiques professionnelles. Professionnalités contemporaines*. Institut de recherche sur le Maghreb contemporain de Tunis. Pas d'éditeur commercial, p. 225, 2001. <https://hal-mnhn.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00120303/document>.



Source : exploitation de données de l'OCDE.

TABLEAU 19

Répartition des migrants maghrébins selon leurs diplômes en France

Diplômés	Maroc	Algérie	Tunisie	ENSEMBLE
Diplôme supérieur à baccalauréat + 2 ans	87 294	95 630	26 782	209 706
<i>Dont doctorats de santé</i>	5 106	17 658	5 106	27 870
<i>Dont licence</i>	4 961	21 034	4 961	30 956
<i>Dont écoles d'ingénieur</i>	6 787	14 115	6 787	27 689
Baccalauréat + 2 ans	52 407	44 255	17 325	113 987
<i>Dont BTS (Brevet de technicien supérieur)</i>	8 891	17 762	8 891	35 544
Total (1) niveau universitaire	139 702	139 885	44 107	323 694
Total (2) population immigrée occupée (25-46 ans)	640 046	453 395	230 402	1 323 843
Taux migrant universitaire / ensemble de migrants (1/2)	21,8	30,9	19,1	24,5

Source : Exploitation Enquête Emploi, INSEE, 2012 (France).

deux profils est presque au même niveau dans l'ensemble. L'Algérie semble faire encore l'exception : trois fois plus de médecins algériens et deux fois plus d'ingénieurs, par rapport à ceux des pays voisins. Si la connaissance sur les ingénieurs maghrébins est assez documentée ¹, le deuxième profil, celui des médecins, invite à l'analyse. Quels sont les profils de médecins les plus prisés dans l'hexagone ?


Les données de l'Ordre des médecins en France (2014) permettent une première analyse. L'estimation du *taux de fuite* ² selon certaines spécialités est

faite en rapport avec la démographie des médecins en exercice au Maghreb selon les données publiées par l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS).

Le taux de fuite le plus important relevé est celui des psychiatres (avec 30 %) provenant de l'Algérie. Ce profil est également important dans les deux autres pays. L'Algérie enregistre aussi le taux le plus élevé de radiologues et d'ophtalmologues. Au Maroc comme en Tunisie, la spécialité la plus prisée en France est celle des anesthésistes-réanimateurs, autour de 24 %.

² Ce taux est calculé sur la base des médecins *nés et formés* dans le pays d'origine et installés dans le pays d'accueil par rapport au nombre total de médecins en activité dans le pays d'origine - cf. Article ZEHNATI, A. *La démographie médicale en Algérie : formation, activité et brain drain*, p. 171-190 dans MUNETTE, S. *De la fuite des cerveaux à la mobilité des compétences ? Une vision du Maghreb*, CREAD/BIT, Alger, 2016.

GRAPHIQUE 22 Taux de fuite des médecins maghrébins selon les spécialités en France




Source : établi selon les données de Zehnat Ahcène, CREAD, 2016.

Du *Brain Waste* au *Brain Gain* en passant par le réseau diaspora ?

Ces constats nous conduisent à interroger les différentes approches de la fuite des cerveaux. D'abord, celle des « transferts de fonds », approche soutenue par les analystes de la Banque mondiale (Bollard, 2009). Cette thèse soutient que les migrants scientifiques installés à l'étranger peuvent contribuer au développement du pays d'origine à travers l'envoi de leurs épargnes mais aussi à travers leurs connaissances, leurs savoir-faire... Ensuite, une autre approche met en valeur l'éventualité d'un « brain gain » (Oded Stark). Plus un profil est demandé à l'étranger, plus la demande de formation dans ce profil serait enregistrée dans le pays d'origine. Puis, à la longue, s'il y a un retour, il y aura un gain en personnel expérimenté qui servira à l'essor économique du pays d'origine. Enfin, la dernière approche se fonde sur la constitution de « réseau diasporique » (Brown & Meyer,

1999 ; Galliard, 2005) qui permet de réunir dans le cadre des associations savantes. Ces réseaux peuvent servir de liens avec les compétences nationales. Des mouvements associatifs, nous sommes passés, les NTIC aidant, à des réseaux sociaux numériques virtuels. La vérification de ces trois approches sur le terrain a produit des résultats mitigés. D'abord, sur les questions de transferts. Les études empiriques conduites au niveau du Maghreb démontrent que les travailleurs hautement qualifiés contribuent peu aux transferts d'argent (MIREM, 2008). Les conditions de travail des migrants de haut niveau démontrent qu'il y a aussi un gaspillage de cerveaux. Ces travailleurs sont souvent « sous-payés » et sont ainsi déclassés.

Les résultats de l'enquête Emploi INSEE (2012) indiquent que le niveau des rémunérations des compétences, pour les originaires d'Algérie, varie entre moins de 500 euros à 8 000 euros et plus. 35 % des personnes perçoivent moins de 1 500 euros,



Source : exploitation des données de l'INSEE in Musette (2016), CREAD/BIT, Alger.

25 % entre 1 500 et 2 500 euros et puis 37 % plus de 2 500 euros. La rémunération comprend, certes, une catégorie de personnes sous-payées, mais elle dépend aussi du volume horaire de travail, donc de la nature du contrat de travail des migrants.

Les mêmes constats de déclassements sont observés chez les travailleurs marocains par l'économiste Aomar Ibourk (2016). Il est constaté un sentiment de déclassement, notamment chez des jeunes travailleurs hautement qualifiés installés à l'étranger. Puis, il y a aussi un constat qui ne souffre d'aucune ambiguïté, c'est la non-reconnaissance des diplômes obtenus dans le pays d'origine par le marché du travail, notamment en Europe.

Ibourk tente aussi d'observer les gains attendus des migrations des compétences. L'effet incitatif à développer son capital humain est plus élevé chez les jeunes ayant un faible niveau d'instruction et désireux de tenter une expérience migratoire.

L'analyse des économistes tunisiens Mohamed Kouini & Mohamed Boughzala apporte des éléments intéressants quant aux effets incitatifs de la fuite des cerveaux (El Jafari, 2012) pour un accroissement du capital humain. L'un des résultats le plus frappant est la faiblesse de retour, notamment chez


les Tunisiens ayant un niveau supérieur. Ce constat est valable aussi pour les autres pays du Maghreb.

La dernière thèse portant sur le « réseau diaspora » reste à valider dans les pays du Maghreb. Il existe certes une multitude de réseaux des Maghrébins à l'étranger, réseaux actuellement encouragés aussi par l'Internet et les nouveaux moyens de communication. Le dénombrement effectué par ANIMA³ pour les pays de la rive sud donne un premier aperçu de la formation des réseaux. Ils sont très disparates et ne concernent pas exclusivement les scientifiques.

D'une manière brève on peut affirmer que la migration maghrébine des scientifiques présente presque la même configuration en Europe. Les conditions de vie et de travail de ces migrants, formés dans les pays d'origine, traduisent des formes de discriminations, résultent en un gaspillage de cerveaux, que ce soit sur le niveau de rémunération, de reconnaissance du diplôme ou encore de classement professionnel. En termes de gains, le nombre de migrants qualifiés qui effectue des transferts est faible en rapport avec leur effectif. Mais le peu qui s'y adonne apporte un volume assez conséquent (Musette, 2012). Les réseaux scientifiques de la diaspora n'arrivent pas encore à s'imposer pour être des véri-


³ ANIMA Investment Network est une plateforme multi-pays de coopération pour le développement économique en Méditerranée. www.animaweb.org/fr/missions#sthash.jsw117wb.dpuf.

GRAPHIQUE 24 Taux de non-reconnaissance des diplômes



Sources : Conçu par l'auteur sur la base de données d'Aomar Ibourk (2016).

GRAPHIQUE 25 Taux de déclassement professionnel



Sources : Conçu par l'auteur sur la base de données d'Aomar Ibourk (2016).

tables relais à l'investissement dans le pays d'origine. Nous rejoignons ainsi les analystes de l'IPEMED (2011) sur le passage de la migration à la mobilité au niveau des pays de la Méditerranée avec des moyens différents.

Pistes nouvelles

Quelques pistes sur la fuite de cerveaux restent encore à explorer. Trois questions restent encore peu étudiées et nécessitent plus d'exploration. Il s'agit de revoir la question du retour, puis de s'interroger sur le tarissement des transferts et ensuite de revisiter celle de l'investissement de la diaspora maghrébine.

- (i) La diaspora maghrébine ne se limite pas aux « scientifiques » mais rassemble l'ensemble des élites (politique, économique, sociale et culturelle) ainsi que les talents (artistes, sportifs). Une observation plus approfondie des réseaux diasporiques permettrait de déceler les possibilités réelles de leur contribution au développement des pays du Maghreb.
- (ii) Le tarissement des transferts est une hypothèse forte prenant appui sur le profil démographique des migrants-remiseurs. En effet, tous

les migrants ne sont pas remiseurs, tout comme on peut aussi attester que tous les remiseurs ne sont pas des migrants. Ils peuvent être issus de la migration ou être apparentés aux familles des migrants. L'exemple de l'Algérie est éloquent : plus de 90 % des transferts transitant par la voie bancaire proviennent des « retraités ». L'extinction de cette génération à court terme est prévisible.

- (iii) Les travaux récents conduits par l'UNECA sur la question des transferts de fonds démontrent que l'investissement de la diaspora reste assez faible, une plus grande mobilisation des ressources est attendue par les pays d'origine. Le passage des transferts à l'investissement reste encore énigmatique.

Dans l'ensemble, la fuite des cerveaux ainsi que le tarissement des transferts à terme invitent à de nouvelles questions sur le rapport entre migration et développement, qui reste une des thématiques de la plus haute importance dans l'agenda des Nations unies. Les crises (politiques, économiques, sociales) au niveau de notre région invitent aussi à de nouvelles formes de migration, à des déplacements forcés des populations non seulement à l'entrée des pays du Maghreb mais aussi au départ des pays de la sous-région vers les pays du Nord.

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Assessing the Quality of Education in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

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Assessing Quality of Education

To properly assess the quality of education, one needs to first of all define what 'quality' in education actually is, and the extent to which this can be measured, if at all. If by 'quality' one refers to student attainment in standardized tests in such subjects as mathematics, science, language competence, and so on, then the news from the Euro-Mediterranean region has been somewhat disheartening. Statistics generated by organizations comparing achievement across a range of 'core' curriculum areas and competences have consistently shown that students from the Arab states underperform when compared to other students from countries with a similar GDP. This is true, for instance, for the results obtained in the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA – a triennial international survey of reading, maths and science skills and knowledge involving more than half a million students from 65 economies), and in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS – conducted every four years to assess proficiency in mathematics and science of 9-10 and 13-14 year olds), which is coordinated by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement.

These assessments include the Gulf States beyond those in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in their purview. However its contours are defined, the region is clearly performing below the level expected given the participating countries' per capita income. In the TIMSS study of 2007, none of the MENA countries scored at or above the global average and most were clustered at the bottom of the table with countries that had much lower levels of per capita income. TIMSS 2011 showed some improvement for 13 countries, while seven had deteriorated. Using such international statistical evidence to compare eighth graders in MENA at different levels of achievement to an international benchmark, the World Bank notes that in absolute terms, MENA countries fail to raise even half their student population to 'low' levels of learning. While MENA has a large number of low and very low achievers, it has few high performers at the other end of the scale (see, *inter alia*, World Bank, 2008, and Gatti et al., 2013).

Another indicator of quality is the ability of the education system to positively respond to the needs, interests and characteristics of individual students, such that it succeeds in keeping them engaged in learning rather than pushing them out. Several aspects of schooling have an impact on systems' capacity to give an adequate response. These include qualified teachers, suitable student-teacher ratio, educationally sound resources, appropriate language of instruction, and so on. While there are many potential causes of student disengagement,

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high dropout rates also suggest that schools may not be adequately responding to student needs, interests and characteristics, with youths and their parents deciding that it is not worth their while to invest in formal education. While UNESCO reports that average dropout rates at the basic school level in MENA shrunk from 9.3% in 1999 to 5% in 2009, the rates for secondary level schooling remain high, with the Brookings Institution (Steer et al., 2014) reporting that in many countries in the region, more young people are dropping out of this level of compulsory age schooling than a decade ago.

Key Challenges for Education in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

On the basis of these and similar statistics, most commentators agree that education in Arab countries is in dire need of reform (Mazawi & Sultana, 2010). Criticisms are generally levelled at all levels of formal education; kindergartens are said to be either non-existent, or mainly available in urban areas and only for the professional and middle classes. Where early childhood education is provided by the State, it tends to be poor in quality with classrooms ill-equipped to implement the playful learning strategies that are most suitable for children up to five years old (Sultana, 2009). From primary right up to the end of compulsory schooling, many education systems in the Arab states are said to be hampered by inadequately trained teachers whose low salaries can hardly serve as an incentive, leading many to reserve their 'spare capacity' for after school employment which helps them make ends meet. Across the education system, the system is marked by an approach that emphasizes coverage of the curriculum over mastering it and by end-of-cycle examinations – such as the notorious *Tawjihi* – that demand rote learning rather than interactive and innovative pedagogy. This dated educational paradigm further feeds into the private tutoring 'industry,' which creates a shadow education system that has a major impact on equity (Bray, Mazawi & Sultana, 2013). Arab education also suffers, say its critics, from centralized and bureaucratic management that tends to discourage, if not squash, initiatives that respond to local needs. Most education systems in the Arab world, as elsewhere, reflect

broader social divides, so that access to better educational methods – and sometimes to formal education of any sort – depends on one's social class and gender.

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With a few notable exceptions, technical and vocational training is generally seen across the region as an educational sector for low achievers, so that it suffers from a negative image instead of being seen as an opportunity to create skilled labour. Yet at the same time, the increasing numbers of students staying on beyond compulsory school age means that many Arab universities now suffer from 'academic drift' and are overcrowded and ill-equipped, with a divide between the medical, engineering and science faculties that are considered to be the 'royal road' to higher incomes, and the lower-status humanities. The result of all this is that demand for graduates with marketable skills far outstrips supply, with many Arab governments forced to allow local and foreign investors to establish private universities, whose standards are not always of an acceptable level either.

Beyond Statistics and Bad News

The 22 Ministers of Education of the region have acknowledged these and other challenges and have, in November 2010, collectively endorsed the Doha Declaration on Education Quality. Several international agencies are offering support in this endeavour, including the World Bank. The latter has contributed to the development of the Arab Regional Agenda for Improving Education Quality, which operates as a network connecting initiatives together

for greater impact in areas as diverse as early childhood education, teacher education, the use of ICT in teaching and learning, and so on. Some of the most promising initiatives started at individual universities but have become regional in scope, as is the case of the important movement towards the use of action research in order to improve schools, currently driven by ARAS (Action Research on Accredited Schools – see <https://arasproject.wordpress.com/page/9/>) in Egypt, and TAMAM (*Al Tatweer Al-Mustanid ila Al-Madrassa*, or ‘School-Based Reform,’ with the acronym also meaning ‘all is well’ or ‘complete’ in Arabic – see <http://tamamproject.org/>).

Education, therefore, had a long way to go when these countries gained independence, and indeed much has been achieved. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has in fact increased the average level of schools by a multiple of four since 1960

When considering both the disappointing results and the encouraging initiatives highlighted above, three comments need to be made. First, one must not forget the *starting point* from where the different education systems under consideration commenced. Much of the educational provision in the Arab states had stultified during the colonial period, due either to neglect or to strategic manipulation by colonial powers to ensure widespread ignorance among the populace, while cultivating the sympathies of a small local elite that was schooled in loyalty to the metropole in language, values and culture. Education, therefore, had a long way to go when these countries gained independence, and indeed much has been achieved. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has in fact increased the average level of schools by a multiple of four since 1960. Nine of the top 20 countries in the world that have increased the average number of years of schooling between 1980 and 2010 are from the MENA region. Illiteracy has been cut down by half since 1980, while almost attaining total gen-

der parity for the primary education sector. For a region not particularly known for gender equity, girls outperform boys in maths from Grade 4 to Grade 8 – a surprising finding that bucks the international trend. Net enrolment ratios for the primary sector rose from 86 to 94% between 2000 and 2010, while those for the secondary sector rose from 62 to 70% over the same period. The average public investment in education across the region as a percentage of GDP is above 5.3% – a very respectable figure.

Second, a ‘*regional*’ approach tends to indiscriminately lump together countries, and regions within countries, that are widely disparate. Jordan and Tunisia, for instance, are not Yemen or Morocco. The problems of war-torn Syria, post-revolutionary Libya, or occupied Palestine are not the same as those of Lebanon, a country with 4 million people trying to cope with an influx of over 1 million refugees. While, generally speaking, these countries share similar histories, language, majority religion (or rather, versions thereof), a youthful demographic structure, and a broad range of cultural practices, the differences are often equally striking, inflected as these are through recent political processes, internal and external influences, and popular movements that have shaped the provision of education. In the Maghreb, the language of instruction is a major problem, with many students ending up proficient in neither Arabic nor French. In Lebanon, conflicts over identity and history are major stumbling blocks. Jordan, Tunisia and Palestine have all made major strides in ensuring women’s access to education, while Morocco and Yemen still trail far behind. Educational achievement also differs greatly between different parts of the same country: students attending schools in coastal cities of, say, Tunisia, are likely to get a different quality of educational service than those registered in schools in the rural and remote interior of the same country, such as in Kef and Kasserine. Such differences are exacerbated when there are no policies in place to ensure that high quality resources – such as trained and committed teachers, and suitable textbooks – are shared equally and fairly across all regions, with priority given to the poorer and more vulnerable sectors.

Third, general statistics – such as the ones provided by the international student assessment exercises referred to earlier – tend to mask the differences

between types of schools. Some of the private institutions available to the upper middle class and elite in such countries as Lebanon and Egypt, for instance, stand in stark contrast to the mainstream government schools, in terms of all the indicators of quality associated with education provision, such as attractiveness of school premises, high level of training of school leaders and teachers, appropriate educational resources, including digital infrastructure, innovative pedagogies, and so on. Some of the schools I have visited in the region would actually put many schools in the wealthiest European countries to shame. Quality education, however, is not restricted to private, fee-paying institutions: some state-funded schools in the region provide an excellent example of the kinds of learning spaces that encourage students from modest and even poor backgrounds to invest in studying. I have had the honour

If we have learnt anything about educational dynamics after a century of reforms internationally, it is that education systems can only change if the social and political structures that have produced them are also transformed

and the pleasure of visiting several such schools in the region, from the highly impressive community and 'girl-friendly' schools across several governorates in Egypt (Sultana, 2008), to UNRWA schools for Palestinian refugees across five fields in the Middle East (Sultana, 2007). These kinds of successes are, unfortunately, rarely captured in statistical evaluations, and can only be witnessed through more time-consuming, and expensive qualitative research, of which there are few examples in the region.

Conclusion

So, while there is much to be concerned about when considering the quality of education in the Euro-Mediterranean region, there is also much that gives hope. Particularly encouraging are the number of home-grown initiatives that draw on local re-

sources to ensure that children and young people have access to knowledge that transforms communities and lives. If we have learnt anything about educational dynamics after a century of reforms internationally, it is that education systems can only change if the social and political structures that have produced them are also transformed. The epochal shifts that we are witnessing in the region, which have fuelled as much disillusionment as hope, will play themselves out over the coming decades. The outcome will shape not only the landscape in which citizens live their lives, but also the institutions they will inhabit. And that also holds true for the quality of education we will bequeath to the next generation.

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The Union for the Mediterranean in 2017: Stocktaking and Consolidation

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At a time of political divisiveness, challenge to multilateralism and global disbandment, the co-presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean successfully managed to convene a foreign affairs ministerial conference for the second consecutive year, in Barcelona, early 2017, in the context of a broader Regional Forum that gathered public decision-makers and regional stakeholders.

From the initial launch of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), nine years ago in Paris, to the third UfM foreign affairs ministerial conference in Barcelona in 2017, the UfM has undergone considerable changes, which have substantially modified its physiognomy and refined its political significance. More importantly, drastic political and economic events have completely altered the landscape of both the northern and southern Mediterranean countries in which the UfM operates.

The Union for the Mediterranean was born as a balloon that had lost its air, amidst a pompous Summit of Heads of State and Government in Paris, the only one so far that has gathered all 43 Euro-Mediterranean countries. Indeed, the headlines that (former French President) Sarkozy's project managed to grab were transformed by the politics and diplomacy of negotiations into a downsized project of much lesser impact and tainted with a strong flavour of intergovernmentalism. The previous Barcelona Process had been underpinned by a set of principles regarding human

rights, good governance and international law that had been subscribed by all the parties involved. In contrast, the UfM abandoned the pursuit of political and legal reforms in the region, which mirror the EU's mission, and instead is focused on the political dialogue among "equal" partners and on the implementation of concrete projects. The latter appears to be in line with classical functionalist thinking: the belief that flexible and transnational institutions with clear practical functions can ameliorate international economic stagnation and security tensions¹.

Yet the first three years after the Summit were witness to a political stalemate due to the crisis in Gaza and the endurance of the Arab-Israeli conflict. So it was business as usual in the region, with the consequence that the main institutional provisions laid down in the Paris Declaration (biennial UfM Summits and ministerial meetings) could not be brought into play.

It was not until 2012 that the general environment started to change and factors of both an exogenous and endogenous nature were able to propel the UfM:

1. The wave of uprisings in the Arab Mediterranean countries triggered a first rethinking of the ENP in 2011. The EU better understood the additionality that the UfM could bring into the reviewed strategy towards the southern Mediterranean countries in pursuing state and societal resilience through economic and social development.
2. The decision that the UfM co-presidency would be taken over by the EU and Jordan was extremely positive. Whilst Jordan is a relatively stable country that provides ownership of the initiative vis-à-vis the Arab group of UfM countries, the EU (notably the EEAS, but also the EC

¹ MITRANY, David. *The road to security* London: National Peace Council, 1944.

and the EIB) plays a pivotal role in steering the organization and ensuring visibility and the inclusion of the UfM in the EU strategy towards the southern Mediterranean countries.

3. The consecutive appointment of two Moroccans at the helm of the UfM Secretariat in Barcelona was also reassuring. In particular, the decision, in March 2012, to appoint Fathallah Sijilmassi as UfM Secretary General was a blessing for the institution, not least because it offered fresh evidence of Morocco's commitment towards the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

Is the Union for the Mediterranean Experiencing a *Spring Mood*?

Between 2012 and 2016, the Union for the Mediterranean expanded considerably: feasibility studies were prepared and countless high-level meetings and seminars were regularly held to discuss a wide range of issues. To these manifold activities, one has to add the project-oriented conferences, and the identification, appraisal, labelling and promotion of regional pilot-projects. Under the dynamic leadership of Secretary General Sijilmassi, the Secretariat has undergone severe and deep transformations, both at strategic and structural levels, strengthening its capacities, partnerships and achievements. This has yielded concrete results and given new momentum to the regional cooperation.

The first three years were witness to a political stalemate with the consequence that the main institutional provisions laid down in the Paris Declaration could not be brought into play

The aforementioned expansion came with the recognition of the catalytic role that the UfM plays in regional cooperation and integration processes. A

number of high-level official documents of the EU and other multilateral organizations, reassert this role and mandate the UfM to undertake certain actions, as shown in Table 2.

Between 2012 and 2016, the Union for the Mediterranean expanded considerably: feasibility studies were prepared and countless high-level meetings and seminars were regularly held to discuss a wide range of issues

The years 2015 and 2016 emerged as a turning point for the short history of the UfM: the first UfM projects were effectively implemented thereby delivering on the core mandate for which the UfM had been established; the EU took public account of the value that the UfM entails in its policy towards the southern neighbourhood²; and, most importantly, the UfM managed to convene, albeit on an informal basis, a Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs³, the first one in this format of the 43 member countries since November 2008. In the course of the latter, Member States requested that the UfM Secretary General prepare a UfM Roadmap for action⁴ with a view to broadening the organization's thematic scope, which would be discussed throughout 2016 and eventually adopted at the beginning of 2017.

