Second UfM Regional Forum
Mediterranean in Action: Youth for Stability and Development

Union for the Mediterranean
Union pour la Méditerranée
الإتحاد من أجل المتوسط

PANEL IV

THE FUTURE STARTS NOW: YOUTH AT THE HEART OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AGENDA

Palau de Pedralbes, Barcelona, 24th January 2017

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EuroMeSCo

09.30-12.30

PANEL IV.

The future starts now: Youth at the heart of the Mediterranean Agenda

This panel is organized by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), acting as the Secretariat of the EuroMeSCo network of think tanks. A prospective and forward looking vision is essential to the debates in the Forum. A vast and largely untapped potential of opportunities exists on both rims of the Mediterranean. Youth represent the present and the future of our societies and constitute the largest age group in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. More than one third of the population is under 15.

We need to exchange on experiences and good practices, with a view to turning regional challenges related to youth into opportunities for increased stability, human and sustainable infrastructure development and regional integration. We have to better understand how Mediterranean youth aspirations, needs and ideas can be more adequately addressed, and how the UfM and other regional and subregional cooperation initiatives can more effectively contribute to the shared objectives of greater social and political cohesion in the region.

- How can the aspirations, needs and ideas of youth in the Mediterranean be met by adequate responses?
- What are the best mechanisms and levers to unleash youth potential as means of ensuring sustainable and inclusive development, and avoid risks of social exclusion and radicalization in the region?
- How can the UfM and other regional cooperation initiatives tackle the needs of Mediterranean youth more effectively in order to achieve greater social and political cohesion in the region?

Co-Chairs

- **Senén Florensa,** President of the Steering Committee of EuroMeSCo and Executive President of the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed)
- **Jorge Borrego,** Deputy Secretary General for Energy and Climate Action, Union for the Mediterranean
- **Maria Badia,** Secretary for Foreign and European Union Affairs, Generalitat de Catalunya

Speakers

- **Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck,** El-Erian Fellow, Carnegie Middle East Center
- **Nathalie Tocci,** Vice-Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali
- **Claire Spencer,** Senior Research Fellow for the MENA programme, Chatham House
- **Hamza Meddeb,** Research Fellow, Middle East Directions Programme, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Special presentation by

- **Hatem Atallah,** Executive Director of the Anna Lindh Foundation

Testimonials

- **Tina Hocevar,** Bureau member, European Youth Forum
- **Sara Hasna Mokaddem,** International Relations Specialist, OCP Policy Centre

Youth Unemployment in Mediterranean Countries: Nature of the Problem and Possible Ways Forward

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Youth Unemployment Patterns in Mediterranean Countries

Youth unemployment is one of the major challenges the world is facing at present. At all levels, awareness is being raised on the arduous situation young people are facing. Data lend support to the premonitory signs of alarm: according to the International Labour Organization (ILO), almost 74 million young people are unemployed, constituting around 37% of the total global unemployed. Though recent trends point to a slight decrease in youth unemployment, the fact is that *"overall, two in five economically active young people are still either unemployed, or working yet living in poverty."*[1]

Prospects for Mediterranean countries are not encouraging. In southern Europe, the global financial crisis has left a legacy of high unemployment and underemployment, with disproportionate effects on young people. There is a significant gap between European countries that have low youth unemployment rates (such as Germany, where the unemployment rate for 15-24 year olds is 7.2%) and southern Europe (youth unemployment rates stand at 51.4% in Spain, 50.6% in Greece, 44.8% in Croatia and 42% in Italy).[2] There is also widespread job precariousness among those young people who do have a job. And, a new class of young working poor is emerging. Likewise, in 2014, North African and Middle Eastern countries had the highest rates of youth unemployment in the world.[3] A recent ILO report on Tunisia shows that more than one third of active young people – of which graduates form an important part – are unemployed, while most of those who do have a job are employed in the informal economy.[4] The expectation that education would open the way to a good job is often not met. Furthermore, the labour market position of young women is particularly difficult in the region. The unemployment rate of young women is over 20 percentage points higher than that of young men.

That said, the sociopolitical context in the region makes the task of tackling youth unemployment extremely complex. Several countries are subject to destabilizing political forces, exacerbating insecurity and hurting the business climate which is so important for job creation. Libya and Syria have been immersed in a crisis for the past five years. Three Mediterranean countries are absorbing the bulk of Syrian refugees, namely Jordan (654,100 refugees), Lebanon (1.1 Million) and Turkey (1.5 Million).[5]

The facts are well known. The point is whether policy makers in Mediterranean countries will have the capacity to act and the willingness to look for solutions that go beyond the view that economic growth will solve all problems. For instance, in Tunisia, youth unemployment coexisted with relatively high economic growth in the early 2000s. So, economic

[1] ILO: *Global Employment Trends for Youth 2015.International Labour Organization. Geneva. 2015.* p. 1.
[2] All data fourth quarter 2014 from : http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4102_en.htm
[3] ILO: *Global Employment Trends for Youth 2015.International Labour Organization. Geneva. 2015.*
[4] Charmes, J. *La jeunesse tunisienne et l'économie informelle,* Bureau International du Travail. Tunis. 2015.
[5] UNHCR: *World at War. Global trends forced displacement in 2014.* The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Geneva. 2014 http://unhcr.org/556725e69.pdf

growth, important as it is, is not enough. Likewise, partial interventions, which are often mentioned in the debate, are not up to the challenge. These include active labour market policies and targeted measures that address some of the worst symptoms of youth unemployment – without however tackling the problem as a whole.

Consequences of Youth Unemployment

Before looking at the possible policy approaches, it is important to examine the consequences of inaction. Indeed, there is not enough recognition of the perverse consequences of youth unemployment in Mediterranean countries.

Youth Unemployment, a Major Impediment to Economic Growth and Development…

To start with, youth unemployment represents a major drag to economic growth and development in the region. It is a waste of human resources, especially when qualified young people are not able to realize their human capital potential. When compared with other regions, most Mediterranean countries suffer from overly high unemployment among well-educated youth. Therefore, part of the investment in education and training of young people is wasted. This is particularly problematic for young women, who tend to perform better than their male counterparts – and yet their career prospects are, on average, worse than those of young men.

To some extent, the situation can be addressed through the emigration of young people to low-unemployment regions like northern Europe, the United States and, until recently, Latin America. However, emigration is a second best solution. And, in any case, many host countries are increasingly reluctant to accept new immigrants.

The economic consequences of youth unemployment go well beyond the waste of human capital. Indeed, as is well known, young people are often the most innovative group. They often bring new ideas and novel ways of working. In some cases, this is expressed in the form of entrepreneurship and business start-ups, notably in the new technology sector. More generally, young people can help adapt workplaces to the ongoing transformations in the world of work. Much of the success of innovative places like Silicon Valley owes to their ability to attract and retain young talent.

> Facts are well known. The point is whether policy makers in Mediterranean countries will have the capacity to act and the willingness to look for solutions that go beyond the view that economic growth will solve all problems

Importantly, in the presence of high and persistent youth unemployment, Mediterranean countries will face significant difficulties in coping with demographic challenges. In most of these countries, the size of youth cohorts is shrinking compared with older cohorts. This means that, in principle, there are fewer young entrants into the labour market than retirees who exit it. However, in the presence of barriers to youth employment, this demographic dividend is often not realized.

… and a Threat to Social Cohesion and Political Stability

Youth unemployment also represents a major challenge to social cohesion. It is a factor of social inequalities. In a number of Mediterranean countries, young people from high-income families enjoy easier access to quality education and good jobs than their low-income counterparts. And the situation has tended to deteriorate. This breaks the basic social pact that used to govern these countries, and, furthermore, a lack of decent jobs also hampers social mobility, thus weakening that social pact. For a number of years, low- and middle-income families believed that their children would benefit from improved living standards. However this is less and less the case, fuelling discontent. The fact is that there is an empirical relationship between social unrest and youth unemployment.[6]

[6] See ILO, *World of Work Report.* various issues. *Geneva. 2013.*

Even among young people who do work, the employment situation is increasingly precarious. In most Mediterranean countries, the incidence of temporary work, informal arrangements and atypical forms of employment are high and growing (these patterns are more pronounced than in other regions). The result is that young people, even among those who work, are not able to borrow and invest in housing, leading to considerable frustration – all the more so because housing ownership is an important aspiration in the region.

There is not enough recognition of the perverse consequences of youth unemployment in Mediterranean countries

These trends undermine political stability as well. In high-unemployment European countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, there have been major demonstrations of public anger among youth. The political spectrum has become more fragmented as a result, complicating the task of forming government coalitions.

Possible Policy Responses

Youth unemployment is not a fatality. There are ways to tackle it, provided the right diagnosis is made. This section examines these broad policy requirements, before turning attention to what is the most important obstacle to youth employment, namely weaknesses in governance arrangements – both within Mediterranean countries and between them.

Various Policies Exist to Tackle Youth Unemployment in Southern Europe…

Thus, in southern European countries young people with low levels of education, mainly NEETs (not in education, employment or training) form the backbone of youth unemployment. Therefore these countries require, first and foremost, policies that enhance educational attainment, improvements in the school-to-work transition and employment programmes targeted on NEETs, such as the Youth Guarantee.

The latter represents an interesting recent innovation. Drawing on European Structural Funds, Youth Guarantees provide an opportunity to all NEETs – whether a subsidized job, a second chance at school, support to set up a new business or reinforced job-seeking services.

… and North Africa and the Middle East

By contrast, in North African and Middle Eastern countries, young people with tertiary education are more likely to be unemployed than their low-educated counterparts. The problem in these countries is lack of demand in general and a mismatch between the skills acquired in education on the one hand, and labour market needs on the other.

The economic consequences of youth unemployment go well beyond the waste of human capital. Indeed, as is well known, young people are often the most innovative group

Strengthening framework conditions for economic growth, stimulating investment and spurring regional integration are therefore of paramount importance for boosting demand and job creation. Also, these countries require an overhaul of their education systems and a new partnership with enterprises with a view to tackling skills mismatch. The establishment of well-functioning apprenticeship pathways may be an interesting way forward in this regard.

The National Employment Strategy of Morocco, though still in an early phase of implementation at the national level, is a case in point. It focuses on the labour market problems of youth and women through a broad range of economic, employment and social measures. Importantly, it has been discussed extensively with social partners and involves key ministries, notably finance, employment and social affairs, and education.

The Real Challenge Lies in Improving Governance within Countries…

While there is a certain consensus around some of the measures mentioned above, the fact is that action in terms of adopting them is typically slow. This mainly reflects a lack of a clear strategy and weak policy coherence and other limitations in internal governance arrangements.

Strengthening framework conditions for economic growth, stimulating investment and spurring regional integration are of paramount importance for boosting demand and job creation

To start with, few Mediterranean countries have a comprehensive youth employment strategy, thus reducing the effectiveness of specific policy initiatives. There are some recent exceptions, however. For instance Morocco has developed a National Employment Strategy which pays considerable attention to the various factors of youth unemployment.
As part of the strategy, it is also important to set aside public budgets and an inter-ministerial coordination body to avoid fragmentation of efforts and build synergies – in particular among education, labour and employment, and finance ministries.
The involvement of social partners is important for the success of the strategy. Recent labour market reforms in Italy and Portugal, and the New Social Contract in Tunisia concluded in the aftermath of the Arab Spring are interesting examples in this respect.

… and across Them, Notably through Coordination Action in the Mediterranean Region

There is significant scope for enhancing policy coordination in mutual learning across Mediterranean countries, as part of a broad youth employment strategy. This is not only because there are similarities among countries in the nature of labour market imbalances, but also because acting together will magnify benefits compared to countries acting in isolation.

For instance, there could be grounds for a coordinated youth guarantee programme in North Africa. By pooling resources – some of them funded from the donor community and the African Development Bank for example – and implementing a youth guarantee in a coordinated manner, these countries could usefully supplement other national policies. The EU has recently embarked on a similar exercise, which may explain the slight reduction in youth unemployment over the past year or so.

Few Mediterranean countries have a comprehensive youth employment strategy, thus reducing the effectiveness of specific policy initiatives

There is also much to gain from the detection and sharing of good practices. The IEMed could play a major role in this respect, for instance by organizing periodic knowledge sharing meetings on youth employment issues. One way to achieve this would be by establishing a Mediterranean employment and migration observatory. This body would be in charge of an analysis of trends in youth employment and migration, the development of a culture of monitoring and evaluation and peer reviews of different policy approaches.

To Conclude

The situation of youth in the Mediterranean region is much more difficult than in neighbouring countries. This not only entails a major economic drag, but also threatens the socio-political stability of the region. There is however growing awareness of these risks, and indeed governments, social partners and civil society are considering innovative strategies for tackling them. There is no doubt that, by sustaining efforts and engaging in international cooperation, a significant dent in youth unemployment can be made. The Mediterranean region, with its many untapped resources, can thus become a hub of global leadership and innovation in the future.

Strategics Sectors | **Culture & Society**

Education, Education, Education… and Jihad

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Education as Security

The one-time Egyptian Minister of Education, Hussein Kamel Bahaa El Din, was not in much doubt about the link between education and security. He described education as "contributing to the military, economic and political security of the country. The political security dimension … includes contributing to democracy and internal peace through empowering students to think critically, thus protecting them from attempts at brainwashing by terrorists and extremists." He sums up well and – I believe – correctly, the centrality of education in building a society resistant to extremist ideas of any kind.

It is not a question of teaching children *what* to think – this is the biggest fallacy of all. Too much energy and intelligence is spent on 'counter-narratives' and nationalist histories which are, to be charitable, not the most efficient way of addressing the problem of a child's or young adult's susceptibility to seductive and simplistic accounts of the world. For that they need to be taught not *what* to think, but *how* to think – or as the Egyptian minister puts it, how to "think critically." Suggestive corroboration comes from an unexpected source: Saudi Arabia. Here, in 2011, CSIS did an intriguing poll amongst 4,500 students. Among many other questions, the researchers asked whether the students agreed with the statement "Teachers should let us develop our own opinions and not push us in certain directions." Of the students polled, 91% of women and 87% of men agreed with the statement: an appeal, in other words, to 'teach us *how* to think, not *what* to think.' The intellectual doldrum in which they languish is one they want to escape.

Engineers and Social Scientists

There has been research done over the last few years into the old observation that a strangely high proportion of violent jihadists are graduates of engineering faculties. Quite how strange is brought out in a recent book by Diego Gambetta and Steffan Hertog, called *Engineers of Jihad*. They note that in their sample an extraordinary 46% of jihadi recruits in the Middle East, whose education can be identified, are graduates; and of those, 45% are engineering graduates. In Europe, though the sample is much smaller and needs to be treated with caution, the figure is in the range of 25-39% of all graduates recruited, a remarkable figure in itself, at either end of the scale. The authors speculate carefully as to why this might be. Of course there are all sorts of contributory reasons in the sociology of the engineering profession and the dashing of expectations of upward mobility. But they conclude that there is something in the way engineering is taught, or understood, or the kind of outlook to which it appeals, that selects for a black-and-white, un-nuanced view of the world with a predilection for single, clear and conclusive answers to questions. While this phenomenon is very much 'on the margin,' and the numbers involved are tiny compared to the universe of engineers, it is clearly significant, a bellwether to which we must pay careful attention.

But there are two further points that are even more significant. The first is that there are almost no jihadi graduates of the humanities and social sciences

(with the exception of Islamic Studies). Intriguingly these graduates dominate revolutionary movements of the left, where engineers feature very little. It seems that in the context of jihadi recruitment at least, the humanities and social sciences provide some kind of immunity. This is counterintuitive. The vast majority of students in the MENA region study humanities and social sciences (about 63% overall, rising to 74-75% in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and Oman), and these faculties are overcrowded, underfunded and often very uninspired. Their graduates also see much higher levels of unemployment than graduates in science, medicine and engineering (one North African Minister of Education memorably described the Faculties of Letters as "factories of unemployment"). So the common idea of the devil's making work for idle hands – of jihadists being recruited simply from the very real sump of misery that graduate unemployment in the region constitutes – is wrong. Why? There seems to be something different about the intellectual habits

There has been research done over the last few years into the old observation that a strangely high proportion of violent jihadists are graduates of engineering faculties

that the humanities and social sciences inculcate: a former Muslim Brother is quoted by Hazen Kandil as saying (of the Brotherhood, and therefore of a somewhat less violent extremism), "In social sciences one learns that someone made an argument; another criticized it; and history validated or disproved it. Questioning received wisdom is welcomed. In natural sciences by contrast, there are no opinions, only facts. This type of matter-of-fact mentality is more susceptible to accepting the Brotherhood's formulas which present everything as black or white."

Starting at School

And an education that teaches students how to question, think, use evidence and take nothing for granted, is a protection against the doctrinaire simplisticisms of Islamist extremism and jihad. But where do we see this educational inoculation as beginning? I don't for a moment believe that it's at university. In Britain, the President of the Royal Society, Venki Ramakrishna, said recently: "In schools, instead of encouraging active participation by students in exploration and experimentation, science is often taught as a dry collection of facts to be memorized for exams. Moreover we force students to choose between sciences and humanities far too early." It seems likely that the process of closing young minds, of shaping them to reject nuance and ambiguity and rendering them vulnerable to simple answers begins in the early school years.

The process of closing young minds, of shaping them to reject nuance and ambiguity and rendering them vulnerable to simple answers begins in the early school years

Across the Middle East there exists a fierce culture of memorization in schools. Some of the prestige, or acceptability, of rote memorization lies in Islamic educational traditions going back many centuries. But more of it comes from the unfinished nature of education reform since independence, the often clumsy grafting of secular 'modern' educational syllabi and pedagogy onto traditional ones to create a very overloaded and sometimes conflicting hybrid. This hybrid relies on a very rigid teacher-centredness and rote memorization, tested through exams which are all too often simple regurgitations of facts learned. And if this sounds familiar, it is because in a sense much of the educational hardware of the Middle East (and large parts of the wider Islamic world) is a selection mechanism for breeding the 'engineering mentality' hinted at, but a little unfairly so described, above – in which case it is a whole-system deformation which selects those most adept at learning and repeating, at absorbing and uncritically regurgitating. And in a system where the elite streams at secondary school are defined by maths and science and selected

into medicine and engineering at university, you may well be ending up with the carefully chosen best products of this very particular and mechanistic educational regime in the elite faculties. And of these a very few – but a disproportionate share, even more so of engineers than of medical graduates – take their intellectual training to extremes and swallow the easy – and mechanistic – certainties and unambiguous imperatives of dogmatic, extremist Islam.

Ambiguity

There may even be a correlation between a capacity to manage and internalize ambiguity, and an ability to exercise tolerance. This was explored by Else Frenkel-Brunswik half a century ago, and remains controversial, but is an interesting gloss on the way black-and-white binary thinking, the antithesis of comfortable ambiguity, *may* cohabit naturally with what Frenkel-Brunswick and Adorno called 'the Authoritarian Personality.' If this is so, it would suggest that an education which avoids ambiguity in favour of precision, clarity and binary thinking could actually contribute to – or at least evoke innate – intolerance. The end result of such an upbringing, in Frenkel-Brunswik's view is "a political philosophy and social outlook which has no room for anything but a desperate clinging to what appears to be strong and a disdainful rejection of whatever is relegated to the bottom."

An education which avoids ambiguity in favour of precision, clarity and binary thinking could actually contribute to intolerance

The Challenges to Schools Reform – and Authoritarianism

The answer is clear but problematic. In Bahaa El Din's words, children need to be taught critical thinking. But who is to teach them? There are a great many schoolchildren and students in the Middle East – Egypt alone has an education system with a population greater than that of the entire nation of Tunisia – and retraining the whole teaching profession in methods and attitudes that run, often, deeply against the grain is a very tall order. In education systems straining under the demographic pressures of the 'youth bulge' and driven by developmental orthodoxies to imagine that prosperity and development are in some way proportionate to the number of (undifferentiated) graduates in the population, radical reform towards child-centeredness and the teaching of critical thinking represents a real challenge.

It also offers a real challenge in quite another sphere. It's not just schoolteachers who don't like having their primacy and authority questioned. Critical thinking is a threat to authoritarian regimes, whether secular or clerical, which rely on compliance and acceptance of their authority by the populations they govern. This makes critical thinking a two-edged sword, because the same child who is trained to question the glib certainties of the radical preacher and the jihadi recruiter is also going to question the glib certainties of kings, mullahs and religious scholars. It is no surprise that regimes across the Islamic Middle East are very much in two minds about serious, radical education reform and much given to encouraging and funding science and technology in education – on the assumption that it is *safer* than history or sociology or anthropology. In cash-strapped countries it is also cheaper.

A well-educated population will think for itself. This is a remarkable prophylaxis against 'radicalization,' but it is also a mine dug under the foundations of authoritarianism

But it is very necessary. Abdelwahab El-Affendi was talking about exactly this in a recent paper on Islamic education, when he wrote that "We need really to develop a new learning paradigm that encourages students to develop wings, rather than attaching deadweight to their feet." Good education is right at the centre of the questions facing the societies, peoples and governments of the MENA region (and not just the MENA region). It is a neces-

sary destabilizer of orthodoxies, glib assumptions, regimes, pomposities and the seductive lure of jihad. A well-educated population will think for itself. This is a remarkable prophylaxis against 'radicalization,' but it is also a mine dug under the foundations of authoritarianism. It certainly needs to be treated with care, but in the way that a noble and slightly unpredictable bird of prey – an eagle or a hawk – needs to be treated with care. It can certainly bite – but it can also fly.

The Unsettling Novel

The last word goes to a novelist. Reflecting on why it is that students of 'Letters' – of the humanities and social sciences – don't tend to become religious extremists or jihadis, Howard Jacobson recently, and memorably, wrote in an article entitled *Show me the jihadist with a well-thumbed copy of Middlemarch in his back pocket*, "Whoever has once been truly unsettled by a work of the imagination will never give loyalty to a single idea, belief system, religious faith or party. When demagogues or dictators ban art, this is the reason: art is the great solvent of obedient fundamentalism."
It's dangerous stuff, education.

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The Bologna Process and Higher Education Reform in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean: the Case of Israel, Egypt and Lebanon

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Research generally highlights three factors that led 29 European countries to embark on the Bologna Process in 1999 with the aim of creating a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010. These were perceived global pressures on higher education systems in Europe (Charlier & Croché 2008; Hartmann 2008); perceived deficits of national higher education systems (Pechar & Pellert 2004; Charlier & Croché 2008); and tensions between national governments and European interests regarding the competence for policy development in higher education (Tomusk 2004; Corbett 2006; Pechar 2007; Charlier & Croché 2008).

The 'External Dimension' – Cooperation or Competition?

Particularly the first factor has received increasing importance in recent years through the development of the so-called 'external dimension' of the Bologna Process (Zgaga 2006; Vögtle 2010). This was linked to perceived global pressures brought about by declining numbers of foreign students choosing to study in Europe compared to Europeans studying in the US. Particularly the decrease in enrolments of foreign students from regions such as Asia, Latin America as well as Eastern Europe, which were considered by various European countries to be of geopolitically strategic importance, raised concerns (Charlier & Croché 2008). In view of that, European cooperation in higher education through the Bologna Process was considered an effective strategy to increase the attractiveness and competitiveness of higher education systems in Europe. In particular, the size of the European Higher Education Area and European labour market as well as the connection between the two were considered as determining factors for its attractiveness for skilled individuals and its competitiveness with other world regions (Hartmann 2008). Multilateral cooperation appeared to be, therefore, more effective than individual strategies undertaken by each country.

Despite the joint declarations for multilateral cooperation, various countries of the EHEA stepped up their individual promotion activities in the hope of maximising their own national benefits from this cooperation vis-à-vis their cooperating partners (Charlier & Croché 2008). Others appear to have seen it as an opportunity for a rapprochement with the European Union, particularly in view of its enlargement in 2004, for which negotiations had commenced in 1995 (Tomusk 2004).

These diverging motives for engaging in the Bologna Process stress the need to analyse more closely the relationship of the EHEA with countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean. Is the engagement of countries from the eastern and southern Mediterranean in seminars and conferences linked to the Bologna Process (Zgaga 2006: 39-45) evidence of their intention to seek rapprochement with Europe, much in the same way as Tomusk (2004) suggested for the 'new' EU Member States in the early stages of the Bologna Process? Or is it evidence of centre-periphery dependencies as suggested by the World Systems Analysis advanced by Wallerstein (1998; 1990); Amin (1976-77) and Amin & Luckin (1996), namely

as "a disguised transfer of value from the periphery to the centre" (Amin 1976-77: 47) by attracting skilled individuals from South to North, "since the periphery has borne the cost of training this labour force." (Amin 1976-77: 47) Or is it evidence of a combination of both?