Indeed, it was not an easy exercise for the UfM co-presidency to resume the Ministerial Conferences on Foreign Affairs, having proven impossible since January 2009, when the then-Egyptian co-presidency had indefinitely postponed all political meetings of the UfM, namely Summits and Ministerial meetings of Foreign Affairs. At that time, the group of Arab countries considered it self-evident that the Arab delegations, and especially the Palestinian Authority, could not attend political meetings in which an Israeli delegation was also taking part.

² See further references in Table 2 on the Joint Communication "Review of the Neighbourhood Policy" and the adopted strategy "A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign Affairs and Security Policy"

³ 26 November 2015 in Barcelona

⁴ <http://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/UfM-Roadmap-23-JAN-2017.pdf>

TABLE 2 | List of References to the UfM in High-Level Documents

Name of the organization	Document title	Type of document	Date of adoption	Page reference
5+5 Dialogue	Conclusions of the Ministerial meeting of Foreign Affairs	Conclusions adopted at the 7th Ministerial meeting	20 - 21 April 2009	pp. 2 and 5
5+5 Dialogue	Conclusions of the Ministerial meeting of Foreign Affairs	Conclusions adopted at the 8th Ministerial meeting	15 - 16 April 2010	p. 5
EU	Resolution of the European Parliament on the UfM	Adopted resolution in plenary of the EP	20-may-10	all
EU	Conclusions of the European Council Summit	Conclusions adopted by the EU Council	16 September 2010	p. 5
EU	Conclusions of the European Council Summit	Conclusions adopted by the EU Council	4 February 2011	p. 14
EU	A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean	Joint Communication of the HRVP and EC	8 March 2011	pp. 12-13 and 16
EU	Conclusions of the European Council Summit	Conclusions adopted by the EU Council	11 March 2011	p. 6
EU	A new response to a changing Neighbourhood	Joint Communication of the HRVP and EC	25 May 2011	pp. 13, 16 and 18
G8	Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Spring	Declaration of the G8 Summit	26 May 2011	p. 5
EU	Conclusions of the European Council Summit	Conclusions adopted by the EU Council	23 - 24 June 2011	p. 14
EU	Conclusions of the European Council Summit	Conclusions adopted by the EU Council	23 October 2011	p. 9
5+5 Dialogue	Conclusions of the Ministerial meeting of Foreign Affairs	Conclusions adopted at the 9th Ministerial meeting	20 February 2012	pp. 9-10
EU	Conclusions of the European Council Summit	Conclusions adopted by the EU Council	1 - 2 March 2012	p. 11
EU	Resolution of the European Parliament on the evolution of EU macro-regional strategies	Adopted resolution in plenary of the EP	3 July 2012	pp. 3, 4, 6 and 7
5+5 Dialogue	Conclusions of the Summit of Heads of State and Government	Conclusions adopted by the 2nd Summit	5 - 6 October 2012	pp. 2, 7, 11 and 12
EU	Conclusions of the European Council Summit	Conclusions adopted by the EU Council	7 - 8 February 2013	p. 7
EU	European Neighbourhood Policy: Working towards a Stronger Partnership	Joint Communication of the HRVP and EC	20 March 2013	pp. 12 and 17
5+5 Dialogue	Conclusions of the Ministerial meeting of Foreign Affairs	Conclusions adopted at the 10th Ministerial meeting	16 April 2013	pp. 6, 10 and 11
5+5 Dialogue	Conclusions of the Ministerial meeting of Foreign Affairs	Conclusions adopted at the 11th Ministerial meeting	22 May 2014	pp. 10-11
EU-LAS	Declaration	Declaration adopted at the EU-LAS foreign ministerial meeting	10 - 11 June 2014	p. 5
EU	Resolution of the European Parliament on security challenges in the MENA	Adopted resolution in plenary of the EP	9 July 2015	pp. 8 and 15
5+5 Dialogue	Conclusions of the Ministerial meeting of Foreign Affairs	Conclusions adopted at the 12th Ministerial meeting	7 October 2015	pp. 5 and 7
EU	Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy	Joint Communication of the HRVP and EC	18 November 2015	pp. 3, 18 and 20
EU	A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign Affairs and Security Policy	Strategy presented at the European Council	28 June 2016	p. 34
EU	Resolution of the European Parliament on the situation in Tunisia	Adopted resolution in plenary of the EP	14 September 2016	pp. 8 and 10
5+5 Dialogue	Conclusions of the Ministerial meeting of Foreign Affairs	Conclusions adopted at the 13th Ministerial meeting	28 October 2016	pp. 2 and 5
EU-LAS	Declaration	Declaration adopted at the EU-LAS foreign ministerial meeting	20 December 2016	p. 3
EU-7	Madrid Declaration	Declaration adopted at the 3rd Summit of Heads of State and Government of Southern EU Countries	10 April 2017	p. 5

Source: prepared by the author from personal archive

TABLE 3 List of UfM Ministerial Meetings (until May 2017) by Competence Area

Competence area* of the UfM Ministerial Meetings	Date	Location
Foreign Affairs (informal meeting)	3-4 November 2008	Marseille (France)
	26 November 2015	Barcelona (Spain)
	23 January 2017	Barcelona (Spain)
Blue Economy	17 November 2015	Brussels (Belgium)
Digital Economy	30 September 2014	Brussels (Belgium)
Employment and Labour	10 November 2008	Marrakesh (Morocco)
	22 November 2010	Brussels (Belgium)
	27 September 2016	Dead Sea (Jordan)
Energy	11 December 2013	Brussels (Belgium)
	1 December 2016	Rome (Italy)
Environment and Climate Change	13 May 2014	Athens (Greece)
Industrial Cooperation	6 November 2008	Nice (France)
	12 May 2011	Valletta (Malta)
	19 February 2014	Brussels (Belgium)
Regional Cooperation and Planning	2 June 2016	Dead Sea (Jordan)
Research and Innovation	3-4 May 2017	Valletta (Malta)
Strengthening the Role of Women in Society	12 November 2009	Marrakesh (Morocco)
	12 September 2013	Paris (France)
Sustainable Urban Development	10 November 2011	Strasbourg (France)
	21-22 May 2017	Cairo (Egypt)
Trade	9 December 2009	Brussels (Belgium)
	11 September 2010	Brussels (Belgium)
Transport	14 November 2013	Strasbourg (France)
Water Management	22 December 2008	Sweimeh (Jordan)
	13 April 2010	Barcelona (Spain)
	27 April 2017	Valletta (Malta)

Source: prepared by the author from personal archive.

*Before the decision 6702/2/12 MED 8 PESC 202 adopted by the Council of the EU of 27 February 2012, some of the Ministerial meetings were still held under the framework of the previous "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership".

In this lengthy time-lapse, a few weeks after the last Israeli legislative elections in March 2015 and taking advantage of the fact that the government formation was still under negotiation, HRVP Federica Mogherini seized the opportunity to hold consultations with the foreign ministers of the southern Mediterranean countries on the review of the ENP. During the meeting that took place at the UfM headquarters in Barcelona, with both Arab Mediterranean and Israeli delegations in attendance, the need to reinforce the UfM at the political level was explicitly expressed. Six months afterwards, UfM ministerial meetings on foreign affairs were successfully resumed. Table 3 shows the list of UfM ministerial meetings held since the launch of the UfM by competence area.

Concluding Remarks: the Union for the Mediterranean at a Crossroads

Multilateralism is not in fashion nowadays. The UfM was conceived to upgrade the political level

of EU relations with the southern Mediterranean countries. The main problem is that the Mediterranean region as a political construct is under question. The European Union has underpinned a "core-periphery" (EU toward neighbours) policy that works primarily on a bilateral track, instead of reaffirming, in practice, that common (regional) pressing challenges need further regionalization as regards debates, policies and decision-making. *Moving from the technocratic floor to the political arena.* The UfM as the other EU policies toward the region have been de-politicized in recent years. Whilst the latter follows a logical path with a view to softening some of the relations with certain southern Mediterranean partner countries, there are growing demands to enhance regional dialogue on political and stability related issues. Considering that Summitry remains unattainable for the time being, one could thus envisage the possibility of densifying the political strategic dialogue at the Senior Official Meetings, convening Joint Strategic Permanent Committee meetings in Brus-

sels⁵, strengthening the mandate of the PA-UfM and holding informal ministerial meetings on the margins of the UNGA in order to lever political debate and decision-making.

The years 2015 and 2016 emerged as a turning point for the short history of the UfM: the first UfM projects were effectively implemented thereby delivering on the core mandate for which the UfM had been established

A UfM Roadmap for action, as a hammer to break the glass ceiling of 2008. The regional landscape at the time the Paris and Marseille Declarations were adopted has little in common with the one of 2017. The endorsement of the Roadmap by the last ministerial meeting in Barcelona constitutes a significant leap forward in the alignment of UfM priorities with those laid down in the EU Global Strategy, and more specifically in the ENP review of 2015. Nevertheless, the practical implementation of the Roadmap as regard to fields such as migration, mobility and prevention of extremism and terrorism is to be carefully monitored in order to avoid the Roadmap becoming an empty marketing shell rather than an effective political propeller.

Smooth transition of generals in the Secretariat. The most critical institutional turning point for the UfM in the short term is the replacement of its current Secretary General, whose mandate ends before the summer 2018. There is no room for eventual failure and it will not be easy to find a replacement as skillful and competent as the current Secretary General, and who complies with the political criterion. The post is still up for grabs.

It is no secret that a fully-fledged operational Secretariat with 47 labelled regional projects requires a better equipped infrastructure

An underfinanced and understaffed Secretariat in Barcelona. While considerable progress has been made in this endeavour, for instance the recent announcement that the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) had allocated a €6.5-million multiannual fund to support UfM core activities, it is no secret that a fully-fledged operational Secretariat with 47 labelled regional projects requires a better equipped infrastructure. Hence, the creation of a dedicated financial mechanism (i.e. Trust Fund) that enables funds to be pooled from interested contributors is of paramount importance to be able to reward the UfM label, alongside a more flexible set of rules to hire long-term expert personnel.

⁵ Envisioned in the Paris Declaration (2008), the Joint Permanent Committee is a body that brings together Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to the EU with the mission to react rapidly if an exceptional situation arises in the region that requires the consultation of Euro-Mediterranean partners.

The Mediterranean in the EU's 2016 Global Strategy: Connecting the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa

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Since 2007, the EU has developed a continental, and thus pan-African, approach, based on an Africa-EU Strategic Partnership¹ that also covers the African Mediterranean. The June 2016 EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)² has also directly linked the Mediterranean to the Middle East and Africa, following the “Neighbours of the EU’s Neighbours” approach.³ It is therefore time to assess the potential implications of these progressive, strategic reorientations, as 2017 will also be remembered as the year Morocco returned to the African family through the African Union (AU).

The June 2016 EUGS and the Mediterranean: The EU’s “Surrounding Regions,” the “Arc of Crisis” and the “Resilience” Concept

This article concentrates on the parts of the EUGS directly linked to the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa, but one should keep in mind that there are many other specific thematic chapters of interest for the region, such as the one on “A More Effective Migration Policy” or another entitled: “An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises.” “State and Societal Resilience to our East and South” is the EU’s second external action priority

(point 3.2) identified in the EUGS, after the “The Security of Our Union” (point 3.1). What is interesting here, is the broad geographical coverage: the EU’s eastern and southern “surrounding regions” and the use of the “resilience” concept. To the east, reference is first made to the need for the EU to “invest in the resilience of states and societies (...) stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa”. The “neighbours of the EU’s neighbours” or “the EU’s broader neighbourhood” approach is thus clearly taken into consideration as a priority, with the arc of crisis remaining in the background.⁴ Then, the concept of “resilience” is defined as being: the “ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises.” Therefore, the EU will, with its partners, “promote resilience in its surrounding regions,” since a “resilient state” is a “secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy.” According to the EUGS, resilience encompasses “all individuals and the whole of society,” and a “resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.” Thus, resilience is the new keyword in the area, and might be considered as a more realpolitik approach based on the stabilization of the EU’s neighbours, compared with the promotion of the (too) ambitious economic, legal, institutional and political reforms, including “deep democracy” criteria, promoted until recently under the ENP. The arc of crisis is clearly in the background and EU’s interest in the stability of its neighbours is

¹ The Africa EU Strategic Partnership, 2007, www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf

² A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016, www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

³ Ewan LANNON, “The ‘neighbours of the EU’s neighbours,’ the ‘EU’s broader neighbourhood’ and the ‘arc of crisis and strategic challenges’ from the Sahel to Central Asia”, in Sieglinde GSTOHL & Erwan LANNON, *The Neighbours of the European Union’s Neighbours - Diplomatic and Geopolitical Dimensions beyond the European Neighbourhood Policy*, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 1-25.

⁴ Ibid.

the first priority given the current development of transnational threats, especially terrorism.

Then, the enlargement policy of the EU is mentioned with references again to the “challenges of migration, energy security, terrorism and organized crime” that are “shared between the EU, the Western Balkans and Turkey.” Resilience is therefore also valid within the pre-accession framework, whereas, as stressed in the EUGS, EU policy towards the candidate countries will continue to be based on a “clear, strict and fair accession process.” In fact, with the Juncker Commission, the new DG NEAR (Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations) was created to reflect the so-called enlargement fatigue, whereas the activation of Article 50 TEU for BREXIT has launched an unprecedented process of narrowing the EU. The re-establishment of the death penalty in Turkey, regularly mentioned by President Erdogan, would also stop this country’s accession process.

In the subsequent part of the EUGS entitled: “Our Neighbours,” state and societal resilience is again identified as being the “strategic priority in the neighbourhood.” Reference is made in this regard to Tunisia and Georgia, therefore considered as the current ENP frontrunners and as “prosperous, peaceful and stable democracies” that could “reverberate across their respective regions.” The incentives are, however, the usual ones: Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), the creation of a still undefined “economic area with countries implementing DCFTAs,” the extension of “Trans-European Networks and the Energy Community,” and also “enhanced mobility, cultural and educational exchanges, research cooperation and civil society platforms.” Last but not least is the “full participation in EU programmes and agencies.” What is more innovative is the reference to a “strategic dialogue with a view to paving the way for these countries’ further involvement in CSDP.” It is interesting to note that Morocco or Ukraine, that were previously considered as the ENP frontrunners, are not mentioned in this part. Surprisingly there are only two references to Ukraine in the whole EUGS linked of course to Russia’s “violation of international law and the destabilization of Ukraine,” and to “Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.” Morocco and Egypt are not mentioned at all in the EUGS, which is worth noting.

The EUGS is also focusing on the idea of developing a “multifaceted approach to resilience in its surround-

ing regions” and “pursuing tailor-made policies to support inclusive and accountable governance, critical for the fight against terrorism, corruption and organized crime, and for the protection of human rights.” Differentiation between the EU’s neighbours will be increased and a multi-layered (bilateral, multi-lateral, state and non-state actors) approach will be developed, as the EU will support “different paths to resilience” in its broader neighbourhood. The risk here is to go too far with differentiation, which can lead to discrimination and promote a double-standard approach. Another clear trend is to better associate the EU Member States to the EU actions in certain specific areas. In this regard the EU will adopt a “joined-up approach to its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies” and improve “horizontal coherence between the EU and its Member States.” The development-security nexus approach has already been adopted in the Sahel strategy and to some extent in the Horn of Africa and will now be extended. However, clear evaluations, good practices and lessons must be drawn from these experiences.

Connecting the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa: towards a More Geopolitical Approach *Vis à Vis* the EU’s Broader Neighbourhood “Cooperative Regional Orders”?

A specific section (3.4) on “Cooperative Regional Orders” has been introduced in the EUGS. This is where the linkage between the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa is made under the theme: “A Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa.” The first link between the “Mediterranean, Middle East and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa” is that they “are in turmoil.” Therefore, “solving conflicts and promoting development and human rights in the south is essential to addressing the threat of terrorism, the challenges of demography, migration and climate change.” A quite vague reference to “the opportunity of shared prosperity” is then made at the end of the section. The fact that the strategy is security-oriented is normal in the sense that the EUGS is a product of the High Representative, in charge of CFSP/CSDP issues, but one should also

think about the perception such an approach may have in the abovementioned regions.

At the level of the institutional actors, the EU will reinforce its “support for and cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa and the Middle East, as well as functional cooperative formats in the region.” The institutional actors of interest for this article, and which were explicitly mentioned by the EUGS, are: the Arab League, the Union for the Mediterranean, the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community and the G5 Sahel. However, the strategy is based on “flexibility in helping to bridge divides and support regional players in delivering concrete results.” Moreover, the EU’s “bilateral and multilateral policies and frameworks” will be used as well as “partnering” with “civil societies in the region.” This functional and flexible approach, relying also on civil societies, will not be easy to implement given the complexity of the interrelationships among and between the different institutional and civil society actors. A lot of pragmatism will therefore be required and informality should be privileged, at least at the start of the process.

Among the five lines of action identified in this part, the first one is the “Maghreb and the Middle East” where the European Union will “support functional multilateral cooperation.” What is striking is how the document reflects the “US-MENA” approach to the region. It is neither the “Euro-Mediterranean” nor the ENP that are referred to. The general objective is to “back practical cooperation” and to do so “including the Union for the Mediterranean.” A number of sectors are identified: “border security, trafficking, counterterrorism, non-proliferation, water and food security, energy and climate, infrastructure and disaster management.” Dialogue and negotiation is also envisaged regarding regional conflicts (Syria, Libya and Palestinian- Israeli). At this level, it is of course the Quartet and the Arab League that are mentioned as key partners.

The second line of action is related to “sectoral cooperation with Turkey;” reinforcing the feeling that the “strict and fair accession conditionality” mentioned in the EUGS highlights a clear “negotiation fatigue” with respect to Turkey. In other words, Turkish stabilization and the role of this country as an actor in the externalization of the EU’s border controls are now more important than its democratization process, ac-

ording to the Copenhagen Political Criteria. The migration crisis and the adoption of the EU-Turkey statement on 18 March 2016 on the migration issue, just two months before the publication of the EUGS, have certainly played a role in this respect.

Turkish stabilization and the role of this country as an actor in the externalization of the EU’s border controls are now more important than its democratization process

The third line of action is the “Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and individual Gulf countries.” Iran’s “nuclear deal and its implementation” is also mentioned as well as the “dialogue with Iran and GCC countries on regional conflicts, human rights and counterterrorism.” In other words, it seems that the EU is trying to profile itself as a potential mediator regarding the conflict in Yemen, for example, where the humanitarian situation is worsening every day.

The fourth line of action is more innovative as it is about “interconnections between North and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.” The idea to support cooperation across sub-regions derives again from the Neighbours of the EU’s Neighbours approach. A second point is, however, a bit more difficult to understand. It is the idea of fostering “triangular relationships across the Red Sea between Europe, the Horn and the Gulf to face shared security challenges and economic opportunities.” This might be linked to the fact that Yemen, which is not a GCC member, is increasingly linked to the other fragile states of the Horn of Africa (Sudan and Somalia) as massive refugee flows are connecting the zone and many transnational destabilizing factors, such as terrorism and human trafficking, have to be taken into consideration. In addition, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia are all Red Sea riparian, so this might well be another bridge across the EU’s traditional, geographical administrative silos.

While it is good news that the “cross-border dynamics in North and West Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad regions” will be systematically addressed

through “closer links with the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel,” no clear methodology has yet been identified. The dialogue should thus produce recommendations soon for new innovative instruments to work at cross-border and transnational levels. For the time being, the Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) track of the ENP has generated poor results because of the reluctance of Russia to be an actor in the Eastern Partnership and northern dimension, but also because the EU instruments were too EU-inspired (EU structural funds). In other words, new specific instruments of cooperation created on the basis of partners’ requirements still have to be designed.

The last line of action is “African peace and development,” which implies an intensification of the “cooperation with and support for the African Union, as well as ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa, and the East African Community.” In this respect, the progressive creation of a network of free trade areas, in the form of (regional/interim) Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) is mentioned. It will be important, in the coming years, to connect the EPA network to the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and to other FTAs concluded recently by the EU in Asia (notably with ASEAN members). However, the emphasis is clearly and logically placed on the trade/development-security nexus. The first priority of the EU-African partnership is to “support peace and security efforts” in Africa and to assist African organizations in working on “conflict prevention, counterterrorism, organized crime, migration and border management.” This includes working at the diplomatic, CSDP and trade/development levels and reinforcing the sub-regional strategies (including Sahel, Horn of Africa, Great Lakes and Gulf of Guinea). But now an interesting novelty to note is that Morocco is to be taken into consideration in implementing the Africa EU Strategic Partnership, and this is of particular interest to the Mediterranean at large.

Conclusion

One can conclude that the 2016 EUGS is, for the time being, a diplomatic success, as its endorsement by, at that time, 28 Member States was not a

foregone conclusion. Although the result of numerous compromises, the Strategy goes beyond a simple threat list and is much more detailed compared to the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2008 update. There are, for instance, more developments in methodology and the general approach. It is, therefore, a real medium-term “Strategy” but not yet an EU Security/Defence “Doctrine.” Moreover, the fact that, for the time being, there is no real supplementary financial means is of course a major issue. We are currently in the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, meaning that it would be very difficult to mobilize supplementary financial resources before the next three years, and one should not forget the impact of BREXIT at the financial level, regarding the EU’s internal and external policies.

While in 2011, in the aftermath of the so-called “Arab Spring,” the key words for the ENP were: “deep and sustainable democracy” and the “more for more” approach, in 2017, stabilization, resilience, pragmatism and the “EU’s interests first,” characterize the new approach. The resilience concept might be well received by partners confronted with unprecedented security challenges. For instance, Tunisia will certainly benefit from an increase in Security Sector Reform assistance. But the consequences of developing a more flexible approach in terms of relations with authoritarian regimes should be evaluated very seriously.

What is striking is that the Mediterranean has been mentioned in the EUGS, but at the same time almost replaced by “North Africa or Maghreb and the Middle East,” thus coming closer to the MENA-US concept. It is, however, clear that the Mediterranean is increasingly fragmented given the recent crisis and wars. Could we witness the end of the (EEC) EU Mediterranean policies developed since 1972 with the “Global Mediterranean Policy,” followed by the renewed Mediterranean Policy” (1992) and the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (1995)? Today, the ENP and the Union for the Mediterranean are the two main frameworks for cooperation, but at the strategic level, the Mediterranean is included in a broader African/Asian Neighbourhood. Of course, the ENP has already changed the framework for cooperation while the Union for the Mediterranean includes 43 members. However, it is clear that we are entering a new phase in Euro-Mediterranean relationships.

The Euromed Dream in the New Hobbesian International Wilderness

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The Barcelona Constellation

The Euro-Mediterranean project was engendered through the Final Declaration of the First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Barcelona on 25 November 1995, in a particularly favourable international geopolitical constellation, whose optimism thoroughly influenced the project's content. On 25 December 1991, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the Soviet flag was raised for the last time over the Kremlin towers. It was the end of the confrontation between blocs and the end of the bipolar world in which blocs of countries and the major systems of capitalism and communism had faced off. Francis Fukuyama hailed it as the 'end of history' in his seminal 1989 article, later expanded into his famous book. Fukuyama foresaw 'the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.' Western-style democracy and the free market economy would thus signal the final stage of historic evolution, understood as a history of struggle whose end would give rise to a sort of perpetual peace like that imagined by Kant two centuries earlier, in which international cooperation would prevail over confrontation. With the end of the Cold War also came the end of confrontations by proxy in the developing world.

The failure of real socialism likewise entailed the discredit of the Third-World leftism and socialist leanings that had prevailed in the mindset of the leaders

in the developing world and throughout its societies. The new philosophy of international cooperation thus left behind the manipulation it suffered during the bipolar era to culminate – after a series of preliminary conferences under a positive climate with winds of hope – in the United Nations Millennium Declaration on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), that was finally approved in 2000. Clearly, the preparation and final declaration of the Millennium Goals were one of the most obvious expressions of the atmosphere of optimism permeating the international stage after the end of the Cold War, auguring a major era of peace, progress and international cooperation. In the strictly political sphere, talk also began of a 'third wave' of democratisations, as announced by the title of the well-known book by Samuel Huntington. It seemed clear that the third wave of democratisations that began in southern Europe with the democratic transitions of the 1970s in Portugal and Spain would reach, and was already beginning to reach not only Latin America and certain Asian countries but, progressively, the rest of the world. Obviously, the democratic transitions already underway at the time in Central and Eastern Europe were an important part of such change.

The Middle East Peace Process, to which we will return later, seemed particularly auspicious, in the 1995 Barcelona constellation with the 1991 Madrid Conference and the Oslo Agreements pointing towards the possibility of reaching a lasting peace in the Middle East under the principle of Israel and Palestine as two States coexisting next to one another in peace.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had provided the great, unexpected opportunity for Germany's reunification, which Chancellor Kohl effectively and vigorously managed to bring about. At the same time, the fall of the Iron Curtain gave all of Europe the great

opportunity of attracting to the European Union, still under construction, all Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) that had remained hidden and separated behind the Iron Curtain for decades, under Soviet domination. And this was when a major pact was made, symbolised by Chancellor Kohl and the President of the Spain, Felipe González: Europe would launch a major cooperation operation with the CEECs through the PHARE and TACIS programmes, with the end goal of bringing them closer to the European Union, while at the same time launching another major operation towards the South, a major Euro-Mediterranean policy to attract Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) to the EU orbit. This major pact, concluded at the Cannes Summit among the leaders of EU countries, would facilitate the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Barcelona and the approval of its Final Declaration in November 1995. In both cases, the European Union did what it knew best: applying the experience of building the EU as an area of growing integration. First cooperation, then progressive commercial, economic and finally political integration. This involved applying what we now know as the 'integration method' to foreign policy. It has been occasionally said that the EU's most successful and efficient foreign policy was precisely its enlargement process. The latter has profoundly marked EU foreign policy and its evolution. Their joint emergence in that great European Pact at the Cannes Conference demonstrates the profound, close connection between both processes, preparation for enlargement to the East and association to the South.

What would eventually become the pre-accession policy for the East European countries was clearly based on a philosophy of integration. The profound transformation aimed at and expected of the CEECs was based on their progressive approximation to the EU. These countries would have to change not only their political systems – as had occurred in the countries joining the Union in the 1970s, with Greece, Portugal and Spain going from dictatorial systems to democracies. Besides democratising their political systems, the CEEs also had to change their entire economic systems, adapting them to the market economy. The manner considered most efficient for achieving this immense transformation was their approximation and 'regulatory' adaptation to the European Union. Accepting the EU's *acquis com-*

munautaire would completely transform their institutional organisation and regulatory system political organisation to technical regulations for product manufacture, not to mention the immense, prolific body of legislation accumulated by the European Union over the course of decades. The effort required of the CEECs was immense, but so were the rewards: their complete integration into the sphere of the European Union, as well as their inclusion as full members under the protective umbrella of NATO, keeping at bay any possible blows by the fearsome Soviet bear, now a friendly country but one of formidable scale within the confines of Eastern Europe and the vast Eurasian area.

The 1995 Barcelona Declaration is not just supposed to be a charter regulating relations among countries. It goes far beyond this by proposing an immense project for change and transformation towards modernisation of the Mediterranean Partner Countries

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), traditionally also known as the Barcelona Process, was designed as a major association or partnership project whose policies also partake of the integration method. This aspect would become much more explicit through President Prodi's later announcement of a new stage of bilateral development of the Barcelona Process via the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in this case, the Southern Neighbourhood.

Barcelona Process: Goals and Approach

As is well known, what was proposed in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration was the construction of an area of peace and stability, of shared economic progress and understanding and intercultural dialogue among the peoples living along our Sea. But it is not just supposed to be a charter regulating relations among countries and between North and South. It goes far beyond this by proposing an immense project for change and transformation towards mod-

ernisation of the Mediterranean Partner Countries such that, in a manner clearly reminiscent of the integration method applied in Central and Eastern Europe, they can come into alignment with the system prevalent in the EU. It is thus an immense, ambitious, modernising project designed to upgrade the societies of those countries through the modernisation of their institutions and economies, allowing them to close the economic gap between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean Basin, a process of modernising the prevailing cultures and mindsets and a progressive coming together of countries. This immense political project fundamentally had an economic motor that consisted in creating a free trade area to revitalise countries' economies and modernise their institutions and economic policies along with their trade. The implementation of this economic motor for the great Euro-Mediterranean political project would moreover be reinforced by financial aid, which was to contribute to upgrading both sectoral policies as well as companies and economic organisations throughout the Euro-Mediterranean countries.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was built as of 1995 based on what was actually the EU foreign policy remit or areas of competence at that time; thus fundamentally comprising foreign trade and tariffs measures, and technical and financial cooperation for development. This had been the true foundation of any presence in third countries and foreign action by the European Union, through the Commission's, aid programmes in any sector, as part of a common EU policy, that of cooperation for development or foreign commercial policy, but not included in any common policy internal to the EU. Then, with the progressive expansion of the EU's own remit, policies in different spheres or topics would be introduced. The entire Barcelona Process appears as a major operation of development aid that offers as well a limited integration through the use of the same methods with partner countries as those used as a pre-accession system for candidate countries to the EU. This method, the EU method, is radically different to the classic diplomacy that continues within the sphere of exclusive or nearly exclusive powers of Member States. As indicated earlier, this method, ultimately limited to 'soft power,' is in the very genes of both EU institutions and civil servants. As Pierre Vimont indicated, to attempt to overcome it, the

Commission officers still perceive conventional diplomacy, based more on interests and *Realpolitik*, as contrary to the principles and the spirit of the EU's community approach since its founding, more focused on values and the principle of legality.

The reality is that all of the Partner Countries had democracy nominally enshrined in their constitutions or legislation and in their proclamations, but with differing degrees of conviction, and practically in no case are they intended to be applied immediately or in the short term

One of the most important applications of the method of integration to the Barcelona Process is the consideration of democracy and human rights as values commonly accepted as universal and as the foundation for the Partnership. The basis is therefore a traditional concept of modernisation understood as the convergence of different human societies towards the model developed first in Europe in the Western World, and that has, according to this view, gradually become the universal model through globalisation. It is a modernisation project considered 'universal' and acceptable by all. It is assumed that social and economic structures will be capable of progressively adapting and become flexible in order to advance towards each country's own modernisation through integration in the Euro-Mediterranean normative area modelled on the EU's *acquis communautaire*. More specifically, referring to Mediterranean Partner Countries, it is thus assumed that their traditional authoritarian regimes will accept and encourage their opening up and democratisation, although in a slow, progressive manner. Thenceforward, the hypothesis is followed of developmentalism as inducer of the modernisation process. That is, it is believed that economic liberalisation, both national and international, with countries opening themselves to international trade and competition and encouraging the national application of free market principles, will induce economic growth in these countries. And with this economic growth,

structural, economic and social changes will take place along with an effective development process. Finally, and this is the critical point of the developmental hypothesis, the economic and social changes will be followed by political change that will progressively accompany the process of modernisation.

The Euro-Mediterranean project today must contend with a geopolitical environment that could be qualified as a new Hobbesian jungle in which, in addition, there is no Leviathan that could impose order

In other words, the traditional Arabic authoritarian regimes, through the growth and development brought about by partnership with Europe, would gradually modernise their political structures as well to eventually embrace the values of democracy and human rights declared as shared, according to the commitments accepted by all countries in Barcelona '95. The reality is that all of them had democracy nominally enshrined in their constitutions or legislation and in their proclamations, but with differing degrees of conviction, and practically in no case are they intended to be applied immediately or in the short term. The 'langue de bois' was a common feature to different degrees in all countries. Some, such as Syria and above all, Libya, straight out rejected such a prospect and remain on the margins of the Euro-Mediterranean process, and in the case of Libya, without accepting any agreement whatsoever. But what is certain is that all countries, even those most inclined to accept the long-term developmental and democratising approach, would in fact only accept the 'method of integration' in its economic aspects, and even then only partially. There is not only the political reticence of the regime, but also the great pressure of the ruling classes in each country, whose 'vested interests' advocate resistance to liberalisation. Moreover, when liberalisation entails privatisation, in many cases these privatisations are to the benefit of those participating in power. As had occurred in Europe in the century and a half before the EU was formed, it is a social pressure with protectionist proposals, are attempting to stem any ex-

ternal economic liberalisation, demanding internal regulations benefiting each group and industry. Despite this, the progress made by the Barcelona Process in this regard is undeniable, though to different degrees according to the country. With Tunisia and Morocco in the lead, there has been progress towards adapting the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's postulates by applying the respective agreements with the EU. The intention was to reach the major goal of bridging the economic gap between the North and South Mediterranean through economic modernisation and growth. And indeed, this was the case to a significant degree during the Barcelona Process's first ten years or 'classic period.' Together with the application of reforms, with support from MEDA funds, European technical assistance consolidated the economic reform processes that had already begun under the auspices of international financial institutions since the late 1980s. The strengthening and advance of these policies within the Barcelona Process certainly fostered improved economic performance levels and even some approximation of per capita income levels to the EU average, despite the enormous distances still is. This was particularly the case in countries that progressed most in reforms induced by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, above all in Tunisia and Morocco, as indicated, and lagging behind in Jordan, Lebanon and above all in Egypt, a key country for its demographic and economic dimension as well as its political centrality within the Arab World.

What Went Wrong?

Paraphrasing a famous title, we could also pose the question *What went wrong* with the Euro-Mediterranean project? Clearly, the Euro-Mediterranean project today must contend with a geopolitical environment that could be qualified as a new Hobbesian jungle in which, in addition, there is no Leviathan that could impose order like the State did in traditional Nation-States.

To answer the question '*What went wrong?*' we must refer to the various phenomena foreign to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, some of them of great global impact, that have developed in the Arab-Mediterranean World in recent years.

- First of all, the derailment of the Middle East Peace Process. The lack of understanding between Israel and the Arab World has been growing. Suffice it to recall that on both sides, the greatest symbols of willingness to understand and negotiate – Israeli President Yitzhak Rabin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat – were assassinated by radicals of their own camp. The opportunities for peace were criminally sabotaged by extremists on both sides. The idea was to demonstrate that these were two incompatible projects, one side proposing the creation of a strictly Jewish State and the others proclaiming the desire to throw the Jews into the sea. Despite the previous groundwork – the agreements reached at Camp David as of '78 and then Oslo as of '93 – no-one ever even considered exploring the possibilities offered by the Arab Peace Initiative put forth by Saudi Arabia and all Arab States in 2003, just as there has never been a capacity to control violent anti-Israeli and by extension anti-Western extremist groups.
- The Arab Mediterranean countries accepted some of the economic modernisations offered by the Barcelona Process and certain social, education or health-related modernisations, etc. Nonetheless, as has been said, it can be observed that they never seriously considered complying with the commitments made in 1995 in Barcelona to progressively democratise their political structures. This is why the 'Arab singularity' continues to be discussed. The majority of them dragged their feet, practicing the 'langue de bois' while others, particularly Syria, and even more so Libya, flat-out rejected the notion point-blank.
- The societies of the Arab Mediterranean countries, however, are modernising. Their newest citizens – youth and the new professional classes – are beginning to express growing discomfort with the inherited authoritarian systems. The regimes are thus at odds with both the more or less underground, pro-leftist democracy protesters and Islamist movements. And sometimes pitting them against one another. Regarding the phenomenon of corruption pervading the traditional authoritarian regimes, even constituting the essential kleptocracy of the regime in the case of Tunisia under Ben Ali, the Islamists put themselves forth as pure. Especially for the pop-

ular classes, who have not enjoyed the advantages of a higher education, Islam-inspired movements appear as the defenders of their Palestinian brothers, as denouncing corruption from their religious stance, and as denouncing the process of Westernisation of traditions that governments are attempting to impose.

- For reasons fundamentally foreign to sphere of the Mediterranean Partner Countries, the fact is that we are witnessing an upsurge of radical Islamist movements with terrorist acts that are growing in force. In 1978, the Saur Revolution, of a communist inclination, began in Afghanistan, which immediately led to Soviet intervention to defend it against Mujahideen insurgents. This would lead to a long period of war lasting from 1978 to 1992. The first part of the Afghan Civil War ended with the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 on Gorbachov's orders and the growing involvement of the United States in the area, especially through covert operations in support of the anti-communist Mujahideen insurgents. Finally, in 1996, the Taliban took power and imposed Sharia, and Afghanistan became an incubator State for all sorts of Jihadist groups, above all al-Qaeda, which began to propagate international terrorist violence, especially against their former US and Saudi sponsors.

Arab Mediterranean Countries never seriously considered complying with the commitments made in 1995 in Barcelona to progressively democratise their political structures

- The Khomeini-led Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the United State's great humiliation from the takeover of its embassy began a period of increasing perplexity and incomprehension by the Western World regarding what was really happening in the Muslim world. The Iran-Iraq War contained the situation in the area, which was broken by the invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War. In the Euro-Mediterranean region, meanwhile, there was the extremely cruel civil war in Algeria in the years following the coup in

1991, which robbed the Islamists of their electoral victory, increasing the perplexity and sensation of difficulty in comprehending the Muslim Arab World among Westerners. Finally, the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington DC definitively changed the course of history. The American response, at first supported by the international community regarding the intervention in Afghanistan and later outside international legality with the occupation and accumulation of errors committed in Iraq, has led to a new world in which violence is unleashed, preventing the normal evolution of the Arab World in general and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Partner Countries specifically.

With the arrival of the Arab Spring and Arab Revolutions in 2011, what we encountered was the crisis of the Arab authoritarian State. The progress of the new independent, secular and markedly Arab nationalist States insofar as education, construction of the basic State structures, and modernisation of society and mindsets clashed with the authoritarian patrimonialisation of the State by the groups in power. Abuse, kleptocracy and lack of freedoms only increased this contradiction and made it more obvious. The mega-attacks of 11 September 2001, moreover, strengthened authoritarian leaders in the Arab World, who presented themselves as guarantors of anti-terrorist cooperation and containment of Islamist movements, by then feared throughout the West. Revolutions broke out with the immolation of young Bouazizi in Tunisia. At that point, in the countries of the Arab World, a struggle emerged that had been concealed by the authoritarianism practised by the regimes; a struggle between on one side young people and modern-leaning citizens and on the other Islam-oriented movements that connect particularly well with the traditionalism of the popular classes, especially in rural areas, and that are aided in one way or another by external support and financing from the Gulf States.

As a consequence of the Arab Spring, we now have a Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Basin that is more differentiated than ever, as per the results of the popular movements in each country. Different typologies can be distinguished among the Mediterranean Partner Countries at present. The first would be those countries that have most advanced in their

internal transformation along the lines of their Barcelona 1995 commitments and the aspirations of their populations, whether through a revolutionary youth and educated professional movement in their countries, as in Tunisia, which managed to overthrow the Ben Ali dictatorship, or through a process of reform from above to attend to popular demands as in the case of Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Jordan.

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In the case of countries with natural gas or oil revenues available, as with Algeria, and as has been the case in the Gulf States, reforms have simply consisted of raising civil servant and general employee salaries and increasing employment in public institutions and the administration, debiting the cost to the budget, and little more. The case of Egypt is particularly significant because of its role as centre of gravity within the Arab World, from a demographic as well as historical and political standpoint. When the citizen revolution beginning in Tunisia with the self-immolation of young Bouazizi and the overthrow of Ben Ali spread to spark the popular revolts in Cairo, it became clear that the phenomenon was going to spread one way or another, with one or another result, throughout the Arab World. The Administrations of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, which, through its political arm, succeeded in winning the elections, were an important sign of the advance of movements of Islamic tendencies throughout the Arab World. For the same reason, the Thermidorian reaction of the army and a significant section of the secular, modern-leaning population behind President al-Sisi marked a new direction to keep in mind in the Arab World, whether it be a return to the traditional authoritarian habits or the correction of past errors. Finally, we have the case in which the failure of the revolts has led to chaos and civil war, as in Syria and Libya. The emergence of the new phenomenon of terrorism on a large scale, with occupation and control of the territory and a prelude

of the Islamic State in the bloody maelstrom of Syria and Iraq has triggered alarm bells among the international community.

In this situation, Europe and the West should clearly help and exercise much greater influence, in a positive sense, on the evolution of the Arab World, particularly in the Mediterranean Partner Countries. It is obvious that the internal conflicts in the Arab World and the Muslim World must be settled internally and that any foreign intervention does nothing more than aggravate the situation. But it is also obvious that the role incumbent upon Europe especially and the West in general is of extraordinary transcendence. And one of the key problems, from this perspective, resides in the shortcomings of the instruments and the conventional 'European approach' of cooperation for development and the offer of limited regional integration, as a European foreign policy towards these countries to deal with the current situation. One could say that the candid Euromed is surrounded by the Hobbesian jungle that the current international stage has become, for which it lacks the tools for reaction precisely in the most severe cases. Preaching European values is of little use in such circumstances, if not wholly counterproductive by provoking much greater rejection than acceptance.

What Direction Now? What Should Be Done?

It seems that the massive arrival of refugees to the EU from across the Mediterranean under dramatic conditions, with the many deaths occurring on the way and the overcrowding of refugee camps together with the aggravation of the situations of State implosion and war, in Syria in particular as well as Libya, have managed to awaken the European conscience with an awareness that something must be done. To do this, there must be a profound reflection on foreign and internal policy of the EU and its Member States towards the Mediterranean region. It seems evident that EU 'soft power' as a major instrument of social transformation is absolutely incapable of handling the situations of instability and violence on the short and medium terms. The European Union is also applying its instruments of Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Aid that have conventionally accompanied humanitarian cooperation policies when necessary. We should be able, in the first place, to handle

the humanitarian and refugee emergencies, which we are far from achieving. It seems clear that all the EU's soft power instruments can help to bring about change in the medium and long terms in countries with governments that are firm, stable and willing, but they cannot cope in the short term with the situations of crisis and conflict, nor address the causes that, beyond development shortcomings, are fuelling the current situation of conflict. Europe, the European Union, has not been using the instruments of *Realpolitik*, whether they be in the hands of EU coordination organs or fundamentally by the Member States. And when it has, as with Libya, serious errors have been committed. With the current extremely conflictive situation on the one hand and the reform process of the European Neighbourhood Policy launched by EU institutions on the other, it could be an opportune time for Europe to create the legal changes and generate the political will to enable it to rise to the occasion.

The decision-making capacity lies with the States, but this does not mean action is impossible. States must finally realise the need for a great common European foreign policy, in full synergy with the foreign policy of the individual governments

European foreign policy consists of two parts: the EU foreign policy on the one hand, which has been called 'exterior action' to date, focussing on instruments of 'soft power' and the foreign policy of Member States on the other. Where the former was based on promoting European values and 'soft' attraction to Europe, doubtless of great political and economic interest to all in the long term, the latter dealt with the promotion and direct protection of national interests. After the application of the Lisbon Treaty, as indicated above, the situation has not changed greatly. The distribution of powers among the EU institutions and in Member States continues to be fundamentally the same. The creation of the European External Action Service and the strengthening of the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as Vice-President of the Commission at the same time does not preclude a fundamental consideration: the

power continues to be fundamentally vested in the States, which must approve all sorts of action through the Council, and anonymously at that.

The decision-making capacity lies with the States, which moreover have the operative means, especially insofar as security; but this does not mean action is impossible. States must finally realise the need for a great common European foreign policy, in full synergy with the foreign policy of the individual governments. EU institutions will have to grow accustomed to protecting the interests of Member States in addition to working towards high European values, while the Member States will have to get used to having a common foreign policy and undertaking joint concrete actions in this field, coordinating amongst themselves and with the EU institutions through a Common Foreign and Security Policy worthy of the name. While the instruments of security policy, on both the police-judicial and the military levels continue in the hands of the States, close coordination within the framework of joint European action is absolutely essential, especially with the serious situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions. It also follows that we must go beyond this, and that 'more Europe' is the solution.

Currently, there is a need for coordination in the first place among both EU institutions and Member States. And likewise between the whole of Europe and the different international institutions and actors within the framework of the United Nations, with allies as the United States and with NATO as a whole. The classic adage 'si vis pacem, para bellum' ('if you want peace, prepare for war'), sadly, becomes necessary in times of crisis. The ideal of military strength is one that does not need to be used, but its availability is a prerequisite for this ideal. And in the case of the conflicts in the Arab World, as indicated, this is all the more true since any foreign intervention in their territory is and will be absolutely counterproductive. But first we must convince the powerful in the Arab World – with the political, economic or security-oriented arguments appropriate for each case according to the country – to exercise their influence to pacify the Arab world and not by funding violent movements of which they that eventually even lose control.

Insofar as coordination among institutions within the EU, it seems clear that the distribution of instruments and powers between the Commission and the European External Action Service are not the most propi-

etious for efficient action. Foreign policy and its execution supposedly fall within the remit of the European External Action Service, whereas the main financial and cooperation instruments, beginning with the ENP, to all effects continue in the hands of the Commission. If any policy measure falls under the Common Security and Defence Policy, its control by the Council, where any Member State can veto a decision due to the rule of unanimity, makes it difficult to achieve a foreign policy and effective external action. Moreover, although much progress has been made, at least insofar as the Mediterranean Partner Countries, in decentralising from Brussels to the EC Delegations (today EU Embassies) in Partner Countries, there is still much to be done on the ground regarding coordination between the EU Delegations and Member State Embassies. It would be particularly useful if, in the process of preparing and approving the Action Plans of the European Neighbourhood Policy, these Action Plans translated into real joint action by the European Union as a whole the Commission and the European External Action Service in conjunction with the policies and cooperation carried out by Member States. Although the strictly EU Action Plans should continue to exist, there should at least be higher planning and a coordination schemes to include EU and Member State action, possibly re-vamping and modifying insofar as necessary the former Indicative Programmes to increase synergies and political weight through coordination of all European action in each country.

Regionalisation in Globalisation

One of the fundamental aspects of the consultation by the Commission and the High Representative regarding overhauling the European Neighbourhood Policy referred to the geographic sphere of reference. To date, the European Neighbourhood Policy, like the Barcelona Process in its classic period, has aspired to its application in the strict sphere of the Euro-Mediterranean Partner Countries, that is, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries with a Mediterranean coastline, as well as Jordan.

What we are really discussing in the Euromed project is the role that the European Union should play on the international stage in a globalised world. Clearly,

Euro-Mediterranean policy can neither be applied the same to all Mediterranean seaboard countries. Nor can it be considered separately from the impact that other countries, the neighbours of our neighbours, have in the area. First of all, there are the Gulf States, including Iraq, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Iran; secondly, there are the countries of the Horn of Africa; and thirdly, the Sahel countries. Hence it would seem appropriate to distinguish between three levels of countries to which the EU should apply different political action structures.

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First and foremost, regarding the Euro-Mediterranean Partner Countries, we should distinguish between those that have a true Euro-Mediterranean vocation as such, as is fundamentally the case with Morocco and Tunisia, and the rest of countries, which participate but with limited when not decreasing enthusiasm depending on the case. There should be a clear differentiation between two levels of Mediterranean Partner Countries. The first would be the 'Preferential Partner Countries,' with whom the EU would aspire to build an integrated Euro-Mediterranean area. The countries of this first level should have a privileged status in their relations with the EU, clearly differentiated and favourable to them. It should be a status that countries should apply for in order to become first candidates and eventually members of a possible Euro-Mediterranean Economic Integration Community. Clearly, as in all areas of advanced integration, although the fundamental aspects may be economic, there are political aspects of enormous significance as well. Both the 1995 Barcelona Final Declaration and the European Neighbourhood Policy concept, not to mention the Morocco's Advanced Status or the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, move along these lines. Attaining such status should constitute a differentiated privilege not automatically extensible

to the rest of the Partner Countries. The remainder of the countries should be able to see the advantages of belonging to such a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Integration Community and aspire to become members themselves, being ready to carry out the necessary changes. Only thus will the effects on the countries joining said Community be equivalent to those attained in Central and Eastern European Countries before their integration into the EU.

The remaining Euro-Mediterranean Partner Countries would be on a second level, as members of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean policy in general, with the application of the ENP on their level. In the third place, a new concentric circle of privileged relations should be established beyond our immediate neighbours in order to reach our neighbours' neighbours as well. For this second external neighbourhood area the most appropriate scheme would probably not be a uniform approach, which would be impossible to conceive and even more so to execute, but rather a series of agreements of privileged relations with those countries, in groups or individually and at a level of formalisation and commitment greater than the current one. This is the case with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council or Iraq, as well as Iran, the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel Countries.