Quality Assurance, Comparability and Compatibility and their Link to Mobility

In the Bologna Process the discourse on quality assurance has gained importance in bringing about a systemic change in higher education, alongside structural reforms to ensure the accountability of higher education institutions to external expectations at national level and increase comparability, compatibility and mutual trust between national quality assurance systems.

European cooperation in higher education through the Bologna Process was considered an effective strategy to increase the attractiveness and competitiveness of higher education systems in Europe

Facilitating the comparability of and mutual trust in national quality assurance systems is of particular importance from an international perspective, since it eases the recognition of qualifications and study periods between one country and another. This in turn supports the mobility of students and graduates within and towards the EHEA – a central element of the 'external dimension' of the Bologna Process as suggested above. Apart from that, it projects the quality of higher education in the EHEA internationally – thus, aiming to create a pull-factor towards the EHEA. However, facilitating student and graduate mobility is not uncontroversial in view of the difference in socio-economic development among the countries, resulting in some countries being more 'attractive' for the best talent than others. The effects of such push and pull factors are noticeable both within the EHEA (Kwiek 2004) and between countries from outside it towards the EHEA (Shawa 2008). Therefore, embarking on higher education reforms that improve the recognition of qualifications of foreign graduates may further facilitate the mobility of the best talent towards the EHEA.

Besides that, quality assurance also seeks to ensure the accountability of higher education institutions to external expectations at national level. This is important in view of increasing cross-border provision of higher education and the need for regulation at national level that arises from such developments. Kwiek (2004) argues that such developments within and outside the EHEA may affect the spirit of 'cooperation' and 'competition' since: some countries are already global players in higher education; and some are already exporters of higher education to Central and Eastern Europe in various, but mostly highly lucrative, disciplines. It may be hard to combine the 'competitive' spirit presented to the non-European global competitors with the 'solidarity' spirit presented at the same time to the (central) European partners. Can we imagine sheer cooperation and solidarity as driving motives in contacts with the countries of the region on the part of institutions from the countries with strong market traditions and a good share in the global education market (like for example, the UK or the Netherlands)? (Kwiek 2004: 770).

Facilitating the comparability of and mutual trust in national quality assurance systems is of particular importance from an international perspective, since it eases the recognition of qualifications and study periods between one country and another

If countries forming part of the EHEA voice such concerns regarding the consequences of implementing the higher education reforms arising from the Bologna Process, who may influence its discourse? And, why should other countries and regions of the world be interested in implementing such reforms and seeking comparability and compatibility with higher education systems in the EHEA?

Quality Assurance in Higher Education in the Mediterranean

Indeed similarities in reforms on quality assurance between countries of the EHEA and the eastern and southern Mediterranean are noticeable. However, it is questionable to what extent these reforms are the result of cooperation with the EHEA or a response to it. Instead, reforms may have been influenced by the aim of strengthening ties with the US or with former colonial economic powers rather than the EHEA per se.

The Example of Israel

Research on the process of quality assurance in Israel suggests a focus on quality assurance by subject area across higher education institutions, in contrast to the focus on external quality assurance of higher education institutions in the EHEA. Bearing in mind the strong influence of research intensive universities in the governance structures of the Council for Higher Education, which is responsible for quality assurance of higher education in Israel (Bernstein 2002; Lieven & Graeme 2006; Geva-May 2001) this comparative approach to quality assurance across a diverse set of higher education institutions appears to serve particularly their interests in sustaining the stratification of Israel's higher education system (Bernstein 2002; Davidovitch & Iram 2009; Davidovitch & Soen 2010).

Reforms may have been influenced by the aim of strengthening ties with the US or with former colonial economic powers rather than the EHEA per se

Another notable difference in the discourse on quality in higher education in Israel is the progressive de-nationalisation of higher education. Quality assurance regulations in Israel stress that the members of the quality evaluation committees must be in the majority foreigners (CHE 2013), while the recommendations and guidelines issued by the Council for Higher Education in 2006 had no such requirement (CHE 2006). Indeed, only two out of seven evaluations of academic disciplines, carried out during the academic year 2005/2006, were carried out by a majority of foreign evaluators. In comparison, out of 32 evaluations of academic disciplines carried out between the academic year 2005/2006 and 2011/2012 foreign evaluators made up the majority of the evaluation committees in 27 cases. This clearly indicates a major effort by the Council for Higher Education to seek foreign influences on Israel's higher education system. In view of that, it is interesting to note that in 28 out of 32 cases the majority of foreign experts were from the US. Indeed, in 17 out of 32 instances all foreign experts were from the US. Thus, Israel's higher education system appears to be more in line with higher education and research institutions in the United States, rather than with the EHEA.

The Example of Egypt

Developments on quality assurance in Egypt seem to mirror more closely the tiered structure of programme accreditation and external quality assurance of higher education institutions (Arab Republic of Egypt 2004; 2006; 2009). However, these developments appear influenced by external consultancy from the Quality Assurance Agency of the UK and conditions of funding from World Bank loans rather than by the policy discourse from the Bologna Process. Thus, they appear to be more aimed at strengthening economic ties with the former colonial power or between centre and periphery rather than being inspired by a policy dialogue with the EHEA.

Besides that, the final project report of the Arab Republic of Egypt (2009) on the higher education enhancement project, of which the development of the national quality assurance framework on higher education formed part, also noted the resistance of universities to the reforms pursued through this World Bank project. Nevertheless, it expressly stated its resolve to overcome this resistance by pursuing the reforms in a top-down fashion (Arab Republic of Egypt 2009: 41, 47). It appears, therefore, that such reference to funding conditionalities or the discourse on quality assurance, which seeks to increase the accountability of higher education institutions to external expectations, may have been used to strengthen control over higher education institutions.

The Example of Lebanon

In Lebanon, the Directorate General of Higher Education has been responsible for the licensing of new higher education institutions through exercising a simple process of auditing. Beyond this initial licensing by the Ministry, quality assurance was being ensured through institutional competitiveness and, for some selected universities, through foreign quality assurance agencies. However, the recent rapid increase in the number of higher education institutions locally calls for the establishment of a national QA agency. This need comes as a response to the growing regional competition where the weak quality of some higher education institutions affects the reputation of the whole national system (Towards the Lebanese Quality Assurance Agency - TLQAA Project, 2013). In addition to the national need (DGHE, 2007/2008), there is a growing international pressure to establish a national quality assurance agency as mentioned in the EU country strategy paper (ENP, 2007-2013) and the recommendations of the conference of Arab ministers of HE in Dubai 2007.

With the absence of a national regulative framework to regulate and monitor institutional quality, the individual institutions' endeavours to maintain their quality have been the sole quality assurance measures available. As the institutions have a high degree of autonomy and freedom, the higher education arena in Lebanon has traditionally been a very diverse one and much influenced by foreign forces where each institution follows the education system of the country it is affiliated to and gets evaluated by QA agencies from the corresponding country as well. In other words, French, American, Arab, and Canadian universities follow the European, American, Arab and Canadian system respectively.

In Lebanon, there is no specific mechanism for supporting the implementation of the Bologna Process apart from the Tempus Higher Education Reform Experts, who disseminate information on Bologna to both institutions and Ministries. (Tempus, 2012) In fact, it is through European funded Tempus projects and one AMIDEAST project that a Lebanese QA agency was initiated in the form of a draft law prepared and completed on 14/12/2010 and submitted to the government (MEHE, 2011). Political and sectarian interference, limited monetary resources and human expertise, in addition to the current regional unrest, dramatically impede the ratification of such a law. In the meantime, another recent Tempus project, TLQAA, has been developing a Lebanese QA model by emulating the functioning of external QA through a pilot evaluation of several higher education institutions.

> Just because similarities may be drawn between strategies for higher education reform in the EHEA and countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean this does not imply the existence of sound and reciprocal cooperation

In addition to the old French universities who initially adopted the Bologna reforms, an NQA inspired by European standards, can influence the only public university, the Lebanese University, which has around 40% of the total students' enrolments, as well as a number of the new universities, who have not opted for a foreign quality assurance agency. Furthermore, even though the Bologna process has no direct influence on the few old well-established universities that initially followed a non European system of education; those same universities have been involved in the TLQAA Tempus project and have agreed to perform the pilot evaluation. This means that the Bologna process has influenced the Lebanese higher education through its work on paving the way to establishing a national quality assurance agency based on EU funds and consultancy which ensures that the main Lebanese education ambiance is in phase with the EHEA.

Conclusions

Overall these findings suggest that countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean pursue their own national interests for higher education reform and to this end may draw to different extents on the Bologna Process discourse as well as on funding and consultancy from individual countries within the EHEA. However, just because similarities may be

drawn between strategies for higher education reform in the EHEA and countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean this does not imply the existence of sound and reciprocal cooperation. A more comprehensive and sustained dialogue would be needed to ensure such cooperation. However, bearing in mind the present regional unrest, such dialogue may be difficult.

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Youth Empowerment as a Collective, Bottom-Up and Long-Term Process

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The exceptional youth-led wave of anti-authoritarian protests in several Arab countries in 2010-2011, refocused the world's attention on Arab youth. In particular, the rapid and unexpected mass mobilisations, anticipated by the development of youth-based activist groups in the last decade and the spread of new communication technologies, brought to the fore the idea of youth as the engine for long-needed change in the region.

The recent negative, if not dramatic, course of events in most countries of the Arab region, should not divert our attention from the fact that youth can, and indeed should, represent "a force of cultural and social regeneration."[1] However, due to the severe political, economic and social conditions regarding youth exclusion in the region, this potential can only be realised through a *transformation* of the systemic inequalities that lead to exclusion in the first place. This can only happen through collective, bottom-up and long-term processes whereby young people gain by themselves the ability, authority and agency to implement change in their own life and in the life of society at large or, in other words, through processes of *youth empowerment*.

Youth Empowerment as a Collective and Bottom-Up Process

Empowerment is a widely used concept, but also one that is difficult to define and use correctly. As can be derived from the composition of the word itself, the concept has to do with the issue of *power* and implies a *change in power relations*. Youth empowerment should imply an expansion of the ability to make strategic life choices in a situation in which that ability was previously denied, as much as it should imply a challenge and a destabilisation of unequal power relations through a *transformative* process.

However, in a context in which dominant norms and cultural values strongly limit the ability of young people to make strategic life choices, structural constraints cannot be addressed by individuals alone. Young individuals can and do act against dominant norms, but their impact on the general situation of youth is limited and they might pay a high price for their autonomy. The process of youth empowerment depends on collective solidarity in the public arena, as well as individual assertiveness in the private one. Youth organisations and social movements thus have an important role to play in creating the conditions for change and in reducing the costs of individual action.[2]

Understanding youth empowerment as a transformation process of existing exclusionary power relations implies that it can only be brought about through a bottom-up process rather than a top-down strategy. To deal with social exclusion, young people cannot be 'empowered,' but they must empower themselves through forms of agency, although the pre-conditions for this to take place could depend on structural factors or even be facilitated by top-down policies. For instance, giving young people access to better education is unlikely to be automatically empowering, but it creates a favourable factor for creating the pre-condition for

[1] Herrera, Linda. "Youth and Generational Renewal in the Middle East." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 3 (2009), p. 368.
[2] Adapted from Kabeer, Naila. "Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurements of Women's Empowerment." *Development and Change* 30 (1999), p. 457.

youth empowerment (such as a more critical consciousness). Youth empowerment is also an open-ended process and cannot be predicted at its outset without running the risk of violating its essence, which is to enhance young people's capacity for self-determination.

The process of youth empowerment depends on collective solidarity in the public arena, as well as individual assertiveness in the private one. Youth organisations and social movements thus have an important role to play in creating the conditions for change and in reducing the costs of individual action

It is, furthermore, critical to recognise youth as a diversified category. The expressions, ideas and experiences of being young vary across cultures, classes, genders, ethnicities and other groupings. Young people from different social strata experience important social changes in different ways, and have different needs and demands. However, while it is true that young people cannot be considered a single homogeneous category, it is equally true that schooling, mass media, urban spaces (public parks, shopping malls) and new information technologies have played a crucial role in developing a particular consciousness about being young, which facilitates mutual influence and peer interactions.[3] Moreover, youth in Arab countries from almost all social classes have been confronted with an increasingly problematic transition into adulthood owing to economic, political and social failures of the system created by the older generation. This means that being young in the Arab region today is more than a biological attribute: it is the consciousness of a shared experience of exclusion determined by the failure of post-independence development models.[4]

More in general, and beyond the Arab region, certain conditions of the contemporary period have contributed to creating a distinct global political youth culture, thus increasing youth self-awareness and the chances for collective youth agency. For example, new forms of horizontal youth political involvement unmediated by the older generation (social movements vs. the youth section of traditional political parties) and new technologies mastered by youth (with young people playing a larger role than in the past in teaching and acquainting the older generation with new technologies and cultural patterns associated with globalisation) have opened up new avenues of active political, economic and socio-cultural participation for the current generation.

The 2011 uprisings that led to the overthrow of Ben Ali and Mubarak and seriously challenged other regimes in the region are a testimony that youth collective agency has today a great potential in transforming existing power relations, although its impact may be subtle, long-term and often unintended. During the decade prior to the uprisings, youth collective agency in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the region, brought about broad cultural transformations by affecting values, symbols and political cultures and challenged many of the dominant ideas that sustained the power structure of authoritarian regimes, such as hereditary rule, police brutality, emergency law and corruption.

Within political parties and organisations, a generation of young activists started to openly dissent from the old conservative leadership and to develop a more critical and less subordinate culture vis-à-vis the older generation (the young bloggers within the Muslim Brotherhood; Youth for Change within Kifaya). Young women activists also started to gradually shift the boundaries of acceptable public behaviour for their group, thus transforming power relations both within family and youth groups (for example, a young woman, Israa Abdel-Fattah was the co-founder of the April 6 Movement). In Tunisia, in 2006, unemployed graduates established the Union des Diplômés Chômeurs (UDC) to denounce their precarious situation. In a few months, the UDC, initially tolerated by the regime, was able to establish a

[3] Herrera, Linda and Bayat, Asef (eds.). *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North*, New York: Oxford University Press 2010.

[4] Murphy, Emma. "Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systemic Failure." *Mediterranean Politics*, 17: 1 (2012).

number of small committees in the most marginalised areas of the country, including Gafsa and Redeyef. These committees were at the heart of the large protest movement that erupted in the mining area of Gafsa in January 2008. The protests, although harshly repressed by police, began to call into discussion the prevailing discourse of Tunisia's economic miracle, seriously undermining the legitimacy of the Ben Ali regime.[5]

Largely unnoticed or underestimated by scholars and analysts working in the region, these ideas started to enter the public debate and gained increasing legitimacy among the masses, thereby laying the groundwork for widespread protests.

Youth Empowerment as a Nonlinear and Long-Term Process

It is also of fundamental importance to consider that, like all social processes, youth empowerment is a complex, contradictory and long-term process. As such, it does not have a linear development: it can make significant achievements and also suffer major setbacks.

As stated above, the wave of youth-led protests in most Arab countries in 2010-11 represented a significant challenge to traditional power relations. Not only were the security apparatuses taken by surprise and, at least in Tunisia and Egypt, temporarily defeated by the unexpected and large-scale spontaneous mobilisation of millions of people, but also protestors subverted well-established patterns of oppositional politics in the region by creating new slogans and symbols and by side-stepping traditional opposition parties and organisations, which did not have a significant role in promoting and sustaining the uprisings.

However, shortly after the revolutionary events, it became apparent that the entrenched structure of power was much more difficult to eradicate than the activists had initially hoped, especially in the absence of organised revolutionary movements that could channel youth energy and demands. This is most evident in the case of post-Mubarak Egypt, but also in Tunisia, where the voices of youth and particularly those who inspired the popular uprisings have continued to remain unheard in policy decision-making and also excluded from major political organisations. In Egypt, all post-uprising authorities have governed in a top-down manner without any genuine involvement or consultation with youth groups, have been reluctant to discard the old system of power and have increasingly resorted to repressive tactics such as arrests, intimidation, and the use of force to placate youth protests. After the first elected President, Mohamed Morsi, was deposed, the crackdown on youth activists has intensified. Prominent activists of the April 6 Youth Movement were sentenced to three years in jail for joining the "No Military Trials for Civilians" campaign last November against the new protest law, approved by President Adly Mansour on 24 November.

Youth groups who were behind the mass protests against authoritarian regimes have been left out of emerging institutions and parties, both in Egypt and Tunisia, or simply destroyed by the violent turn of events in other contexts. For example, in the first parliamentary elections after the overthrow of Mubarak and Ben Ali, not only did youth groups from traditional opposition forces play a minor role in setting the agenda, but also youth coalitions such as the Egyptian Revolution Continues Alliance coalition, which included a number of youth groups and activists that contributed to the fall of Mubarak, took less than ten parliamentary seats, while al-Adl Party, another force composed of youth activists, only won two seats. Similarly, in Tunisia, despite a number of newly formed political parties (e.g., the Mouvement des Jeunes Tunisiens Libres and Rencontre Jeunes Libres) and independent lists representing youth and the unemployed (e.g., the Afkar Mostaquilla platform and some members of the Union of Unemployed Graduates) as well as the requirement that at least one candidate on each list be under the age of 30, the Constituent Assembly elected in October 2011 was unrepresentative of young people. Finally, the involvement of a few youth representatives in decision-making is likely to reflect the post-uprising authorities' attempts to co-opt young activists into

[5] Allal Amin. "'Ici, si ça ne 'bouge' pas ça n'avance pas !' Les mobilisations protestataires de l'année 2008 dans la région minière de Gafsa. Réformes néo libérales, clientélismes et contestation," in Myriam Catusse, Blandine Destremau et Éric Verdier (eds.), *L'État face aux débordements du social au Maghreb. Formation, travail et protection*, Paris, Karthala, 2010.

the existing system.[6] For example, Ahmed Maher, leader of the April 6 Youth Movement was member of the second Constituent Assembly elected in June 2012, but later withdrew from the assembly criticising the slow pace of drafting, the scarce representativeness of the Assembly and the lack of consideration for proposals made by civil society forces. Much worse is the situation in countries where the initial peaceful uprisings led to immediate harsh repression, foreign military interventions or to the escalation of violence and civil war, such as Bahrein, Libya or Syria.

More in general, the transformative potential of youth collective agency on the existing power system has been weakened over the last three years by a number of factors. Youth activism has been dispersed in myriad groups and initiatives, scarcely coordinated and representing different, albeit not necessarily, conflicting demands. Political youth groups have suffered from ideological and strategic divergences, as well as rivalries and a lack of a clear coherent strategy to adopt in the post-uprisings era. For example, in Egypt, they were unprepared, divided and confused regarding the best strategy to follow ahead of the 19 March Referendum of 2011 and the legislative elections of November 2011. After the military coup that deposed Morsi, youth groups are now even more plagued by contrasts and divisions. As it was for the first presidential elections, they have not reached a unified consensus on a presidential candidate. The leaders of the Tamarrod movement have decided to support the military and the presidential candidacy of Field Marshal General Abdel Fattah Sisi. At the same time, the April 6 Movement and others have expressed their refusal. The same Tamarrod is now plagued by internal divisions, as a number of its activists have announced their support for Hamdeh Sabahi. Ideological and strategic divergences have thus prevented youth groups from elaborating a unified and coherent policy vis-à-vis the post-Mubarak authorities, have diminished their ability to influence Egyptian politics beyond street protests and have compromised their credibility, causing them to lose popular support. In many Arab countries, the Islamist / non-Islamist ideological divide among youth activists, which has deepened in the wake of the uprisings, is likely to undermine youth collective action. The Tamarrod movement in Egypt, for example, has led to similar movements in other countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and the Palestinian Territories, raising contrasts among young people. In Egypt, the lack of alliance and cooperation between youth groups and independent trade unions has also weakened the likelihood of revolutionary forces having a stronger influence on policy decision-making. Similarly, in Morocco, the 20 February Movement and the unemployed graduates have failed to cooperate.

However, in the face of the current and well-placed widespread pessimism, many observers have underlined the long-term importance of an 'awakened and mobilised society;' one in which a youth component that does not passively accept the long-term authoritarian re-composition of power relations is crucial. After decades of authoritarianism it would be at best naïve to think that bottom-up, well-organised and participatory political actors could suddenly emerge, or that traditional parties and organisation could promptly welcome the active participation of young activists. The renewal of the dynamics of participation in any context is a long and difficult process and could take years or even decades to actually have an impact at the macro-structural level.

Nevertheless, the largely unexpected nature of the 2010-11 mobilisations should teach us a lesson: the importance of looking at below-the-radar dynamics and processes to understand the prospects for change.

In the last few years, some authors, mainly from the field of political sociology, have given new strength to promising bottom-up approaches, paying more attention to subaltern actors (such as youth) and to informal and often unnoticed forms of (political) agency.[7]

[6] For example, the young blogger and activist Slim Amamou, who was arrested during the early days of the anti-Ben Ali protests, was appointed Secretary of State for Youth and Sport Affairs in January 2011. Probably being aware of the risk of cooptation, Amamou resigned from his cabinet post in May 2011. In Egypt, Mahmoud Badr et Mohamed Abdel Aziz from Tamarrod were appointed in Egypt's 50 member constitution committee to modify the 2012 constitution.

[7] See for instance: Bayat, Asef, *Life as Politics. How Ordinary People Change the Middle* East. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009; Beinin, Joel and Vairel, Frédéric (eds.). *Social Movements, Mobilisation, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2011.

Although the current structural/policy context is unfavourable to creating the right pre-conditions for youth empowerment and young people are excluded from political processes, we should not overlook the long-term implications of youth agency in challenging existing power relations. For example, in Tunisia, last December, in response to the candidature of old personalities to form a new government, a group of young Tunisians launched a campaign, "Jeunesse Décide" (Youth Decides), on Facebook, calling for youth to take part in decision-making. Young people posted their candidature to Prime Minister and their CV. Within a few days, many Facebook pages and groups were created drawing thousands of followers. While this campaign did not lead to an immediate visible success, these young people continue to openly challenge the prevailing hierarchical structure of power, which is biased against youth.

More in general, beyond street protests, young activists and groups in Egypt, Tunisia and other Arab countries have been experimenting with new creative ways of doing politics and raising public awareness of political manipulations, based on transparency and participatory democracy. While it is too early to gauge the extent to which these forms of youth agency will effectively undermine existing power relations, they are likely to generate self-identity, confidence and awareness among those involved. In Egypt, with the renewed crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, women, particularly young women, seem to be playing a more central role within the movement. In November 2013, twenty-one female members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of them under the age of 18, were condemned to 11 years in prison for taking part in pro-Morsi demonstrations. The growing mobilisation of young MB women could have an enormous transformative potential: destabilising existing gender relations within the movement; enlarging the chances for collective agency among young women in a country where the public sphere of political activism remains heavily male; and favouring important psychological transformations among women from being passive subjects to more active agents of self-expression. In the Palestinian Territories, although most young Palestinians are disillusioned and have abandoned politics, a vibrant, albeit small, youth movement has been emerging that is challenging not only Israeli occupation but also the existing elite, the Palestinian leadership. While the movement is faced with many obstacles such as the Israeli occupation and oppression by Fatah and Hamas, it bears many similarities to the youth activism of the 1980s which eventually led to the First Intifada.[8] In addition, as Bayat argued, beyond organised collective agency, under repressive contexts, youth continue to reclaim their youthfulness and enhance their individual lives through dispersed actions and with no aim of overthrowing authoritarian regimes.[9] These non-movements of youth, according to Bayat, probably became part of the 2011 Arab uprisings and merged into a more concerted collective action once they were provided with an opportunity. The transformative impact of youth activism should then be assessed in multiple dimensions, even, and maybe most of all, below the level of real immediate impact on state policies or institutions. The Arab region is rich with forms of political contestation and mobilisation – mostly led by youth – which, while not leading inexorably towards the expansion of civil society or democratisation, still have potential for a long-term transformative impact on the political culture or on forms of participation (although this is less visible). For example, as was mentioned above and as has already happened, social movements can bring about cultural transformation by affecting values and symbols as well as by reshaping public debates towards key political issues. Other kinds of consequences include movement spill-over effects. Social movements may indeed have an impact in that they inspire other forms of mobilisations. The gains or losses made by one movement can have beneficial consequences for the demands or the strategies of other movements, or their success can encourage further mobilisation (e.g. the labour movement vs the youth movement as happened in 1968 in the US and Europe).