It is clear that in all cases, independently of the geographic area, the principles of differentiation and conditionality must be applied. But clearly, the greatest differentiation should consist in belonging or not to each concentric circle of this European structure for integration or international cooperation, which decreases towards the outer circles to reach areas solely of cooperation and therefore with decreasing application of conditionality.

Insofar as the thematic spheres, it seems clear under the current circumstances that, in applying the necessary coordination among Member States and EU institutions, new thematic areas of cooperation must be fostered, reaching, if need be, spheres such as reform of the security sector, in both police and judicial cooperation aspects, as well as and in particular its military security aspects. In other spheres, there should likewise be coordinated action between Member States and EU institutions, as in the case of migration and taking in both immigrants and refugees.

The case of Euro-African cooperation merits particular consideration within regional globalisation. Once

colonial ties were broken, with better or worse outcomes, Europe has tended to overlook Africa. Yet Africa is an important part of the future of Europe and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership offers a particularly interesting angle to approach Euro-African relations. The participation of North African Mediterranean Partner Countries in Euro-African cooperation is of particular interest due to the special complementarity, synergies and capacity for action existing between the EU and its Member States, and the Mediterranean Partner Countries, which would allow them to act jointly in negotiating and implementing projects and broad cooperation agreements with Sub-Saharan countries.

At the present time, it is clear that Europa , the EU institutions and the Member States must carry out urgent action preventing the cataclysms we are all beginning to discern on the horizon

Turkey is also a special case because it is a Mediterranean Partner Country and at the same time, a candidate for membership in the EU, as well as enjoying an agreement since 1996 now that goes beyond a free trade area to institute a customs union with the EU and its Member States. Turkey has based its progress on moving towards convergence with Europe and the Western World over the past 90 years. Over the past few decades it has increased this convergence exponentially through its economic relations with the EU, especially through the benefits of the trade agreement instituting the Euro-Turkish customs union. But there are also pulsations in Turkey moving in the other direction, of moving closer to the Turkic countries of Central Asia and the Arabic ones of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. There has been discussion of the intention of building a neo-Ottomanism lending Turkey a key role in the geographic regions formerly constituting the Ottoman Empire and beyond. It is crucial that Europe make an effort to let Turkey understand that its best future consists of playing that important role in said region as part of a broader Euro-Mediterranean project to its own benefit, to play that major role as a European country with a diverse and rich heritage.

Urgent Tasks

At the present time, when there has even been talk of the end of the Southern Neighbourhood as a reality and an economic project, and when we are witnessing a disruption of political and even social structures among Mediterranean Partner Countries, it is clear that, in addition to fostering modernisation and adapting its own instruments and political approach to the Euro-Mediterranean area, Europa , the EU institutions and the Member States must carry out urgent action preventing the cataclysms we are all beginning to discern on the horizon.

In the first place, massive assistance is absolutely necessary for countries that share values with the EU and that should be included in the first circle of economic, and to a large extent, political integration with the EU. In the case of Tunisia in particular, which is under serious and peremptory threat from those who wish to end the Tunisian democratic experience, the EU must effect a massive aid operation. The EU has gradually expanded its funds, especially for Tunisia, through new aid instruments of support to democratic transitions and civil society, beyond the conventional ENP funds. Nonetheless, we continue to work on an unrealistic scale. All told, this aid hardly reaches 200 million euros per year for Tunisia, when in the internal European crises we have experienced, the amounts handled were always in the billions. The aid packet currently being negotiated with Greece may reach 85 billion. Although in this case, it may fundamentally consist of loans, it is clear that the amounts cannot be compared with the meagre 200 million allocated to Tunisia. This amount should at least be multiplied by ten to reach 2 billion in non-returnable funds, apart from the EIB loans, which to date have more or less doubled the current amount of donation aid.

In the second place, we must act more decisively with humanitarian and emergency aid in the face of the enormous crises being experienced in Syria and its neighbouring countries. It is true that EU and its Member States have donated nearly 3,500 million euros in emergency and humanitarian aid to offset the consequences of the war in Syria. However, it seems obvious that this is not enough and that the EU must increase the calibre and efficiency, as well as the political and public communication of its aid if we do not wish to see to even greater catastrophes.

In the third place, we must undertake an exercise of convergence of *soft power* with *Realpolitik* as a joint EU policy to negotiate and offer the Thermidorian regime in Egypt economic and political support that enables it to overcome its current situation as quickly as possible and allow Egypt to advance with security and confidence towards a modernised country with a positive economic evolution, stably and in democracy. In this regard, of course, in Egypt as in other countries in the area, security aspects cannot be ignored. We cannot look the other way. Al-Sisi already has the firm political and financial support of Saudi Arabia, and it is crucial that Europe offer him other perspectives as well.

In the fourth place, Europe, with the entire weight of the EU and its Member States behind it, should participate in a determined, uninhibited manner in the pacification of Syria and Libya. As in all the current conflicts in the Arab World, *the need for solutions to be internal to the Arab World* must be reiterated. It is essential that the Arab countries themselves decide that none of them should support any of the forces or groups involved in the conflicts. And the same should be done to convince Iran. Negotiations with Iran constitute a good precedent in this regard, with the prominent role played by the EU and its High Representative Mogherini. But it seems clear that the efforts being carried out in both Syria and Libya by the United Nations representatives in these countries must attain significant, decisive and effective support from the EU and its Member States. Especially in order to convince the regional powers to play a pacifying and not incentivising role in the confrontations. The entire political, economic and military weight of the EU and its Member States, as well

as its allies, in particular the US, must attempt to get the regional Middle East powers to stop pouring oil on the fire of conflict and foster peace.

On reading the Barcelona Final Declaration today, twenty years after the fact, you will realise almost with surprise that it remains entirely valid

All in all, it can be concluded that the future will continue to be extraordinarily complicated and that we may have to get used to managing the crisis for many years to come. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that in the long run, social transformations will prevail and will eventually bear fruit. Hence the need for urgent tasks in the face of the current episodes of crisis and the need to renew the arsenal of instruments of influence in the face of the major challenges in the region should not lead us to conclude that the conventional approach of cooperation through integration in the Euro-Mediterranean sphere is no longer appropriate. On reading the Barcelona Final Declaration today, twenty years after the fact, you will realise almost with surprise that it remains entirely valid. It is the continuation of this long-term task of helping our neighbours and partner countries in their process of modernisation, progress and development that will allow the realisation of the dream we had envisioned in 1995, that of building a Mediterranean area of peace and security, shared economic progress and intercultural understanding and dialogue among peoples and cultures throughout our seaboard.

Dossier: Barcelona +20: an Assessment

The Changed Regional Environment since the Barcelona Conference of 1995

Marc Pierini

Former EU career diplomat and a scholar at Carnegie Europe

The ministerial conference held in Barcelona on November 27-28, 1995 was then regarded as a historical landmark in the relationship between the European Union and Mediterranean countries: a vast programme of cooperation had been launched by the 27 partners based on a shared vision of the region's destiny.

Twenty years later, most of the political concepts used at the Barcelona conference have either become obsolete or are radically challenged by the long series of events that took place in the interval: September 11, 2001; the launching and subsequent failure of the Mediterranean Union; the Arab Spring of 2011; and finally the proclamation of the Islamic State in June 2014.

Looking back at these two decades, it is important to understand what has happened and what remains of the initial political assumptions.

The Barcelona Process as a Shared Vision

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership started as an ambitious project between equals, offering shared economic and social objectives, a forum for political and security dialogue and an avenue for the development of civil societies based on shared values.

This partnership – quickly known as 'the Barcelona Process' – was the subject of an unprecedented joint preparation over nearly one full year. It was defined as a "necessary ambition," for both a European Union in need of stability and prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood and for the Mediterranean

Partners who, beyond market access, investment and know how, expected a better cultural and social understanding.

As a result, the EU's financial means were substantially increased, cooperation policies were diversified, and a large number of networks created in many different fields, from political science to economic research, from heritage conservation to cooperation among small and medium-size enterprises.

The Shock of September 11, 2001

The massive attack of al-Qaeda on New York and Washington, the first large-scale terrorism act inspired by a radical Islamic movement on US territory, sent shockwaves through not only the United States but also Europe and the Arab world. It was followed by major terrorist attacks in Tunisia (against the Djerba Synagogue on April 11, 2002), in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2007). The 'Western model' was directly challenged at its very heart.

Predictably, the reaction of the European Union consisted in significantly beefing up counter-terrorism policies and seeking cooperation from 'moderate' Arab leaders. This, in turn, was seen by a number of these leaders, particularly those then in power in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, as an opportunity to create a new type of relationship with Western governments. The 'selling argument' became: 'we will be your best buffer against Islamic terrorism.' A typical example was the way in which the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia cooperated with France, Germany and the US in the enquiry into the Djerba bombing and in effect 'offered' them the means to arrest the then number four of al-Qaeda, himself the planner of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington.

The 'price' exacted from Western countries was indeed a much less critical eye on human rights abuses in the countries concerned. Without saying it openly, an entire pillar of the Barcelona Process had been sacrificed to anti-terrorism policies.

An Ephemeral Union for the Mediterranean

When elected in May 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy promoted one of his personal projects, the Union for the Mediterranean, by which he essentially intended to shelve the Barcelona Process and promote his own vision of relations between Europe and the Mediterranean region, based on a stronger focus on private investment and a much weaker emphasis on governance. Several conceptual and protocol mistakes – such as co-opting unilaterally then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak – made this policy initiative quite unpalatable for other Arab leaders.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership started as an ambitious project between equals, offering shared economic and social objectives, a forum for political and security dialogue and an avenue for the development of civil societies based on shared values

Meanwhile, across Europe's southern neighbourhood, Islamic conservatism was becoming more deeply rooted than ever before, not just within Islamist parties but throughout entire societies, including those long perceived as predominantly 'secular' and 'modern' such as Tunisia and Turkey. Their societal, scientific, and legal norms, long-inspired by Europe's, were now regularly challenged. A different concept of society and state was being discussed or introduced in a number of countries.

In parallel, the image of Europe in the region kept being tarnished by the deep resentment toward the EU for its lack of influence on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Year after year, Arab populations felt increasingly let down by the very group of countries

– the European Union – which had promoted fundamental rights and shared values in Barcelona in 1995 but kept cooperating with repressive Arab regimes.

The Arab Spring of 2011

In a matter of weeks, starting in a small town in Tunisia in December 2010 and spreading like wildfire to Egypt, Syria and Libya, a popular movement raged across the Arab world. At first sight, the message heard from the 'Arab street' was music to European ears: individual rights, freedom of expression, stopping corruption, accountability, free elections and dignity were the mottos of all the protests.

Very quickly, seemingly unshakable dictators fell one by one in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, while Syria was plunged into the ugliest civil war imaginable. When elections were finally held in the first three countries, they produced religiously conservative regimes that had little resemblance with the 'shared values' of the Barcelona Process. Conservative Islamic norms were the result of the wave of free elections, and only Jordan and Morocco managed to produce enough consensual reforms to keep their societies away from bloody developments.

The political landscape in the EU's southern neighbourhood had changed radically and Europe realised that these countries were undergoing deeper political and societal changes than what was meeting the eye. The pre-existing EU assumptions about its southern neighbourhood had been shattered.

The Intrusion of the Islamic State

On 28 June, 2014, a self-proclaimed 'Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL) appeared on the map and started expanding its territorial grip on large swaths of Iraq and Syria, based on the failures of the respective states. It rapidly expanded its political influence through the affiliation of radical movements in the Egyptian Sinai, Libya, and Northern Nigeria. With its territorial control, military aptitude, unimaginable violence, cultural revisionism, and massive recruitment of jihadists in a number of European countries, the Maghreb, Turkey and the Gulf, the caliphate of Daesh now presents a challenge that no

Western diplomacy has had to cope with before. All the premises of the Barcelona Process are now finding their absolute opposite in the narrative and objectives of Daesh.

Where Does the EU Stand?

These developments render the EU's traditional model (liberal democracy) and methodology (personal high-level talks and financial incentives towards good governance) largely ineffectual. EU leaders are now suddenly confronted with failed states (Libya, Syria), or movements they cannot even conceive to interact with (al-Baghdadi). Elsewhere, as in Tunisia, the EU is now dealing with an unprecedented governing coalition between liberals (Nidaa Tounes) and Islamists (Ennahdha) with radically diverging societal objectives.

The comfortable days of dealing with like-minded liberal interlocutors are largely over: the 'EU model' is becoming less sellable in today's global environment and the EU's brand of democracy and civilisation is being fundamentally challenged.

Yet, a large segment of the civil society in neighbouring Arab and Muslim countries is very much looking for better governance, accountability, freedom of speech and independent justice. This means that,

even if the 'shared values' narrative is of little political relevance today, even if one should not be overly naïve about expectations from the EU, the EU should continue to support citizens who support these values. It is very telling that women organisations in Tunisia have managed to counter the Islamic party's intention to change the definition of the role of women in society through a constitutional change. It is similarly relevant that a last-minute civic movement in Turkey manage to scrupulously invigilate the ballot counting in the 7 June legislative elections, making them more credible.

The comfortable days of dealing with like-minded liberal interlocutors are largely over: the 'EU model' is becoming less sellable in today's global environment and the EU's brand of democracy and civilisation is being fundamentally challenged.

While it is high time it adjusted to the Mediterranean region's new realities, the EU needs to continue promoting its values with the appropriate measure of realism.

MAURITANIA			
Official Name:	Islamic Republic of Mauritania		
Form of Government:	Islamic Republic		
Head of State:	Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz		
Head of Government:	Yahya Ould Hademine		
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	(National Assembly)		
Union for the Republic (UPR)	75	Union for Democracy and Progress (UDP)	4
Assembly of Democratic Forces (Tawassoul)	16	Alliance for Justice and Democracy/Movement for Renewal	4
El Wiam	10	Sursaut	3
People's Progressive Alliance (APP)	7	El Vadila	3
El Karam	6	PUD	3

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Nouakchott (0.96)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Nouadhibou (0.14); Rosso (0.05)		
Area km ² :	1,030,700 v	Population age <15 (%):	40
Population (millions):	4,3	Population age >64 (%):	3
Population density (hab/km ²):	4	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	4,70
Urban population (%):	60 v	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	62/65
Average annual population growth rate (%):	2,8	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	54

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	5,44	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	27,4
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	4,102 v	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	30
GDP growth (%):	2,7	Services, value added (% of GDP):	42,6
Public Debt (in % GDP):	91,1 v	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	1,2 v	Labour participation rate, female (%):	31,0
External Debt (millions \$):	3,83	Unemployment rate (%):	10,2
Inflation Rate (%):	4,7	Youth unemployment rate (%):	15,2
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	272	Agriculture (% of total employment):	76,0
Outflows (millions \$):	19	Industry (% of total employment):	7,0
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	17,0
Tourists arrivals (000):	..	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	30	Production (millions mt oil eq):	..
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	..
Receipts (millions \$):	65	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	..
Receipts (in % GDP):	.. v	Import (% energy used):	..

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)	1.293	2.570	-1.278
in goods (millions \$)	1.112	1.900	-788
in services (millions \$)	181	670	-490
in goods and services (% GDP)	27,7	55,1	-27,4

Main Trading Partners
Import: China (30%), United Arab Emirates (10%), France (6%), Morocco(5%), Netherlands (5%)
Export: China (33%), Switzerland (10%), Spain (9%), Nigeria (7%), Japan (6%)

Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate (%):	58,6	Human Development Index (Value):	0,513
Net enrolment rate (primary):	75,3	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	157
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	31,6	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	5,2	Physicians density (per 10,000):	1,3
Mean years of schooling:	..	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	..
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	2,6	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	4,6
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	..	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	0,7
Water resources (km ³):	11,4	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	..
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	406	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	88	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	0,6
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	9	Marine (% of territorial waters):	4,2
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	3	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	84,0
Total armed forces (000):	21	Households with computer (per 100):	..
Military expenditure (% GDP):	2,9	Internet users (per 100):	18,0

ALGERIA			
Official Name:	People's Democratic Republic of Algeria		
Form of Government:	Semi-presidential republic		
Head of State:	Abdelaziz Bouteflika		
Head of Government:	Abdelmalek Sellal		
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	(National People's Assembly)		
National Liberation Front (FLN)	164	Socialist Forces Front (FFS, social democrat)	14
National Rally for Democracy (RND)	100	El Moustakbel Front (FM, "Future", centrist)	14
Movement of Society for Peace - Front of Change (MSP-FC, Islamist coalition)	33	Algerian Popular Movement (MPA, democrat)	13
Rally for Hope for Algeria	19	Independents	28
Ennahda-Front for Justice and Development (FJD, Islamist)	15	Others	62

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Algiers (2.68)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Oran (0.89); Blida (0.45); El Djelfa (0.43); Constantine (0.43)		
Area km ² :	2.381.740	Population age < 15 (%):	29
Population (millions):	40,6	Population age > 64 (%):	6
Population density (hab/km ²):	17	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2,84
Urban population (%):	71	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	75/77
Average annual population growth rate (%):	1,8	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	22

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	159.046	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	13
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	13.867	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	38
GDP growth (%):	3,3	Services, value added (% of GDP):	49
Public Debt (in % GDP):	25,8	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-6,4	Labour participation rate, female (%):	15,1
External Debt (millions \$):	5.466	Unemployment rate (%):	10,2
Inflation Rate (%):	6,4	Youth unemployment rate (%):	24,0
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	1.546	Agriculture (% of total employment):	12,7
Outflows (millions \$):	55	Industry (% of total employment):	49,0
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	40,2
Tourists arrivals (000):	2.039	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	243	Production (millions mt oil eq):	142,8
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	54,0
Receipts (millions \$):	2.046	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	1.360
Receipts (in % GDP):	11,4	Import (% energy used):	-177

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)	60.134	32.915	-27.220
in goods (millions \$)	49.312	29.354	-19.959
in services (millions \$)	10.822	3.561	-7.261
in goods and services (% GDP)	37,8	20,7	-17,1

Main Trading Partners	
Import:	China (16%), France (12%), Italy (9%), Russian Federation (8%), Spain (7%)
Export:	Spain (17%), Italy (16%), United States (11%), France (11%), Brazil (5%)

Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):/..	Human Development Index (Value):	0,745
Net enrolment rate (primary):	97,1	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	83
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	..	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	43	Physicians density (per 10,000):	..
Mean years of schooling:	..	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	35,0
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	4,4	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	7,1
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	..	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	3,3
Water resources (km ³):	11,7	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	93
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	225	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	59	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	7,9
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	5	Marine (% of territorial waters):	1,2
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	615	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	117,0
Total armed forces (000):	317	Households with computer (per 100):	37,0
Military expenditure (% GDP):	6,7	Internet users (per 100):	43,0

FRANCE			
Official Name:	French Republic		
Form of Government:	Semi-presidential constitutional republic		
Head of State:	Emmanuel Macron		
Head of Government:	Édouard Philippe		
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	(National Assembly)		
La République En Marche! (liberal)	312	New Left Goup (social democrat)	31
The Republicans (LR, liberal conservative)	102	La France Insoumise (left coalition)	17
Democratic Movement (centrist)	47	Democratic and Republican Left (communist)	16
UDI, Agir and Independents	32	Non-inscrits	18

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Paris (11.01)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Lyon (1.64); Marseille-Aix-en-Provence (1.63); Lille (1.03); Nice-Cannes (0.98); Toulouse (0.96)		
Area km ² :	549.087	Population age <15 (%):	18
Population (millions):	66,9	Population age >64 (%):	19
Population density (hab/km ²):	122	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2,01
Urban population (%):	80	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	80/86
Average annual population growth rate (%):	0,4	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	3

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	2.466.472	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	2
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	39.860	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	20
GDP growth (%):	1,2	Services, value added (% of GDP):	79
Public Debt (in % GDP):	96,6	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-1,5	Labour participation rate, female (%):	50,7
External Debt (millions \$):	..	Unemployment rate (%):	10,1
Inflation Rate (%):	0,3	Youth unemployment rate (%):	24,5
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	28.358	Agriculture (% of total employment):	2,9
Outflows (millions \$):	57.328	Industry (% of total employment):	21,8
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	76,8
Tourists arrivals (000):	82.570	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	50.883	Production (millions mt oil eq):	137,8
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	246,5
Receipts (millions \$):	24.332	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	3.710
Receipts (in % GDP):	1,0	Import (% energy used):	44,1

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)	772.979	743.839	-29.140
in goods (millions \$)	537.300	507.079	-30.221
in services (millions \$)	235679,3	236760,4	1.081,1
in goods and services (% GDP)	31,3	30,1	-1,2

Main Trading Partners
Import: Germany (19%), Belgium (11%), Italy (8%), Netherlands (8%), Spain (7%)
Export: Germany (14%), United States (9%), Italy (7%), United Kingdom (7%), Belgium (7%)

Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	../..	Human Development Index (Value):	0,897
Net enrolment rate (primary):	99	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	21
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	111	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	65	Physicians density (per 10,000):	32,3
Mean years of schooling:	11,3	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	65,0
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	5,5	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	11,1
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	2,2	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	4,4
Water resources (km ³):	211,0	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	496
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	476	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	10	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	25,3
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	71	Marine (% of territorial waters):	62,9
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	12	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	103,5
Total armed forces (000):	306	Households with computer (per 100):	81,5
Military expenditure (% GDP):	2,3	Internet users (per 100):	85,6

ITALY			
Official Name:	Italian Republic		
Form of Government:	Parliamentary constitutional republic		
Head of State:	Sergio Mattarella		
Head of Government:	Paolo Gentiloni		
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	(Chamber of Deputies)		
Five Star Movement (M5S, populist movement)	222	Free and Equal (left)	14
Northern League (LN, regionalists, populist right)	125	Associative Movement Italians Abroad (centrism)	6
Democratic Party (social democrat)	111	Popular Civic List-AP-PSI-AC (centre-liberal)	4
Forza Italia- (FI, conservative)	105	Linguistic Minorities (SVP-PATT)	4
Brothers of Italy (Fdl)	32	Others	7

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Rome (3.76)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Milan (3.11); Naples (2.20); Torino (1.77); Palermo (0.85); Bergamo (0.85)		
Area km ² :	301.340	Population age <15 (%):	14
Population (millions):	60,6	Population age >64 (%):	23
Population density (hab/km ²):	206	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	1,37
Urban population (%):	69	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	81/86
Average annual population growth rate (%):	-0,2	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	3

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	1.850.735	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	2
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	34.195	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	24
GDP growth (%):	0,9	Services, value added (% of GDP):	74
Public Debt (in % GDP):	132,0	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	1,3	Labour participation rate, female (%):	39,6
External Debt (millions \$):	..	Unemployment rate (%):	11,7
Inflation Rate (%):	-0,1	Youth unemployment rate (%):	37,9
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	28.955	Agriculture (% of total employment):	3,9
Outflows (millions \$):	22.794	Industry (% of total employment):	27,8
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	70,0
Tourists arrivals (000):	52.372	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	40.373	Production (millions mt oil eq):	36,1
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	152,6
Receipts (millions \$):	10.669	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	2.510
Receipts (in % GDP):	0,6	Import (% energy used):	76,4

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)	491.647	555.167	63.520
in goods (millions \$)	387.656	453.764	66.108
in services (millions \$)	103990,2	101402,3	-2.587,9
in goods and services (% GDP)	26,4	29,9	3,4

Main Trading Partners
Import: Germany (16%), France (9%), China (6%), Netherlands (6%), Spain (5%)
Export: Germany (12%), United States (10%), France (9%), United Kingdom (5%), Spain (4%)

Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	99.1/98.6	Human Development Index (Value):	0,887
Net enrolment rate (primary):	97,2	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	26
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	103	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	63	Physicians density (per 10,000):	39,5
Mean years of schooling:	10,2	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	34,0
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	4,1	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	9,0
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	1,30	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	5,4
Water resources (km ³):	191,3	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	628
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	900	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	..	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	21,5
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	..	Marine (% of territorial waters):	20,1
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	..	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	140,4
Total armed forces (000):	357	Households with computer (per 100):	64,7
Military expenditure (% GDP):	1,5	Internet users (per 100):	61,3