[8] Hoigilt, Jacob. "The Palestinian Spring That Was Not: The Youth and Political Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 35: 4 (Fall) 2013.

[9] "Urban Subalterns and the Non-Movements of the Arab Uprisings: An Interview with Asef Bayat." *al-Jadaliyya*, 26 March 2013. Available at www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10815/the-urban-subalterns-and-the-non-movements-of-the-

The Challenges of Young People in Arab countries

Arab Youth Values and Identities: Impact of the Arab Uprisings

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The wave of uprisings and social unrest that swept through Arab countries, together with the prominent role played by youth in instigating and maintaining a "revolutionary" momentum, have motivated reflections about the transformative influence these events might have had in shaping new identities and emerging values. This paper focuses on youth in the Arab region and explores identity dynamics and value preferences in the diverse Arab landscape following the 2011 uprisings.

The Youth Bulge

The Arab uprisings occurred in the context of seriously deteriorated living conditions under highly repressive autocratic regimes and a bulging youth population (see the Arab Human Development Reports,[1] 2002-2009). The Arab populations' 357 million people are young, with a majority in many countries under the age of 25. Some estimate that a third of the Arab region's population is under the age of 15, and a fifth is between the ages of 15 and 24. This "youth bulge" is thought to have peaked in 2010, and it is set to decline from 20 to 17% in the coming years (Mirkin, 2013).

While Arab youth are more educated and marrying at a later age than before, some Arab countries still suffer from high illiteracy rates. The majority of Arabs (55%) do not access the Internet (Arab Opinion Index, 2013) and rely on TV as their main source of information. Rates, however, differ greatly by country. While only a minority (22%) of Egyptians use the Internet, majorities do in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Tunisia (Dennis et al., 2013).

Even before the Arab uprisings, youth unemployment rates in the region were the highest in the world, ranging between 20 and 40% compared to worldwide averages of 10 to 20% (ESCWA, 2009). Post-uprisings assessments report a significant increase in youth unemployment, with one in three Arab young people without a job (Urdal, 2012). The Arab region is the only region where unemployment exceeds 10% (around 27% in 2012), and with twice the global rate for youth (Mirkin, 2013). Conservative estimates suggest that 12 million jobs need to be added by 2025 to absorb this young workforce, while others put estimates as high as 5 million jobs per year until 2020.

These global figures also differ by region. While youth unemployment rates are low in most GCC countries[2] (as low as 2% in Qatar), they rise to about 30% in Egypt, and up to 44% in Iraq (Mirkin, 2013). It is no wonder that almost a quarter of Arabs would like to emigrate in search of better prospects, and that employment concerns rank as the highest priority across several polls and countries (e.g. Arab Opinion Index, 2013; Asdaa', 2014).

It is also no surprise that some analysts associate youth bulges with political violence (e.g. Urdal, 2012). Given the right conditions, a surge in the youth population could galvanise socio-economic development and enable societies to "reap the dividends of the youth bulge." However, in the context of exceptionally high unemployment rates and

[1] A new AHDR on "Youth in the Arab countries" is due to be published in 2015.
[2] Saudi Arabia has an exceptionally high youth unemployment rate, at 30% (Mirkin, 2013).

significant socio-economic challenges, a youth bulge can turn into a liability, with increased risks of social upheavals and challenges to the status quo.

The Arab Uprising: Authoritarian Regimes and the Absence of Ideology

High levels of corruption, incompetent and ageing authoritarian regimes, socio-political repression, abusive treatment, and difficult living conditions are some of the factors that eventually led to massive social protests across several Arab countries. Long-standing autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia were ousted in a matter of weeks, sending shockwaves across the Arab region and pushing neighbouring regimes to quickly instigate reforms (e.g. Morocco), disburse large cash bonuses (e.g. Saudi Arabia), or brutally repress dissent (e.g. Bahrain, Syria).

Young people occupied public spaces in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria, while smaller protests occurred in every other Arab country from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian-Arabian Gulf. The fact that the uprisings neither involved ideological platforms nor proposed alternative governance models or regimes is quite telling. Concerns for dignity, social justice and better overall governance are often cited as the primary motivators behind the uprisings, and they are indicative of the values and identities that animated the youth.

Identities: Unity in Diversity

Each of the uprisings in the Arab world took a different path and reached a different outcome, clearly reflecting the diverse socio-historical dynamics behind them. The discrepancies and divergences in the path the uprisings took hint at widely differing conditions, populations, and aspirations. Furthermore, country-specific outcomes ranged from peaceful and rapid transitions to the most brutal and protracted of repressions.

Yet, the rapid – contagious – spread of popular uprisings across different Arab contexts points to a shared sense of future and communality across populations and identities. A recent representative survey of 20,350 people from 14 Arab countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Mauritania, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait and Libya) showed that "79% of the Arab public believes in the integrity of a single Arab nation, or that the various Arab peoples comprise one nation, notwithstanding the possible differences between Arab peoples" (Arab Opinion Index, 2013). This unitary identity, endorsed by an overwhelming majority of citizens across the spectrum of Arab countries, has also been growing over time, with a 7% increase between 2011 and 2013.

Yet, this consensus about Arab identity and the communality of Arab peoples does not preclude the prominent co-existence of other social identities specific to each of the Arab countries or cultural regions. While multiple identities can be organised in a hierarchical model of inclusiveness (Harb, 2010), specific identities are preferentially sampled in different contexts. An overview of the uprisings in the Arab world points to four salient social identities: national, pan-national (Islamic and/or Arab), tribal-familial, and ethno-sectarian. For example, an Al-Jazeera poll of 8,045 young people in "four uprising countries" showed youth endorsing an Islamic identity before a national one in Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, but not in Egypt, where national identity was held first. Other identities (political, professional, regional, etc.) do not seem to be widely endorsed in Arab societies.

Cultural Differences

The Arab world is often perceived as four large cultural entities: the Fertile Crescent countries (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine), the Gulf Countries (the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries), the Nile countries (Egypt and Sudan), and the Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco).

The **Fertile Crescent countries** have the most diverse populations within the Arab world, with multiple ethnicities and sects spread across their territories. Nationalist and secular parties have dominated rule in these countries, often under authoritarian regimes. The region is now plagued by inter-sectarian conflict, insecurity, and potential disintegration pushing youth towards immigration or stricter sectarian and tribal affiliations. The US invasion of Iraq fed Sunni-Shia divisions, and the uprising in Syria quickly drew in regional sectarian actors, each push-

ing its own agenda. The presence of radicalised Sunni groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in all countries of the Fertile Crescent further polarised the youth along sectarian lines, especially in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. The weakened central governments and the pervasive security threats left youth with few options other than affiliating with sectarian networks that provided them with a sense of group security and a source of basic services. The multi-polarity of the financial and military assistance provided by regional (Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel) and international (US, Europe and Russia) powers exacerbated the conflict and continues to fan the flames of sectarian tensions.

Egypt: Historically, the political dynamics in Egypt have continuously pitted two main ideological streams: the military-nationalistic parties and the Islamic parties. Until the 2011 uprising, all Egyptian presidents had a military background and entertained a nationalistic discourse. The popular uprising of 2011, initiated by progressive youth groups, eventually brought together secular, nationalist and Islamist forces against the corruption of an ageing and abusive autocratic regime. The post-Mubarak era was quickly transformed into a competition between three main factions: the weakened old guard, with its extensive network of clients and dependents; the Muslim Brotherhood, with its organised and ideologically driven membership; and youth and civil groups, with weak organisational skills and little experience. The Muslim Brotherhood's experienced political organisation helped them win (albeit with a small margin) the first democratic election since the founding of the Egyptian republic in 1953.

The instability that rocked Egypt after the election of the Muslim Brotherhood to Parliament, and then to the Presidency, along with the continued insecurity and difficult living conditions across Egypt, pushed a sizeable portion of the population to seek stability and security. The promises made by the military appealed to some, while the persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood and, later, of youth revolutionary groups (e.g. the 6 April movement) upset others.

Egyptians are currently split with regard to their leadership preferences. A recent Pew poll conducted just prior to the May 2014 elections showed an almost 20% decline in favourable attitudes towards the army, the Muslim Brotherhood and the judicial courts. Support for Al-Sisi was marginal, with 54% for and 45% against. Importantly, a large majority of Egyptians (72%) reported being dissatisfied with the way things are going in Egypt, on par with dissatisfaction levels prior to the 2011 uprisings and on course for more instability ahead.

A majority of Egyptian youth (72%) support a civil state with little military involvement, and 96% reported not belonging to any political party (Al Jazeera, 2013). While a majority of Egyptians do not support the Muslim Brotherhood, a large proportion does not support a return to military rule either. The latest presidential election saw only a third of the electorate turn out to vote in the first two days of the election, and a noticeable absence of young voters. The massive media campaigns in support of Al-Sisi, a questionable 24-hour extension of voting, and rumoured threats of fines and prosecution for those who boycotted the election did little to change the results.

The **GCC countries** present a different socio-economic profile from the Fertile Crescent countries and Egypt. The oil-rich nations continued their clampdown on political dissent at home and immediately spent billions of dollars to prevent the contagious uprisings from reaching their kingdoms (e.g. the 3 months' salary bonus provided to employees in Saudi Arabia). While freedoms are certainly restricted in most GCC countries, their oil-based economies and high GDP make their populations slightly less inclined to rebel.

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The GCC monarchies are strongly dependent on family networks and ties, and a strict socio-normative enforcement of Islamic texts. While a number of youth espouse conservative values and observe strict Wahabi or Salafi codes, another substantial segment of the youth population aspires to lifestyles and values more in line with their globalised identities. Saudi Arabia has already sent over 145,000 students to study abroad, and the number of scholarships for

studying in the West continues to grow. International centres of excellence have opened branches in the GCC countries, and both Dubai and Doha are now recognised globalised cities.

The Maghreb: Popular unrest in Libya and Tunisia led to the demise of the leadership in both countries, but the current situation between the two neighbours could not be any more different. While transition to democratic governance is proceeding relatively smoothly in Tunisia, chaos and warfare plague post-Gaddafi-era Libya. Tunisian youth continue to be divided between left-wing secular groups and Islamic parties, but the dialogue between them tends to be pragmatic and peaceful. Tunisian youth remain engaged in public life, and national debates on the future of Tunisia continue unabated. In contrast, Libya remains beset by tribal and regional loyalties, and warring factions do not seem any closer to unity or a national identity. The administrative vacuum left in the wake of an uprising largely supported by international forces is difficult to fill in a country saddled by decades of international isolation and no history of political parties and debates.

The 2011 uprisings briefly affected Algeria and Morocco. However, vivid memories of Algeria's bloody civil war, with its 100,000 dead, may have made Algerians wary of brutal change. The recent re-election of the ailing President may signal a concern for stability, especially in light of the violent outcomes in Libya, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain. However, the low voter turnout and the boycott by some parties may be indicative of growing dissatisfaction. On the other hand, Morocco's monarch was quick to seize the post-uprising moment and initiated large-scale constitutional reforms that were overwhelmingly adopted in a July 2011 referendum. This was quickly followed by national elections that saw the rise of moderate Islamic parties on par with developments in Egypt and Tunisia.

Values

The Arab uprisings have also raised questions about the changes in the value systems of the rebellious populations, with many assuming that the 2011 events transformed Arab societies from passive and subdued populations to dynamic and potentially democratically-oriented ones.

Values are beliefs or concepts that pertain to desirable behaviours or end states and that guide the selection or evaluation of events and behaviour (Schwartz, 1992). Because values represent motivational goals, they tend to transcend specific situations and change only in the context of major life events. The proposition that the uprisings were sufficient to change individual values beyond the increased need for security may not be warranted. A majority of Arabs did not partake in the uprisings and little has changed in their immediate lives: some heads may have rolled in some countries, but the difficult conditions that preceded the uprisings have only worsened since. The groups directly involved in collective action may have experienced substantial changes to their worldview, but not necessarily in the direction advertised by some media outlets.

The Arab uprisings have also raised questions about the changes in the value systems of the rebellious populations, with many assuming that the 2011 events transformed Arab societies from passive and subdued populations to dynamic and potentially democratically-oriented ones

The sixth wave of the World Value Survey, released in May 2014, included a record number of 12 Arab countries (Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, Algeria, Qatar, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan). This popular worldwide survey of values posits that countries can be classified along two bipolar dimensions: a) traditional versus secular-rational values [sic][3] and b) survival versus self-expression values (WVS, 2014). This latest post-uprising survey showed Arab countries ranking highest globally on both traditional and survival values, i.e. at the conceptual opposites of the secular, rational, self-expressive countries composed of "Protestant

[3] The labelling of these value dimensions has condescending connotations and assumes that traditional societies may possess irrational values.

Europe" and "English-speaking countries" (WVS, 2014). The authors also state that "the social dominance of Islam and individual identification as Muslim both weaken emancipative values," oblivious to the rebellions that swept the Arab world. This reductionist view assumes a rather static set of Arab societies and fails to capture the popular uprisings' demands for change (emancipation) without the need to transform their value system.

Repeated polls in the Arab world show a high Arab endorsement of religion across countries. While such findings allude to a potentially observant and devout population, they do not explain the cultural practices and the role religion actually plays in the lives of Arab peoples. The idea that Islam is a monolithic religion permeates the (Orientalist) literature, and little attention is given to the competing creeds within Islam: dozens of traditions and sects exist within each of the main branches of Islam (Sunni, Shia and Sufi), and they range from the strictest interpretation to the loosest. The region's diversity of traditions and beliefs also reflects the social complexity of an area rich with millennia-old history. As such, monolithic and reductionist approaches are both faulty and prejudicial. In addition, political freedoms are denied in most Arab countries, with state security brutally clamping down on dissent and organised action. Mosques (and universities) remain the only "free" spaces where people can gather and discuss social and political challenges (virtual spaces excepted). Under ideologically bankrupt regimes, and in the absence of political freedoms, religion was quick to flourish.

Under ideologically bankrupt regimes, and in the absence of political freedoms, religion was quick to flourish

A poll of 3,500 young people from 16 different Arab countries showed that family, friends and religion held the most influence in shaping the youths' lives, but also found a growing number of young people embracing "modern values" (ASDA'A, 2014). Almost half the participants in the 2014 poll endorsed the statement "Traditional values are outdated and belong in the past. I am keen to embrace modern values and beliefs," a three-fold increase over the 2011 findings (17%, 25%, 40%, and 46% for 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively). While the survey has serious limitations (e.g. small sample sizes, construct validity, etc.), this noticeable and robust trend was consistent across data sets.

Conclusions

The euphoric images of millions of youths gathering in public spaces chanting for a change of regime across several Arab countries have long faded. The public spaces in Cairo, Sanaa, Tunis, Tripoli, Damascus and Manama are now largely empty. Three overlapping phases can be observed in the post-2011-uprisings era: the first phase saw popular uprisings and youth groups taking to the streets; the second saw Islamic parties affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood reap the electoral benefits; and the third saw counter-revolutionary efforts spread across the region, especially in Egypt and Syria. The pan-Arab revolutionary ebb of 2011 has now been replaced by a counterrevolutionary flow in key states and chaotic infighting in others.

It is no wonder that many citizens in the Arab world are wary of the uprisings. The Al Jazeera poll (2013) found that more than 90% of young people surveyed refrain from partisan affiliation and do not want to belong to any political party in future. Political disaffection does not mean young people are any less involved in current affairs, with a majority in all countries now following news developments and events.

Regional interference: The large majority of Arabs (82%) continue to support a "pluralistic political system in which all parties can compete through regular elections, regardless of ideology" (Arab Opinion Index, 2013). However, the youth's aspirations and the process of self-determination are not occurring in a vacuum, but amidst strong local, regional and international interference. Old elites are on the counter-offensive in Egypt, Syria and Yemen, and regional powers (Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran) are directly interfering in the various contexts, each vying to protect its self-interests or expand its area of influence.

The oil-rich GCC countries constitute a primary Western strategic interest and the security of the monarchies is assured by a heavy US military

presence in the region. On the other hand, the GCC monarchies (especially Saudi Arabia) have a strategic interest in actively curbing the Arab uprisings because a) unrest may spread to their kingdoms and threaten their own rule and b) the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relatively moderate version of Islam is a direct threat to their own Wahabi interpretation and influence. The fact that Saudi Arabia hosts the deposed Yemeni and Tunisian autocrats, backed the King of Bahrain, and poured billions of dollars into support for the military coup in Egypt is quite telling.

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The Arab uprisings were not driven by ideological change (e.g. a religious uprising or democracy-seeking populations) but by feelings of exasperation with current conditions and practices. While many now seem to call for stability and security, the social conditions that led to the uprisings continue to worsen, and instability is likely to remain. The Arab uprisings are still ongoing and have yet to settle. It may thus be too early to cast identities and values as crystalised, as both are still being forged and shaped by the fires sweeping the region.

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The Challenges of Young People in Arab countries

Labour Market and Education: Youth and Unemployment in the Spotlight

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Since the global economic crisis, youth employment prospects have worsened continuously throughout the world, in developed, transition and developing countries alike. The situation is particularly acute in the Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs) as a result of additional specific factors. As well as the global economic crisis, some countries experienced extraordinary political changes in what is now called the Arab Spring. 'Employment, Liberty, Dignity' was the slogan of the Jasmin Revolution of January 2011 in Tunisia, which created a domino effect across the whole region. The initial economic impact of the Arab Spring was rather negative owing to political turbulence and social unrest, which have had a particular impact on the tourism, production and export sectors and on foreign direct investment.

Beyond this political and economic context, what is unique about youth in AMCs is the high share of youth population. Indeed AMCs are experiencing the largest cohorts of their youth population in history, which is likely to continue for at least three to four decades. Whether youth is a 'gift' or a 'burden' is a matter of long discussion, but demographic pressure is a key feature of educational systems and labour markets in most of the AMCs. The share of the population under the age of 30 years has exceeded 60%, and as a result the working-age population is approaching 70% (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2012). Considering the high aspirations of youth for education, jobs, marriage, housing etc., this puts a tremendous pressure on national economies and political systems in general. If the situation is not well managed, it may well pose a risk of social instability (ETF, 2013).

Key Features of the Youth Labour Market

Labour markets in AMCs have many challenges, but this article focuses on the youth labour market. Before youth unemployment rates, though, one should start with labour force participation rates of youth. According to the ILO (2013), on average, the youth labour force participation rate in 2012 ranged from 30.3% in the Middle East to 33.2% in North Africa, while the world average of youth labour force participation stands at slightly below 50%. Furthermore, there is a significant difference by gender: on average around 45% of young males and only 15% of young females are active in the labour markets of AMCs. Female labour force participation is particularly low in Mashreq countries (Jordan, Palestine), while the regional youth male participation rate – 45% – is comparable to the rates in advanced economies. Youth employment rates are even lower (around 35% for males and around 10% for females).

This very low youth activity rate (less than one third) suggests three important implications. *Firstly*, youth unemployment rates (Table 2 below) refer to only those unemployed within this 'active youth group' (currently standing at around 31%). In other words, although the youth unemployment rate is very high in the region, the highest regional average in the world and more than twice as high as the global average (as highlighted by ILO 2014), it corresponds only to the share of unemployed within 31% of youth, not the whole youth population. Hence when we talk of youth unemployment this refers to quite a small number of youth (approximately 8.6% of the total young population).

Nevertheless, the youth unemployment rate has increased after the Arab Spring, estimated at 28.1% in 2013 in the region, and is projected to increase gradually to 30% by 2018 (ILO, 2014). For example, unemployment among young people was 25% in Algeria, 30% in Egypt, 31% in Jordan, 42% in Tunisia, 44% in Palestine and 49% in Libya (see Chart 5). Indeed the majority of unemployed people in MPCs (up to 80% in some countries, such as Egypt) are first job seekers with no previous work experience. Moreover, most of them have intermediate and higher education, implying that educational attainment actually increases the risk of joblessness. For instance, the unemployment rates for those with tertiary education are 30% in Tunisia, 22% in Egypt, 19% in Morocco and 18% in Jordan (see Chart 6).

Secondly, there is also clear gender segmentation in the labour market opportunities for young people: employment opportunities are rare for young men in the region, but almost non-existent for young women, as most employers openly give preference to male job seekers (ETF, 2012). Other employers do prefer female workers, though the jobs offered are low skilled and low paid, and hence not attractive to the few 'educated' females who seek employment. As seen in Table 2, the unemployment rate for young women is extremely high despite the fact that the female labour force participation rate is the lowest of

TABLE 2 **Unemployment Rates: Total, Female Total, Youth Total and Youth Female (last available year)**

Country and date of data	Total Unemployment (15+)	Female Unemployment (15+)	Total Youth Unemployment (15-24)	Youth Female Unemployment (15-24)
Algeria 2013	9.8	16.3	24.8	39.7
Egypt 2012	12.7	24.1	29.7	53.2
Jordan 2013	12.6	22.2	31.2	55.1
Lebanon 2009	11.4	23	16.8	22.3
Libya 2012	19.03	25.05	48.7	NA
Morocco 2013	9.2	9.6	19.3	18.1
Palestine 2013	23.4	35.0	43.9	62.1
Tunisia 2013	15.9	23.0	42.3	45.4
EU28	10.8	10.9	22.9	–

Source: National Statistical Offices; EU28: Eurostat; Libya ILOSTAT database. Notes: Egypt unemployment rates 15-64; EU28 15-74; Tunisia: data from 2nd trimester of 2013

CHART 4 **Gross Enrolment Rates in Lower Secondary and Upper Secondary Education and the Share of VET Students in Upper Secondary**



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics UIS-UNESCO; Note: *Libya are UIS estimations

CHART 5 **Unemployment Rates: Total, Female Total and Youth Total (last available year)**



Source: National Statistical Offices; EU28: Eurostat; Libya ILOSTAT database. Notes: Egypt's unemployment rates 15-64; EU28 15-74; Tunisia: data from 2nd trimester of 2013.

CHART 6 **Unemployment Rate of Total Population and those with Higher Education by Sex**



Source National Statistical Office, Notes: Algeria 15-59, Superiéur 2013; Egypt: 51-64, 2012, Jordan: 2012. Data refer to 2nd trimester of the year; Morocco 2011. ISCED: International Standard Classification on Education.

all regions. Young female unemployment is particularly high in Palestine (62%), Jordan (55%), Egypt (53%), Tunisia (45%) and Algeria (40%). Therefore, the current employment gap between males and females is reflected in the same way among the youth population as well – and this gap will not decrease, even in the medium term, in the AMCs.

Thirdly, we do not know exactly what the rest of the youth population (almost 70%) is doing, as they are neither employed nor unemployed (not in the labour market). Given the age group 15-24, part of the youth population are students at different levels and types of education. As seen in Chart 4, gross enrolment rates in lower secondary education are almost universal (with the exceptions of Morocco, Lebanon and Palestine), but they are relatively low in upper secondary education which corresponds to the age group of 15-18 (ranging from 54% to 77%). Moreover, the share of vocational education and training (VET) students at upper secondary level is extremely small in AMCs – with the exception of Egypt, with almost half of students directed to VET streams. This means that there are a considerable number of early school leavers (or school drop-outs) in most AMCs.

Considering the gross enrolment rates of secondary and higher education in the region, ETF calculated that around 30-40% of youth population are currently in education (with wide variations between countries) (ETF, 2012). Putting together the 'active youth population' (31% including employed and unemployed) and 'youth in education' (30-40%), there is no information on the remaining one-third of the youth population. Indeed this group is neither in education nor in the labour market, and is not visible in statistics. The article employs here the concept of NEETs: young people who are not in education, training and employment. NEETs refer to those youth who currently do not have a job, are not enrolled in training or are not classified as students. Therefore it focuses on the 'youth at risk' who lack access to learning opportunities and are jobless and/or inactive.

As seen in Table 3 (and Chart 7), the NEETs are a more serious problem in AMCs and exceed the EU28 average. They increase from the age group 15-24 towards 15-29. For the age group 15-29, it reaches 41% in Egypt, for which data is available, 35% in Palestine, 32% in Tunisia and 29% in Jordan. This means that at least one out of three youth aged 15-29 is not in education or training, and not employed. Moreover, there is a big difference in the NEET rate for males and females. In Egypt, for instance, there are 40 percentage points difference between males and females in the NEET rate, 30 percentage points in Jordan, 23 in Palestine and 20 in Tunisia (see Table 2). Female NEETs are primarily 'inactive' in these countries (around 80% of them), while male NEETs are mainly 'unemployed' instead of inactive. This may be explained by typical gender roles pushing women to take care of a household, children or other relatives and remain at home.

High Diversity among the Youth Groups

Youth are not only at a disadvantage compared with adults, there are also particular youth groups that are more vulnerable to social and economic disadvantages and poor performance in education

TABLE 3 **NEETs Rate in Available AMCs and EU28**

	15-24 age group	15-29 age group	Males (15-29)	Females (15-29)
Egypt 2012	35.9	40.5	9.3	49.5
Jordan 2012	24.6	29.0	14.9	44.2
Palestine 2013	28.1	35.0	23.6	46.2
Tunisia 2013	25.4	32.2	22.4	42.2
EU28 2013	17.7	14.1	14.1	17.7

Source: Jordan, Tunisia, Palestine: ETF calculations based on ILO School to Work Transition Surveys; Egypt: ETF calculations based on the Egyptian labour market panel survey 2012 (ELMPS); EU28: Eurostat.

CHART 7 **NEETs Rate in Available AMCs and EU28 (15-29 age group)**



Source: ETF calculations based on ILO School to Work Transition Survey; Egypt: ELMPS 2012, Eurostat for EU28. Note: Data for Egypt and Jordan 2012, for Palestine and Tunisia 2013.

and employment. This is particularly the case in AMCs where the social and economic inequality is very high (ETF, 2012) and the traditional state institutions (including education and the job market) tend to reinforce inequality rather than reduce it. The determinants of such disadvantages include:

- *Socio-economic background*: Young people from poor households tend to become young working poor, because of missed education opportunities and/or poor employment opportunities. They tend to leave education early.
- *Literacy, education and skills*: Less-educated (uneducated) youth are more vulnerable in life and in the job market, although they may start working earlier in poor quality and informal jobs. In most cases, they remain trapped in these jobs.
- *Gender*: Being female means a higher risk of being inactive or unemployed, having lower wages and directed to low-paid segregated jobs that are traditionally accepted 'female' jobs.
- *Rural/urban (and regional):* The prospects and opportunities of youth in urban and rural areas are completely different. In general rural youth and youth from less developed regions are more vulnerable in education and employment.
- *Health conditions:* Youth with learning difficulties and the disabled youth are not even visible in society and public policies, although in most cases they are vulnerable to much abuse.

Therefore, 'heterogeneity' and 'diversity' are the key words to understanding the youth in AMCs, as well as their labour market situation. Despite the difficulties of mapping all youth groups in the region, and at the risk of oversimplification, a few distinct groups of young people with different types of employment challenges can already be identified.

The first such group is the youth with relatively good access to education opportunities and who go through the upper secondary, post-secondary and/or university education. Strangely enough, this is the group who face higher unemployment in the region, the so-called 'educated unemployed,' which receives a lot of attention. Despite the seriousness of the problem, we must remember that the proportion and absolute number of educated youth within the total age group of 15–30 is very small, and they are more likely to belong to the higher socioeconomic strata of society. This means that they may be able to choose between 'available jobs' or 'remain unemployed.' Their labour market entry is slow (postponed adulthood), but they are more likely to get better jobs in the end. Exception to this pattern is young females, whose unemployment rate is three times higher than that of their male counterparts (e.g. Egypt, Jordan and Palestine). As the labour market (in particular the private sector) is mostly closed to females, the majority become discouraged and drop out of it after a few attempts.

The second youth group consists of unskilled and low-skilled young people who tend to start working early. They are, in general, early school leavers and under strong social pressure to meet the economic needs of their families (early adulthood). A large part of this group are young males who occupy precarious positions in the labour market and move between short-term insecure jobs without experiencing long-term unemployment. There are also some young females working mainly in subsistence agriculture as family helpers in this group. Being employed, they may not get attention, but in reality they cannot afford to be unemployed. They do not have the necessary financial or human resources to improve/upgrade their skills. Thus they search for any (precarious) jobs and accept the poorest working conditions in the informal sector that will allow them to make a living, with subsistence wages and without any prospects for improvement.

The third group is inactive youth who are neither in education and training nor in the labour market. This is the most vulnerable to social exclusion as they are likely to be illiterate and/or uneducated women, including those who have dropped out of school. Surveys for some countries indicate that more than 40% of the young population is in this situation. Evidence points to rates close to 25% of the young male population in countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Palestine and close to 70% for young women (ETF, 2012). A large part of this gender difference is due to early school leaving and gender-related social norms that restrict mobility and access to further education or work for young girls after they have completed compulsory education.

It is clear that each of these groups requires different types of help for their specific needs. Given the large numbers of disadvantaged and vulnerable youth in

the second and third groups, there is a need to balance policy measures among these youth groups and to develop more instruments for those young people who are less visible in AMCs. For example, the second group needs special programmes for school reintegration combined with apprenticeships and/or second-chance adult training courses to enable them to upgrade their skills and hence progress in their careers and find better-quality jobs. The most effective actions for the third group would be those that promote universal literacy, together with developing key life competences for women, including mentoring programmes and second-chance adult training courses.

Key Barriers for Youth Insertion in the Labour Market

It must be remembered that the main factors affecting youth employment prospects are poor macroeconomic performance and growth (particularly deteriorated after the Arab Spring), the model of development, which determines the intensity of employment growth and the level of skilled job creation, and a lack of sufficient labour demand corresponding to the high demographic pressure. This is related to the model and stage of economic development in AMCs, but also to inbuilt factors such as the rigidity of labour market regulations. However, from the point of view of employability there are also a number of factors that make insertion into the labour market more difficult (ETF, 2012).

Adequate education and training: Despite wide-ranging improvements in educational coverage and achievement, school drop-out and illiteracy rates are still relatively high, and upper secondary enrolment rates relatively low. Young people refuse to enrol in VET programmes and are unwilling to learn manual work or craft professions. This still poses a major challenge to employability in large populations. Moreover, the low quality and Labour Market relevance of academic-oriented education, individuals' preference for humanities degrees, the low proportion of young people opting for VETs, the strong gender segregation in VET occupations and the mismatch between individuals' skills and employers' needs are frequently mentioned in this regard.

Generic and/or soft skills (key competences): These include ICT literacy, foreign languages, communications and social skills, analysis and synthesis, critical thinking and work discipline. All studies point to this element as a major shortcoming in AMCs. Soft skills are tightly linked to cultural attitudes and need to be seen as a process rather than a single intervention. Teachers' professional development and changes in school and university curricula and teaching methods could contribute much more to improving them than a proliferation of programmes such as those being implemented in some countries.

Social expectations: These still dissuade young people from enrolling in VETs and working in technical/manual occupations. Even graduation from prestigious VET centres, a step that opens positive employment prospects, is used as a method of entry into university by many students, and there is still a strong preference, in particular among graduates, for obtaining a state job (offering full social security and job security), despite the fact that for many young individuals this entails undertaking unproductive and unsatisfactory work. Although the State is no longer the employer of last resort for all graduates, political mobilisation often leads to increased public sector hiring, and being unemployed is a precondition for entry into the public sector.

Overall business environment: The business environment, the amount of red tape and bureaucracy involved in creating a company, and in particular the conditions prevailing in the financial sector do not encourage self-employment and SME development, despite positive experiences of entrepreneurship programmes on labour market insertion and employability. The structure of unemployment suggests that a significant part of unemployment results from high job expectations by workers with some formal education and a low valuation of these credentials by the private sector. Indeed many private companies identify the lack of skills among workers as a major constraint to business development.

Efficient job-matching services and transparent labour market information systems: Weak job-matching services is reflected in the fact that most jobs are found through personal contacts and social networks by those who are already employed, rather than through transparent and merit-based recruitment mechanisms involving open competition and/or job intermediation by public employment services.

Women are in particular at a great disadvantage as they lack personal contacts. Very low activity rates and very high unemployment rates imply strong discrimination suffered by women in relation to access to employment. Indeed, female employment is highly concentrated either in the public sector (in the education, health and social sectors) or in agriculture as family helpers.

Conclusions

The above analysis of the youth labour market implies much vulnerability among a highly diverse young population, poor performance of education and training systems, strong discrimination of females in the labour market, the devaluation of (scarce) national human resources and an increased risk of social instability. Some social theories point to the correlation between the proportion of unemployed young people in a society and the incidence of political violence (ETF, 2012). Nonetheless, there is a wide spectrum of policy options available in the field of youth employment promotion and employability to address the challenges of specific youth groups over the short, medium and long term, given the need to optimise the limited resources allocated to promoting employment.

- Young people are not a homogeneous group; therefore, targeting specific groups and specific disadvantages in the labour market is more effective. In particular, more measures for vulnerable groups are needed (early school leavers, inactive females, informal workers, NEETs etc.).
- The quality and relevance of, and access to, universal education need to be improved to reduce school drop-out rates and prevent youth from falling into the unemployment and poverty trap. Particular attention needs to be given to secondary education (both lower and upper secondary).
- Focusing principally on supply-side interventions will not solve the problem. Job creation policies (e.g. growth strategy, private sector development) and the use of labour market policies for targeted groups, such as wage subsidies, apprenticeships and training programmes, are needed.
- Entrepreneurship, self-employment, cooperatives, public investment programmes and employment intermediation services should be given priority to increase employment opportunities, particularly for the disadvantaged youth groups identified.
- VET systems have to be made more attractive, better quality and more responsive to the rapidly changing demand for skills in local labour markets. A more diverse offer of VET programmes, improved curricula and teachers, and extended outreach of VET to the youth are all needed. More emphasis on lifelong learning and soft skills is key to improving youth employability.

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Geographical Overview | **The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Others Actors**

Towards a Creative and Innovative Mediterranean: An Ambition for Youth

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In the face of the currently ferocious and generalised competition imposed by a globalised economy, countries have attempted to improve their standing in the new world order by two means: on the one hand, creating regional sub-ensembles intended to play the role of "antechambers of globalisation," and on the other hand, stepping up their competitive edge by developing innovation and entering the knowledge society.

The Lisbon Strategy adopted by the European Council in June 2000 is a good example of this evolution; announcing the ambition of making "the European Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world," this strategy was based on the three pillars needed for any knowledge society: support to innovation (which was to amount to 3% of the GDP); modernisation of the educational system (in order to sustain our collective capacity to innovate and adapt); and management of the continent's energy transition; a technological ambition that was to consolidate society's participation in reindustrialisation on the basis of new foundations.

Revised in March 2010 to take into account the severe effects of the crisis, this policy was called the "Europe 2020" strategy, then "Horizon 2020." The latter added two priorities to the Lisbon Strategy goals: social cohesion (job creation and the struggle against poverty) and decentralisation of decision-making (civil society participation). The aim was to attenuate, among the neediest sectors, the effects of opening up to international markets and internal modernisation. And thus emerged, for the first time in Europe, the start of a true structural policy on the scale of the 28 EU Member States; considerable progress, even if, to be fully effective, Horizon 2020 should be complemented by two other structural components: common industrial and energy policies.

A Profound Economic and Social Mutation

To further this ambition, the EIB Group[2] mobilised its entire financial "fire power" in the European Union: since the year 2000, the Group has invested nearly €130 billion to support technological innovation (R&D and RDI), over 45 billion to develop human capital and some 25 billion more to strengthen information network infrastructure (in particular to foster super-fast broadband connections). At the same time, the EIB Group dedicated over a quarter of its financing to accelerating energy transition: renewable energy, electric mobility, energy efficiency in cities and transport systems, etc.

In any case, there is no denying that the results have fallen short of the goals, in particular that of restoring the industrial component of the European Union's GDP to 20%. The main reasons are the difficulty for our economies of managing a head-on transformation towards a new industrial foundation and compensating for the effects of the world crisis, namely: preserving jobs despite relocation of average value-added pro-

[1] This article, completed in April 2014, is an expression of the author's personal opinions.
[2] The EIB Group consists of the European Investment Bank (www.bei.org), which is the bank of the European Union, and its subsidiary specialised in support to Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (SMEs): the European Investment Fund (www.eif.org).

duction; focalising priority investment on sectors with strong innovation and technology content; mobilising public finances for countercyclical response to the crisis; maintaining our social protection systems, etc.

I have taken this "European detour" to underscore two characteristics that affect European-Mediterranean relations.

The first has to do with the complexity of policies for transition to the knowledge society: even for highly developed countries, it is very difficult to ensure a type of transformation based not only on financial means and technology infrastructures, but above all on society's participation in a collective project.

Integrating South Mediterranean economies into the European value chain is both a challenge and an opportunity for success in a globalised economy

The second is that, to guarantee its global competitiveness, the European economy needs to involve operators in the South with the production of certain segments of European added value. This is what the German industry's experience with its Central European neighbours after the fall of the Wall demonstrates. Integrating South Mediterranean economies into the European value chain is thus both a challenge and an opportunity for success in a globalised economy.

The Knowledge Economy in Arab Countries: An Improvable Attempt

At the turn of the millennium, the South Mediterranean countries pursued, within their means, the same ambition of entering the world economy through regional integration and transition to the knowledge society. The results there likewise fell short for two reasons:

- First of all, the positive effects of opening to international markets were insufficiently compensated by structural policies aiming at a more equitable distribution of wealth. Indeed, authoritarian regimes fostered crony capitalism that left out many sectors, above all youth;
- Secondly, these same, pre-revolution autocratic regimes attempted to effect the transition to the knowledge society via centralised sectoral policies and the creation of innovation infrastructures. The component of society's participation was thus neglected because they believed that a national identity thus reinforced would move public opinion towards an ambition for modernity.

Although there are tangible results in various countries, such as Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco (where the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership – FEMIP has financed a number of science and technology parks), it is evident that these policies have had only a relative effect in relation to the significant public financial resources employed, and have brought about very little change in society. It is thus with very good reason that the study done by the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economics Institutes (FEMISE) at the request of the EIB-FEMIP[3] emphasises that it is above all through an organic approach and via the definition of societal goals that an innovation policy can have any chance of success, whether in the South or the North Mediterranean.

And paradoxically, the context of economic and political uncertainty currently prevailing on both shores of our common sea presents an opportunity to make innovation the core of the future "social contract" and place youth at the heart of the "new growth" for which the peoples of the Mediterranean are calling.

Making Innovation the Core of the Forthcoming "Social Contract"

When viewed from this innovative angle, the transition to a knowledge and innovation society seems like an eminently "living" process whose main component is the development of the "creativity function" on the scale of the whole of society. The success of the transition to the knowledge society thus resides more in the qualitative arrangement of the innovation

[3] A link to the study is given in the "References" section at the end of this article.

chain than in the construction of infrastructures in which innovation can develop (even if the latter remain fundamental).

The success of the transition to the knowledge society resides more in the qualitative arrangement of the innovation chain than in the construction of infrastructures in which innovation can develop

Without going into detail, note that the process should concern four priority sectors and should operate via two springboards.
The four priorities are, of course, the following:

- Modernising education and training in their main functions, which are developing people, their employability and their social inclusion;
- The function of research, its organisation and promotion in society;
- Participation of enterprise in the innovation chain and its link to higher education;
- Fostering networks of innovation actors, whether they be individuals or structures.

But even more important are the springboards:
The first is that of **individual development**, in the democratic and economic sense of the term; development that should allow individuals to liberate their creative faculties and boost their social and professional integration. Without significant progress in this sphere, there will be neither social response to the aspiration to democracy nor organic enrichment of the innovation chain. This is an essential point, because it conditions society's participation in the global vision consisting of the new social contract to be defined, which should aim to establish the conditions for more equitable growth, for both generations and regions.
Without freedom for the individual, there can be no research, no creation and no collective ambition!
The second springboard is that of **decentralisation**, one that consists of resituating individuals in their territory: decentralisation of decision-making, bringing it as close as possible to the local level, where civil society expresses itself and individuals are fulfilled; decentralisation of the decision to study, research, network, but also to undertake, finance, etc.
Such autonomy given to the different actors in the innovation chain is a formidable springboard for creation, but also for organisation: at schools and universities, in businesses, in networks, at banks. Is this to say that the State would lose all influence in defining the implementation of a policy for knowledge and innovation? Certainly not! It will be up to the State, on the basis of a democratically defined social contract, to establish a new growth strategy. A growth in which innovation will be one of the foremost pillars, together with territorial balance and decentralisation, and youth shall be the main actor and beneficiary.
In this perspective, three key factors seem to me to be decisive:

- **The autonomy of local authorities**, particularly in matters of economic intervention;
- **The autonomy of universities and public research structures**, resulting in the freedom to organise synergies with local enterprise and with their foreign counterparts;
- **The autonomy of public finance actors** to make the most appropriate decisions on the local level with regard to financing research programmes and innovation infrastructures.

It is thus up to the State to define the course of action and to organise and ensure the coherence of the new strategy's implementation; and also to accept that its action will not be solely top-down, that civil society is a voice to be heard and that it is pertinent to delegate forms of implementation to local actors.

Three implications to Consider for the Action of Development Finance Institutions

If countries in democratic transition gain a long-term vision placing creativity and youth at the core of their ambitions, then the international community should accompany this major evolution by finding ways of adapting their forms of development aid intervention.
In this regard, three conclusions can be reached.

1. If we are to pursue financing innovation infrastructures (as we have already done in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan), we should also implement financial instruments for the South Mediterranean countries allowing us to **finance immaterial R&D programmes**, as the EIB Group has done in Europe (with over 45 billion euros invested in five years in this sort of project). But this entails that, with the help of the European Neighbourhood Policy budget, we develop risk-bearing instruments, primarily for innovative SMEs, in the spheres of both loans and equity.
2. Along the lines of what we have already done in nearly all of our Mediterranean Partner Countries, we should **extend our technical assistance measures to the local banking sector** to allow them to better grasp the nature of risk associated with innovation, establish competencies on the local or regional level and develop hedging instruments, either with state aid or with that of regional authorities (similar to the French "loans for innovation," which have the support of the EIB Group).

   Also along these lines is the important programme for the promotion of innovation systems (Innovation Capacities),[4] directed by the EIB at the Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI) over the course of four years now, together with the European Commission's Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG Research), the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), the Tunisian and Moroccan Ministries of Innovation and FEMISE as partners.
3. Since we are taking the dual perspective of decentralising decision-making and fostering networking among actors, the results should be **cross-border cooperation between research structures and actors in various countries**, and hopefully in a South-South direction. This poses a problem for development funders insofar as their instruments are defined on a regional basis, but they are most often implemented on the national level. We should also, in due time, envisage extending the scope of application of the regional guarantee mechanism for SMEs that the EIB, Switzerland's State Secretariat for International Financial Matters (SFI) and the French Development Agency (AFD) have established within the framework of the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition for a volume of $400 million (190 million of which are subscribed by the EIB).

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Youth Unemployment in Mediterranean Countries

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It is a well-known fact that youth unemployment rates are currently alarmingly high in all of the EU's Mediterranean countries (comprising France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Even before the economic crisis hit in 2008, unemployment in each of these countries was already higher than the EU average. During and after the crisis, youth unemployment increased sharply, especially in Greece and Spain. By the end of 2012, the youth unemployment rate was above 50% in both countries: 55.0% in Spain and 58.1% in Greece. Likewise, the rate in Italy and Portugal was almost 40%, although in France it was only slightly higher than the EU average. In 2013, youth unemployment rates continued to rise, by 0.1% in the EU as a whole, 1.7% in Spain, and 2.9% in Italy. In Greece, youth unemployment remained quasi stable at 58.0% (-0.1). In France, the rate decreased in the third quarter of 2013 to 25.2%. The most significant drop was observed in Portugal.

According to Eurostat, the share of pupils in upper-secondary education enrolled in the vocational stream in the EU was 55.7% for males and 44.7% for females. The shares are lower than in the EU as a whole for all of the Mediterranean countries except Italy (70.1% male, 49.2% female).

The unemployment rate of people aged 15 to 24 is more than twice as high as that of people aged 25 and over, both in the EU as a whole and in the Mediterranean countries. However, those numbers must be interpreted carefully for two reasons (Barslund and Gros, 2013). First, the group of 15-to-24-year-olds actually consists of two subgroups, teenagers (aged 15 to 19) and young adults between the ages of 20 and 24. Most of the teenagers are still in school or training or, if not, are likely to be very low-skilled. Therefore, even in normal times, they would have difficulties finding a job. Young people aged 20 to 24 have typically completed secondary education or finished their university studies early and are seeking a full-time job. Second, only a small fraction of young people are in the labour force, on average only about 10%. A youth unemployment rate of 60% does not mean that 60% of the whole cohort is unemployed. It means that 60% of young people in the labour force are unemployed. The youth unemployment rate is thus potentially misleading, and it is therefore preferable to look at the youth unemployment ratio instead. This is the percentage of unemployed people in the reference population. The youth unemployment ratio of young people aged 15 to 24 is only slightly higher than the unemployment rate for those aged 25 and over and is somewhat less alarming.

In Italy and France, the youth unemployment ratio is similar to that for the EU-28 as a whole. In contrast, in Spain, the ratio increased dramatically during and after the economic crisis. In Greece and Portugal, the percentage of out-of-work young people looking for a job did not increase until 2009. After 2009, the ratio in both countries consistently went up, reaching 14.3% in Portugal and 16.1% in Greece in 2012.

An alternative indicator is the NEET rate. This includes all young people aged 15 to 24 who are not in education, employment, or training. The NEET rate for teenagers is usually much lower than the NEET rate both for young adults aged 20 to 24 and for the age group as a whole, as most of them are still in

CHART 16 **Youth Unemployment Rate (ages 15 to 24)**



Source: Eurostat.

CHART 17 **Different EU-28 Indicators of Youth Exclusion**



Source: Eurostat.

school or training. The NEET average for the EU is lower than the youth unemployment rate. However, especially in Italy, Spain, and Greece, the NEET rate is much higher than in the EU as a whole. In Spain, it grew tremendously during and after the recession, rising from 12.2% in 2007 to 18.3% in 2009, and it has remained high at about 19%. The NEET rate in Italy was already high even before the recession, at

The youth unemployment rate is potentially misleading, and it is therefore preferable to look at the youth unemployment ratio instead. This is the percentage of unemployed people in the reference population

about 17%. It, too, continued to grow during and after the crisis, reaching 21.1% in 2012. In Greece, the rate began to climb in 2009; by 2012, it had reached a similar level as in Italy (20.3%).

CHART 18 **Youth Unemployment Ratio (ages 15-24)**



Source: Eurostat.

CHART 19 **NEET Rates (ages 15-24)**



Source: Eurostat.

Macro vs. Institutions

The high youth unemployment rates in the EU's Mediterranean countries clearly reflect a structural problem with regard to training for youths and other institutional aspects of the labour market. The first problem is the dualisation of the labour market between permanent and fixed-term contracts. While permanent employment has strict dismissal protection, with temporary employment this protection is reduced. This makes the transition to a permanent job more difficult as it is quite costly for the employer. Furthermore, the NEET rates are above the EU average; it is not only low-skilled young people but also university graduates who are having significant problems finding work. This is due to the marginal role of vocational training, which is mainly school-based. Better integration of employer-provided training could improve this situation. Active labour market policies (ALMPs), which focus on hiring subsidies for apprentices, have only a limited impact (Zimmermann et al., 2013).

It is not only low-skilled young people but also university graduates who are having significant problems finding work. This is due to the marginal role of vocational training, which is mainly school-based. Better integration of employer-provided training could improve this situation

In **Italy**, the school-to-work transition is very problematic. In the Italian system, the presence of the State is marginal compared to the central role played by the family, which bears the primary costs of the transition to adulthood. In Italy, more than 60% of the unemployed belong to the category of new labour market entrants, and the share of long-term youth unemployment (more than 12 months) is also significant. This is due to the excessively rigid educational system, particularly in the tertiary stage, which results in very late entry into the labour market. Furthermore, Italy has extremely high dropout rates at all stages of schooling. Economic returns for tertiary education have fallen, and the number of university enrolments is higher than the number of graduates.