LIBYA	
Official Name:	State of Libya
Form of Government:	Provisional parliamentary republic
Head of State:	
Head of Government:	Fayez al-Sarraj
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	
<p>Uncertain state due to the collapse of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 2011. During the month of march 2016, UN-backed primer Minister-designated, Fayez al-Sarraj, came back from self-exile with the task of uniting the country after an ongoing civil war between the Council of Deputies in Tobruk and its supporters, the New General National Congress in Tripoli and its supporters, and various jihadist and tribal elements controlling parts of the country</p>	

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Tripoli (1.13)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Benghazi (0.77); Misrata (0.73); Zawiya (0.20)		
Area km ² :	1,759,540	Population age < 15 (%):	28
Population (millions):	6,3	Population age > 64 (%):	4
Population density (hab/km ²):	4	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2,31
Urban population (%):	79	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	69/75
Average annual population growth rate (%):	0,9	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	11

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	20,463	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	..
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	6,811	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	..
GDP growth (%):	..	Services, value added (% of GDP):	..
Public Debt (in % GDP):	..	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-43,2	Labour participation rate, female (%):	25,8
External Debt (millions \$):	..	Unemployment rate (%):	18,4
Inflation Rate (%):	27,1	Youth unemployment rate (%):	45,7
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	493	Agriculture (% of total employment):	16,8
Outflows (millions \$):	341	Industry (% of total employment):	32,3
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	55,0
Tourists arrivals (000):	..	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	..	Production (millions mt oil eq):	31,6
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	17,3
Receipts (millions \$):	..	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	2,750
Receipts (in % GDP):	..	Import (% energy used):	-103,0

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)
in goods (millions \$)	13.409	6.395	-7.014
in services (millions \$)
in goods and services (% GDP)

Main Trading Partners
Import: Italy (13%), China (13%), Turkey (10%), Republic of Korea (8%), Tunisia (5%)
Export: Italy (24%), United Arab Emirates (15%), Spain (11%), Germany (7%), France (7%)

Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	../..	Human Development Index (Value):	0,716
Net enrolment rate (primary):	..	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	102
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	..	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	..	Physicians density (per 10,000):	20,9
Mean years of schooling:	7,3	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	37,0
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	..	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	..
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	..	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	7,2
Water resources (km ³):	0,7	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	348
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	928	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	83	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	0,3
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	5	Marine (% of territorial waters):	4,3
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	70	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	119,8
Total armed forces (000):	..	Households with computer (per 100):	..
Military expenditure (% GDP):	..	Internet users (per 100):	20,3

MALTA			
Official Name:	Republic of Malta		
Form of Government:	Parliamentary republic		
Head of State:	Marie Louise Coleiro Preca		
Head of Government:	Joseph Muscat		
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	House of Representatives		
Malta Labour Party (MLP, social democracy)	37	Nationalist Party (NP, centre-right)	30

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Valleta (0.39)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Birkirkara (0.02); Qormi (0.02)		
Area km ² :	320	Population age <15 (%):	14
Population (millions):	0,4	Population age >64 (%):	19
Population density (hab/km ²):	1.365	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	1,42
Urban population (%):	96	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	80/84
Average annual population growth rate (%):	1,2	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	6

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	11.003	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	1
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	38.206	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	15
GDP growth (%):	5,5	Services, value added (% of GDP):	84
Public Debt (in % GDP):	56,2	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	3,2	Labour participation rate, female (%):	42,3
External Debt (millions \$):	..	Unemployment rate (%):	4,7
Inflation Rate (%):	0,9	Youth unemployment rate (%):	11,0
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	3.575	Agriculture (% of total employment):	1,3
Outflows (millions \$):	-5.362	Industry (% of total employment):	21,1
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	78,9
Tourists arrivals (000):	1.966	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	1.451	Production (millions mt oil eq):	0,0
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	0,6
Receipts (millions \$):	203	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	1.480
Receipts (in % GDP):	2,0	Import (% energy used):	98,4

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)	13.650	14.116	466
in goods (millions \$)	4.876	2.764	-2.112
in services (millions \$)	8773,5	11351,5	2.578,0
in goods and services (% GDP)	124,1	128,3	4,2

Main Trading Partners
Import: Russian Federation (17%), Italy (13%), China (12%), Singapore (6%), Germany (5%),
Export: United States (24%), Germany (8%), China (7%), Italy (7%), Egypt (6%)

Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	91.8/94.8	Human Development Index (Value):	0,856
Net enrolment rate (primary):	98,4	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	33
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	96	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	49	Physicians density (per 10,000):	39,1
Mean years of schooling:	10,9	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	47,0
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	7,8	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	9,6
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	0,80	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	3,8
Water resources (km ³):	0,1	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	644
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	108	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	64	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	23,1
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	2	Marine (% of territorial waters):	4,7
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	19	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	124,8
Total armed forces (000):	2	Households with computer (per 100):	73,7
Military expenditure (% GDP):	0,6	Internet users (per 100):	77,3

MOROCCO			
Official Name:	Kingdom of Morocco		
Form of Government:	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy		
Head of State:	King Mohammed VI		
Head of Government:	Saadeddine Othmani		
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	(House of Representatives)		
Justice and Development Party (PJD, Islamist)	125	Socialist Union of People's Forces (USFP)	20
Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM, liberal)	102	Constitutional Union (UC, centrist)	19
Istiqlal Party (PI, Centre-right, nationalism)	46	Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS, communist)	12
National Rally of Independents (RNI, centre-right, liberal)	37	Democratic and Social Movement (royalist)	3
Popular Movement (MP, conservative)	27	Others	4

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Rabat (2.04)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Casablanca (3.58); Fes (1.22); Marrakech (1.20); Tanger (1.05); Meknes (0.75)		
Area km ² :	446,550	Population age <15 (%):	28
Population (millions):	35,3	Population age >64 (%):	7
Population density (hab/km ²):	79	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2,53
Urban population (%):	61	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	74/77
Average annual population growth rate (%):	1,4	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	23

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	103.607	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	14
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	7.567	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	30
GDP growth (%):	1,2	Services, value added (% of GDP):	57
Public Debt (in % GDP):	64,4	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-1,0	Labour participation rate, female (%):	25,0
External Debt (millions \$):	46.265	Unemployment rate (%):	9,4
Inflation Rate (%):	1,6	Youth unemployment rate (%):	18,6
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	2.322	Agriculture (% of total employment):	37,7
Outflows (millions \$):	639	Industry (% of total employment):	20,6
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	42,8
Tourists arrivals (000):	10.332	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	7.921	Production (millions mt oil eq):	1,8
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	19,4
Receipts (millions \$):	7.010	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	560
Receipts (in % GDP):	6,8	Import (% energy used):	90,7

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)	45190,1	34227,9	-10.962,3
in goods (millions \$)	36.586	18.848	-17.738
in services (millions \$)	8.604	15.379	6.776
in goods and services (% GDP)	43,6	33,0	-10,6

Main Trading Partners
Import: Spain (21%), France (13%), China (8%), Germany (6%), United States (5%)
Export: Spain (24%), France (18%), Germany (4%), United States (4%), Italy (4%)

Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	80.4/59.1	Human Development Index (Value):	0,647
Net enrolment rate (primary):	98	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	123
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	..	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	32	Physicians density (per 10,000):	6,2
Mean years of schooling:	..	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	11,0
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	5,3	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	5,5
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	0,7	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	1,6
Water resources (km ³):	29,0	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	73
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	316	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	88	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	33,6
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	2	Marine (% of territorial waters):	1,3
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	7	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	120,7
Total armed forces (000):	246	Households with computer (per 100):	54,9
Military expenditure (% GDP):	3,2	Internet users (per 100):	58,3

PORTUGAL			
Official Name:	Portuguese Republic		
Form of Government:	Semi-presidential constitutional republic		
Head of State:	Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa		
Head of Government:	Antonio Luis Santos da Costa		
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	(Assembly of the Republic)		
Social Democratic Party (PSD)	89	Democratic and Social Centre - People's Party (CDS/	
Socialist Party (PS)	86	PP, Christian democracy)	18
Left Bloc (BE, socialism / Trotskyism / communism)	19	Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)	15
		Ecologist Party "The Greens" (PEV)	2
		People-Animals-Nature	1

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Lisbon (2.92)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Porto (1.31); Braga (0.19); Guimaraes (0.16)		
Area km ² :	92.225	Population age <15 (%):	14
Population (millions):	10,3	Population age >64 (%):	21
Population density (hab/km ²):	113	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	1,23
Urban population (%):	64	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	78/85
Average annual population growth rate (%):	-0,3	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	3

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	204.649	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	2
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	27.705	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	22
GDP growth (%):	1,5	Services, value added (% of GDP):	76
Public Debt (in % GDP):	129,9	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	1,9	Labour participation rate, female (%):	53,6
External Debt (millions \$):	..	Unemployment rate (%):	11,1
Inflation Rate (%):	0,6	Youth unemployment rate (%):	28,0
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	6.065	Agriculture (% of total employment):	6,9
Outflows (millions \$):	1.583	Industry (% of total employment):	25,8
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	68,6
Tourists arrivals (000):	11.223	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	17.185	Production (millions mt oil eq):	5,3
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	22,0
Receipts (millions \$):	4.582	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	2.120
Receipts (in % GDP):	2,3	Import (% energy used):	76,9

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)	79.645	83.933	4.288
in goods (millions \$)	64.876	54.636	-10.240
in services (millions \$)	14769,0	29296,9	14.527,9
in goods and services (% GDP)	38,9	41,0	2,1

Main Trading Partners
Import: Spain (29%), Germany (13%), France (7%), China (6%), Netherlands (6%)
Export: Spain (21%), Germany (12%), France (11%), United Kingdom (7%), United States (6%)

Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	91.8/94.8	Human Development Index (Value):	0,843
Net enrolment rate (primary):	97,8	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	41
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	118	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	63	Physicians density (per 10,000):	44,3
Mean years of schooling:	8,9	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	34,0
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	5,1	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	9,0
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	1,30	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	4,5
Water resources (km ³):	77,4	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	441
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	867	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	..	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	22,1
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	..	Marine (% of territorial waters):	5,5
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	..	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	109,1
Total armed forces (000):	74	Households with computer (per 100):	71,1
Military expenditure (% GDP):	1,8	Internet users (per 100):	70,4

SPAIN			
Official Name:	Kingdom of Spain		
Form of Government:	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy		
Head of State:	King Felipe VI		
Head of Government:	Mariano Rajoy		
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	(Congress of Deputies)		
People's Party (PP, conservative)	134	Catalan European Democratic Party (independentist regional)	8
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE, social democrat)	84	Basque Nationalist Party (Christian democratic nationalist)	5
United We Can - In Common We Can - En Masse (left wing)	67	Commitment Coalition (left wing, environmentalist)	4
Citizens - Party of the Citizenry	32	EH-Bildu (far left, basque nationalist)	2
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC, independentist regional)	9	Others	5

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Madrid (6.32)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Barcelona (5.35); Valencia (0.82); Zaragoza (0.71); Sevilla (0.70)		
Area km ² :	505.940	Population age <15 (%):	15
Population (millions):	46,4	Population age >64 (%):	19
Population density (hab/km ²):	93	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	1,32
Urban population (%):	80	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	81/86
Average annual population growth rate (%):	0,0	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	2,7

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	1.232.597	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	3
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	34.873	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	23
GDP growth (%):	3,3	Services, value added (% of GDP):	74
Public Debt (in % GDP):	99,0	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-2,0	Labour participation rate, female (%):	52,3
External Debt (millions \$):	..	Unemployment rate (%):	19,6
Inflation Rate (%):	-0,2	Youth unemployment rate (%):	44,6
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	18.659	Agriculture (% of total employment):	4,2
Outflows (millions \$):	41.789	Industry (% of total employment):	20,9
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	76,2
Tourists arrivals (000):	75.315	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	60.605	Production (millions mt oil eq):	33,6
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	118,9
Receipts (millions \$):	10.352	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	2.560
Receipts (in % GDP):	0,8	Import (% energy used):	71,4

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)	371086,4	407987,3	36.900,9
in goods (millions \$)	300.127	280.855	-19.271
in services (millions \$)	70.960	127.132	56.172
in goods and services (% GDP)	30,0	33,0	3,0

Main Trading Partners
Import: Germany (15%), France (12%), Italy (8%), China (7%), Netherlands (6%)
Export: France (13%), Germany (11%), Portugal (8%), Italy (8%), United Kingdom (8%)

Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	98.8/97.7	Human Development Index (Value):	0,884
Net enrolment rate (primary):	99,4	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	27
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	128	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	91	Physicians density (per 10,000):	38,2
Mean years of schooling:	9,9	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	30,0
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	4,3	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	9,2
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	1,20	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	5,3
Water resources (km ³):	111,5	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	482
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	801	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	68	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	28,0
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	18	Marine (% of territorial waters):	7,5
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	100	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	109,7
Total armed forces (000):	200	Households with computer (per 100):	77,1
Military expenditure (% GDP):	1,2	Internet users (per 100):	80,6

TUNISIA			
Official Name:	Republic of Tunisia		
Form of Government:	Semi-Presidential Republic		
Head of State:	Beji Caid Essebsi		
Head of Government:	Youssef Chahed		
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)	(National Constituent Assembly)		
Ennahda (Islamist)	69	Tunisian Aspiration (Secularism, Liberalism)	8
Call for Tunisia (NT) (Secularism, Social democracy)	67	Al-Irada	4
Machrouu Tounes	25	Democratic Current (Pan-Arabism)	3
Popular Front (FP) (Secularism, Socialism)	15	People's Movement (Secularism, Socialism)	3
Free Patriotic Union (UPL) (Secularism, Liberalism)	11	Others	12

Population			
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):	Tunis (2.03)		
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):	Sfax (0.75); Sousse (0.67); Kairouan (0.57)		
Area km ² :	163.610	Population age <15 (%):	24
Population (millions):	11,4	Population age >64 (%):	8
Population density (hab/km ²):	73	Total fertility rate (births per woman):	2,22
Urban population (%):	67	Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):	74/78
Average annual population growth rate (%):	1,1	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):	11,7

Economy			
GDP & Debt		Economic Sectors	
GDP (millions \$):	42.074	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):	10
GDP per capita (\$, PPP) :	10.708	Industry, value added (% of GDP):	26
GDP growth (%):	1,2	Services, value added (% of GDP):	64
Public Debt (in % GDP):	71,3	Labour market	
Public Deficit (in % of GDP):	-3,6	Labour participation rate, female (%):	24,4
External Debt (millions \$):	28.111	Unemployment rate (%):	15,5
Inflation Rate (%):	3,7	Youth unemployment rate (%):	36,1
FDI		Employment in:	
Inflows (millions \$):	958	Agriculture (% of total employment):	13,7
Outflows (millions \$):	34	Industry (% of total employment):	56,0
International tourism		Services (% of total employment):	43,8
Tourists arrivals (000):	5.724	Energy	
Tourism receipts (million \$):	1.706	Production (millions mt oil eq):	6,4
Migrant remittances		Consumption (millions mt oil eq):	10,9
Receipts (millions \$):	1.794	Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):	970
Receipts (in % GDP):	4,5	Import (% energy used):	36,2

Total trade	Imports	Exports	Balance
in goods and services (millions \$)	21.376	16.705	-4.672
in goods (millions \$)	18.374	13.569	-4.806
in services (millions \$)	3002,0	3136,1	134,2
in goods and services (% GDP)	51,3	40,1	-11,2

Main Trading Partners
Import: France (19%), Italy (18%), Germany (8%), China (7%), Turkey (5%)
Export: France (32%), Italy (17%), Germany (12%), Spain (3%), Algeria (3%)


Society			
Education		Development	
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):	86.1/72.2	Human Development Index (Value):	0,725
Net enrolment rate (primary):	98,6	Human Development Index (Position in ranking):	97
Gross enrolment rate (secondary):	93	Health	
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):	33	Physicians density (per 10,000):	16,5
Mean years of schooling:	6,7	Hospital beds (per 10,000):	23,0
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):	6,3	Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):	6,7
R&D expenditure (% of GDP):	0,60	Emissions	
Water		CO ₂ Emissions (mt per capita):	2,3
Water resources (km ³):	4,6	Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):	88
Water withdrawal (m ³ per capita):	304	Protected areas	
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):	80	Terrestrial (% of total land area) :	5,4
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):	5	Marine (% of territorial waters):	2,7
Desalinated water production (millions m ³):	20	ICT	
Security		Mobile subscriptions (per 100):	125,8
Total armed forces (000):	48	Households with computer (per 100):	39,3
Military expenditure (% GDP):	2,3	Internet users (per 100):	49,6

Les migrations en Méditerranée

TABLEAU C1 Nombre d'étrangers des pays partenaires méditerranéens (PPM) dans l'UE, par nationalité													
	Algérie	Maroc	Tunisie	Égypte	Syrie	Jordanie	Liban	Palestine	Israël	Turquie	Libye	Total d'immi-grants Euromed	Total d'immi-grants non UE-27
Belgique	12 054	93 012	5 730	1 972	4 406	487	2 609	585	1 537	43 686	236	166 314	489 997
Bulgarie	369	85	95	161	1 365	193	670	6	434	6 551	206	10 135	63 664
République tchèque	699	300	752	695	856	172	350	91	477	1 580	190	6 162	246 347
Danemark	955	5 632	926	1 706	4 322	1 216	13 061	0	1 709	34 379	246	64 152	380 261
Allemagne	23 272	114 552	41 332	23 350	53 099	12 663	79 534		14 900	1 655 996	4 471	2 023 169	6 882 176
Estonie	13	14	7	38	6	4	9	1	46	81	4	223	190 000
Irlande	588	274	100	532	114	111	133	67	220	489	439	3 067	195 992
Grèce	1 102	2 076	636	28 267	7 044	813	2 052	1 001	712	33 489	641	77 833	912 421
Espagne	55 306	699 800	2 734	4 128	5 910	2 261	3 341		2 858	3 969	966	781 273	3 863 226
France	1 430 656	926 466	388 598	30 937	16 758	1 443	47 162	993	9 197	297 429	2 351	3 151 990	5 461 071
Italie	22 471	425 238	107 671	108 490	6 058	2 991	7 086	391	3 883	20 491	36 222	740 992	3 967 424
Chypre	39	71	39	5 776	3 628	492	3 067	404	426	682	254	14 878	105 332
Lettonie	14	9	1	35	16	5	40	0	98	88	5	311	234 691
Lituanie				48			44		33	64		189	118 605
Luxembourg	100	246	136	25			36		41	201		785	27 228
Hongrie	681	200	238	1 183	1 433	350	369	69	1 695	2 154	423	8 795	148 474
Malte	61	260	376	546	307	46	75	62	13	268	935	2 949	20 929
Pays-Bas	3 975	172 291	4 568	12 893	9 714	923	3 475		5 086	199 551	908	413 384	1 468 713
Autriche	1 290	1 926	3 690	14 891	3 320	749	1 841	277	2 562	184 847	459	215 852	890 688
Pologne	583	318	409	452	588	137	383		346	874	240	4 330	378 647
Portugal	223	1 906	133	407	26	28	71		329	287	28	3 438	643 407
Romanie	146	107	1 078	70	2 499	58	176	40	1 772	5 555		11 501	143 337
Slovénie	30	23	50	107	52	63	25		34	108	38	530	213 812
Slovaquie	102	52	144	181	228	56	105	38	181	308	55	1 450	29 892
Finlande	1 009	2 480	810	1 297	1 039	329	673	57	957	7 860	232	16 743	175 346
Suède	3 004	9 233	4 943	5 934	69 199	3 755	26 279	5 269	2 631	47 188	2 211	179 646	1 122 033
Royaume-Uni	26 826	23 519	6 606	33 686	9 950	6 321	17 128		19 608	100 956	17 684	262 284	5 669 313
Total	1 585 568	2 480 090	571 802	277 807	201 937	35 666	209 794	9 351	71 785	2 649 131	69 444	8 162 375	34 043 026

Élaboration propre. Source : United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin*, 2015.

GRAPHIQUE C1 Comparaison des arrivées mensuelles par la Méditerranée 2014-2015-2016



Élaboration propre. Source : <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php>

TABLEAU C2 Relocalisation en Europe

La Relocalisation est le transfert de personnes qui ont besoin d'une protection internationale d'un État membre de l'UE vers un autre État membre de l'UE *

État membre	Relocalisation depuis l'Italie	Relocalisation depuis la Grèce
Autriche	-	-
Belgique	29	177
Bulgarie	-	29
Belgique	9	10
Chypre	10	55
République tchèque	-	12
Danemark	-	-
Estonie	-	87
Finlande	359	560
France	282	2 445
Allemagne	700	1 342
Hongrie	-	-
Irlande	-	280
Lettonie	9	188
Lituanie	-	229
Luxembourg	61	164
Malte	46	-
Pays-Bas	422	939
Pologne	-	-
Portugal	267	690
Romanie	45	523
Slovénie	23	101
Slovaquie	-	9
Espagne	144	600
Suède	39	-
Liechtenstein	-	10
Norvège	415	204
Suisse	340	78
TOTAL	3 200	8 732

* Décision du Conseil relative à la relocalisation de 120 000 personnes depuis l'Italie et la Grèce ; Décision du Conseil relative à la relocalisation de 40 000 personnes depuis l'Italie et la Grèce (juillet 2015).
Source : Commission européenne

TABLEAU C3 Réinstallations en Europe

La réinstallation est un outil qui aide les personnes déplacées ayant besoin de protection à atteindre l'Europe en toute sécurité et légalement, et à recevoir une protection aussi longtemps que nécessaire.

État membre	Réinstallations totales *	Total réinstallé dans le cadre du mécanisme 1 : 1 avec la Turquie **
Autriche	1 501	
Belgique	597	102
République tchèque	52	
Danemark	481	
Estonie	11	11
Finlande	293	162
France	1 088	684
Allemagne	1 213	1 213
Irlande	519	
Italie	673	117
Lettonie	10	10
Lituanie	25	25
Luxembourg		98
Pays-Bas	1 000	557
Portugal	12	15
Espagne	289	57
Suède	491	278
Royaume-Uni	2 200	
Islande	50	
Liechtenstein	20	
Norvège	2 924	
Suisse	519	
TOTAL	13 968	3 329

* Total réinstallé dans le cadre du régime du 20 juillet incluant le mécanisme 1: 1 avec la Turquie

** Dans la déclaration UE-Turquie de 18 mars 2016, il a été convenu que, pour chaque ressortissant syrien renvoyé d'îles grecques, un autre sera réinstallé vers l'UE directement en provenance de Turquie. Ce 1: 1 visait à remplacer les flux irréguliers de migrants voyageant dans des conditions dangereuses à travers la mer Égée par un processus de réinstallation ordonnée et légale.


Élaboration propre. Source : Commission européenne

TABLEAU C4 Retours de Grèce en Turquie (avril 2016 - juin 2017) par origine



Pakistan	553
Syrie	193
Algérie	130
Bangladesh	86
Afghanistan	77
Maroc	33
Iran	29
Irak	21
Sri Lanka	16
Autre	79

Source : UNHCR


CARTE A.3b | Réfugiés, demandeurs d'asile et déplacés internes dans les pays méditerranéens



Distribution des réfugiés * des pays méditerranéens en 2016 (en milliers)



Évolution des réfugiés, des demandeurs d'asile, des déplacés internes et des rapatriés dans le cadre du mandat du HCR entre 2006-2016



Pays d'asile. Réfugiés par millions de \$ (PIB), fin 2016


1	Soudan du Sud	90,1	49	Chypre	0,43
2	Tchad	38,7	53	Bosnie et H.	0,32
3	Ouganda	35,9	57	Libye	0,28
4	Niger	22,2	61	Grèce	0,24
5	Liban	19,5	62	Monténégro	0,24
6	Rwanda	18,6	74	France	0,12
7	Burundi	18,3	76	Israël	0,10
8	Jordanie	17,7	80	Italie	0,08
9	Mauritanie	15,7	86	ARYM	0,06
10	Cameroun	12,8	88	Maroc	0,05
			106	Tunisie	0,02
25	Turquie	3,4	111	Albanie	0,01
39	Serbie et **	0,97	113	Espagne	0,01
41	Malte	0,73	114	Slovénie	0,01
42	Égypte	0,64	126	Croatie	0,01
44	Algérie	0,59	128	Portugal	0,01

Production propre. Source : HCR, *Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2016* and UNRWA.

* Pour les données HCR : Demandeurs d'asile exclus. Pour les données UNRWA : Réfugiés inscrits. Le HCR fournit assistance et protection aux réfugiés palestiniens situés hors des domaines d'opérations de l'UNRWA. Cette dernière prend spécifiquement en charge les réfugiés palestiniens dans ses 5 domaines d'opération, situés en Jordanie, au Liban, en Syrie, en Cisjordanie et sur la Bande de Gaza.

** Kosovo sous la résolution 1244 du CSNU.

CARTE A.17 | L'empreinte écologique dans les pays méditerranéens



Production propre. Source : Global Footprint Network www.footprintnetwork.org/

La Méditerranée en chiffres

TABLEAU F1 Indice de développement humain (IDH)

	Espérance de vie à la naissance	Durée moyenne de scolarisation	Durée attendue de scolarisation	RNB par habitant	Indice de développement humain	Position au classement de l'IDH
	années	années	années	PPA \$	2014	2014
	2014	2014 ^a	2014 ^a	2014	2014	2014
Portugal	81,2	8,9	16,6	26 104	0,843	41
Espagne	82,8	9,8	17,7	32 779	0,884	27
France	82,4	11,6	16,3	38 085	0,897	21
Italie	83,3	12,1	17,3	28 664	0,890	26
Malte	80,7	11,3	14,6	29 500	0,856	33
Slovénie	80,6	12,1	17,3	28 664	0,890	25
Croatie	77,5	11,2	15,3	20 291	0,827	45
Bosnie et Herzégovine	76,6	9,0	14,2	10 091	0,750	81
Serbie	75,0	10,8	14,4	12 202	0,776	66
Monténégro	76,4	11,3	15,1	15 410	0,807	48
ARYM	75,5	9,4	12,9	12 405	0,748	82
Albanie	78,0	9,6	14,2	10 252	0,764	75
Grèce	81,1	10,5	17,2	24 808	0,866	29
Chypre	80,3	11,7	14,3	29 459	0,856	33
Turquie	75,5	7,9	14,6	18 705	0,767	71
Syrie	69,7	5,1	9,0	2 441	0,536	149
Liban	79,5	8,6	13,3	13 312	0,763	76
Jordanie	74,2	10,1	13,1	10 111	0,741	86
Israël	82,6	12,8	16,0	31 215	0,899	19
Palestine	73,1	8,9	12,8	5 256	0,684	114
Égypte	71,3	7,1	13,1	10 064	0,691	111
Libye	71,8	7,3	13,4	14 303	0,716	102
Tunisie	75,0	7,1	14,6	10 249	0,725	97
Algérie	75,0	7,8	14,4	13 533	0,745	83
Maroc	74,3	4,8	13,5	6 049	0,647	123

Élaboration propre. Source :

PNUD


PNUD

PNUD

PNUD

PNUD

PNUD

GRAPHIQUE F1 Indice de développement humain et Revenu national brut par habitant (2005-2014)


Élaboration propre. Source : PNUD.

	Population totale	Estimation de la population en 2050	Taux brut de natalité	Taux brut de mortalité	Taux d'accroissement démographique annuel	Indicateur de fécondité	Immigrants	Nombre net de migrants	Taux net de migration ^b	
	millions	millions	pour 1 000 habitants	pour 1 000 habitants	%	enfants par femme	milliers	milliers	pour 1 000 habitants	
	2015	2014	2014	2014	2015	2010/15	2015	% de la population totale 2015	2010/15	2010/15
Portugal	10,4	9,2	7,9	10,1	-0,4	1,28	837	81	-140	-2,7
Espagne	46,4	44,8	9,2	8,5	-0,1	1,32	5853	127	-593	-2,6
France	66,8	71,1	12,4	8,4	0,4	2,00	7784	121	332	1,0
Italie	60,7	56,5	8,3	9,8	-0,1	1,43	5789	97	528	1,8
Malte	0,4	0,4	9,8	7,7	1,0	1,43	41	99	6	3,0
Slovénie	2,1	1,9	10,3	9,2	0,1	1,58	236	114	4	0,4
Croatie	4,2	3,6	9,3	12,0	-0,3	1,52	577	136	-20	-0,9
Bosnie et Herzégovine	3,8	3,1	8,9	10,5	-0,2	1,28	35	09	-3	-0,1
Serbie	7,1	7,3	9,3	14,2	-0,5	1,56	807	91	-100	-2,2
Monténégro	0,6	0,6	11,6	10,0	0,1	1,71	83	132	-2	-0,8
ARYM	2,1	1,9	11,3	9,4	0,1	1,51	131	63	-5	-0,5
Albanie	2,9	2,7	13,4	7,4	-0,2	1,78	58	20	-92	-6,3
Grèce	10,8	9,7	8,5	10,5	-0,6	1,34	1 243	113	-136	-2,5
Chypre	1,2	1,4	11,3	6,9	1,0	1,46	196	168	35	6,2
Turquie	78,7	95,8	16,8	5,7	1,5	2,10	2965	38	2000	5,3
Syrie	18,5	34,9	23,1	5,7	-1,4	3,03	875	47	-4030	-41,1
Liban	5,9	5,6	15,2	4,6	4,2	1,72	1998	341	1250	49,1
Jordanie	7,6	11,7	27,1	3,8	2,4	3,51	3112	410	230	6,5
Israël	8,4	12,6	21,3	5,2	2,0	3,05	2012	249	19	0,5
Palestine	4,4	9,8	32,7	3,6	2,9	4,28	256	55	-44	-2,0
Égypte	91,5	151,1	27,8	6,1	2,1	3,38	492	05	-216	-0,5
Libye	6,3	8,4	20,9	5,3	0,3	2,53	771	123	-502	-16,0
Tunisie	11,3	13,5	19,2	6,2	1,1	2,16	57	05	-33	-0,6
Algérie	39,7	56,5	24,3	5,1	1,9	2,93	242	06	-143	-0,8
Maroc	34,4	43,7	20,8	5,7	1,3	2,56	89	03	-311	-1,9


Élaboration propre. Source :

BM UNPOP BM BM BM UNPOP UNPOP UNPOP UNPOP UNPOP UNPOP

a. Moyenne annuelle nette de migrants: nombre annuel d'immigrants moins le nombre annuel d'émigrants. b. Nombre net de migrants divisé par la moyenne de la population du pays bénéficiaire au cours de la période. (...) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F2

Évolution de la population dans 10 pays méditerranéens les plus peuplés (1960-2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : BM.


TABLEAU F3 Population: structure et distribution

	Structure de la population				Population dans les agglomérations de plus de 750 000 habitants	Population vivant aux régions côtières de la Méditerranée		Population urbaine vivant dans des zones précaires	Densité de population Habitants au km ²
	0-14 ans	15-64 ans	≥ 65 ans	Population rurale		milliers	%		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%		
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2014	2014-2016 ^a	2014	2015	
Portugal	14	65	21	37	40,4	29280	41,4	..	113
Espagne	15	66	19	20	26,4	7221	10,9	..	93
France	18	62	19	20	26,8	33913	55,9	..	122
Italie	14	64	22	31	21,8	434	100,0	..	206
Malte	14	66	19	5	1350
Slovénie	15	67	18	50	..	113	5,5	..	102
Croatie	15	66	19	41	..	1397	33,2	..	75
Bosnie et Herzégovine	14	71	15	60	..	219	6,1	..	74
Serbie	16	67	17	44	16,7	81
Monténégro	19	68	14	36	..	452	72,7	..	46
ARYM	17	71	12	43	82
Albanie	19	69	12	43	..	1957	68,0	..	105
Grèce	15	64	21	22	28,2	9624	89,2	..	84
Chypre	17	71	13	33	..	1165	100,0	..	126
Turquie	26	67	8	27	40,9	36943	46,3	11,9	102
Syrie	37	59	4	42	52,9	1805 ^f	8,4 ^f	19,3	101
Liban	24	68	8	12	38,0	3961	67,8	..	572
Jordanie	36	61	4	16	15,2	7020	..	12,9	86
Israël	28	61	11	8	66,2	1881	82,9	..	387
Palestine	40	57	3	25	39,1	..	735
Égypte	33	62	5	57	25,7	30987	34,4	10,6	92
Libye	30	66	5	21	29,8	4811 ^e	84,4 ^e	..	4
Tunisie	23	69	8	33	17,9	8294	74,4	8,0	72
Algérie	28	66	6	29	8,7	1349 ^d	39,6 ^d	..	17
Maroc	27	67	6	40	25,5	3817	11,3	13,1	77

Élaboration propre. Source :

a. Dernières données disponibles pour cette période. b. Élaboration propre à partir des données de l'UNPOP. c. Élaboration propre à partir des données des bureaux nationaux de statistique. e. Données du 2010. f. Données du 2011. (..) Données non disponibles

GRAPHIQUE F3 Population d'agglomérations urbaines de plus de 300 000 habitants en 2014 (2015)



24 % - 1 : Pourcentage de population dans les agglomérations urbaines - Nombre d'agglomérations urbaines de plus de 300 000 habitants

Élaboration propre. Source : UNPOP.


TABLEAU F4

Éducation et formation du capital humain

	Taux net de scolarisation		Rapport élèves par enseignant dans le primaire	Durée de la scolarité obligatoire	Personnel de R-D	Dépenses publiques en éducation				
	primaire	secondaire				Dépenses en R&D	maternelle et primaire	secondaire et post-secondaire	supérieur	
	%	%	élèves par enseignant	années	par million d'habitants	% du PIB	% de l'ensemble des niveaux	% de l'ensemble des niveaux	% de l'ensemble des niveaux	
	2013/15 ^a	2012/15 ^a	2013/15 ^a	2014/16 ^a	2012/14 ^a	2013/14 ^a	2011/2013 ^a	2011/2013 ^a	2011/2013 ^a	2011/2013 ^a
Portugal	98,6	93,0	13,4	9	9 116	1,29	5,3	37,6	43,9	17,0
Espagne	99,4	96,4	13,2	10	7 171	1,23	4,3	37,3	36,9	22,4
France	98,8	99,4	18,2	11	9 012	2,26	5,5	33,4	44,1	22,6
Italie	97,5	95,7	12,1	12	6 231	1,29	4,2	35,3	45,1	19,6
Malte	98,3	80,3	11,3	11	5 502	0,85	8,3	25,8	38,0	19,2
Slovénie	97,7	94,9	16,9	9	10 302	2,39	5,5	39,0	33,8	20,5
Croatie	88,7	92,6	13,7	8	3 981	0,79	4,6	21,9
Bosnie et Herzégovine	17,2	9	835	0,26
Serbie	96,2	93,7	15,2	8	2 460	0,78	4,2	46,4	23,1	29,1
Monténégro	92,9	9	3 426 ^b	0,36
ARYM	83,2	..	15,2	13	2 043	0,44
Albanie	95,5	85,9	18,6	9	974 ^d	0,15 ^d	3,5	..	19,8	21,9
Grèce	96,3	95,1	9,4	9	7 479	0,84
Chypre	97,4	94,6	11,9	9	2 609	0,47	6,4	36,1	41,5	22,4
Turquie	92,9	86,7	19,8	12	2 756	1,01	4,8	23,9	42,9	33,2
Syrie	66,7	46,6	..	9	5,1 ^c	38,9	36,9	24,2
Liban	81,8	64,8	12,3	9	2,6	..	17,1	28,7
Jordanie	96,6	81,4	..	10
Israël	96,7	98,4	12,1	13	..	4,11	5,9	52,4	25,8	15,8
Palestine	90,2	81,0	24,0	10	1 972	..	1,3
Égypte	98,0	81,8	23,1	9	2 549	0,68	3,8 ^d
Libye	9	182 ^c
Tunisie	98,6	..	15,8	9	3 180	0,64	6,2	27,7	47,3	28,1
Algérie	97,1	..	23,8	10	4,3 ^d	27,0
Maroc	98,4	56,1	25,9	9	1 267	0,71 ^e	5,3 ^c	37,7	42,6	20,2

Élaboration propre. Source : UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO
 a. Dernières données disponibles pour cette période. b. 2011. c. 2009. d. 2008. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F4 Inscription par type d'établissement (2013-2015) *



Élaboration propre. Source : UNESCO.

* Dernières données disponibles pour cette période.

TABLEAU F5


Santé et survie

	Taux de mortalité infantile		Taux de mortalité maternelle	Prévalence du VIH		Fumeurs	
	pour 1000 naissances vivantes	< 5 ans pour 1000 naissances vivantes	pour 100 000 naissances vivantes	estimation	%	hommes	femmes
				> 15 ans	15-49 ans	%	%
	2015	2015	2014	2015	2015	2012	2012
Portugal	3,0	3,6	10	32,4	14,0
Espagne	3,5	4,1	5	150 000	0,4	33,7	28,0
France	3,5	4,3	8	31,1	25,8
Italie	2,9	3,5	4	140 000	0,4	29,1	19,8
Malte	5,1	6,4	9	31,5	21,5
Slovénie	2,1	2,6	9	23,6	18,9
Croatie	3,6	4,3	8	39,4	32,3
Bosnie et Herzégovine	5,1	5,4	11	49,0	31,2
Serbie	5,9	6,7	17	45,5	39,8
Monténégro	4,3	4,7	7
ARYM	4,8	5,5	8
Albanie	12,5	14,0	29	52,1	8,2
Grèce	3,6	4,6	3	16 000	0,3	54,3	34,2
Chypre	2,5	2,7	7
Turquie	11,6	13,5	16	42,7	13,5
Syrie	11,1	12,9	68
Liban	7,1	8,3	15	2 400	< 0,1	43,0	29,4
Jordanie	15,4	17,9	58	63,6	10,0
Israël	3,2	4,0	5	41,7	20,1
Palestine	18,0	21,8	45
Égypte	20,3	24,0	33	11 000	< 0,1	45,9	0,4
Libye	11,4	13,4	9
Tunisie	12,1	14,0	62	2 600	< 0,1
Algérie	21,9	25,5	140	8 600	< 0,1
Maroc	23,7	27,6	121	24 000	0,1	42,5	1,7

Élaboration propre. Source : CME CME BM ONUSIDA ONUSIDA BM BM
 a. Dernières données disponibles pour cette période. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F5

Évolution des décès de moins de cinq ans dans les pays méditerranéens (1985-2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : CME.

* Les moins de cinq ans : décès entre la naissance et exactement cinq ans. Infantile : décès entre la naissance et l'âge exactement d'un an. Néonatal : décès dans les 28 premiers jours de vie.

TABLEAU F6 Nutrition et sécurité alimentaire


	Apport alimentaire kcal/ personne/jour	Commerce de céréales				Enfants avec surpoids < 5 ans 2011/14 ^a	Enfants avec sous-poids < 5 ans 2011/14 ^a
		importations		exportations			
		tm	milliers \$	tm	milliers \$		
2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2011/14 ^a	2011/14 ^a	
Portugal	3477	3236256	1035576	139087	61556
Espagne	3174	9904008	3075561	1440010	687849
France	3482	1836885	1193072	33625131	11147419
Italie	3579	10840590	3622898	1260533	938920
Malte	3378	133369	49998	685	330
Slovénie	3168	521745	160215	272332	78337
Croatie	3059	113374	58817	559121	150914
Bosnie et Herzégovine	3154	631656	171652	56544	17875	1,5	17,4
Serbie	2728	51581	43261	2156364	538283	1,8	13,9
Monténégro	3491	116169	33541	10796	2638	1,0	23,3
ARYM	2949	174268	50772	11799	6355	1,3	12,4
Albanie	3193	410122	140668	166	96
Grèce	3400	1424177	491545	413894	172519
Chypre	2649	462739	150681	16209	8148
Turquie	3706	6088726	2000312	3480567	1137824	1,9	10,9
Syrie	..	3090664	1119401	10853	1462
Liban	3066	1112229	374490	61865	22563
Jordanie	3100	2129034	786111	26532	9673	3,0	4,7
Israël	3610	3441858	1050548	66485	25167
Palestine	..	344982	104012	19782	6123	1,4	..
Égypte	3522	16153073	4744178	442780	242577	7,0	15,7
Libye	..	3423398	1131809	365	113
Tunisie	3349	3194824	993626	15789	6841	2,3	14,3
Algérie	3296	10172317	3271036	462	252	3,0	12,4
Maroc	3403	4704130	1528418	247390	89666	3,1	10,7

Élaboration propre. Source :

FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO OMS OMS

a. Dernières données disponibles pour cette période. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F6 Taux de dépendance à l'égard des importations céréalières (2014)



Élaboration propre. Source : FAO.

TABLEAU F7

Accès aux ressources sanitaires

	Médecins	Population ayant accès à l'eau potable	Population ayant accès à des installations sanitaires adéquates	Accouchements assistés par un personnel de santé qualifié	Taux d'utilisation de moyens de contraception	Taux de fécondité des adolescentes	Dépenses de santé totales
	Pour une population de 10 000 personnes	%	%	%	% de femmes mariées ou en couple qui en déclarent l'usage	naissances pour 1 000 femmes âgées de 15-19 ans	% du PIB
	2007/13 ^a	2015	2015	2009/14 ^a	2008/13 ^a	2015	2014
Portugal	41,0	100	100	99	74	9	9,5
Espagne	49,5	100	100	8	9,0
France	31,9	100	99	98	83	9	11,5
Italie	37,6	100	100	100	..	6	9,2
Malte	34,9	100	100	100	..	16	9,2
Slovénie	25,2	100	99	100	..	4	9,2
Croatie	28,4	100	97	100	..	9	7,8
Bosnie et Herzégovine	19,3	100	95	100	46	8	9,6
Serbie	21,1	99	96	98	58	19	10,4
Monténégro	21,1	100	89	99	23	12	6,4
ARYM	26,2	99	91	..	40	17	6,5
Albanie	11,5	95	93	99	69	22	5,9
Grèce	..	100	99	7	8,1
Chypre	23,3	100	100	100	..	5	7,4
Turquie	17,1	100	95	97	74	27	5,4
Syrie	14,6	90	96	96	54	..	3,3
Liban	32,0	99	81	98	55	12	6,4
Jordanie	25,6	97	99	100	61	23	7,5
Israël	33,4	100	100	9	7,8
Palestine	57
Égypte	28,3	99	95	92	59	51	5,6
Libye	19,0	..	97	100	42	6	5,0
Tunisie	12,2	98	92	74	63	7	7,0
Algérie	12,1	84	88	97	57	10	7,2
Maroc	6,2	85	77	74	67	31	5,9

Élaboration propre. Source :

OMS

OMS

OMS

OMS


OMS

OMS

OMS

a. Dernières données disponibles pour cette période. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F7 Dépenses en santé publique (% of PIB)



Élaboration propre. Source : OMS.

TABLEAU F8 Genre : développement social


	Espérance de vie à la naissance		Taux d'alphabétisation des adultes ≥ 15 ans		Taux brut de scolarisation combiné (du primaire au supérieur)		Année d'obtention du droit de vote des femmes	Année d'obtention du droit de candidature des femmes	Première accession ou élection d'une femme au Parlement	Nombre de femmes parlementaires ^e
	femmes	hommes	femmes	hommes	femmes	hommes				
	years	years	%	%	%	%				
	2014	2014	2015	2015	2011/15 ^f	2011/15 ^f				
Portugal	84	78	94,1	96,9	99	99	1931 ^c , 1976	1931 ^c , 1976	1934	34,8
Espagne	86	80	97,5	98,8	112	107	1931	1931	1931	39,1
France	86	79	98	94	1944	1944	1945	25,8
Italie	85	80	98,8	99,3	93	89	1945	1945	1946	31,0
Malte	84	80	95,6	92,5	79	83	1947	1947	1966	12,5
Slovénie	84	77	99,7	99,7	103	94	1945	1945	1992 ^a	36,7
Croatie	80	75	98,9	99,7	94	86	1945	1945	1992 ^a	19,9
Bosnie et Herzégovine	79	74	97,4	99,6	1946	1946	1990	21,4
Serbie	78	73	97,0	99,1	88	82	1946	1946	1946	34,4
Monténégro	78	74	98,0	99,4	1946	1946	2006 ^a	23,5
ARYM	78	73	96,9	98,8	70	69	1946	1946	1990 ^a	31,7
Albanie	80	75	96,8	98,4	88	85	1920	1920	1945	22,9
Grèce	84	79	93,7	97,0	105	107	1952	1952	1952	18,3
Chypre	82	78	98,6	99,5	89	83	1960	1960	1963	17,9
Turquie	79	72	92,9	98,6	93	98	1930	1934	1935 ^b	14,9
Syrie	76	64	80,7	91,8	65	55	1949 ^c , 1953	1953	1973	13,2
Liban	81	78	92,0	96,0	78	66	1952	1952	1963	3,1
Jordanie	76	72	97,5	98,5	97	75	1974	1974	1989 ^b	15,4
Israël	84	80	80	91	1948	1948	1949	27,5
Palestine	75	71	94,8	98,5	77	71
Égypte	73	69	68,1	83,6	..	79	1956	1956	1957	14,9
Libye	75	69	85,8	97,0	81	..	1964	1964	..	16,0
Tunisie	77	72	72,8	89,7	83	76	1959	1959	1959	31,3
Algérie	77	73	73,1	86,1	66	79	1949 ^c , 1962	1962	1962 ^b	31,6
Maroc	75	73	62,0	81,9	58	73	1963	1963	1993	20,5

Élaboration propre. Source :

BM UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO IPU IPU PNUD IPU

a. Correspond à la première année où elle a été élue dans le système parlementaire actuel. b. La date indique la première année où une femme a été élue au Parlement. c. Première reconnaissance partielle de vote ou du droit d'être élue. d. Situation au 1^{er} janvier 2017. e. Les valeurs indiquées sont pour la chambre basse ou unique. f. Dernières données disponibles pour cette période. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F8 Espérance de vie à l'âge de 60 ans (2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : UNPOP.

TABLEAU F9


Technologie et communication

	Lignes de téléphone fixe		Abonnement de téléphone mobile		Abonne- ments à large bande fixe	Abonne- ments à large bande mobile	Proportion des ménages ayant		Utilisa- teurs d'internet pour 100 habitants	Proportion des biens TIC dans le commerce total	
	total	pour 100 habitants	total	pour 100 habitants			un ordinateur	accès à internet		expor- tations	importa- tions
	2015	2015	2015	2015	pour 100 habitants	pour 100 habitants	%	%	pour 100 habitants	%	%
Portugal	4 682 997	44,14	11 714 693	110,41	29,6	52,0	71,1	70,2	68,63	2,44	4,93
Espagne	19 599 274	41,52	51 067 770	108,20	28,7	82,1	75,9	78,7	78,69	1,26	4,98
France	38 929 000	59,91	66 681 000	102,61	41,3	74,7	81,5	82,6	84,69	4,02	6,67
Italie	20 209 324	33,05	86 893 935	142,12	24,4	82,1	72,5	75,4	65,57	1,90	5,19
Malte	230 226	53,39	557 583	129,30	37,8	63,2	81,1	81,9	76,18	22,53	8,67
Slovénie	753 082	36,22	2 353 926	113,22	27,6	52,0	77,8	77,6	73,10	2,02	4,05
Croatie	1 476 506	34,70	4 415 660	103,77	23,2	75,4	76,8	76,7	69,80	2,45	5,23
Bosnie et Herzégovine	772 684	20,23	3 443 520	90,15	16,6	33,5	65,07	0,26	3,02
Serbie	2 770 462	36,47	9 155 664	120,52	17,4	71,8	64,4	63,8	65,32	1,21	3,96
Monténégro	154 448	24,85	1 007 890	162,16	18,1	43,7	51,3	55,0	68,12	0,55	4,72
ARYM	371 003	17,59	2 083 583	98,78	17,2	56,2	68,4	69,4	70,38	0,63	3,72
Albanie	226 718	7,09	3 400 955	106,38	7,6	40,6	63,25	0,79	3,58
Grèce	5 260 560	47,28	12 566 649	112,95	30,9	45,6	68,6	68,1	66,84	3,07	4,89
Chypre	323 707	27,79	1 111 123	95,40	22,4	54,8	71,5	71,2	71,72	6,22	4,73
Turquie	11 493 057	14,99	73 639 261	96,02	12,4	50,9	55,6	69,5	53,74	1,47	5,67
Syrie	3 539 665	15,90	14 312 271	64,28	3,1	10,4	29,98
Liban	1 012 849	20,04	4 657 651	92,16	25,4	53,4	71,5	61,8	74,00
Jordanie	368 938	4,80	13 797 968	179,43	4,2	35,6	47	69,0	53,40	1,78	4,40
Israël	3 412 000	43,08	10 570 000	133,47	27,4	56,1	81,3	72,1	77,35	14,33	11,46
Palestine	406 500	8,94	3 531 000	77,62	6,0	57,42	3,70	4,47
Égypte	6 235 133	7,36	94 016 152	110,99	4,5	50,7	47,3	39,2	37,82
Libye	632 000	10,00	9 918 000	157,00	1,0	19,02	5,41	5,60
Tunisie	943 642	8,40	14 595 875	129,91	4,3	62,6	33,2	17,1	48,52	0,00	5,38
Algérie	3 267 592	8,04	43 227 643	106,38	5,6	40,1	37,0	31,9	38,20	2,17	4,10
Maroc	2 222 370	6,55	43 079 696	126,87	3,4	39,3	54,8	66,5	57,08	0,35	3,47

Élaboration propre. Source : UIT

(..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F9 Utilisateurs d'internet et abonnements à large bande (2015)




Élaboration propre. Source : UIT.