The level of secondary and tertiary education is low, and there is insufficient contact between the education system and the labour market. By focusing mainly on theory rather than practical applications, young people do not develop the problem-solving skills and competencies required by potential employers and have hardly any chance to gain early work experience. Moreover, the task of filling the youth experience gap has been left to the market, which has resulted in inadequate solutions such as temporary employment. Also, the lack of an adequate vocational training system and the absence of post-graduate bridges, such as job placement activities, are problematic. Furthermore, the significant mismatch of human capital generated by disparities in demand (technical) and supply (humanistic) is a problem in Italy. Because of the lack of demand for their particular type of qualification, young people are forced to accept jobs designed for candidates with lower qualifications. This phenomenon is called overeducation. McGuinness and Sloane (2010) report that overeducation is normally below 10% in the EU, but in Italy the percentage of graduates employed in posts designed for those with a secondary school diploma is one of the highest (23% for first-time hiring) in the EU. With a total of 13%, Italy is the third lowest in terms of performance five years after graduation, just marginally ahead of Spain.

In **Spain** the educational structure is also deeply polarised. The country has the highest rate of both early dropouts (almost 25% in 2012) and university graduates in the EU. University graduates have the same problem of mismatched skills as their Italian counterparts. More than 40% of young Spanish university graduates work in occupations requiring only low or medium skills (Garcia, 2011). Prior to the crisis, the construction boom-and-bust cycle and high growth in low-knowledge intensive service jobs raised the wages for unskilled workers during the long expansion period, thereby discouraging the pursuit of education. As a consequence, both during and after the crisis, employment rates among unskilled workers have fallen considerably. Since the crisis, participation in education has risen again (Dolado et al., 2013). Furthermore, there is a lack of means for developing specific occupational skills and acquiring practical experience with employers. Most of the vocational training in Spain is school-based. Only 4% of vocational training combines school- and work-based training. Introducing dual training in Spain could facilitate screening by firms to find potentially good job matches and would provide young people with occupation-specific work experience, thereby easing their transition into permanent positions. Instead, youth employment policies have concentrated on offering training contracts, which mainly reduce the cost to the employer of hiring young workers via subsidies. This has not increased firms' investment in the youth population's specific human capital because the training is not work-based. Instead, it has increased youth employment turnover, shifting the occupational distribution towards less qualified jobs. Moreover, because these contracts have not lowered entry-level wages, they have provided the wrong kind of incentives, encouraging students to drop out of school at a young age (Zimmermann et al., 2013).

In **France**, vocational trainees can enrol in either full-time vocational schooling or on-the-job apprenticeships combined with part-time study at training centres. Apprenticeships in France suffer from the perception that this training path is an inferior alternative to full-time vocational schooling (Cahuc et al., 2013). Employers receive some support for providing training. To address the issue of young people who fail to enter the training system, there is a long-standing tradition in France of subsidising temporary employment and training contracts as an ALMP. During the crisis, support was also given for additional apprenticeships, as well as the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones. Yet the effectiveness of these measures is questionable (Zimmermann et al., 2013).

Dual vocational training connects with the changing needs of the economy and gives young people the opportunity to gain specific knowledge and preliminary job experience

In general, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece have only limited provisions for training. In contrast, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Denmark have maintained a highly successful dual education and

training system through apprenticeships. In all four countries, over 40% of young people who leave school when it ceases to be compulsory take on apprenticeships (EEAG, 2013). Dual vocational training connects with the changing needs of the economy and gives young people the opportunity to gain specific knowledge and preliminary job experience. Firms contribute alongside the government to the costs and co-management of the overall system (Eichhorst et al., 2013). In this system, the transition from education to work is smoothed and young people have better chances of ending up in a permanent job.

Over the last few years, the importance and the share of public expenditure on ALMPs have risen in all of the EU's Mediterranean countries. The share of public expenditure spent on training is high in Portugal, modest in France and Italy, only small in Spain and almost non-existent in Greece. In Spain, most ALMPs consist of wage subsidies and reductions of non-wage labour costs in order to encourage companies to hire the unemployed or maintain their staff (Zimmermann et al., 2013). The same pattern can be found in Italy and Greece. This is not a good bridge to regular employment. Subsidised forms of employment should be combined with substantial job-related training by employers to increase young peoples' employability and productivity. Furthermore, support for start-ups, which is minor in all Mediterranean countries, can be a useful tool for creating jobs for young people and help to boost economic development.

A high level of employment protection for permanent jobs makes dismissing employees expensive. In contrast, firing costs are much lower in fixed-term contracts. As especially marginal workers, young people are generally less qualified and are often employed with temporary contracts. On the one hand, fixed-term contracts can help workers accumulate human capital and experience, potentially resulting in a permanent job. On the other, there is a danger that young people will simply move from one fixed-term contract to the next without improving their job situation. Therefore, the effects on workers are ambiguous. The dualisation between permanent contracts and temporary contracts is crucial. Fixed-term employment has been highly responsive to the crisis. Most employment adjustment took place via termination of fixed-term contracts and was concentrated among young people (Zimmermann et al., 2013). In countries hit hard by the crisis, young people stay in school longer because of the lack of employment options. At the same time, more and more youths fall into the NEET category. In countries like Spain, France, and Italy, non-standard employment has been an alternative for jobseekers and for taking on apprenticeships. Non-standard employment provides learning opportunities, but at the same time, young workers are confined to the lower segment of a dual labour market, which leaves them to bear the brunt of labour demand shocks (EEAG, 2013).

CHART 20 **Temporary Employees Aged 15 to 24 as a Percentage of the Total Number of Employees**



Source: Eurostat.

The share of temporary employment is high in all countries except for Greece. Spain has the highest share of temporary jobs in the EU for all sectors and occupations (Dolado et al., 2013). Spain has a long history of very high and volatile unemployment. A high share of temporary jobs results in a lack of employment stability and increasing job insecurity (Dolado et al., 2013). The strong concentration of temporary employment in conjunction with structural change problems caused the current youth unemployment disaster (Eichhorst et al., 2013). The share of temporary employment is also very high in Germany. But the vast majority of teenagers (94.4% in 2010) are covered by a training period as an apprentice or through training that culminates in permanent employment. In contrast, most teenagers in Spain (60% of teenagers and 77% of the young adults in the 20-to-24 age group) accept a fixed-

TABLE 12 **Comparing Minimum Wages and Special Rules for Young People**

	Monthly minimum wage (MW), second half 2013	Special rule for young people
France	€1,430.22[1]	Workers under the age of 17: 80% MW Workers aged 17-18: 90% MW[2]
Greece	€683.76[1]	Workers aged 15-18: 70% MW First entrants aged 19-21: 80% MW First entrants aged 22-25: 84% MW[2]
Portugal	€565.83[1]	No[2]
Spain	€565.83[1]	No[2]

[1] Eurostat and [2] Eurofound 2011.

term contract because they failed to find a permanent job and are therefore on a fixed-term contract involuntarily (Dolado et al., 2013).

The existence of a minimum wage raises the payment of the least well-paid workers, who are generally young and less qualified. There are minimum wages in France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Some countries employ a special rule for the young workforce, normally consisting of a fraction of the prime-age minimum wage rate. Without a provision like this, young workers can be squeezed out of the labour market. In general, young people are less experienced, and those young people who are affected by the minimum wage are mostly less qualified and therefore less productive. In consequence, the minimum wage is too high in some countries to hire young people.

In France the monthly minimum wage is very high. This creates a substantial barrier to accessing employment for low-skilled, young and inexperienced job seekers. A large number of young people in France are not sufficiently qualified to be as productive as the minimum wage requires them to be. In Greece, the exception to the minimum wage is broader and includes a higher share of young people. Until 1998, the Spanish distinguished between employees under and over the age of 18, but the country no longer has a special rule for young people. In Portugal, a reduction of up to 20% can be applied to apprentices and interns for a period not to exceed one year.

Outlook and Policy Conclusion

In EU Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is mostly structural and has deteriorated during the Great Recession. Therefore, well organised strategies to fight youth unemployment should improve the overall performance of the labour market. The goal is to reduce the high unemployment level, the volatility of employment and the risk of exclusion of specific groups from the labour market. Reforms have to be introduced that try to reconcile the security, efficiency, and fiscal aspects of labour market policies. It is important to set the right incentives to reduce high dropout rates, smooth the transition from education to work and increase the possibility of securing a permanent job. At the same time, returns to (vocational) education have to be high, to make investing in all varieties of education worthwhile. Furthermore, the match between the supply and demand for skills has to be improved. Better interaction between the education system and the working world is pivotal in this regard. The gap between the high employment protection and firing costs of permanent contracts and the negligible protection and job security of fixed-term contracts has to be narrowed. The limits on the widespread use of fixed-term contracts must be stricter. Each employment contract could be seen as unlimited, and the longer it remains in force, the more claims could be granted (Eichhorst et al. 2013). Also more flexible wages are needed.

In EU Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is mostly structural and has deteriorated during the Great Recession. Therefore, well organised strategies to fight youth unemployment should improve the overall performance of the labour market

Still, structural reforms of this kind will need some time to show effects and improve the situation for young people in the labour market in a sustainable way. Of course, they will also interact with the overall

At the same time, returns to (vocational) education have to be high, to make investing in all varieties of education worthwhile. Furthermore, the match between the supply and demand for skills has to be improved. Better interaction between the education system and the working world is pivotal in this regard

macroeconomic environment and labour demand. But the losers of the Great Recession and the labour market cannot be left on their own. The State has a responsibility and must give financial and active support to activate young people in the current situation.

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Youth, those Anti-Heroes of the Arab Spring

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The Role of Youth as Civil Society Actors During the Arab Spring and Democratic Transitions

This article follows up on two studies on youth policies in Tunisia[1] and Morocco[2] published by the European Commission in 2009. The great unease and tension among the youth of these countries at that time had been widely discussed and there was already talk of a youth torn between "rebellion and submission," a situation premonitory of the events of 2010 and 2011.

The aim here, a year later, is to define the place of youth in the South Mediterranean countries, their place in society, in terms of social and political force. We will also emphasise the terms "civil society" and "democratic transition," for all too often, concepts and analyses from North Mediterranean countries are hastily transposed, in general, with those from the West, comprised of democratic States with parliamentary and pluralist traditions wholly different to South and East Mediterranean States.

The geographic ensemble of the Mediterranean Basin is criss-crossed by tensions and often also misunderstandings between societies on the North and South shores, such that the events that continue to disrupt the established order of the Arab States are read and analysed in Northern countries based on frames of reference often at variance with reality. It seems necessary to us in this article to review all of these concepts and delve into the complex situation of these young people, who have taken and continue to take the forefront at protests and revolts, who surf the social networks and "put the yeast in the dough without always being able to enjoy the bread."

A Tangle of Events

On 17 December 2010, young Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in the town of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, after the confiscation of his vegetable cart by the police. Less than a month later, on 14 January 2011, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who had been in power since 7 November 1987, fled the country, driven out by the cries of "clear out!" chanted by the crowds for weeks on end. Only a month later, on 11 February, it was the turn of the Egyptian rais, Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, to leave, toppled by unprecedented popular protests. In the same period, Yemen, Jordan, Bahrain, Libya, Syria – all of these States were caught up in the same revolutionary fever. In Algeria, the government attempted to stifle the attempts at revolt by purchasing peace via the distribution of petrodollars and stepping up military pressure. The Moroccan monarchy was quick to offer an early reform of its constitution which limited the political prerogatives of the King without undermining his immense economic privileges. By the end of the summer of 2011, Libya, with the intervention of NATO forces, freed itself from Muammar Gaddafi's yoke after extremely violent armed confrontation. In March of that year, the Bahraini population was crushed by military forces supported by the forces of the oil monarchies panicked by the risk of contagion in their States. The Syrians continue to face, in blood and tears, the fierce repression of Bashar al-Assad's troops. We do not

[1] www.salto-youth.net/downloads/4-17-1871/09-EuroMedJeunesse-Etude_TUNISIA.pdf?
[2] www.salto-youth.net/downloads/4-17-1867/06-EuroMedJeunesse-Etude_MOROCCO.pdf?

yet know the outcome of this conflict, which has taken the form of a civil war, but what is certain is that the regime is discredited by now.
This leads us to the following assessment: in less than ten months, the geopolitics of Maghreb, Mashreq and Middle East countries and Gulf States has been either shattered or altered by "revolutions" as sudden as they were unexpected, breaking the image of immobility of Arab societies often circulated by the West and allowing them to "make history."

Arab Societies Were Experiencing "Social Fatigue"

In the face of these historic changes whose determining factors we do not fully know or control, it is worth remembering how these Arab societies were experiencing a kind of "social fatigue" because of the political, economic and societal factors that contributed to "anesthetise" and even paralyse them. A sort of "cartelisation" of power coupled with tighter security progressively gained ground within State regimes. Nothing portended a renewal of leaders in this frozen plebiscitary system at any time soon. Groups monopolising violent coercion played – and in some cases still play – a considerable role in society.
"The phenomenon of multiplication of armed forces and police is a common feature in many authoritarian states in which the process of institutionalisation remains incomplete. The duplication and sometimes the escalation between armed forces and police, armed forces and intelligence services, State armed forces and State militias and State and private armed forces reveal the regime's mistrust of its military and security agents." (Elisabeth Picard, *Armée et sécurité au cœur de l'autoritarisme)*.
Recall to what degree Western post-11 September anti-terrorism policies had contributed to strengthening the security complex, a strengthening up that was done at the expense of States' responsibilities in the social, educational and health spheres. These societies were imbued with fear of repression in all its forms. It was this fear that gave youth the strength to form a "bloc" and advance while regimes expected their retreat.
The security priority in these States had favoured the reduction of their sovereign functions, which were taken up by many NGOs, trade associations or guilds and civil society organisations that stepped in to assuage the collapse of the political regulation of society.
Is it the concentration of power and misuse of common property for the benefit of a few that have contributed to this geographic area, including oil-producing States, being the only area on the planet to have made little progress in recent decades, as evinced by the reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)? The figures are staggering: one in five people live on less than two dollars a day. The current period is characterised by significant absolute poverty levels, which are even growing in some States, such as Egypt, where it affects nearly one fifth of the population, and Yemen, with nearly 50% of the population in the category of absolute poverty. The (official) unemployment rate is approaching 20%, 23% of those over 15 are illiterate and more than 17% of the population is functionally illiterate despite the sharp rise in overall literacy, not to mention the high maternal death rate and the underrepresentation of women in the political sphere (parliaments have only 8% women MPs as opposed to a world average of 18%).

> We can assert that individuals of these societies, in particular young people, were in a position of "sub-citizens," which explains why the first word to be chanted at demonstrations was "dignity"

Add to this state of affairs a demographic context that makes public policy difficult in these States: 65% of the population is under 25 years of age and the average age of the population has just reached 22 (as compared to a global average of 28 years of age), despite a sharp, rapid decline in fertility rate in the Maghreb (the rate has gone from six children born per woman in the 1980s to just over two now). All of these factors profoundly modify intergenerational relations and the organisation of society. They shed light on the internal conflicts that endure in these societies, conflicts largely underestimated by Westerners, who are moved by security imperatives, anxieties relating to Islam and economic interests and display a rather condescending attitude towards them.
In light of these observations, we can assert, as Václav Havel does in his political essay "The Power of the Powerless," that individuals of these societies, in particular young people, were in a position of "sub-

citizens," which explains why the first word to be chanted at demonstrations was "dignity."

What "Civil Society" Are We Talking About?

Before discussing the organisation of civil society, we must first refer to a form of *dissent* through the affirmation of the individual and the desire to maintain social ties in truth and transparency despite everything.
Although comparison doesn't prove anything, Václav Havel's words on the Prague Spring in "The Power of the Powerless" resound cannily: "Today it is difficult to ascertain when and by which sinuous paths a particular act or genuine attitude influenced a given milieu and how the virus of truth gradually spread through the tissues of life within the lie and began attacking it. One thing, however, seems clear: the attempt at political reform was not the cause of society's awakening but rather the end result."
It is the young, those active forces of the States, in contrast to politicians considered "professionals" of policy, who take to the streets and squares and who are the expression of the body social as opposed to the body politic. These young people are seeking a social and economic life organised according to the logic of civil society, following a line that would find its dynamic within itself rather than in the role of the State. Václav Havel speaks of "real life" as opposed to lies and the corruption prevailing in authoritarian regimes. "Our revolution is civil – neither violent nor religious" was the slogan wielded by activists on Tahrir Square. It is according to this civil society approach that we will examine the role of youth in societies during the Arab Spring.

"Plural" Youth, All of Them Victims of Downward Social Mobility

First of all, we should consider the place of youth in Arab societies at the time events spontaneously broke out, though it would be more pertinent to speak of a "lack of a place" for youth. "We are, without being nor having," stated a young Tunisian student on the eve of hostilities during an interview.
These 15 to 24-year-olds comprise nearly a quarter of the population, yet they are fewer than at the time of the "bread riots" (IMF riots) and the apogee of radical Islamism in the late 1980s; as the demographer, Philippe Fargues, observed 25 years ago following demographic transition, "the 20-30 age group has never comprised a proportion as high as today's among the population over 20, and most probably never will again." In fact, in Arab countries, the most massive arrival of youth on the labour market is history. We must thus partially rule out the motif of the demographic explosion as a factor in the Arab Spring and turn towards social and economic insights. Young people are still far too numerous for the labour market's absorption capacity, which is why the unemployment rates for this age group (15-24 years of age) are very high, reaching 30% in Egypt and 32% in Morocco, with major geographic disparities in inland areas. In December 2010, young Mohamed Bouazizi's immolation in Sidi Bouzid, where two thirds of the population in the region is unemployed, is symptomatic of the sentiment of despair among youth in many Arab countries. What can be said of the situation of young university graduates? If we consider Tunisia again, 60,000 higher education graduates arrive on the labour market every year, while several dozen millions are already registered with the National Employment and Independent Work Agency (ANETI). According to a study done by Carnegie Middle East, these young graduates experience higher unemployment rates than average for the active population in general. Whereas 13.3% of the population lacks formal employment, qualified youth represent 21.1% of the unemployed. In Algeria, a country that lives off its oil income, young unemployed university graduates are twice as numerous as in other countries with the same per capita income level.
One can speak of a sentiment of despair among these young graduates who had nurtured aspirations of upward mobility through investment in higher education and now share a sentiment of downward mobility due to the dearth of opportunities on the national employment market. In the Gulf monarchies, youth has also experienced downward social mobility, partially due to the real estate boom of the 2000s and the rise in the price of housing. Strong intergenerational tension is generated between these youth, "stuck" at their parents' homes due to lack of financial independence until they are 30 or older, and their parents, who do not understand and resent these "spoiled" children who remain in their charge. This disappointment primarily affects the middle classes, but events following the death of Mohamed Bouazizi allowed contact between disadvantaged youth from both urban and rural areas and primarily young, urban, downwardly mobile intellectuals. Then an unexpected alliance came about

in the Arab States between the various components of this "plural" youth, who shared this sense of downward mobility and exclusion.

Though the youth of Tunisia are not the same as those of Bahrain, Syria or Morocco, they do share certain common features, highly publicised in the media on the North shore of the Mediterranean, with an emphasis on the role of young women in the Arab Spring.

Who Are These Young Women Involved in the Arab Spring?

Television networks the world over showed varied, emblematic figures. There were images of young women sporting veils and black niqabs, waving flags with an attitude of victory during popular protests. There were also images of heroines at the head of the revolt like the one pictured in *Le Monde Magazine* on 5 February 2011, which featured a full-page photo of a young woman, alone before a police cordon, with the caption "*COURAGE. On 26 January in Cairo, this young woman urged protesters to advance towards a police cordon*." There were also young women who were not religious and proud of it, such as Nadia El Fani, appearing on television. The former represent what the West fears, the latter, the hope for a shift of this youth towards the standards of globalisation: young female bloggers, symbolising women's struggles against dictatorship and the patriarchy, heroines of the defence of human rights in the Arab world. These two positions, which are quite real, nevertheless remain stereotypical portrayals of the political engagement of young women in the region. Such reductionist readings should be avoided, as for instance, when female political engagement is seen as the prolongation of and/or reaction to male domination, as in the first case, or when young Arab women are considered the only real actors in the Arab Spring, relegating men to the role of followers, as in the second case. In the Western perspective, she can only be either submissive or rebellious, a position widely adopted in representations of young Maghrebi women in France – recall the "neither whores nor submissive" movement.

In fact, women's engagement in politics did not wait for the Arab Spring and has often emerged for less heroic but also deeper causes such as generalising schooling for girls, lowering the fertility rate and progressively integrating part of these young people on the wage labour market. A growing minority has taken on responsibilities in civil society or political posts, namely elective offices or important posts within party structures. The West's astonishment at the strong female presence in the protest movements of Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain is due above all to its ignorance of the phenomenon of progressive politicisation of young Arab women and of their place in the public sphere today, an ignorance heightened by a certain complacency among their Western counterparts, in particular young female journalists.

"In France, one can hardly imagine," states Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun, "that since the turn of the 20th century, there could have been militant feminism in regions of the Near East that sought to both free themselves from the hold of a moribund Ottoman Empire and a European colonisation with many faces. As soon as the issue of women arises in what it has become customary to call the Arab world, Orientalist prejudices and stereotypes abound."

The very beginning of feminism in the Arab world was rather the doing of men expressing a certain "feminism in the masculine," as the Tunisian sociologist, Leila Labidi, puts it. They were Muslim reformists who had been advocating the emancipation of women under Sharia law since the 1930s and who greatly inspired the Tunisian Personal Status Code proclaimed in 1956, which remains the most liberal and egalitarian in the entire Arab world, even if this "State feminism" is not enough for the young women who have been taking to the streets in Tunisia for over a year now.

Today, the complexity of understanding the place of women and their political role in Arab societies has been heightened by the manipulation of the feminine issue under authoritarian regimes in the Maghreb and Mashreq, as well as in the conservative regimes of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Kuwait, in particular since the 11 September 2001 attacks. All these States have implemented a sort of State feminism in favour of women's rights. They have encouraged women's NGOs working to promote women in the public sphere and developed an arsenal of measures providing an illusion of democratic progress in the eyes of their Western backers. The most emblematic example is the proclamation of the *Mudawwana* (family code) by Mohamed VI in February 2004, a sort of "Islamic feminism of State" declaring the emancipation of women through a liberal reading of religious texts (*ijtihad*) without questioning the basis of patriarchal society. This State feminism can also be used to

struggle against Islamists, declared "enemies of women," whereas a few years earlier, the King had encouraged the population's "Muslim fibre."

The complexity of understanding the place of women and their political role in Arab societies has been heightened by the manipulation of the feminine issue under authoritarian regimes in the Maghreb and Mashreq

Feminist movements have always objected to this manipulation of the feminist cause by authoritarian regimes.

Today, Arab feminist discourse criticises a patriarchy no longer conceived as male domination but rather as a social, political, economic and societal patriarchy that prevents both men and women from advancing in life. We are no longer really in a dominant (men) – dominated (women) relation but rather in a power-aspiration to freedom relation.

Young women, like their male counterparts, wish to free themselves of family and social pressure, which has become increasingly restrictive with the erosion of the traditional family model, the urban housing crisis and this group's major difficulties in finding work. There is even talk of a "Malthusian poverty" (Montenay, 2009). This expression sums up the generational conflict issue of all of these youth "stuck" at their parents' homes and subject to prolonged celibacy.

What about Youth's Relation to Islam in Arab States?

On this issue, once again, one must proceed with caution and take into account the complexity of the matter. The same generational divide can be found in Islamism with the opposition of the "old white-beards" to the "young black-beards" as well as to the young beardless. Though the leadership of political organisations remains in the hands of older men, excluding youth and women from party responsibilities, they have shown mistrust of or aloofness from "spontaneous" protest movements beyond their control, in contrast to the youth in their parties, who have joined protests against regimes, more in tune with the slogans and expectations of their generation than with their elders. The following statements by Patrick Haenni on intergenerational strife within the Muslim Brotherhood can certainly be applied to the Arab world in general:

"The demands of the new generation are: greater transparency, less authoritarianism, recognition of youth, promotion of networking, desire for democracy, rejection of the major catch phrases. These six points are all at odds with the leadership's positions. What the Muslim Brotherhood did not understand, at least initially, was that the mobilisation of their youth was as much a desire to overthrow the corrupt political regime as a questioning of how the institution they were involved in was functioning. Where they call for transparency, the Brothers maintain the culture of secrecy. Where they think networks, their leaders think pyramidal organisation. Where they think freedom of action, their elders think authority and hierarchy. Where they think democracy, part of the leadership does not necessarily lend this term the same definition."

It is this socio-political divide between age groups that constitutes the common element among the Arab Spring youth. Young Islamist demands are similar to those of other Arab youth. Like them, they reject paternalist, authoritarian methods; they condemn dictators just as much as the leaders of their own movements or parties. It is the young people's expression of "the leader's disgrace," according to Michel Camau.

This factor should play a major role in post-revolutionary transitions.

These Young Arabs: Actors of Subversion Rather Than Revolution

One of the common characteristics of the great majority of these youth is the use of pacific and/or legal forms of action with a high protest potential and showing major defiance towards the established institutions and regimes in power. The occupation of public squares has been a common denominator in all the Arab revolts, to the point where these squares have become a political actor in their own right, serving as the exclusive voice of the people.

Another characteristic of the Arab revolts is the role played by social networks, and not only the social networks of educated youth, such as Facebook and Twit-

ter, which depend on the population's computer ownership and access to internet connections (less than 10% of the population in Egypt owns a computer and has an internet connection, and the percentage of mobile phone ownership is even lower) and highly differentiated uses of these means of communication. These new means exist in parallel to older networks that have long structured social interaction in Arab countries despite the control and pressure exerted by the regime in power, such as labour unions like the General Union of Tunisian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens, UGTT), universities or solidarity networks such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, one of the most powerful solidarity networks, targeted by Mubarak.

Another singular approach used in the revolts relates to everyday life: local engagement and cultural passions with no apparent public or political end. This series of practices, qualified as "infra-politics," which youth in Arab countries have been effecting for years, has grown exponentially since a year ago and seems to be leading towards a form of secularisation of Islamism, a sort of "post-Islamism" (Gilles Kepel).

Mark Levine has identified the signs of this "post-Islamism" by analysing heavy metal music. Reda Zine, a Moroccan in this genre, explained to Levine, "We play heavy metal because our lives are heavy metal, that is, oppressive, in struggle against censure, the verdicts of the authorities and the power of the religious establishment. Remember the role of graffiti like the huge stencilled piece by Alaa Abdel Fattah on the walls of an Egyptian military hospital, which he embellished with this furious slogan 'You can kill us, but you will never be able to govern us,' or the Moroccan rapper, L7a9d, imprisoned for his lyrics, in which he demanded his 'rights right now' and for having declared that he preferred "long live the people" to "long live the king."

What Is Left Today?

Certainly, a year later, part of this youth has the feeling of having been little understood or not at all. The need for a return to order was expressed at the polls with the rise to power of the Islamists, but nothing will ever be the same. Several highly significant examples support this observation.

For the first time in the history of Egyptian universities, the deans were elected by the faculty and not designated by the presidents as had previously been the custom. The largest Sunni university in Egypt, Al-Azhar University, has just added the following four freedoms to its charter: freedom of expression, freedom of artistic creation, freedom of religion and freedom of research. In Libya, the National Transitional Council (NTC) has announced the modification of the electoral law governing the election of the Constituent Assembly. The former electoral law had established a quota of 10% for female MPs, but under pressure from civil society, it has now been set at 50%.

Certainly, the voice of youth has been greatly excluded at elections and repression is often fierce, but nonetheless, nothing will ever be the same. To borrow a phrase from Václav Havel, thanks to youth, "the future is once again open."

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Young Graduates in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries: Untapped Potential stuck in Job Queues

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The issue of young people's employability (15-24 year-olds) in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) has gained more importance over the past ten years, triggering the "Arab Spring" revolt. Indeed, it is significant to note that the spark to this wave of protests was the self-immolation by fire of a young Tunisian university graduate in response to an altercation with a policeman over his "informal" business as a street vendor. The persistence and worsening difficulties in integrating the young into the labor market over the past decade have given rise to mounting tensions between the youth, especially the most highly qualified, and society. The social cohesion in force did not resist the deterioration of young people's living conditions caused by a long-term exclusion from the labor market. This economic exclusion was also fueled by an acute sense of social and political exclusion. In fact, the increasing awareness and access to broader parts of the world through the media, especially information and communication technologies (ICT) have changed the aspirations of the younger generations in SEM countries, on the way society works and the part they could play in it. Consequently, the generation gap regarding adults and public authorities, still rooted in a traditional pattern, has widened quickly, hitting a breaking point in Tunisia and Egypt.

Although most SEM countries have completed their demographic transition, those under 25 years of age accounted for nearly half of their population in 2010, i.e. a proportion twice higher than in Northern Mediterranean countries (26%). If the large number of young people is a long-term asset for these countries, it also poses challenges in the labor market. Indeed, however low in previous decades, the demographic growth will yet have a continuous effect on the labor market. According to UN projections, the population of most SEM countries is expected to increase by a quarter as from 2030. Young people would then account for about 70 million people against 55 million today. As a result, this outlook implies that the labor market may absorb these additional millions of people in the next two decades.

Along with this demographic impact, a labor force participation rate effect is bound to be added. Indeed, SEM countries feature the lowest participation rates in the world. (Chart 14). This result is mainly due to a female participation rate lower than 25% in most SEM countries, compared to a global average of 52%. Along with the rising enrollment rate and average level of education (Chart 17), female participation rates are expected to rise significantly in the region. For instance in Turkey, the participation rate of women is 15% for those with a level of education lower than high school while it reaches a staggering 75% for those with a level of education higher than high school. By projecting the population dynamics, Blanc (2011) considers that SEM countries would badly need to create a minimum of 34 million new jobs by the year 2030

[1] We are particularly grateful for the assistance given by Isabelle Barthes to this second English version of the text.

CHART 14 **Participation Rates in Different Regions of the World (2010)**



Source: Key Indicators of the Labor Market (KILM).
Note: SEMCs represents the average of the following countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.

just to maintain participation and unemployment rates at their current level. This figure is bound to triple, if the aim is to secure a job to all new entrants into the labor force. Not only is the challenge quantitative but also qualitative in order to respond to the surge in the number of university graduates, as observed in SEM countries.

A Growing Number of Graduates

In SEM countries, the new generation of young people is characterized by a fairly high level of education. Indeed, the allocation of substantial resources to primary and secondary education between 1960 and 1990 has sharply increased the number of students in higher education (post A-level) since the mid-1990s. Some countries, such as Tunisia, experienced a fourfold increase, ranging from 100,000 students to over 400.000 in 2010. In Algeria, the rise was equally important, as the student number soared from 30,000 in 1995 to over 1.1 million in 2010. Related to the total population, the number of students in SEM countries (except Morocco) is now reaching ratios comparable to those of North Mediterranean countries i.e. between 3200 and 4000 students per 100,000 inhabitants. This rise in university graduates results in a massive influx of graduates into the labor market. Thus, in Egypt and Turkey more than 400,000 new graduates enter the labor market every year. In Algeria, this figure reaches 150,000, in Tunisia and Morocco it is close to 70,000. Thus, the economies of these countries must create jobs meeting the qualifications and expectations of these new graduates, both in terms of wages and working conditions while seeing their situation on the labor market likely to deteriorate even more.

Young Graduates Faced with Mass Unemployment

For most Mediterranean countries, with the exception of Israel, the situation of young people in the labor market is critical with an unemployment rate between 25% and 45% (Chart 15). However, due to their substantial demographic share in SEM countries (except Israel) young people account for one third to 60% of the unemployed (Chart 16) while they are between 17% and 20% in most Northern Mediterranean countries. This ratio tends to increase with the financial crisis that affects primarily young people and enhances the structural problems related to the transition from the education system to the labor market. This mass unem-

CHART 15 **Unemployment Rate by Age Group (2010)**



Source: KILM. Note: SEMCs represents the average of the following countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.

CHART 16 **Unemployed Youth as a Percentage of the Total of Unemployed (2010*)**



Source: KILM.
Note: SEMCs represents the average of the following countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.

ployment for young people is the main challenge for SEM countries since it has a major impact on the dynamics of the economy, the intergenerational balance and the relationship between youth and society. This may have serious political implications, as demonstrated by the events of the "Arab Spring".

Education and Youth Unemployment Relationship: a Cause for Concern

The problem of youth unemployment in SEM countries, including graduates, though worsened by the current crisis is not cyclical but structural. Indeed, the sustained growth of the graduate labor supply has

CHART 17 **Unemployment Rate by Education Level (2010*, 15 years old and over)**



Source: KILM and Martin (2009).
* Or latest data available

not met such a dynamic labor demand. As a result, the unemployment rate for university graduates has increased in the 2000s in most SEM countries. Thus, a growing relationship between the unemployment rate and the education level is noteworthy (Chart 17). These findings are all the more worrying as they may jeopardize individual and collective incentives to invest in human capital. In fact, from an individual perspective, if the degree no longer guarantees getting a job and a higher wage, the investment in human capital will not be cost effective. From a macro-economic perspective, public spending on education will no longer be relevant unless they produce the expected effects (innovations, better adaptation to technical advances) on the long-term growth. Conversely, in countries of the European shore, there must be a negative relationship between the education level and unemployment rate. In Spain, the unemployment rate for individuals with a primary education level is twice as high as that of individuals with a higher level of education. Another case in point, France, where the graduate unemployment rate is three times lower for people with a primary education level.

How can High graduate Unemployment be accounted for?

The rise in the unemployment rate of graduates reveals an inadequate creation of skilled jobs and this despite a sustained economic growth in the region (5% per year on average). This result shows that the relationship between the growth rate of GDP and the net creation of skilled jobs is low due to poor growth regime gains. To account for these low productivity gains in SEM countries, the fairly sizeable public sector as well as the low value-added content of private-sector jobs are the elements most often put forward.

An Over-extensive Public Sector?

Historically, the public sector has been the main outlet for university graduates in SEM countries. Although this distortion of skilled jobs to the low-productive public sector is sub-optimal for the long-term dynamics, curbing total factor productivity (TFP) gains, it used to guarantee a degree of social cohesion between the young and society. This social contract has slowly disintegrated under the effect of a dual evolution. On the one hand, as described above, the number of graduates has grown apace while, on the other hand there is a drop or slowdown in public recruitment. Indeed, during the 1990s, driven by the structural adjustments programs, SEM countries initiated policies of privatization and liberalization of their economies and faced drastic budget constraints. Thus, in Morocco the share of the public and semi-public

sector in total employment (including non-graduates) shrank by 2.5 percentage points between 1999 and 2010. Egypt, where the public sector has a much greater impact, experienced a 4-percentage-point decrease between 1995 and 2004 and in Tunisia the decline stood at 6 percentage points between 1997-2003 (Kocoglu, 2011). The public sector exerts an attraction over graduates for its numerous benefits associated with public jobs (job security, national healthcare access with advantageous terms for the pension system). As regards SEM countries, we can add a starting wage higher than in the private sector. Indeed, in most SEM countries wages in the public sector are higher than in the private sector. The gap is particularly wide in Morocco with an average wage 75% higher for public- sector workers than in the private sector. These benefits, in particular the wage gap, affect the job-search strategy of individuals by changing among other things their reservation wage, an important aspect for graduates that favors the segmentation of the labor market.

The investigation on the integration of university graduates in Tunisia, conducted in 2004, illustrates the "binary" situation of young graduates (Ben Halima et al., 2011). Graduates in active employment 18 months after graduating, benefit, all things being equal, from a higher average wage than those who land a job in the private sector. This wage premium is based solely on the integration of the holders of a Master's degree, a degree obtained by nearly half of Tunisian university graduates. When Master's degrees' holders pass the entrance examination in the public, then they get a job, particularly in Education, with a "high" monthly wage. In case of failure in the competition, they are either unemployed or obtain a job with a very "low" wage in the private sector and most often in the informal sector. As regards the other degrees, according to the authors there is no significant wage gap between private and public jobs. This second result shows that the private sector is not, in terms of wages, attractive enough for graduates.

Thus, the combination of a shortage of public sector jobs and expansion in the number of graduates have resulted in long "waiting lines". In SEM countries young graduates would be in rent-seeking strategies, obtaining public jobs and shifting away from more productive activities for growth. Consequently, upstream young people choose general training programs to land a job in the public service. Once graduated and unemployed, they would await a job meeting their expectations in terms of wages and working conditions that the public sector is best able to provide. Conversely, they will run the risk of long-term unemployment that can lead to unemployment of exclusion. For example in Morocco, the rate of long-term unemployment, which stands between 44% for non-graduates reaches 77% for university graduates: that is an average unemployment duration of 40 months against 24. In Tunisia, it is 28 months for university graduates against 19 months for non-graduates. Moreover, the majority of long-term unemployed university graduates are primo job seekers highlighting the difficult transition from university to the labor market. The problem of the duration of unemployment for young graduates is a key point in two main ways. Firstly, the isolation of young people from the labor market makes any initiative of return to work more costly and uncertain. Secondly, it leads to the depreciation of human capital, their main asset on the labor market and can sustainably divert future generations from investments in education and encourage the emigration.

The Difficult Transition to the Knowledge Economy

The productive structure of the economies of SEM countries is still oriented towards sectors with low skilled labor needs (agriculture, services, tourism, low-tech manufacturing industries). In Tunisia, for example, 90% of jobs in the textile and clothing sector are made up of operating agents, managers accounting for less than 5% of jobs. In SEM countries the private sector does not create enough skilled jobs to absorb the massive influx of new graduates. In the 2000s, Tunisia created an average of 30.000 jobs per year for graduates while the double would be needed to provide a job to each new university graduate (Kocoglu, 2011). This mismatch between the dynamics of the labor supply and demand thus explains, from a quantitative point of view, the significant rise in the unemployment rate of university graduates.

The transition to an intensive-skilled-labor economy involves structural policies and long transitional periods. The integration of a generation of educat-

ed youth requires the development of a formal private sector that must focus more on study courses fostering the emergence of high value-added activities such as new technologies. The consequence of this upmarket productive structure is a drop in the informal sector that plays a prominent role in the economy of SEM countries (up to 50% of non-agricultural employment in Morocco and Egypt). Without this upward adjustment of production, the rapid improvement of education level does not result in productivity gains affecting the long-term growth.

The mismatch between labor supply and demand for graduates may also be explained by the content and quality of the training. University curriculums would be on one hand too focused on general courses overlooking technical and scientific courses and on the other hand their quality would be quite low (Martin, 2009). Companies search for skills and the degree is not, in the case of the countries with a high unemployment rate of graduates, the way young people can signal their skills and level of productivity to firms. Thus the failure of the signal effect of the diploma occurs through two effects. The first is quantitative and linked to the rapid enrollment increase in higher education. A too-easy access, or perceived as such by recruiters, causes a rapid depreciation of the degree and overrides the positive signal linked to the degree. The second effect concerns the quality of the training and the skills required for graduation. If recruiters are convinced that the graduation in question does not reveal any information on the potential "productivity" of individuals, they will not be able to use the degree as part of the selection of applicants. This result is all the higher as students are highly concentrated in a few course studies. Indeed, the heterogeneity of the jobs available in the labor market in turn requires skill heterogeneity. One of the challenges of the future educational policies is to alter the way recruiters, including the formal private sector, view graduates in order to restore credibility to the signal sent by the training.

Active Employment Policies for Young People

SEM countries' governments have become aware of the issue of university graduates' employment and since the 2000s have implemented measures to assist and support their integration. These measures are a combination of miscellaneous programs. First, governments have introduced policies to support youth employment which, if correctly targeted, can help young people find a proper job in the labor market. This type of measures is impeded by the well-known problem of deadweight losses and substitution effects between the target population and the rest of the population. In addition, the jobs created with this system may vanish with the removal of subsidies. Other public policies attempt to promote vocational training for the young to enable them to gain experience in firms. However, the training is not sufficient to secure a job, so the job creation is strongly needed. Governments have also tried to improve the monitoring of the unemployed to assist them in their job search or expand public employment aimed at the young for missions of general interest. Finally, policies to support entrepreneurship are likely to meet the needs for job creation and the expectations of young people in terms of independence and freedom. Active employment policies have shown limited successes. Tunisia's example is a good case in point. Compared to other graduates, the young who carried out an Introductory Internship to Professional Life (SIVP), have an average unemployment rate slightly lower (30% against 36%), but an employability rate with a permanent job lower (22% against 28%). If we add deadweight losses for employers, still in connection with subsidy policies of hiring, the cost-effectiveness of these measures do not really seem worthwhile. In addition, active job policies target more specifically graduates and give fewer opportunities to unqualified youth, putting them in a predicament.

Conclusion

In the framework of SEM countries' economic developments, the young have been a significant potential, especially since they are more qualified. However, the rapid and high unemployment rate of graduates in the 2000s emphasizes that this potential remains not only untapped but instead pushed aside «into exclusion through unemployment». This potential achievement requires a systemic approach to the problem for implementing structural measures. They must go beyond cyclical

policies to respond to the urgency of the situation by creating public jobs or subsidized temporary jobs for the young. The question is mainly to improve the content of the training offer (targeting common skill foundations) for a better match with the needs of the economy. In that respect, it is necessary to support skilled job-generating activities to help the productive system reach high value-added activities and foster innovative entrepreneurship through easy financing mechanisms.

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Social Media in the Arab World: the Impact on Youth, Women and Social Change

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The societal and political transformations that swept the Arab region throughout 2011 have empowered large segments of the population. Many stereotypes have been shattered, with Arab youth, "netizens" and women becoming the main drivers of regional change. Arab women and youth in particular have become more engaged in political and civic actions, playing a leading role in the rapid and historic changes sweeping the region. Meanwhile, the debate about the role of social media in these transformations has reached policymaking circles at the regional and global levels.

Throughout 2011, social media usage continued to grow significantly across the Arab world, coupled with major shifts in usage trends. Once used merely as a tool for social networking and entertainment, social media now infiltrates almost every aspect of the daily lives of millions of Arabs, affecting the way they interact socially, do business, engage with government, and take part in civil society movements. By the end of 2011, Arab users' utilisation of social media had evolved to encompass civic engagement, political participation, entrepreneurial efforts, and social change. With a critical mass of Arab users in many countries, governments have also begun to recognise social media's potential to develop more transparent, participatory and inclusive governance models. However, while creative and socially beneficial uses of social media abound, they are accompanied by newfound concerns surrounding issues of security, privacy, freedom of expression, and the disruptive uses of social media on foreign policymaking and diplomacy.

The Shift to Activism

The first three months of 2011 saw what can only be termed a substantial shift by social media users in the Arab region towards online civic and political mobilisation, whether by citizens – to disseminate information within their networks, organise demonstrations (both pro- and anti-government) and raise awareness of ongoing events locally and globally – or by governments, in some cases to engage with citizens and encourage their participation in government processes and in others to block access to websites and monitor and control the information on them. The growth of social media in the region and this shift in usage trends have both played a vital role in mobilising and empowering people, shaping opinions, and influencing change. A critical mass of young and active social media users exists in the Arab world today that is using Facebook and Twitter, among other social media sites, to effect this change.

A large percentage of young men and women primarily used social media during the "Arab Spring" to raise awareness within their own countries about societal grievances and the ongoing uprisings – according to several regional surveys conducted by the Governance and Innovation Program at the Dubai School of Government throughout 2011. While many users said they used social media tools to mobilise popular movements, a significant percentage of respondents (25%) also voiced concerns that they could be held accountable by au-

thorities for expressing their social and political views online. In Egypt and Tunisia, specifically, the ramifications of political activism – which included the authorities blocking the Internet – did little to deter people; in fact, the surveys indicate that for almost 60% of respondents, it motivated them further and even pushed the undecided to get involved in the civil and political movements on the ground.

According to the *Arab Social Media Report* series,[1] Facebook and Twitter usage grew substantially throughout 2011 in the Arab world. For example:

- The total number of Facebook users in the Arab world stood at 37,865,442 as of December 2011, having almost doubled since the same time the year before (21,368,605 in December 2010).
- At the beginning of December 2011, the country average for Facebook user penetration in the Arab region was just over 10%, up from just under 6% at the end of 2010.
- The number of Facebook users in the Arab world increased by 77% between January and December 2011. Youth (between the ages of 15 and 29) make up around 70% of Facebook users in the Arab region, a number that has held steady since April 2011.
- The percentage of female users has been at a standstill since April 2011, at 33.5%. This is still significantly lower than the global trend, where women constitute roughly half of Facebook users.
- The estimated number of active Twitter users (users who tweet once a month) in the Arab region at the end of September 2011 was 652,333.
- The estimated number of tweets generated in the Arab region in September 2011 by these "active users" was 36,889,500 tweets, with an estimated 1,229,650 daily tweets.
- The most popular trending hashtags across the Arab region in September were #bahrain (with 510,000 mentions in the tweets generated during this period), #egypt (with 310,000 mentions), #syria (with 220,000 mentions), #feb14 and #14feb (with a combined 153,000 mentions), and #kuwait (with 140,000 mentions).

Facebook: Mobilising Movements and Calls to Protest

As the statistics above indicate, the number of Facebook users has risen significantly in most Arab countries, most notably during the first three months of 2011 – at the height of the "Arab Spring" – and in the countries where protests have taken place. The role of social media in the revolutions that have swept the region has been debated, with some camps labelling them the main instigators and others relegating them to mere tools. Regardless, it can be stated that many of the calls to protest in the Arab region were initially made on Facebook (save for the first protest in Tunisia), and all did indeed manifest in the streets (with the exception of the first call to protest in Syria on 4 February 2011). This is not to say that there was a causal relationship or that the Facebook pages were the defining or only factor in people organising themselves on those dates, but as the initial platform for these calls, they were undeniably a factor in mobilising the movements.

Conversely, the protests themselves seem to have led to a rise in the number of Facebook users in the region. The countries where protests occurred have all shown a positive growth rate, except for Libya, which could be explained by the number of expatriate workers leaving or switching Facebook locations. A comparison of the growth rate for each country during and following the protests to a similar period the year before shows that the growth rates doubled and even tripled in some countries (see Chart 41). The numbers themselves do not illustrate the type of usage, of course. Some usage may be political, while other usage may be purely social and not entirely related to the civic movements at the time. But the exponential growth in the number of Facebook users coinciding with the protests in each country does indicate the need for further research to explore the possible correlation.

Twitter: Informing the Online Political Conversation

Twitter usage in the Arab world grew throughout 2011 as well, both in terms of the number of users and the volume of tweets they generated. As with

[1] Source: *The Arab Social Media Report* series, available at: www.ArabSocialMediaReport.com.

CHART 41 **Growth Rate of Facebook Users During 2011 Protests As Compared to a Similar Time Period in 2010**



Facebook, much of this growth can be attributed to the events of the "Arab Spring" and its influence on the Twittersphere. This influence was not only reflected in the growing numbers of users and tweets, but also in the fluctuations in the number of daily tweets and in the top trending topics and hashtags during the period of the "Arab Spring."

In looking at the fluctuations in the volume of daily tweets in certain countries, we noted that some of the fluctuations or "spikes" seemed to coincide with current events at the time. For example, Chart 42 shows a drop in the number of tweets in Egypt during the Internet blackout (28 January – 2 February 2011) and a spike when former President Mubarak left office on 11 February. This does not conclusively indicate that the events directly contributed to the fluctuations in tweet volume, but their concurrence provides a high degree of circumstantial evidence for linking current events to the surge in tweet volume. As with the daily volume of tweets, spikes and fluctuations within the daily volume of mentions of popular trending words and hashtags (in Chart 42, #Jan25, specifically) also coincided with these events and accounted for a large number of the daily tweets. This gives a clearer idea of what the Twitter conversation in Egypt – in this case – was about and indicates that, to a large extent, ongoing social and political events at the time did indeed drive this conversation.

Social Media and Arab Women's Empowerment – A Regional Perspective[2]

The societal and political transformations taking place across the region have also played an instrumental role in challenging stereotypes about Arab women as oppressed and subservient. In particular, the leading role that women have played in orchestrating and participating in social movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen has cemented their position as equal partners to men in transforming the political landscapes in their countries. The most obvious acknowledgement of this leadership role was the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to an Arab woman, Tawakkul Karman, a leading Yemeni political activist. Whether Arab women's civic and

[2] The Gender and Social Media Regional Survey was conducted jointly by the Governance and Innovation Program and the Gender and Public Policy Program at the Dubai School of Government.

CHART 42 **Daily Tweet Volume and Mentions of #Jan25 in Egypt (January – February 2011)**



political engagement will be enhanced in the aftermath of the "Arab Spring" remains to be seen.