TABLEAU F10 Sécurité et dépenses militaires

	Personnes déplacées dans leur propre pays	Réfugiés		Forces armées totales	Transferts d'armes conventionnelles		Dépenses militaires		
		par pays d'asile	par pays d'origine		importations	exportations	millions \$	% du PIB	
		milliers	milliers		milliers	millions \$	millions \$	millions \$	
		2015	2015		2015	2014	2012/16 ^d	2012/16 ^d	2015
Portugal		0,7	0,0	78	76	194	3 684	1,9	
Espagne		5,8	0,1	200	802	3 958	14 104	1,2	
France		265,0	0,1	312	301	8 561	50 860	2,1	
Italie		93,7	0,1	357	1 617	3 823	23 840 ^h	1,3 ^h	
Malte		6,1	0,0	2	26	5	56 ^b	0,6 ^b	
Slovénie		0,3	0,0	14	1	..	407	1,0	
Croatie		0,7	33,7	20	123	..	755	1,6	
Bosnie et Herzégovine	98	6,8	19,6	11	..	3	162 ^{b,g}	1,0 ^{b,g}	
Serbie		35,3	44,6	28	14	60	724	2,0	
Monténégro		6,2	0,6	12	65	1,6	
ARYM	0	0,8	1,8	8	1	..	107 ^e	1,1 ^e	
Albanie		0,1	10,5	9	36	0	132 ^{f,g}	1,1 ^{f,g}	
Grèce		8,2	0,1	147	1 369	..	5 083	2,6	
Chypre	272	5,8	0,0	13	6	..	354 ^b	1,8 ^b	
Turquie	954	1 838,8	63,0	613	4 721	1 055	15 275	2,1	
Syrie	6 600	149,2	4 180,9	281	746	
Liban	12	1 172,4	4,3	80	142	..	2 239	4,1	
Jordanie		664,1	1,8	116	879	198	1 616	4,2	
Israël		38,5	1,0	185	2 061	3 233	18 106 ⁱ	6,0 ⁱ	
Palestine	221	..	97,2 ^a	56 ^c	
Égypte	78	226,3	16,1	836	4 204	30	5 477	1,7	
Libye	500	27,9	4,3	7 ⁱ	262	..	3 289 ⁱ	7,3 ⁱ	
Tunisie		0,8	1,5	48	124	..	980	2,2	
Algérie		94,1	3,5	317	5 312	..	10 413 ^f	6,2 ^f	
Maroc		2,1	1,6	246	1 773	..	3 068	3,2	

Élaboration propre. Source : IDMC HCNUR HCNUR BM SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI
 a. Les données se réfèrent seulement aux réfugiés palestiniens dans le cadre du mandat HCR. b. Pensions militaires non incluses. c. Données du 2012. d. Somme des exportations ou des importations pour toute la période. e. Pensions militaires partiellement comprises. f. Données relatives au budget, non pas aux dépenses réelles. g. Forces paramilitaires non incluses. h. Inclut les dépenses de défense civile, qui normalement représentent 4,5 % du total. i. Données de 2013. j. Données de 2014. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F10 Dépenses militaires (2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : SIPRI.

TABLEAU F11 Structure économique et production


	PIB par habitant, prix courants		Croissance du PIB	Participation au PIB par secteur			Indices des prix à la consommation
	PIB			agriculture	industrie	services	
	millions \$	\$	%	%	%	%	
	2015	2015 ^c	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015
Portugal	199 222	19 122	1,5	2	22	76	0,5
Espagne	1 193 556	25 865	3,2	3	23	75	-0,5
France	2 420 163	37 675	1,3	2	20	79	0,1
Italie	1 825 820	29 867	0,7	2	24	74	0,1
Malte	10 293	22 734	6,2	1	16	83	1,2
Slovénie	42 798	20 732	2,3	2	33	65	-0,5
Croatie	48 676	11 573	1,6	4	26	70	-0,5 ^b
Bosnie-Herzégovine	16 251	4 088	3,0	8	27	65	-1,0
Serbie	37 160	5 120	0,8	8	31	60	1,4
Monténégro	4 022	6 489	3,2	10	20	70	1,6
ARYM	10 054	4 787	3,7	11	26	63	-0,2 ^b
Albanie	11 393	3 995	2,8	22	25	52	1,9 ^b
Grèce	194 958	18 064	-0,2	4	16	80	-1,1
Chypre	19 570	22 587	1,7	2	11	87	-1,5
Turquie	859 040	9 437	4,0	9	27	65	7,7
Syrie
Liban	50 800 ^b	11 237	1,3	5	17	79	-3,7
Jordanie	37 570	5 513	2,4	4	30	66	-0,9
Israël	299 413	35 343	2,5	-0,6
Palestine	12,4	..	23 ^a	72 ^a	..
Égypte	332 075	3 740	4,2	11	36	52	11,0
Libye	29 763	6 059	8,0 ^b
Tunisie	43 156 ^b	3 923	1,0	10	28	61	4,9
Algérie	164 779	4 318	3,9	13	39	48	4,8
Maroc	100 593	3 079	4,5	14	29	56	1,6 ^b

Élaboration propre, Source :

FMI FMI BM BM BM FMI

a. Données de 2014. b. Estimation du FMI. c. Estimation du FMI sauf pour la France, l'Italie, la Slovénie et Israël. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F11 Dette brute des administrations publiques (% du PIB)



Élaboration propre, Source : FMI.


TABLEAU F12 Agriculture

	Superficie des terres	Superficie agricole ^a	Terres arables et cultures permanentes	Prairies et pâturages permanents	Superficie totale équipée de systèmes d'irrigation	Terres dédiées à la production céréalière	Production céréalière	Rendement de la production céréalière	Utilisation d'engrais	Population agricole
	milliers ha	milliers ha	milliers ha	milliers ha	milliers ha	milliers ha	milliers ha	kg / ha	kg / ha	milliers
	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2013
Portugal	9 161	3 702	1 885	1 817	552	302	1 333	4 416	185	488
Espagne	50 021	26 578	17 188	9 390	3 923	6 347	20 604	3 246	151	890
France	54 756	28 767	19 328	9 438	2 830	9 606	73 331	7 634	151	498
Italie	29 414	13 162	9 121	4 041	4 005	3 393	19 368	5 709	131	738
Malte	32	10	10		4	4	17	4 763	468	2
Slovénie	2 014	615	237	378	5	101	653	6 481	260	5
Croatie	5 596	1 509	891	618	26	496	2 997	6 037	251	67
Bosnie et Herzégovine	5 120	2 162	1 117	1 045	3	272	1 083	3 977	109	35
Serbie	8 746	3 506	2 793	713	78	1 824	10 876	5 963	157	516
Monténégro	1 345	230	14	217	2	2	8	3 452	272	34
ARYM	2 522	1 263	452	811	128	161	629	3 900	72	60
Albanie	2 740	1 174	696	478	354	143	700	4 893	88	587
Grèce	12 890	8 175	3 725	4 450	1 530	1 041	4 305	4 134	157	560
Chypre	924	108	106	2	46	25	7	291	176	27
Turquie	76 963	38 561	23 944	14 617	5 215	11 551	32 708	2 832	105	7 710
Syrie	18 363	13 921	5 733	8 188	1 310	2 536	2 697	1 064	5	1 369
Liban	1 023	658	258	400	104	67	177	2 620	474	27
Jordanie	8 878	1 064	322	742	105	62	91	1 456	388	119
Israël	2 164	538	398	140	225	82	359	4 356	239	48
Palestine	602	298	148	150	24	27	49	1 851		105
Égypte	99 545	3 745	3 745		3 670	3 292	23 804	7 231	663	6 277
Libye	175 954	15 350	2 050	13 300	400	452	304	673	5	57
Tunisie	15 536	10 073	5 232	4 841	476	1 338	2 350	1 756	32	821
Algérie	238 174	41 431	8 439	32 992	1 360	2 509	3 436	1 369	51	3 387
Maroc	44 630	30 592	9 592	21 000	1 530	4 770	6 938	1 454	67	2 905

Élaboration propre. Source : FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO BM FAO

a. La superficie agricole est divisée en «terres arables et cultures permanentes» et «prairies et pâturages permanents». (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F12 Rendement des céréales (kg par hectare) (1965-2014)



Élaboration propre. Source : FAO.

TABLEAU F13

Élevage



	Stock animaux vivants					Commerce d'animaux vivants	
	bovins, caprins et ovins ^a	porcins	volailles ^b	équidés et chameaux ^c	ruches	exportations	importations
	milliers	milliers	milliers	milliers	milliers	milliers \$	milliers \$
	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2013	2013
Portugal	3963	2126	51500	190	333	128949	268146
Espagne	24215	26568	138860	500	2450	615100	404590
France	27625	13485	216587	454	789	2348641	252486
Italie	14228	8676	161900	425	500	49814	1958965
Malte	30	47	1013	2	0	248	544
Slovénie	591	288	2937	22	64	114613	27268
Croatie	1107	1156	10317	23	560	61357	158594
Bosnie et Herzégovine	1543	533	20851	17	392	4015	68933
Serbie	2887	3236	17037	16	677	46948	16212
Monténégro	313	21	596	5	43	22	35494
ARYM	1064	165	1940	19	74	2032	1765
Albanie	3300	172	12048	91	261	0	30292
Grèce	13988	1046	36194	88	1457	16079	79658
Chypre	706	342	3640	7	40	2699	1766
Turquie	55830	3	298030	345	7083	11037	1025849
Syrie	21242		18273	157	508	114594	30739
Liban	1099	8	60000	24	200	7430	298055
Jordanie	3817		27653	26	44	231466	85521
Israël	1143	190	42206	16	100	293	125248
Palestine	973		6000		47	1800	57639
Égypte	18400	11	180920	1511	930	15834	105100
Libye	9930		34000	133	37	0	30029
Tunisie	8725	6	96900	617	589	1587	29876
Algérie	34987	5	130185	562	400	14	144143
Maroc	28617	8	197000	1726	375	6911	106537

Élaboration propre. Source :

FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO
 a. Inclut les élevages de bovins, caprins, ovins et de buffles. b. Inclut poulets, poules, canards, dindes et oies. c. Inclut chevaux, ânes, mules et chameaux. (...) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F13

Production de viande ovine (2014)



Élaboration propre. Source : FAO.

TABLEAU F14 Pêche


	Pêche totale		Pêche en Méditerranée et en mer Noire	Production aquacole	Commerce de produits de la pêche		Quantité fournie des poissons et fruits de mer	Flotte de pêche ^a
	marine	eau douce			exportations	importations		
	tm	tm	tm	tm	millions \$	millions \$	kg par habitant	
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2014	2014	2013	2010/12 ^b
Portugal	190060	1	98	9322	1188	2085	53,8	6825
Espagne	969632	1187	77356	289821	4084	7051	42,3	9488
France	504026	1391	12740	206800	1835	6670	33,5	4584
Italie	194398	3800	190136	148763	823	6166	25,1	10789
Malte	2438		2438	5913	130	95	32,6	1092
Slovénie	202	141	202	1607	37	98	10,5	..
Croatie	72258	444	72258	15571	187	145	19,0	4029
Bosnie et Herzégovine	5	300	5	4451	7	39	4,3	..
Serbie		3150		7387	6	91	5,8	..
Monténégro	825	662	825	813	0	18	12,2	..
ARYM		350		991	1	24	5,5	..
Albanie	4798	1482	4798	1595	32	15	4,9	280
Grèce	64252	940	36527	106118	743	666	19,3	16888
Chypre	1475	20	1475	5459	31	95	21,6	..
Turquie	397733	34176	397733	238964	690	372	6,1	20100
Syrie	1700	2400	1700	2500	0	70	..	1663
Liban	3618	20	3618	1125	3	157	10,6	..
Jordanie	277	596		20855	4	116	5,3	..
Israël	1594	484	1544	276	30	848	23,2	..
Palestine	3227		3227	1174831	1	19
Égypte	102934	241179	57603	1137091	35	743	22,1	4909
Libye	26002		26002	10	14	140
Tunisie	117600	1192	117600	14425	169	75	13,6	5703
Algérie	96405		96405	1333	7	136	3,9	4189
Maroc	1354925	15006	26206	1050	1961	205	18,1	19207

Élaboration propre. Source :

FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO

a. Bateaux à moteur. b. Dernières données disponibles pour cette période. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F14 Commerce de produits de la pêche (2014)



Élaboration propre. Source : FAO

TABLEAU F15


Emploi et chômage

	Population occupée ^e	Taux d'emploi	Emploi par branche d'activité économique			Taux de chômage			
			agriculture	industrie	services	total	femmes	hommes	jeunes
			% population active	% population active	% population active	% populations actives	% population active féminine	% population active masculine	% population active de 15-24 ans
			milliers	%	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015
Portugal	4558	51,2	8,3	24,0	67,7	12,4	12,8	12,1	32,0
Espagne	17866	45,5	4,1	19,7	76,2	22,1	23,6	20,8	48,3
France	26710	49,4	2,8	20,7	76,6	10,4	9,9	10,8	24,7
Italie	21994	42,6	3,6	27,2	69,2	11,9	12,7	11,3	40,3
Malte	177	49,5	1,3	22,4	76,3	5,4	5,3	5,4	11,6
Slovénie	922	52,3	9,1	30,6	60,3	9,0	10,1	8,0	16,4
Croatie	1580	43,8	9,5	27,1	63,5	16,3	17,0	15,7	43,1
Bosnie et Herzégovine	1121	34,0	18,5	30,4	51,1	26,3	21,5	29,2	70,6
Serbie	3139	42,4	19,4	24,5	56,1	17,7	18,8	16,8	42,6
Monténégro	205	40,3	7,8	17,6	74,7	17,5	16,7	18,1	38,4
ARYM	713	41,3	16,4	29,6	54,0	26,1	25,1	26,7	47,4
Albanie	984	41,7	42,3	18,1	39,6	17,1	17,3	16,9	37,8
Grèce	3632	38,8	13,2	14,9	71,9	24,9	28,8	21,8	49,2
Chypre	529	54,4	4,1	16,9	78,9	14,9	14,7	15,1	31,7
Turquie	16392	45,1	20,5	27,8	51,7	10,2	12,5	9,2	18,5
Syrie	4142	35,6	17,4	38,3	44,2	14,5	33,8	11,3	32,3
Liban	1954	43,9	8,2	22,1	69,7	6,5	11,0	5,1	20,7
Jordanie	1701	34,7	2,0	17,7	80,3	13,1	23,8	10,9	34,0
Israël	3529	60,6	1,1	18,2	80,7	5,3	5,4	5,1	9,3
Palestine	904	32,4	8,7	29,2	62,2	25,9	31,8	24,4	42,2
Égypte	26359	43,1	25,8	25,1	49,1	12,8	24,5	9,4	33,9
Libye	1894	43,0	20,2	25,2	54,6	19,2	28,1	16,1	47,7
Tunisie	3489	40,4	11,9	29,5	58,6	15,2	21,6	12,8	36,1
Algérie	11023	38,9	11,4	35,1	53,5	11,0	18,7	9,2	26,3
Maroc	11117	44,4	33,5	20,5	45,9	9,7	10,4	9,5	20,4

Élaboration propre. Source : OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT
 (...) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F15

Évolution de la population occupée et sans emploi dans les pays méditerranéens (1991-2015)




Élaboration propre. Source : OIT.

TABLEAU F16 Distribution des revenus

	Années	Part du revenu ou de la consommation					Relation entre les 10% les plus riches et le 10% les plus pauvres	Coefficient de Gini
		20 % les plus pauvres	seconde tranche de 20 %	troisième tranche de 20 %	quatrième tranche de 20 %	20 % les plus riches		
		%	%	%	%	%		
Portugal	2012	6,5	12,1	16,2	22,1	43,2	12,6	36
Espagne	2012	5,8	11,9	17,0	23,5	41,8	15,2	36
France	2012	7,8	12,6	16,5	21,8	41,2	8,7	33
Italie	2012	6,2	12,3	17,0	22,8	41,7	13,7	35
Malte	
Slovénie	2012	9,4	14,6	18,2	22,6	35,2	5,7	26
Croatie	2012	6,8	12,7	17,3	23,7	39,5	9,6	32
Bosnie et Herzégovine	2011	7,3	125,1	16,6	22,8	41,4	8,9	33
Serbie	2013	8,6	13,4	17,5	22,7	37,8	6,6	30
Monténégro	2014	8,5	12,3	16,6	22,2	40,5	7,2	33
ARYM	2008	5,4	9,5	13,9	21,0	50,3	16,4	44
Albanie	2012	8,9	13,2	17,3	22,8	37,8	6,3	29
Grèce	2012	5,6	11,7	17,2	23,3	42,3	15,4	37
Chypre	2012	8,0	12,1	15,8	21,4	42,7	8,5	34
Turquie	2013	5,8	10,5	15,2	22,0	46,6	13,8	40
Syrie		36
Liban	
Jordanie		34
Israël	2010	4,6	9,6	15,5	22,9	47,4	18,5	43
Palestine	2009	7,7	11,9	15,9	21,9	42,6	8,6	35
Égypte								31
Libye	
Tunisie	2010	6,7	11,6	16,1	22,6	42,9	14,0	36
Algérie	
Maroc	2007	6,5	10,5	14,5	20,8	48,0	12,5	41

Élaboration propre. Source : BM
(..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F16 Évolution du coefficient de Gini dans certains pays méditerranéens (2004-2013)




Élaboration propre. Source : BM.

TABLEAU F17 Genre : activité économique

	Taux d'activité ≥ 15 ans		Emploi par activité économique						Indice d'inégalité des genres	
	femmes	hommes	agriculture		industrie		services		Classement	Valeur
			femmes	hommes	femmes	hommes	femmes	hommes		
			% du taux d'emploi féminin	% du taux d'emploi masculin	% du taux d'emploi féminin	% du taux d'emploi masculin	% du taux d'emploi féminin	% du taux d'emploi masculin		
2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	
Portugal	53,6	64,2	6	11	15	33	79	57	17	0,091
Espagne	52,3	64,8	2	6	9	29	89	65	15	0,081
France	50,7	60,0	2	4	10	31	89	66	19	0,102
Italie	39,3	58,1	2	5	14	37	84	59	16	0,085
Malte	38,8	66,0	0	2	11	29	89	69	44	0,217
Slovénie	52,2	63,0	9	10	17	42	74	49	6	0,053
Croatie	46,4	58,7	8	11	15	37	77	52	31	0,141
Bosnie et Herzégovine	34,4	58,0	18	19	19	38	64	43	34	0,158
Serbie	43,4	60,1	16	22	17	30	67	48	40	0,185
Monténégro	42,0	56,1	8	7	7	26	84	67	33	0,156
ARYM	43,9	68,1	13	19	26	32	61	49	36	0,160
Albanie	40,3	60,7	49	38	11	23	40	39	51	0,267
Grèce	43,9	60,0	12	14	8	20	80	66	23	0,119
Chypre	57,5	70,2	2	6	7	25	91	69	21	0,116
Turquie	30,4	71,4	32	16	17	33	51	52	69	0,328
Syrie	12,2	70,8	28	16	13	42	59	42	133	0,554
Liban	23,5	70,3	0	11	6	27	93	62	83	0,381
Jordanie	14,2	64,4	1	2	8	19	91	79	111	0,478
Israël	58,9	69,4	1	2	8	27	91	71	20	0,103
Palestine	17,8	69,1	13	8	12	33	75	59
Égypte	22,8	76,1	42	22	5	30	53	48	135	0,565
Libye	27,8	78,7	29	18	26	25	46	57	38	0,167
Tunisie	25,1	71,3	3	15	32	29	65	56	58	0,289
Algérie	16,8	70,4	5	13	35	35	60	52	94	0,429
Maroc	25,3	74,3	34	33	15	22	51	44	113	0,494

Élaboration propre. Source : OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT OIT PNUD PNUD
 (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F17 Emploi par activité économique et genre (2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : OIT.


TABLEAU F18 Production et consommation énergétiques

	Production d'énergie	Consomma- tion d'énergie	Consomma- tion d'énergie par habitant	PIB par unité de consomma- tion d'énergie	Importation nette d'énergie	Part de l'offre totale d'énergie primaire									
						millions tm éq pétrole	millions tm éq pétrole	kg éq pétrole	\$ PPA par kg éq pétrole	% de l'énergie consommé ^a	charbon/ tourbe	pétrole	gaz naturel	nucléaire	autres ^b
											2014	2014	2014	2014	2014
Portugal	6,0	21,2	2035	12,8	72	12,6	43,6	16,4	0,0	27,3					
Espagne	35,1	114,6	2465	12,7	69	10,0	40,9	20,7	13,1	15,4					
France	137,1	242,6	3661	10,2	43	3,8	29,0	13,4	46,9	6,9					
Italie	36,7	146,8	2414	14,1	75	8,9	35,1	34,5	0,0	21,4					
Malte	0,0	0,8	1811	17,2	98	0,0	97,8	0,0	0,0	2,2					
Slovénie	3,7	6,7	3236	8,8	44	15,7	35,2	9,4	24,9	15,5					
Croatie	4,4	8,0	1898	10,6	46	8,0	37,6	25,1	0,0	29,3					
Bosnie et Herzégovine	6,1	7,8	2049	4,8	23	56,8	18,8	1,9	0,0	22,5					
Serbie	9,4	13,3	1859	7,1	29	47,1	24,6	12,1	0,0	16,1					
Monténégro	0,7	1,0	1538	9,6	28	37,5	27,1	0,0	0,0	35,4					
ARYM	1,3	2,6	1264	9,7	52	41,1	33,9	4,2	0,0	20,7					
Albanie	2,0	2,3	807	13,3	14	3,7	56,6	1,1	0,0	38,6					
Grèce	8,8	13,1	2124	11,3	62	28,9	46,4	10,7	0,0	13,9					
Chypre	0,1	2,0	1710	12,8	94	0,1	92,8	0,0	0,0	7,1					
Turquie	31,3	121,5	1568	12,1	74	29,5	27,0	33,1	0,0	10,4					
Syrie	5,6	10,8	575		48	0,0	60,9	36,8	0,0	2,3					
Liban	0,2	8,5	1335	10,1	98	2,2	95,4	0,0	0,0	2,1					
Jordanie	0,3	8,2	1103	9,3	97	4,4	89,5	3,7	0,0	2,3					
Israël	7,5	22,7	2763	11,5	67	28,9	40,0	27,7	0,0	3,4					
Palestine					
Égypte	80,4	74,8	835	12,0	-7	0,5	40,9	54,6	0,0	4,0					
Libye	36,3	17,9	2855		-103	0,0	72,0	27,1	0,0	0,9					
Tunisie	6,7	10,5	945	11,4	36	0,0	38,3	50,1	0,0	11,6					
Algérie	143,2	51,7	1327	10,2	-177	0,3	37,3	62,4	0,0	0,0					
Maroc	1,8	19,0	560	13,0	91	21,3	61,9	5,3	0,0	11,5					

Élaboration propre. Source :

a. Les valeurs négatives indiquent que le pays est un exportateur net. b. Inclut l'hydroélectrique, les biocarburants et déchets, le géothermique, le solaire et l'éolien. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F18 Production d'énergie par des sources renouvelables et de déchets (2014)




Élaboration propre. Source : AIE.