Although social media has been a powerful tool throughout these popular movements, both for mobilising activists and disseminating information, Arab women's use of social media is low compared to men's in the region, as well as in comparison to the global female usage average (for example, women make up about half of Facebook users globally, while they make up only a third of users in the Arab region).

Explaining the Social Media Gender Gap in the Arab World

In the Arab world, men remain twice as likely as women to be users of social media. The barriers to women's utilisation of social media can be divided into two categories: environmental and personal. Environmental factors – which have more to do with the environment in which female social media users operate – constitute the largest barriers to Arab women's use of social media, specifically "societal and cultural constraints," in addition to "access to ICT" and "lack of relevant content for women." On the other hand, the personal factors, which have more to do with the skills or abilities of female social media users themselves, such as "level of education," "ICT literacy," "confidence in social media" as a means for communication, and "level of trust in ICT's security and privacy," are also viewed as barriers, but with lesser impact (see Chart 43). This suggests that closing the "virtual" gender gap will require efforts to overcome the environmental barriers by addressing discriminatory attitudes and cultural constraints on women, rather than addressing the personal barriers by focusing on "fixing the women" solutions.

Social Media as a Gender Equaliser

Arab men and women largely agree on issues related to social media and its implications for women and civic participation. They use social media in similar ways and have similar opinions on the role that social media can play in women's empowerment. Whether this is a result of using social media or has more to do with the typical profile of a social media user warrants further research.

Social Media and Changing Perceptions about Women and Civic Participation

A key finding of this research is the shared view of social media as a tool for women's empowerment. The majority of respondents felt that social media had the potential to be an empowering and engag-

CHART 43 **Research Shows that Women in the Arab World Use Social Media Less Than Men Compared to the Global Average. Why Do You Think This Is?**



ing tool for women, whether in social, economic, legal, political or civic arenas. These perceptions contrast with the reality of gender inequalities that persist in the Arab region when it comes to these domains. In that sense, social media can potentially be a change agent towards women's empowerment in Arab societies.

Social Media: A Panacea for Women's Empowerment?

Gender inequality prevails in "real life" in the political, social and economic arenas in the Arab world. This is apparent in the Arab region's low rankings in terms of gender parity within the political empowerment and economic participation pillars of various women's empowerment indices, as well as in regional and international reports such as the *Arab Human Development Report*.

Even though social media is largely viewed as a tool for empowerment, giving women access to and enabling them to create entrepreneurial opportunities, social change, and civic and political action, 40% of respondents asserted that social media may also present new concerns for women's civic participation. Additionally, the overarching "real life" barriers for women's empowerment may not be surmountable using social media alone. While "virtual" participation might be a first step towards women's empowerment, it may not necessarily translate into real-life participation in mainstream political, civic and public arenas. The real-life barriers on the ground within these arenas should not be underestimated and need to be addressed in efforts to promote gender equality in the region.

Social Media in the Arab Region: from Perception to Reality

Arab societies continue to have limited channels for interactions, with no real civil society, limited media freedoms and a lack of representative government institutions. Until a few years ago, the flow of information in Arab societies remained overwhelmingly hierarchical, mainly flowing top-down from governments to citizens and state media to society. Today, with a critical mass of social media users across the region and the convergence of these informational sources with other communication channels

such as satellite TV and mobile telephony, information flows have been almost fully rewired in Arab societies, giving rise to new opportunities for empowerment.

Coupled with the robust growth of social media usage among youth in the Arab region, there is a pervasive perception of social media as an enabler for youth and women's empowerment

During the "Arab Spring," social media played a critical role in most of the popular movements in the region. According to our research findings, it was promising that, coupled with the robust growth of social media usage among youth in the Arab region, there is a pervasive perception of social media as an enabler for youth and women's empowerment. If lessons are to be drawn from youth utilisation of social media during the ongoing popular movements in the Arab world and young people's growing sense of empowerment today, these strong positive perceptions suggest that social media will continue to play an important role in empowering large parts of Arab societies in the future. From a societal point of view, this will be realised as long as a critical mass of young Arabs continue to embrace social media with the primary objective of influencing change in their societies.

The growth of social media usage also changed the ways in which governments interact with societies in the region. Arab governments' reactions to this new phenomenon have been mixed. While some tried to resist change, a few governments were more responsive and started adapting. The few responsive governments tried to take advantage of this growth by putting policies in place to regulate social media usage. With the continued government restrictions on media, civil society and political representation in most Arab countries, and given the region's young population and increasing penetration rates, social media will continue to play a growing role in the political, societal and economic transformations in the Arab region. From a governance point of view, thanks to the new informational structure in Arab societies, these transformations will continue to take place at an increasingly faster pace and will continue to bypass existing governments' controls and restrictions.

Vers une éducation pour lutter contre la fuite de cerveaux : le cas égyptien

Heba Nassar

Les jeunes de la région MENA sont concentrés dans le secteur informel et ont des emplois temporaires. C'est ce qui a provoqué une fuite de cerveaux

Fournir aux chercheurs un environnement scientifique adéquat et motiver leur créativité est la grande priorité de tous les pays de la région

La science et les valeurs de comportement sont nécessaires pour combler le fossé entre la demande de main-d'œuvre et les compétences des universitaires

Bien que le Moyen-Orient (sauf les pays du Golfe) ait un excédent de main-d'œuvre, le manque de connexion entre le système éducatif et le marché du travail est un grave problème qui se traduit par des taux de chômage relativement hauts dans la région MENA (Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord) en général et spécialement parmi les diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur. En 2014, plus d'un tiers des chômeurs (entre 31,7 % et 40 %) était des diplômés universitaires.

Les jeunes n'ont pas acquis les compétences professionnelles demandées sur le marché du travail et il leur manque une formation pratique. Ils sont concentrés dans le secteur informel et, en général, ils ont des emplois temporaires. Il leur est impossible d'accéder aux ressources comme les terres, les compétences, les connaissances, les capitaux et les réseaux sociaux ainsi qu'aux institutions, aux marchés et aux services publics.

C'est ce qui a provoqué une fuite de cerveaux, en particulier parmi les jeunes. Le pourcentage des groupes d'âge des jeunes (de 18 à 34 ans) parmi les migrants est supérieur à celui des non migrants. La proportion de personnes ayant suivi un enseignement secondaire ou ayant fait des études supérieures parmi ceux qui s'en vont est supérieure à celle de ceux qui restent. La probabilité d'émigrer est plus élevée. Par exemple, plus de la moitié des Égyptiens qui quittent leur pays (53,9 %) ont achevé leurs études secondaires ou supérieures, tandis que ceux qui n'émigrent pas représentent moins d'un tiers (30,2 %). Une étude portant sur l'immigration en provenance de 61 pays en développement et représentant environ 70% de la population totale des pays de cette catégorie, révèle que « les plus grands flux migratoires d'Afrique vers les États-Unis proviennent d'Égypte, du Ghana et d'Afrique du Sud. Plus de 60 % des migrants de ces trois pays ont reçu une éducation universitaire. Dans le cas de l'Égypte, l'exode intellectuel inclut 2,5 % des individus ayant fait des études supérieures qui émigrent aux USA et un autre 5 % vers les pays de l'OCDE » (Carrington William et Enrica Detragiache, 1999). En ce qui concerne l'activité professionnelle des migrants, les données indiquent que le pourcentage de scientifiques et de techniciens a augmenté de 20,4 % pour tous les milieux professionnels en 1985, à 40,2 % entre 1990 et 2012.

La probabilité d'émigrer des pays de la région MENA vers ceux de l'OCDE est cinq fois plus élevée parmi les personnes qui ont fait des études supérieures que parmi celles qui ne dépassent pas l'enseignement primaire.

Deux facteurs peuvent expliquer cet argument. Premièrement, la rentabilité privée de l'éducation est faible, ce qui agit comme un facteur encourageant fortement les travailleurs bien ou moyennement qualifiés à rechercher plus de rendements à leurs études (El Baradei 2004). Deuxièmement, les opportunités d'obtenir un emploi dans le secteur privé de la région MENA, sont très maigres et celles du secteur public sont en baisse. La capacité d'absorption du secteur privé de la région se limite à 8-13 % de la main-d'œuvre totale et les secteurs émergents comme les technologies de l'information, le tourisme, les communications et les transports, ne trouvent pas les compétences adéquates parmi les diplômés des systèmes éducatifs de la plupart de leurs pays. Par conséquent, l'économie informelle continue d'absorber la majeure partie de la force de travail de la région MENA (entre 60 % et 70 %).

Quand on analyse le cursus universitaire dans les pays fortement peuplés de la région, on peut constater divers problèmes qui touchent trois questions fondamentales. La première a trait à la pertinence des résultats de l'enseignement supérieur par rapport aux besoins du marché du travail. À cet égard, on observe que certains programmes universitaires sont de type traditionnel, ce qui éloigne les diplômés de l'évolution requise sur le marché du travail. La seconde question fait partie des défis que pose le modèle éducatif, entre autres l'augmentation du nombre d'élèves dans les classes, la croissance de la journée des cours du personnel universitaire et l'incapacité à moderniser les ressources éducatives. La troisième question

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concerne la recherche scientifique et le manque d'installations adéquates.

Aligner l'éducation sur l'emploi

Les universités sont actuellement en train de travailler afin d'améliorer l'impact de l'éducation et la formation sur l'emploi des jeunes ; d'adapter l'offre à la demande ; de générer des opportunités pour les jeunes à travers les technologies de l'information et des communications ; d'encourager l'utilisation de la technologie dans l'éducation ; de stimuler la très haute formation ; d'améliorer les compétences personnelles et l'expérience professionnelle exigées par un marché du travail de plus en plus flexible et changeant ; de mettre à jour l'employabilité des jeunes par le développement des compétences que requiert la « nouvelle économie » ; de favoriser la formation à travers des programmes liés aux exigences ; et de relier l'emploi au développement des compétences par une formation permanente.

Tout ceci peut être atteint en s'appuyant sur deux piliers : l'amélioration du système éducatif et l'incorporation dans l'enseignement de la formation continue afin de générer les compétences que requiert le marché du travail. Ce qui signifie préparer les étudiants pour qu'ils puissent se débrouiller dans la société et affronter les défis à venir dans tous les domaines : dans le marché du travail, dans l'entourage et dans le monde intérieur et extérieur. La science, l'aptitude à produire des connaissances et les valeurs de comportement ont la même importance pour combler le fossé entre la demande de main-d'œuvre et la précarité de l'efficacité et les compétences des diplômés universitaires.

En ce qui concerne le premier pilier, des efforts ont été entrepris pour améliorer la qualité aux dépens de la quantité de l'enseignement supérieur et pour accroître le financement de la recherche scientifique en stimulant l'apport de fonds privés et publics.

Fournir aux chercheurs un environnement scientifique adéquat et motiver leur créativité est devenue la première priorité des pays de la région MENA.

Récemment, l'Égypte, par exemple, a marqué son intérêt pour accroître les dépenses en recherche scientifique qui sont passées de 0,56 % de son PIB en 1997, à 2 % en 2014. Le financement public représente environ 88,6 % des dépenses totales pour ce poste, dont 80 % est destiné aux salaires et le reste aux équipements et aux fournitures nécessaires pour la recherche scientifique, ce qui fait qu'il est difficile de satisfaire ses besoins. L'apport du secteur privé au financement dans ce domaine n'excède pas 1,5 % des dépenses totales, tandis que celui provenant de sources étrangères s'élève à environ 10 %.

Le second pilier est constitué de divers éléments comme :

– *le développement des compétences personnelles* qui prétend développer l'efficacité interpersonnelle par une autoévaluation des points forts individuels, examiner quelles sont les aptitudes qui coïncident avec les profils professionnels d'intérêt et former aux méthodes de marketing personnel. La communication efficace unie aux relations humaines aboutit à la création d'une image exécutive, accroît la maîtrise de l'art oratoire au service du leadership et assure la couverture pour la création d'équipes, la gestion du temps, le développement des compétences pour recruter et interviewer, la prise de décisions et la résolution de problèmes, la rédaction commerciale efficace, la créativité et l'innovation et la capacité à réaliser des présentations.

– *Le soutien à l'entrepreneuriat.* Les étudiants universitaires participent activement à différents projets et initiatives dont le but est de les sensibiliser sur l'importance de promouvoir la libre entreprise. La formation à l'entrepreneuriat éveille la conscience des valeurs du risque, la pensée critique et créative et la responsabilité citoyenne chez les étudiants provenant d'un système d'enseignement socialiste dirigé par un État qui ne les encourage pas.

– *Les microcrédits à l'université.* Ces projets prétendent familiariser les étudiants avec les formes alternatives de financement comme des outils essentiels pour lutter contre la pauvreté et favoriser le développement de leurs économies. Les bénéficiaires directs sont les professeurs et les étudiants du secteur de la banque et des finances des universités participant aux initiatives. Les bénéficiaires indirects sont les gestionnaires et les clients des institutions de microfinancement qui bénéficient de la diffusion du matériel préparé pendant le projet et de l'échange d'idées et des solutions résultant d'autres expériences, ainsi que les professeurs et les étudiants d'universités qui ne participent pas directement à l'initiative. Ils tireront profit, à travers la diffusion des résultats et du matériel pédagogique mis à la disposition sur le net, de la formation pilote et du manuel. Le projet prétend obtenir un fort effet multiplicateur.

– *L'engagement citoyen des étudiants.* « L'engagement c'est l'association des connaissances et des ressources de l'université vis-à-vis de celles des secteurs public et privé pour enrichir le niveau académique, la recherche et l'activité créatrice ; améliorer le cursus, l'enseignement et l'apprentissage ; former des citoyens cultivés et engagés ; renforcer les valeurs démocratiques et la responsabilité citoyenne ; faire face aux questions sociales décisives et contribuer au bien commun ». (Carnegie Elective Community Engagement Classification, 2015).

Parmi les forces principales qui font évoluer les campus actuels vers plus d'engagement citoyen se trouvent :

– l'appel renouvelé afin que les connaissances académiques soient pertinentes pour les affaires du monde réel;

– un consensus apparent sur l'importance de la participation citoyenne nationale et la responsabilité de l'université en rapport avec elle ;

– les problèmes publics de plus en plus critiques et pressants, l'insécurité économique et humaine en général, la dégradation de l'environnement, la faim, la piètre qualité de la scolarisation, la pauvreté, le logement et la santé ;

– le lieu stratégique que les universités occupent par rapport à l'engagement citoyen. Les universités modernes consacrées à la recherche ont des membres accrédités dans le milieu académique et des domaines professionnels qui dé-

tiennent un fort potentiel pour résoudre des problèmes sociaux, comme le développement économique et de l'entrepreneuriat, l'éducation et l'ingénierie, la santé et les services à la personne;

– le changement de la vision traditionnelle du rôle des universités pour la production de connaissances de base pour des connaissances appliquées à la résolution de problèmes ;

– l'engagement citoyen qui joue un rôle fondamental au moment de maintenir un lien puissant entre les universités et la communauté, là où les méthodes de production et de diffusion des connaissances sont bien connectées.

Dans de nombreuses universités de la région MENA, comme par exemple dans les universités publiques égyptiennes, l'engagement citoyen prend la forme de projets de recherche et de caravanes communautaires. Dans des domaines comme l'ingénierie et l'environnement, le commerce, la gestion et l'économie, le droit, les langues étrangères et la traduction, les médias, la sociologie, la psychologie et les sciences, la recherche communautaire offre des services sociaux par des caravanes médicales et environnementales, des unités de soins et hospitalières, ainsi que des unités mobiles agricoles consacrées à l'industrie alimentaire et au conseil agricole.

– *Développement durable dans le domaine de l'éducation.* Outre les divers projets environnementaux, l'Université du Caire a été incluse récemment dans l'initiative Éducation au développement durable (EDD). L'objectif de l'EDD est de former des personnes capables d'assumer la responsabilité de bâtir un avenir durable. En reconnaissance de l'importance de cette initiative, les Nations unies ont déclaré la période 2005-2014 Décennie des Nations Unies pour l'éducation au service du développement durable. Ses objectifs sont :

– encourager l'établissement de liens et de réseaux, procéder à des échanges entre les participants à l'EDD ;

– développer une meilleure qualité de l'enseignement et de l'apprentissage dans le cadre de l'initiative ;

– contribuer à l'avancement des pays vers les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement (OMD) et à leur atteinte sous l'impulsion de l'EDD ;

– créer pour les pays de nouvelles possibilités d'inclure l'EDD dans leurs efforts de réforme éducative.

L'Université du Caire participe actuellement à un projet régional pour permettre aux établissements d'enseignement supérieur participants de développer des cursus et des méthodes pédagogiques en ligne avec l'EDD par la formation et la préparation du personnel universitaire afin qu'ils puissent transmettre aux étudiants les compétences et les connaissances nécessaires pour vivre et travailler de façon durable.

La question clé est de savoir quelle est le meilleur moyen de permettre que les changements de programmes aillent dans le sens de l'EDD en considérant les priorités régionales et le besoin de moderniser les cursus afin de les adapter à l'initiative.

Dans le but de faire participer les étudiants aux affaires mondiales, l'Égypte, en tant que pays inclus dans le Programme des Nations unies pour le développement, collabore avec l'Université du Caire au programme de défense des OMD récompensé par un prix. Le but est de sensibiliser les jeunes aux OMD et de développer une plateforme de recherche sur la façon dont ils les perçoivent et quelle est la voie souhaitable pour adapter leur application à la société égyptienne à travers un système d'apprentissage et de recherche interactive.

L'objectif est de promouvoir le soutien de l'opinion publique aux OMD et aux initiatives gouvernementales pour les atteindre en 2015 et les sauvegarder dans le temps. Le projet se répétera pour les Objectifs de Développement Durable.

– *Formation professionnelle et centre d'orientation professionnelle.* Le service d'orientation professionnelle vise à mettre en marche un programme multidimensionnel afin de fournir aux étudiants une expérience d'apprentissage interactive destinée à renforcer leurs capacités techniques, personnelles et professionnelles et à les préparer aux demandes du marché du travail.

Les services les plus importants sont : l'orientation professionnelle, la formation axée sur les compétences personnelles, et mettre en contact les étudiants et les diplômés avec les entreprises à travers un portail Internet. Une part considérable des diplômés provient de l'Université du Caire et bien qu'ils aient des spécialités différentes, ils se heurtent souvent aux mêmes problèmes au moment de définir leur trajectoire professionnelle. Cet élément vise donc à établir un cadre permettant de doter les étudiants d'une orientation professionnelle adéquate et efficace.

L'orientation et le conseil sont particulièrement importants au moment de promouvoir l'emploi des jeunes. En Égypte, l'information à la portée des jeunes ne leur permet pas de faire des choix réalistes en ce qui concerne les options disponibles et une période de réorientation est nécessaire, soit dans le système éducatif par l'orientation et le conseil, soit dans le marché du travail à travers les services publics de l'emploi.

– *Prix des Jeunes Innovateurs.* L'Université du Caire collabore avec la société civile pour former ses étudiants à différents projets par des initiatives comme les Prix des Jeunes Innovateurs dirigés à former des jeunes, à développer leurs compétences et à renforcer les liens entre l'industrie et la recherche. Le projet Prix des Jeunes Innovateurs prétend stimuler la culture de la recherche et du développement (R&D) en Égypte, en fournissant aux jeunes scientifiques de multiples opportunités de se consacrer à la R&D. La recherche et le développement sont eux-mêmes un pont important entre la consommation excessive et la production utile. La R&D englobe le développement des compétences provenant du propre pays ou bien leur acquisition et, de cette manière, elle permet d'obtenir davantage de valeur de la chaîne d'approvisionnement. Il est inutile de souligner le besoin évident de plus de scientifiques égyptiens qualifiés axés sur la R&D.

Enfin, pour optimiser les avantages de la formation universitaire pour la vie productive, notre mission devrait inclure : une éducation solide ; des initiatives spécifiques pour accroître le nombre et la qualité des postes de travail créés pour les jeunes ; une attention particulière aux inégalités de genre en matière d'accès à l'éducation et à la formation ; une diffusion des informations sur les bonnes pratiques et sur les enseignements tirés des activités extra scolaires. ■

Le chômage des jeunes et les politiques de l'emploi

Ummuhan Bardak

La région MENA enregistre le taux de chômage des jeunes le plus élevé au monde – 28% en 2013 – et pourrait atteindre 30 % d'ici 2018

Un jeune sur trois au moins, dont l'âge se situe entre 15 et 29 ans, ne travaille pas, n'étudie, ni est en formation. Cette population a été baptisée 'Ninis'

Des politiques de l'emploi sont nécessaires afin d'élargir la demande de main-d'œuvre, d'en améliorer l'offre et d'adapter les services

Depuis la crise économique mondiale, les perspectives d'emploi pour les jeunes se sont continuellement dégradées dans le monde entier. La situation est particulièrement grave dans les pays arabes du fait d'autres facteurs spécifiques.

Outre la crise économique, certains pays ont connu des changements politiques au cours du *Printemps arabe*. « Emploi, liberté et dignité » tel était le slogan de la Révolution du Jasmin de janvier 2011 en Tunisie qui a eu un effet domino dans toute la région. L'impact économique initial du *Printemps arabe* a été négatif à cause de l'instabilité politique et de l'agitation sociale, en particulier dans les secteurs du tourisme, de la production et des exportations, ainsi que dans les investissements directs étrangers qui étaient déjà bas, en raison de la crise économique mondiale.

Même avant le *Printemps arabe*, les conditions difficiles du marché du travail et la pénurie d'emplois décents pour les jeunes étaient déjà bien documentées dans les pays arabes (ETF 2012, Bardak, IEMed 2014). Les marchés du travail sont segmentés par des lignes qui les divisent en publics et privés, formels et informels, modernes et traditionnels et se caractérisent par leur profil informel et précaire, par une participation très faible de la femme et par un chômage élevé et un emploi agricole très significatif. En effet, la région enregistre le taux de chômage des jeunes le plus élevé au monde (28 % en 2013) et pourrait atteindre près de 30 % d'ici 2018 (OIT 2014). La plupart des chômeurs (jusqu'à 80 % dans certains pays comme l'Égypte) sont des jeunes à la recherche d'un premier emploi, sans aucune expérience professionnelle.

Et ce, bien que la participation moyenne de la main-d'œuvre jeune soit inférieure à la moyenne mondiale (environ 31 % selon l'OIT 2013) et que le pourcentage de jeunes scolarisés soit en augmentation. Le taux brut de scolarisation dans l'enseignement secondaire supérieur correspondant au groupe d'âges compris entre 15 et 18 ans oscille entre 54 % et 77 %, mais le taux d'étudiants de formation professionnelle du second degré est extrêmement faible dans la région, à l'exception de l'Égypte où la moitié des étudiants se tournent vers les spécialités de la formation professionnelle (UNESCO). Il existe un nombre considérable de jeunes qui, ayant quitté prématurément l'école, ne travaillent, ni étudient, ni sont en formation (lesdits « Ninis »). Dans le groupe d'âges compris entre 15 et 29 ans, le taux de « Ninis » est de 41 % en Égypte dont on dispose de données, 35 % en Palestine, 32 % en Tunisie et 29 % en Jordanie (ETF 2015). Ce qui signifie qu'au moins un jeune sur trois dont l'âge se situe entre 15 et 29 ans n'étudie, ni est en formation et se trouve au chômage.

Au-delà de ce contexte politique et économique difficile, ce qu'il y a d'unique c'est le taux élevé de jeunes parmi la population arabe. Étant donné un taux de natalité qui s'est traduit par la plus grande génération de jeunes de l'histoire arabe, il est possible qu'il en soit ainsi pendant les quatre ou cinq prochaines décennies, la pression démographique est l'une des caractéristiques clés des systèmes éducatifs et des marchés du travail. Le pourcentage de la population de moins de 30 ans a dépassé 60 %, et la population en âge de travailler (entre 15 et 64 ans) avoisine le 70 % (ONU 2013). Cependant, seule la moitié (voire moins) en moyenne de la population en âge de travailler est active du point de vue économique et fait partie du marché du travail dans la région, ce qui signifie que les pays sont en train de perdre une grande partie des « opportunités démographiques » que leur offre le fait d'avoir une population jeune.