TABLEAU F19 Production, consommation et accès à l'électricité

	Population ayant accès à l'électricité	Production d'électricité	Consommation d'électricité par habitant	Sources d'électricité								
				%	billion kWh	kWh	charbon	gaz	pétrole	hydroélectrique	énergies renouvelables ^a	nucléaire
							%	%	%	%	%	%
							2012	2014	2013	2013/14 ^b	2013/14 ^b	2013/14 ^b
Portugal	100,0	52,8	4685	23	13	3	30	31	0			
Espagne	100,0	278,8	5401	16	17	5	14	26	21			
France	100,0	562,8	7374	2	2	0	11	5	78			
Italie	100,0	279,8	5159	17	34	5	21	22	0			
Malte	100,0	2,2	4736	0	0	98	0	2	0			
Slovénie	100,0	17,4	6833	22	2	0	36	3	37			
Croatie	100,0	13,6	3754	18	15	2	60	5	0			
Bosnie et Herzégovine	100,0	16,2	3219	58	0	0	41	0	0			
Serbie	100,0	34,1	4444	73	1	0	26	0	0			
Monténégro	100,0	3,2	5618	37	0	0	63	0	0			
ARYM	100,0	5,8	3557	66	6	2	26	0	0			
Albanie	100,0	4,7	2532	0	0	0	100	0	0			
Grèce	100,0	50,5	5029	46	19	9	9	16	0			
Chypre	100,0	4,4	3595	0	0	92	0	8	0			
Turquie	100,0	252,0	2745	30	48	1	16	5	0			
Syrie	96,3	21,7	1127	0	62	26	12	0	0			
Liban	100,0	18,0	3194	0	0	93	7	0	0			
Jordanie	99,5	18,2	2104	0	25	74	0	0	0			
Israël	100,0	60,8	6559	53	45	1	0	2	0			
Palestine	97,7			
Égypte	100,0	171,7	1697	0	77	15	8	1	0			
Libye	100,0	37,7	3923	0	61	39	0	0	0			
Tunisie	100,0	19,0	1435	0	96	0	0	2	0			
Algérie	100,0	64,2	1277	0	93	7	1	0	0			
Maroc	100,0	29,1	866	43	21	21	10	5	0			

Élaboration propre. Source : BM AIE BM BM BM BM BM BM BM
 a. Hors hydroélectrique. b. Dernières données disponibles pour cette période. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F19 Production d'électricité par source (2014)




Élaboration propre. Source : AIE & BM.
 * Hors hydroélectrique.

	Émissions CO ₂			intensité des émissions par PIB	Émissions CO ₂ par secteur				Voitures particulières ^a pour 1000 habitants
	total	par habitant	participation mondiale		participation mondiale	transport	industrie et construction	others	
	millions tm	tm	%	kg CO ₂ / PPP \$	%	%	%	%	
	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014	2014
Portugal	42,8	4,1	0,13	0,16	18,1	36,7	36,0	9,3	429
Espagne	232,0	5,0	0,72	0,16	21,4	35,3	30,2	13,0	474
France	285,7	4,3	0,88	0,12	19,4	42,4	10,1	28,1	480
Italie	319,7	5,3	0,99	0,16	14,4	33,0	32,3	20,3	610
Malte	2,3	5,5	0,01	0,20	1,4	23,1	68,3	7,2	622
Slovénie	12,8	6,2	0,04	0,23	13,3	41,6	35,5	9,6	522
Croatie	15,1	3,6	0,05	0,19	25,1	36,6	21,6	16,7	348
Bosnie et Herzégovine	21,6	5,7	0,07	0,61	13,2	13,7	67,3	5,7	241
Serbie	38,1	5,3	0,12	0,46	10,9	15,5	67,9	5,8	252
Monténégro	2,2	3,6	0,01	0,25	6,6	23,6	67,0	2,8	..
ARYM	7,4	3,6	0,02	0,28	15,2	21,6	59,8	3,4	179
Albanie	4,1	1,4	0,01	0,14	25,1	59,9	0,0	15,0	131
Grèce	65,9	6,0	0,20	0,25	15,6	24,8	51,6	8,0	469
Chypre	5,8	6,7	0,02	0,23	11,8	30,3	49,6	8,2	415
Turquie	307,1	4,0	0,95	0,22	18,3	19,8	43,0	18,9	127
Syrie	27,6	1,2	0,09	0,23	15,7	24,0	42,3	18,0	226
Liban	22,4	4,9	0,07	0,30	4,9	24,4	57,2	13,5	96
Jordanie	24,1	3,6	0,07	0,32	12,7	29,2	49,6	8,5	127
Israël	64,7	7,9	0,20	0,26	11,4	26,1	61,1	1,4	301
Palestine									56
Égypte	173,3	1,9	0,54	0,20	23,8	22,6	41,8	11,9	44
Libye	47,9	7,7	0,15	0,52	5,4	39,3	52,0	3,4	329
Tunisie	25,0	2,3	0,08	0,21	23,9	25,3	36,2	14,6	84
Algérie	122,9	3,2	0,38	0,24	20,6	35,3	26,5	17,5	89
Maroc	53,1	1,6	0,16	0,22	15,9	28,9	38,3	17,0	71

Élaboration propre. Source :

a. N'inclut pas les motocyclettes. b. Élaboration propre à partir de données de l'AIE. c. Élaboration propre à partir de données de l'OICA. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F20

Émissions de CO₂ dans les pays méditerranéens. Distribution par pays (2014)

Élaboration propre. Source : AIE.

TABLEAU F21 Eau

	Ressources en eau				Consommation d'eau						
	nationales	en provenance d'autres pays	dépendance en eau	par habitant	total	par habitant	en % du total des ressources	par secteurs			Production désalée
		km ³	km ³	%				m ³	agriculture	domestique	
	2014	2014	2014	2014	2004/14 ^a	2004/14 ^a	2004/14 ^a	2004/14 ^a	2004/14 ^a	2004/14 ^a	2004/14 ^a
Portugal	38,0	39,4	50,9	7,478	9,2	867	11,8	..	11	..	2
Espagne	111,2	0,3	0,3	2,418	37,4	801	33,0	68	14	18	100
France	200,0	11,0	5,2	3,277	30,2	476	14,1	10	18	71	12
Italie	182,5	8,8	4,6	3,199	53,8	900	28,1	..	17	..	97
Malte	0,1	0,0	0,0	121	0,1	108	44,4	64	34	..	19
Slovénie	18,7	13,2	41,4	15,411	1,2	559	3,6	0	15	85	0
Croatie	37,7	67,8	64,3	24,882	0,6	147	0,6	1	85	14	0
Bosnie et Herzégovine	35,5	2,0	5,3	9,843	0,3	86	0,9	15	0
Serbie	8,4	18,326	4,2	469	2,6	3	0
Monténégro	0,2	258	..	1	60	39	..
ARYM	5,4	1,0	15,6	3,080	1,0	269	8,6	23	41	36	0
Albanie	26,9	3,3	10,9	10,425	1,3	435	4,3	39	43	18	0
Grèce	58,0	10,4	15,2	6,244	9,6	865	14,0	88	9	3	10
Chypre	0,8	0,0	0,0	670	0,2	163	17,6	86	10	3	34
Turquie	227,0	-15,4	1,5	2,690	42,0	561	19,8	81	1
Syrie	7,1	9,7	72,4	908	16,8	863	84,7	88	9	4	0
Liban	4,8	-0,3	0,8	770	1,3	321	24,3	60	29	11	47
Jordanie	0,7	0,3	27,2	123	0,9	163	92,4	65	31	4	10
Israël	0,8	1,0	57,9	221	2,0	282	79,7	58	36	6	140
Palestine	0,8	0,0	3,0	179	0,4	111	48,8	45	48	7	0
Égypte	1,8	56,5	96,9	637	78,0	911	126,6	86	12	3	200
Libye	0,7	0,0	0,0	112	5,8	928	82,3	83	12	5	70
Tunisie	4,2	0,4	9,1	410	3,3	304	69,7	80	15	5	19
Algérie	11,3	0,4	3,6	294	8,4	225	66,9	59	36	5	615
Maroc	29,0	0,0	0,0	844	10,4	316	35,7	88	10	2	7

Élaboration propre. Source :

FAO

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
FAO

FAO

FAO

a. Dernières données disponibles pour cette période. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F21 Ressources en eau renouvelables dans les pays méditerranéens avec moins de ressources en eau par habitant (2014)



Élaboration propre. Source : FAO. * Dernières données disponibles pour cette période.

	Superficie totale		Forêts et terres boisées		Production de bois de chauffage	Zones protégées		Espèces menacées			Empreinte écologique
	milliers ha	2014	milliers ha	%		milliers m ³	terrestres	marines	Mammifères et oiseaux	Autres animaux ^a	
					% du territoire total		% des eaux territoriales	nombre	nombre	nombre	
	2014	2014	2014	2014	2015	2014	2014	2016	2016	2016	2013
Portugal	9 223	3 193	34,6	600	22,1	5,5	26	171	84	3,9	
Espagne	50 594	18 384	36,3	3 709	28,0	7,5	34	361	222	4,0	
France	54 909	16 876	30,7	27 133	25,3	62,9	23	209	43	5,1	
Italie	30 134	9 243	30,7	3 004	21,5	20,1	23	254	78	4,5	
Malte	32	0,4	1,1	0	23,1	4,7	7	28	4	4,5	
Slovénie	2 027	1 248	61,5	1 242	53,6	98,5	14	118	11	4,7	
Croatie	5 659	1 921	33,9	1 769	37,7	16,3	24	143	9	3,8	
Bosnie et Herzégovine	5 121	2 185	42,7	1 306	1,3	8,3	12	78	1	3,2	
Serbie	8 836	2 719	30,8	6 306	6,8	0,0	19	46	6	3,1	
Monténégro	1 381	827	59,9	751	4,1	0,0	20	76	2	3,6	
ARYM	2 571	998	38,8	534	9,7	0,0	19	90	0	3,1	
Albanie	2 875	772	26,9	1 100	2,3	1,5	13	118	0	2,3	
Grèce	13 196	4 024	30,5	10 655	34,9	6,0	27	286	60	4,2	
Chypre	925	173	18,7	7	18,4	0,9	13	41	18	3,3	
Turquie	78 535	11 613	14,8	4 634	0,2	0,4	38	244	107	3,2	
Syrie	18 518	491	2,7	33	0,7	0,6	34	80	18	1,4	
Liban	1 045	137	13,1	19	2,7	0,0	22	53	11	3,4	
Jordanie	8 932	98	1,1	342	2,1	30,1	26	82	5	2,1	
Israël	2 207	163	7,4	2	19,9	0,3	33	131	10	6,0	
Palestine	602	9	1,5	17	11	3	..	
Égypte	100 145	72	0,1	17 740	11,2	13,2	33	120	3	2,0	
Libye	175 954	217	0,1	1 012	0,3	4,3	17	42	3	4,4	
Tunisie	16 361	1 031	6,3	3 610	5,4	2,7	24	64	7	2,2	
Algérie	238 174	1 948	0,8	8 533	7,9	1,2	28	87	18	2,4	
Maroc	44 655	5 640	12,6	6 679	33,6	1,3	34	133	38	1,7	



Élaboration propre. Source :

FAO FAO FAO FAO BM BM IUCN IUCN IUCN GFN

a. Pour ces groupes, il y a encore de nombreuses espèces non évaluées. Les chiffres présentés doivent être interprétés comme le nombre d'espèces connues menacées parmi les espèces qui ont été évaluées à cette date. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F22

Empreinte écologique par habitant (2013)



Élaboration propre. Source : GFN.

TABLEAU F23

Commerce international


	Exportations	Importations	Taux de couverture	Balance commerciale	Solde du compte des transactions courantes	Envois de fonds des travailleurs ^{bd}		Investissements directs étrangers	
	millions \$	millions \$	%	millions \$	millions \$	millions \$	% total des échanges ^a	flux entrants	flux sortants
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015
Portugal	54 332	64 498	84	-10 166	903	6 031	8 167
Espagne	277 940	302 702	92	-24 762	16 658	9 243	34 586
France	511 856	537 577	95	-25 720	-4 800	22 982	31	42 883	35 069
Italie	450 262	390 537	115	59 725	39 478	9 517	17	20 279	27 607
Malte	2 956	4 603	64	-1 647	959	173	13	9 532	-215
Slovénie	26 690	24 885	107	1 805	3 133	758	23	993	-65
Croatie	11 904	19 268	62	-7 364	2 529	2 108	86	174	13
Bosnie et Herzégovine	3 950	8 173	48	-4 223	-899	1 772	317	249	21
Serbie	13 358	17 013	79	-3 655	-1 751	3 371	183	2 706	387
Monténégro	360	1 981	18	-1 621	-532	381	223	699	12
ARYM	3 372	5 392	63	-2 021	-137	307	63	174	-15
Albanie	855	3 401	25	-2 547	-1 277	1 047	337	1 003	38
Grèce	27 490	46 620	59	-19 129	-119	429	07	-289	379
Chypre	2 759	6 282	44	-3 522	-713	249	21	4 534	9 718
Turquie	152 016	199 922	76	-47 906	-32 136	1 395	07	16 508	4 778
Syrie	2 409	7 504	32	-5 095	-2 955
Liban	-8 146	7 481	414	2 341	619
Jordanie	7 829	18 039	43	-10 210	-3 332	5 348	383	1 275	1
Israël	57 765	61 318	94	-3 553	14 455	11 566	9 743
Palestine	1 365	6 922	20	-5 556	-629	2 206	890	120	185
Égypte	18 760	50 051	37	-31 291	-16 754	6 885	182
Libye	9 369	22 881	41	-13 512	-7 762	726	864
Tunisie	13 947	19 069	73	-5 122	-3 875	2 347	137	1 002	33
Algérie	33 460	52 441	64	-18 981	-27 556	-587	103
Maroc	18 484	32 738	56	-14 255	-1 923	3 162	649

Élaboration propre. Source :

a. Pourcentage des exportations et des importations de biens et services. b. Transferts personnels et rémunération des salariés. c. Élaboration propre à partir de données de la CNUCED. d. Estimation. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F23

Balances commerciales dans les pays méditerranéens (2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : CNUCED.

	Exportations						Indice de concentration des exportations
	produits alimentaires	matières premières agricoles	combustibles	minéraux et métaux	produits manufacturés	autres	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015
Portugal	12,4	2,5	7,6	2,5	74,8	0,2	0,078
Espagne	16,2	1,0	5,0	3,8	71,2	2,8	0,102
France	11,2	1,0	3,4	2,4	81,2	0,9	0,114
Italie	8,5	0,7	3,2	2,9	82,8	1,9	0,054
Malte	7,5	0,2	25,5	0,7	63,5	2,6	0,310
Slovénie	3,6	1,8	4,4	3,8	69,3	17,1	0,167
Croatie	13,2	5,3	10,9	3,6	66,6	0,4	0,069
Bosnie et Herzégovine	10,0	7,0	7,2	8,7	66,2	0,9	0,100
Serbie	21,0	1,4	2,8	5,4	68,0	1,4	0,091
Monténégro	17,0	10,5	14,8	31,4	26,3	0,0	0,223
ARYM	11,6	0,5	1,2	4,6	82,0	0,0	0,205
Albanie	5,8	2,4	15,5	9,1	55,6	11,7	0,222
Grèce	20,8	1,8	29,8	9,0	36,4	2,2	0,253
Chypre	18,9	0,7	16,6	3,8	53,8	6,1	0,214
Turquie	11,5	0,4	3,0	8,9	74,7	1,5	0,073
Syrie	47,9	1,9	8,3	1,6	40,1	0,2	0,154
Liban	21,1	1,3	2,5	23,5	51,6	0,0	0,118
Jordanie	16,5	0,4	0,1	8,5	73,5	1,0	0,159
Israël	2,8	0,6	0,8	28,8	66,0	1,0	0,273
Palestine	26,5	0,9	0,2	8,5	63,8	0,1	0,186
Égypte	19,3	2,1	22,4	7,5	47,7	1,0	0,140
Libye	0,4	0,1	86,5	3,6	5,5	3,9	0,640
Tunisie	14,2	0,6	7,2	1,4	76,5	0,0	0,141
Algérie	0,7	0,0	95,8	0,3	3,1	0,0	0,485
Maroc	20,5	0,9	2,1	8,3	67,2	0,9	0,163

Élaboration propre. Source :

CNUCED

CNUCED

CNUCED

CNUCED



CNUCED

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GRAPHIQUE F24

Exportations de produits alimentaires (2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : CNUCED.

TABLEAU F25



Importations

	Importations						Indice de concentration des importations
	produits alimentaires	matières premières agricoles	combustibles	minéraux et métaux	produits manufacturés	autres	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015
Portugal	15,0	1,8	13,2	2,8	67,1	0,0	0,076
Espagne	11,3	1,2	14,0	3,9	69,5	0,1	0,085
France	8,6	1,1	10,4	2,5	77,3	0,1	0,081
Italie	10,7	2,3	12,7	5,9	67,0	1,4	0,065
Malte	5,8	0,2	27,6	1,7	59,8	5,0	0,328
Slovénie	7,5	2,5	9,3	5,5	62,1	13,1	0,118
Croatie	13,2	1,2	15,2	2,2	68,1	0,0	0,058
Bosnie et Herzégovine	19,1	1,6	10,7	3,1	64,9	0,6	0,055
Serbie	8,3	1,7	11,5	4,8	65,4	8,3	0,084
Monténégro	25,0	0,7	10,8	2,5	60,9	0,0	0,072
ARYM	11,7	0,9	10,9	15,0	61,4	0,1	0,105
Albanie	14,5	0,9	9,6	1,9	58,6	14,6	0,128
Grèce	14,1	1,1	26,7	3,6	54,4	0,2	0,153
Chypre	20,2	0,7	22,0	0,7	56,3	0,2	0,181
Turquie	5,3	2,5	7,0	7,8	65,4	12,1	0,105
Syrie	18,8	2,3	12,3	3,0	63,6	0,0	0,090
Liban	16,8	1,4	17,9	5,5	57,7	0,7	0,145
Jordanie	18,9	1,2	17,3	6,0	54,7	1,9	0,086
Israël	8,4	1,1	11,9	12,8	65,0	0,8	0,114
Palestine	29,3	0,5	25,2	1,5	43,4	0,0	0,135
Égypte	18,1	2,7	12,9	3,1	62,6	0,6	0,069
Libye	18,9	0,6	6,5	1,3	72,0	0,7	0,065
Tunisie	11,2	1,9	14,2	3,6	69,1	0,0	0,080
Algérie	19,3	1,5	4,5	1,5	73,2	0,0	0,069
Maroc	11,2	1,9	18,1	4,5	64,3	0,2	0,080

Élaboration propre. Source : CNUCED

GRAPHIQUE F25

Importations de produits alimentaires (2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : CNUCED.

	Arrivée de touristes par pays de destination			Sorties de touristes	Revenu du tourisme international	Dépenses du tourisme dans d'autres pays		
	Taux de change		% en Méditerranée	Milliers	millions \$	% des exportations	millions \$	% des importations
	%	milliers						
	2014/15	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	
Portugal	9,7	10 176	3,0	1 460 ^b	15 819	19,2	4 782	6,1
Espagne	5,0	68 215	20,1	14 407	56 426	14,3	17 347	4,7
France	0,9	84 452	24,9	26 648	54 003	7,2	46 835	6,1
Italie	4,4	50 732	15,0	29 040	39 420	7,2	24 417	5,0
Malte	6,0	1 791	0,5	428	1 367	9,3	359	2,6
Slovénie	12,3	2 707	0,8	2 867	2 697	8,1	1 051	3,6
Croatie	9,1	12 683	3,7	2 578	9 018	37,0	770	3,3
Bosnie et Herzégovine	26,5	678	0,2	..	702	12,5	201	2,3
Serbie	10,1	1 132	0,3	..	1 322	7,6	1 254	6,0
Monténégro	15,5	1 560	0,5	..	947	55,5	68	2,8
ARYM	14,2	486	0,1	..	270	5,5	189	2,9
Albanie	13,3	3 784	1,1	4 504	1 614	52,0	1 311	25,9
Grèce	7,1	23 599	7,0	6 291	17 260	29,5	3 537	6,0
Chypre	8,9	2 659	0,8	1 119	2 489	20,8	1 439	12,1
Turquie	-0,8	39 478	11,6	8 751	35 413	17,8	5 686	2,6
Syrie
Liban	12,1	1 518	0,4	..	7 087	36,6	5 187	17,1
Jordanie	-5,7	3 763	1,1	1 230 ^b	4 997	35,3	1 267	5,6
Israël	-4,3	2 800	0,8	5 891	6 061	6,6	6 244	7,5
Palestine	-22,3	432	0,1	..	452	19,5	427	5,7
Égypte	-5,1	9 139	2,7	6 180 ^b	6 897	18,4	3 636	5,4
Libye
Tunisie	-25,2	5 359	1,6	2 637 ^b	1 869	10,7	767	3,5
Algérie	-25,7	1 710	0,5	3 638	357	0,9	765	1,2
Maroc	-1,0	10 177	3,0	1 910	7 765	23,3	2 155	5

Élaboration propre. Source :

UNWTO

BM

BM*

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
BM

BM

a. Valeur calculée en utilisant des données de OMT. b. Données de 2014 (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F26

Tourisme international. Sorties et Dépenses (2014-2015)



Élaboration propre. Source: BM.

TABLEAU F27

Aide publique au développement (APD)

	Aide publique au développement des pays donateurs			Aide publique au développement dans pays bénéficiaires		
	millions \$	% du RNB	\$ par habitant	millions \$	% du RNB	\$ par habitant
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2010
Portugal	308	0,19	30			
Espagne	1397	0,01	30			
France	9039	0,04	140			
Italie	4003	0,02	67			
Malte	17	0,00	41			
Slovénie	63	0,00	30			
Croatie	51	0,00	12			
Bosnie et Herzégovine				355	2,20	93
Serbie				313	0,90	35
Monténégro				100	2,44	160
ARYM				214	2,18	103
Albanie				334	2,96	115
Grèce	239	0,00	22			
Chypre	18	0,00	15			
Turquie	3919	0,02	50	2 145	0,30	27
Syrie				4882	..	264
Liban				975	2,04	167
Jordanie				2 150	5,80	283
Israël	198	0,00	25			
Palestine				1 873	17,52	401
Égypte				2 514	0,78	27
Libye				158	0,51	25
Tunisie				475	1,14	42
Algérie				88	0,05	2
Maroc				1 488	1,51	43



Élaboration propre. Source :

OCDE OCDE OCDE*

a. Valeur calculée en utilisant des données de l'OCDE. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F27

APD des institutions de l'UE aux pays méditerranéens (en millions \$) (2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : BM


	Dettes extérieures					
	millions \$	% du RNB	\$ par habitant	à long terme	à court terme	Service de la dette
				millions \$	millions \$	% des exportations
2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015	2015
Portugal
Espagne
France
Italie
Malte
Slovénie
Croatie
Bosnie et Herzégovine	12 887	79,8	3 382	11 443	644	29,7
Serbie	30 807	88,8	4 342	29 291	884	23,6
Monténégro	2 665	65,1	4 284	2 630	52	25,2
ARYM	6 942	70,6	3 340	5 634	1 217	20,8
Albanie	8 269	73,2	2 862	6 268	1 758	27,9
Grèce
Chypre
Turquie	397 923	56,1	5 058	294 222	102 216	10,7
Syrie	4 420	..	239	3 528	504	..
Liban	30 896	64,7	5 281	26 905	3 723	18,0
Jordanie	25 746	69,5	3 390	13 070	10 605	14,3
Israël
Palestine
Égypte	46 585	14,3	509	40 915	4 424	13,3
Libye
Tunisie	27 363	65,6	2 432	19 021	6 575	12,9
Algérie	4 677	2,9	118	1 194	1 823	1,7
Maroc	42 989	43,6	1 250	35 343	6 867	10,5

Élaboration propre. Source :

a. Valeur calculée en utilisant des données de la BM. (..) Données non disponibles.

GRAPHIQUE F28

Évolution des stocks de dette extérieure (\$ courants) (1985-2015)



Élaboration propre. Source : BM.