Étant donné les grandes aspirations des jeunes à recevoir une éducation, à se marier et à obtenir un travail, un logement et beaucoup d'autres biens de consommation, cette situation provoque une terrible pression sur les systèmes politiques et économiques et contribue à renforcer les facteurs qui les poussent à émigrer. Dans ce contexte, cet article offre une vision globale des politiques de création d'emplois, axée principalement sur les jeunes. En général, ces politiques peuvent se concentrer sur un élargissement de la demande de main-d'œuvre, une amélioration de l'offre de main-d'œuvre et une adéquation des services. Pour obtenir des meilleurs résultats, il faut tenir compte des deux as-

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pects de manière équilibrée et cohérente. Mais la participation active des agents sociaux doit être incluse dans la conception et l'application de ces politiques comme thème transversal.

Élargir la demande de main-d'œuvre

Les mesures relatives à la demande incluent des politiques économiques qui aident à la création d'un environnement favorable au développement de l'entreprenariat et, concrètement, en assurant des conditions macroéconomiques stables, en facilitant l'accès au financement et en garantissant une concurrence équitable. L'amélioration du climat économique peut conduire à la création d'entreprises émergentes ainsi qu'à la croissance des PME qui augmentent ensuite la demande générale de main-d'œuvre. Ces politiques sont surtout axées sur les secteurs économiques à fort potentiel de création d'emplois (c'est-à-dire, les emplois blancs ou verts, le secteur des TIC), à faire partie des chaînes de valeur mondiales, sur la croissance des PME et sur le financement des entreprises, pour favoriser une réglementation du travail envisageant différentes formes d'emploi.

La mondialisation offre des possibilités de création d'emplois aux pays disposant d'avantages comparatifs dans le domaine de la division internationale du travail. À l'exception des ressources naturelles, l'un des avantages concurrentiels fondamentaux d'un pays est lié à sa population active, ses qualifications, sa productivité et ses coûts. Les multinationales recherchent des emplacements où elles peuvent produire à des coûts compétitifs. La délocalisation basée sur des coûts de la main-d'œuvre (comparativement) bas est apparue dans l'industrie textile et dans le secteur industriel en Asie, et dans les processus de délocalisation entre l'Europe et ses pays voisins (comme le secteur automobile et de l'électroménager). La spécialisation dans la production à faible coût de la main-d'œuvre peut être une option stratégique pour certains pays qui développent, dans ce but, des politiques spécifiques pour attirer et retenir l'investissement étranger. Bien que le fait de concurrencer avec une main-d'œuvre bon marché (non qualifiée) soit insoutenable à long terme, car il y a toujours des pays dans d'autres régions qui peuvent offrir des coûts plus compétitifs, cela peut donner le premier élan nécessaire au développement industriel.

Les ressources locales et nationales peuvent offrir un potentiel économique important si elles sont bien exploitées par rapport aux marchés intérieurs et extérieurs. Les processus de production modernes peuvent donner un élan considérable à la production agricole et encourager le développement de nouvelles activités dans le secteur alimentaire, ainsi qu'à « l'économie bleue » ou aux activités de pêche (l'aquiculture, par exemple). L'exploitation des ressources touristiques peut aussi générer un grand nombre d'emplois, bien que certains secteurs (comme l'industrie) puissent créer des emplois de meilleure qualité que d'autres (tourisme, textile et construction). Cependant, les possibilités par rapport à l'emploi ne dépendent pas seulement des ressources disponibles mais aussi de la capacité des acteurs à savoir en profiter.

L'exploitation de ce potentiel pour le développement local et national dépend de l'existence d'entrepreneurs pouvant créer et diriger des entreprises, mais pouvant aussi accéder au financement et recevoir un soutien adéquat (formation et accompagnement d'institutions d'appui spécifiques, mais aussi diverses formes de solidarité développée au travers de coopératives, d'entreprises sociales ou d'associations). Par conséquent, l'encouragement d'une culture d'entreprise et le soutien aux entreprises émergentes ainsi que les initiatives de coopération sont un élément important du développement « endogène » qui conduit à la création d'emplois. L'entrepreneur n'est pas le seul à avoir besoin d'une formation : ses employés eux aussi ont besoin d'une formation adéquate s'il existe dans l'activité une innovation, une technologie et une élaboration qui accroissent les chances de succès.

Les programmes d'aide aux entreprises ne peuvent pas être « universels » mais ils doivent être suffisamment diversifiés et spécifiques pour répondre aux différents besoins. Par exemple, beaucoup de programmes encourageant le travail indépendant ont tendance à cibler les communautés pauvres ou rurales. Il faudrait des programmes qui se centrent davantage sur les entrepreneurs titulaires de diplômes universitaires qui ont plus de chances de réussir ou sur les femmes. Bien qu'il doive exister un équilibre entre les différents groupes auxquels ils s'adressent, non seulement aux segments pauvres de la population, il est important d'encourager les personnes très qualifiées et les femmes à créer une entreprise afin de tirer les meilleurs bénéfices.

Les pays arabes ont traditionnellement une riche culture d'entreprise et il y a un pourcentage élevé d'adultes qui souhaite créer une entreprise. En effet, le nombre d'entreprises qui sont créées est généralement élevé bien que la plupart d'entre elles mettent la clé sous la porte dans l'année. Le principal problème est le faible taux de survie des PME et des micro-entreprises ainsi que l'absence de croissance des entreprises. Un soutien plus systématique et conditionné aux micro-entreprises et aux PME dans certains secteurs prioritaires pourrait les aider à créer, à être plus compétitifs dans les marchés intérieurs et extérieurs et à créer des emplois plus nombreux et de meilleure qualité. Le soutien aux PME doit inclure l'appui à la gestion et au financement, l'utilisation de nouvelles technologies pour améliorer la production, le packaging et le marketing, l'internationalisation de l'entreprise et une formation plus spécialisée, tant pour les dirigeants que pour les travailleurs, avec une plus grande souplesse du rythme de production, du contenu et de la qualité.

Les nouvelles formes d'emploi sont un autre aspect important. Le développement de différentes formes d'emploi et de contrats de travail (contrat à temps partiel, temporaire ou déterminé) dans un environnement relativement sûr peut contribuer à la création d'emplois et à inclure quelques segments de nouveaux demandeurs d'emploi qui, traditionnellement, ne font pas partie du marché du travail (les jeunes, les femmes et les handicapés). Cette « flexisécurité re-

connue » peut aussi contribuer à aider certains secteurs économiques où prédomine l'informalité à s'intégrer dans l'économie formelle. L'informalité est importante dans la région et va de l'activité au sein d'une entreprise familiale traditionnelle aux formes élaborées de concurrence déloyale et de surexploitation des travailleurs. Les mesures doivent s'adresser à des secteurs spécifiques (agriculture, construction et tourisme), à des types d'entreprises concrets (micro-entreprises et PME) et/ou à des catégories spécifiques de travailleurs (femmes, jeunes).

Une autre question connexe est la différence entre les incitations à l'emploi dans le secteur public et dans le secteur privé (majoritairement informel), qui provoque une segmentation et qui peut être préjudiciable pour la création d'emplois dans le secteur privé. Étant donné les grandes différences de conditions de travail, de salaires et de sécurité de l'emploi, les PME connaissent beaucoup de difficultés pour attirer des jeunes diplômés qualifiés. Il est nécessaire de prendre des mesures pour réformer et moderniser le travail dans le secteur public (rationalisation, salaires basés sur le rendement, mécanismes de recrutement transparents et compétitifs), ainsi que pour améliorer les conditions de travail du secteur privé par une législation du travail et le dialogue social.

Améliorer l'offre de main-d'œuvre et adapter les services

Les politiques d'offre incluent tous les aspects de la préparation de la population active visant à obtenir des connaissances et une qualification. L'amélioration des connaissances de l'offre et de la demande de main-d'œuvre est le point de départ de l'élaboration de politiques adéquates et du suivi de l'évolution de leur application. Une connaissance plus approfondie du fonctionnement du marché du travail et l'anticipation des qualifications nécessaires devraient être une partie essentielle des politiques en matière d'emploi. Par conséquent, pour l'élaboration de politiques basées sur des preuves, il est nécessaire de disposer de statistiques du travail exactes et fiables ainsi que d'un système d'information du marché du travail (SMIT) qui fonctionne.

Les problèmes d'employabilité sont dus aux systèmes éducatifs déficients, étant donné que la qualité de la main-d'œuvre dépend de la qualité de l'enseignement primaire et secondaire et des possibilités d'acquérir une formation professionnelle de haute qualité. Dans ce contexte, la formation professionnelle initiale et l'enseignement supérieur doivent préparer les jeunes pour qu'ils puissent s'intégrer au marché du travail et pour répondre aux besoins de l'économie et du marché du travail en matière de qualification. Par ailleurs, la formation professionnelle continue est nécessaire dans des marchés du travail changeants et souvent instables, pour offrir aussi bien aux demandeurs d'emploi qu'à ceux qui en ont, la possibilité d'améliorer leur qualification. Cependant, la formation professionnelle s'adressant souvent à ceux qui abandonnent leurs études et elle a une mauvaise image sociale profondément enracinée dans les pays arabes (ETF 2015).

Par exemple : de nombreux métiers traditionnels en petits ateliers sont peu à peu en train de disparaître, parce qu'ils ne peuvent pas rivaliser avec la production moderne. À l'aide de programmes spéciaux de soutien à la formation professionnelle, certains de ces métiers pourraient se transformer en centres de production modernes pour leur donner une nouvelle vitalité, grâce aussi à des politiques de développement des compétences axées sur les aptitudes techniques et sociales. La nécessité d'intéresser les jeunes à la formation professionnelle est évidente. Les jeunes ne changeront pas d'avis simplement après avoir vu quelques annonces si la propre formation professionnelle ne change pas. Ils ne veulent pas réaliser de petits métiers ou finir comme leur oncle qui a travaillé pendant des années et qui n'a pas gagné beaucoup d'argent, mais ils veulent au contraire, des modèles respectés à imiter, gagner un salaire décent en accomplissant un travail satisfaisant.

Les bas niveaux de qualification et d'inscription à une formation professionnelle, la forte ségrégation entre les sexes, la préférence pour les sciences humaines dans l'enseignement supérieur, les attitudes des jeunes vis-à-vis du travail et de leurs attentes peu réalistes sont les principaux problèmes pour leur employabilité. Nombreux sont ceux qui refusent d'accepter des travaux manuels et choisissent volontairement le chômage s'ils peuvent se le permettre. Par conséquent, l'enseignement secondaire supérieur requiert une attention urgente pour accroître les inscriptions et la qualité de l'éducation (en mettant l'accent sur les aptitudes sociales), ainsi que la qualité de la formation professionnelle et son attractivité.

Par ailleurs, des services de placement professionnels efficaces sont également nécessaires, comme par exemple des mécanismes pour coordonner l'offre et la demande de main-d'œuvre et pour qu'ils servent d'intermédiaires entre les demandeurs d'emploi et les offres de travail. Les aspects à souligner tout particulièrement sont l'orientation et le conseil professionnel, les mécanismes de recrutement compétitifs et transparents, les services publics de l'emploi (SPE) efficaces et la disponibilité de systèmes de formation et de stages (en système combiné) pour faciliter la première entrée des jeunes diplômés dans le marché de l'emploi. En facilitant la transition des jeunes, les programmes actifs du marché du travail (PAMT) jouent aussi un rôle important pour résoudre les différences et l'inadéquation des qualifications dans des contextes où l'enseignement initial et les systèmes de formation sont inefficaces.

L'État peut intervenir sur le marché de l'emploi pour accroître les possibilités des demandeurs d'emploi à trouver du travail et pour réduire le chômage global, à travers des services d'intermédiation, des programmes de formation, des aides à l'emploi, des services publics et le soutien à l'entrepreneuriat (ETF 2014). Les programmes actifs du marché du travail peuvent contribuer à son fonctionnement et à un usage efficient des ressources humaines s'ils ont un objectif clair et s'ils sont bien conçus et bien mis en oeuvre. ■

Promouvoir la formation professionnelle

Mongi Boughzala

Les pays du Sud de la Méditerranée sont face à une urgence, celle qui consiste à développer et à mettre à niveau effectivement leur système de formation

Le système d'éducation et de formation demeure peu articulé et déconnecté des besoins des entreprises et des impératifs de l'employabilité des jeunes

La valorisation de la formation professionnelle et du statut du diplômé passe par la mise à niveau progressive de l'économie et de l'amélioration des conditions de travail

Le défi de l'emploi et de l'inclusion des jeunes dans la vie économique et sociale est important pour tous les pays de la région et il est inséparable de celui du développement des compétences et de la croissance inclusive, pour les jeunes et tout le long de la vie. Le chômage des jeunes persiste depuis plusieurs décennies dans la plupart des pays du Sud de la Méditerranée. Il tend à toucher de plus en plus les jeunes les plus éduqués, notamment les diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur, les femmes et les jeunes résidant dans certaines régions du pays pour qui le taux de chômage atteint le double du taux moyen. En Algérie et au Maroc, par exemple, environ un jeune sur quatre est en situation de chômage ; en Tunisie, un jeune sur trois. Pour certaines catégories (les femmes, les jeunes diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur…), le taux de chômage peut atteindre les 50 %. Le chômage des diplômés est particulièrement préoccupant, mais il y a deux fois plus de chômeurs non-diplômés.

C'est un chômage structurel qui résulte d'une multitude de facteurs relevant à la fois de l'offre et de la demande de travail. Il résulte en particulier de l'évolution rapide de la population active et du nombre des diplômés des établissements universitaires. Il résulte aussi des insuffisances incontestables au niveau de la qualité et de la structure de formation et d'éducation et de la faiblesse au niveau de la création d'emplois, notamment pour la main d'œuvre qualifiée. Il n'y a pas assez de création d'emplois et les emplois créés sont souvent (entre la moitié et les deux tiers) informels et non-conformes aux aspirations des jeunes. Ce sont des emplois mal payés, précaires et ne bénéficiant d'aucune ou de peu de protection sociale. En conséquence, les jeunes qui les acceptent sont souvent peu satisfaits et n'ont pas la possibilité d'améliorer leurs compétences. Ils vont par conséquent continuer à attendre leur chance d'accéder à un emploi formel et décent.

Que faire pour concilier la croissance et l'amélioration de la productivité avec la création d'emplois décents pour les jeunes ? La réponse est complexe et dépend d'un grand nombre de facteurs, dont le facteur humain et le développement des capacités humaines.

De grands efforts d'investissements dans le système d'éducation et de formation, y compris l'enseignement supérieur et la formation professionnelle, ont été réalisés dans tous les pays du Sud de la Méditerranée. En moyenne autour de 20 % du budget de l'État est alloué à l'éducation et à la formation. D'importants progrès en ont résulté mais plus en termes quantitatifs que qualitatifs. En conséquence, malgré l'abondance de main d'œuvre qualifiée (de diplômés), ces pays connaissent des pénuries au niveau des qualifications nécessaires au développement et demandées par les entreprises. Il y a un problème de qualité de la formation générale et spécialisée à tous les niveaux du système éducatif (primaire, secondaire et supérieur) et, plus particulièrement, de la formation professionnelle. Parmi les conditions nécessaires à la résolution du problème de l'emploi des jeunes, il y a donc lieu de restructurer le système de formation et d'éducation et, plus particulièrement, de promouvoir la formation professionnelle.

Plusieurs sondages auprès des entreprises ont révélé qu'elles éprouvent assez souvent des difficultés à trouver les personnes possédant les compétences recherchées. C'est-à-dire que le chômage coexiste avec des difficultés de recrutement et l'existence de postes vacants. Dans de telles conditions, quand il y a des pénuries de qualifications bien identifiées, la formation professionnelle devient un remède efficace pour le chômage.

La formation professionnelle, initiale et continue, est importante d'une manière plus générale pour le développement des entreprises.

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Participation à l'enseignement professionnel dans des pays méditerranéens en comparaison avec d'autres pays européens et asiatiques

Pays	Effectifs des élèves du second cycle secondaire		Taux de scolarisation de l'enseignement professionnel (En % du total des effectifs)
	Tous les programmes	Enseignement technique et professionnel	
Algérie	1 198 601	193 692	9
Égypte	3 684 955	2 355 481	48
Liban	148 821	39 773	18
Maroc	610 135	77 755	4
Tunisie	524 037	15 855	4
Turquie	3 314 812	1 261 077	29
Chine	28 471 353	11 298 031	17
Japon	4 244 886	1 047 720	15
Allemagne	2 781 860	1 729 839	59
Danemark	222 003	118 328	54

Source : UNESCO Institut de Statistique UNIVOC « Participation aux programmes formels d'enseignement et de formation technique et professionnel au niveau mondial : étude statistique préliminaire » 2009

Comme elle l'est pour les actifs, jeunes et moins jeunes, car elle les aide à progresser dans un métier ou pour trouver un emploi. Elle leur permet d'acquérir de nouvelles compétences et d'améliorer leur employabilité. La formation professionnelle est un moyen essentiel pour s'adapter aux changements, et ce pour les employeurs et les employés. En effet, elle permet aux employés d'acquérir des compétences professionnelles nécessaires pour développer leurs capacités d'adaptation et pour accéder à des emplois plus productifs et plus rémunérateurs. La formation professionnelle continue est un moyen qui sert aux entreprises et aux employés pour anticiper les changements de situation et pour se préparer aux emplois d'avenir. Elle sert à entretenir et à adapter les compétences individuelles tout le long de la vie.

Il est par conséquent fondamental de veiller à ce que la formation professionnelle puisse répondre à la demande de qualification et prendre en compte l'évolution des métiers et des connaissances. Comme il est impossible de prévoir avec certitude les métiers d'avenir et la demande future de qualification, il est important que tous les actifs puissent acquérir, à travers l'éducation et la formation professionnelle, la capacité d'adaptation et d'apprentissage.

La double finalité de la formation professionnelle est donc de favoriser l'évolution professionnelle des salariés et la compétitivité des entreprises afin qu'ils puissent s'adapter et rester performants.

Pour être efficace, la formation nécessite d'une coopération entre tous les acteurs et la volonté de répondre concomitamment aux besoins des individus et des entreprises. Plusieurs pays (Égypte, Jordanie, Maroc, Tunisie…) ont tenté de réformer leurs systèmes de formation professionnelle dans ce sens. Ils ont essayé de les réorganiser et de les orienter vers la satisfaction de la demande de compétences exprimée par les entreprises et d'élaborer des curricula selon leurs besoins en compétences et en tenant compte de l'évolution probable de ces besoins. Pour cela, ils ont adopté l'approche par compétence et le principe du partenariat avec les entreprises. Celles-ci interviennent au niveau de la conception des curricula et au niveau de la formation dans le cadre de formation en alternance. Certains pays ont aussi essayé d'adopter un système de certification des qualifications et une démarche qualité dans leur dispositif de formation. Ils ont de même pris des mesures en vue d'adapter le modèle de gouvernance des établissements de formation professionnelle au modèle de pilotage en fonction de la demande. En principe, assez d'autonomie devait être attribuée à ces établissements pour qu'ils puissent faire preuve de réactivité.

Ainsi, ces pays semblent reconnaître que la formation professionnelle est indispensable pour la montée en gamme de l'économie et que cela exige le passage d'une gestion centralisée à une gestion axée sur la participation des acteurs aux résultats et le renforcement du partenariat entre les établissements de formation et les représentants des entreprises qui relèvent de leurs spécialités.

Les tentatives de réformes ont certes produit des effets positifs et donné lieu à une amélioration des performances de certains établissements de formation professionnelle, mais dans l'ensemble il y a de sérieux problèmes de mise en œuvre des réformes et la réalité demeure assez différente du schéma recherché.

Les composantes du système d'éducation et de formation demeurent peu articulées et la formation plutôt déconnectée des besoins des entreprises et des impératifs de l'employabilité des jeunes. La formation professionnelle demeure le parent pauvre du système de formation et d'éducation et continue à n'attirer que les jeunes qui ont échoué dans le système d'éducation générale et donc ceux qui ont la formation de

base la plus faible, alors que, théoriquement, le succès de la formation professionnelle suppose qu'elle soit fondée sur le libre choix des jeunes. L'adhésion libre des jeunes à la formation professionnelle est un prérequis de toute éducation de qualité, en particulier pour la mise en place de normes de qualité dans le dispositif de formation professionnelle. Or, les jeunes qui poursuivent avec succès des études au niveau de base puis au niveau de l'enseignement secondaire ne songent pas à s'orienter vers la formation professionnelle à moins qu'elle soit intégrée à l'enseignement supérieur universitaire (comme c'est le cas pour les études d'ingénieurs). Le système d'éducation et de formation est en réalité toujours composé de deux grands segments cloisonnés. La formation professionnelle est le segment qui demeure presque e marge.

La persistance de cette attitude négative à l'égard de l'enseignement professionnel n'est pourtant, en un sens, pas si irrationnelle de la part des jeunes et de leurs parents. Leur comportement est en effet déterminé par les perspectives d'emploi, les conditions de travail et les rémunérations auxquelles les jeunes diplômés de la formation professionnelle peuvent s'attendre. Des progrès ont été réalisés de ce point de vue, au moins pour certaines spécialités (variables selon la structure économique du pays) mais pour une bonne partie des diplômés de la formation professionnelle d'abord, ils ont rarement la possibilité de bénéficier d'une formation continue ou d'accéder éventuellement à des études supérieures, et ils sont condamnés à travailler dans des conditions de travail et de rémunération peu attractives, voire informelles. La valorisation de la formation professionnelle et du statut du diplômé passe donc par la mise à niveau progressive de l'économie et de l'amélioration de ces conditions de travail.

Dans la pratique, ce qui domine c'est encore l'absence d'un véritable partenariat entre les établissements de formation et les entreprises et la faible implication des employeurs dans l'ingénierie de la formation. L'ingénierie et la planification de la formation sont en effet des processus très complexes non encore maîtrisés. Le but est d'intéresser tous les acteurs, en premier lieu au niveau des établissements de formation, à agir en fonction de la demande de qualifications et en vue d'assurer la meilleure qualité et adéquations possibles de la formation fournie. Cela suppose la mise en place d'un système de qualité et de motivation (à travers un système d'incitations) approprié et d'outils d'analyse et de projection des compétences. La prévision des métiers d'avenir est pourtant fondamentale dans le monde actuel caractérisé par la rapidité de l'évolution technologique.

Il n'est pas aisé d'amener les entreprises à participer à ce processus ou au moins à révéler d'une manière précise et standardisée leurs besoins en formation, sans parler de la difficulté de projeter les besoins à long terme en qualifications. C'est un défi pour tous les pays du monde, y compris ceux du Nord de la Méditerranée, mais ceux-ci ont beaucoup plus de progrès à faire. Ils sont encore au début du chemin.

Par ailleurs, la réactivité des établissements de formation professionnelle n'est pas suffisante ; elle doit aller de pair avec la réactivité des composantes du système éducatif responsables de la préparation des élèves qui vont être accueillis par ces établissements. La réactivité des établissements de formation professionnelle risque d'être limitée pendant longtemps par la rareté des professionnels capables de transmettre leur savoir aux jeunes, que cela soit sur les lieux de l'entreprise ou en salles de classes. Tant que le tissu économique sera peu riche et que les technologies adoptées demeureront peu intensives en savoir, les professionnels expérimentés et de haut niveau seront rares. La solution à ce problème est de former des formateurs en s'appuyant sur des sources alternatives de savoir-faire (formation à l'étranger et recours à des formateurs étrangers, exploitation de résultats de la R&D…).

En attendant, la formation tout au long de la vie reste peu développée et les dispositifs existants pour la gérer ne couvrent qu'une faible partie des employés et des entreprises.

L'idéal est de ne plus séparer de manière si étanche la formation générale traditionnelle de la formation professionnelle et d'intégrer la dimension professionnelle dans toute formation, car tous ceux qui poursuivent des études sont apriori concernés par l'accès à des études supérieures. Quoi qu'il en soit, les pays du Sud de la Méditerranée sont face à une urgence, celle qui consiste à développer et à mettre à niveau effectivement leur système de formation professionnelle. À présent, ce système n'absorbe qu'une minorité de jeunes, moins de 10 % des effectifs de l'enseignement secondaire et supérieur alors que ce pourcentaje dépasse souvent la moitié dans les pays plus avancés.

Des réformes profondes au niveau des institutions et des règles qui régissent le système sont à opérer afin de le rendre bien plus attractif et mieux adapté aux besoins du développement économique. Des changements au niveau de l'attitude et du comportement des individus et des entreprises sont à réaliser. De grands investissements demeurent donc nécessaires. Tout cela pourrait et devrait être planifié sur un horizon raisonnable. ■