

report

THE 5+5 DIALOGUE IN AN EVOLVING REGION

Stabilising the Western Mediterranean through
Inclusive economic development



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II MedThink 5+5 Forum family photo. Reitoria da Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Introduction

The 5+5 Dialogue or Western Mediterranean Forum is a format of multilateral cooperation created in 1990. Over the years it has managed to assert itself as a platform of debate and consultation for its member states. These are divided into two main groups: in the Northern Mediterranean, France, Italy, Malta, Spain and Portugal (members of the European Union); and in the Southern Mediterranean, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia (members of the Arab Maghreb Union).

Since 10 October 1990, the date of the 1st Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 5+5 Dialogue held in Rome, the format has established itself without the

need for a Permanent Secretariat, which has given it a flexible and informal nature suitable for intergovernmental exchanges. This nature is undoubtedly one of the factors that enabled it to be born and develop during the turbulent 1990s (Libyan ostracism, Algerian Black Decade) and experience a new momentum in the 2000s, this time definitive.

After more than 25 years, the 5+5 Dialogue has expanded its fields of attention. It was notably from 2001, on the occasion of the 3rd Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 5+5 Dialogue held in Lisbon, that the number of conferences and sectoral meetings increased. Indeed, until then limited to foreign, home and transport affairs, they have increased following the initiatives of the states to address subjects as central to the Western Mediterranean as defence, energy and the environment, water and education, among others. To date the 5+5 Dialogue has held 12 different sectoral conferences dealing with multilateral cooperation in key issues for the subregion.

In a framework marked by global instability and volatility with major repercussions in the Mediterranean region, the Western Mediterranean Forum is an increasingly useful platform. In a region in which the presence of Jihadist groups has grown worryingly since 11 September 2001 and was also the starting point of social movements that have overturned North African and Middle Eastern political regimes, it is an instrument of choice for coordination between regional actors. The figures speak for themselves: the ministerial conferences of the 5+5 Dialogue countries have increased (28 since 2011) and addressed new fields (five new sectoral conferences have been created since 2011: research and higher education, agriculture, water, finances, and culture).

As a result of this dynamism, in 2012 the Malta Declaration of Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the 5+5 Dialogue welcomed the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) initiative to “set up a subregional network of think tanks from the 5+5 countries to develop research on how to promote regional integration and cooperation between the countries

In an environment characterised by global instability and volatility with major repercussions in the Mediterranean region, the Western Mediterranean Forum is an increasingly useful platform

concerned.” The birth of the MedThink 5+5 network during the conference “The 5+5 Dialogue as a Mechanism of Integration and Regional Cooperation”, held in 2016 in Barcelona at the Union for the Mediterranean Permanent Secretariat, brought together over 30 think tanks, public diplomacy institutes and universities from all the Western Mediterranean Forum countries. This first meeting was received with interest during the 15th Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 5+5 Dialogue held in Marseilles in October 2016. Later, in its first year of existence the network organised in December 2016 a seminar in collaboration with the Institut Tunisien d’Etudes Stratégiques (ITES) in Tunis. This event aimed to address the state of human security and co-development as well as to identify approaches for the new generations.

The implementation last January of the 2017 Action Programme by the Scientific Committee of the network enabled the issues to be addressed to be structured. Thus, in 2017 special attention has been placed on the impact of instability in the Sahel, security and migrations in Libya, the participation of civil society actors and the enhancement of economic and commercial integration in the Western Mediterranean. The MedThink 5+5 Annual Conference held in Lisbon on 6 and 7 July 2017, entitled “The 5+5 Dialogue in an Evolving Region. Stabilising the Western Mediterranean through inclusive economic development” aimed to make these issues visible.

The meeting, organised by the MedThink 5+5 Secretariat at the IEMed in collaboration with the Portuguese Institute for International Relations (IPRI), was divided into five successive parts. The inaugural session provided an opportunity for high level political decision-makers to express their views on the many challenges they are currently facing, from the Libyan civil war to the need for growth and long-lasting economic development in order to offer future prospects to a disoriented youth. The first thematic session focused on the conflictive situation in Libya by discussing the “Prospects for post-conflict stabilisation in Libya as a pre-condition to strengthen security and socio-economic development in the 5+5 countries”. The second session dealt with the issue of FDIs by expanding the effects of the 5+5 Dialogue beyond the

south of the EU and the Maghreb: “Cooperation in 5+5 Dialogue as a factor of reduction of economic risks and investment mobilisation between Southern Europe, the Maghreb and Western Africa”. The third was devoted to the environment and endeavoured to resume a successful model of cooperation of the 5+5 Dialogue and search for ideas about how it could act as a foundation for new projects: “Replicating the model of the 5+5 Water Strategy in other 5+5 strategic fields: food security, the fight against climate change and energy”. Finally, the fourth session focused on the issue of the radicalisation of youth by providing “Joint responses to manage the challenges for youth in the 5+5 Dialogue: confronting violent extremism and radicalisation”.

Inaugural session: Stabilise the Western Mediterranean through inclusive socio-economic development

Marked by the presence of the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Santos Silva, the Spanish Secretary of State for Foreign Relations, Ildelfonso Castro, the Secretary General of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Taïeb Baccouche, and the Deputy Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), Jorge Borrego, the session brought to the fore the current situation of the 5+5 Dialogue within the regional framework, notably in relation to other regional organisations in its response to the challenges of the region.

The 5+5 Dialogue is characterised by openness, informality and conviviality, which has enabled its members to advance in priority fields. Its spirit is even more necessary because, despite the progress achieved in the bilateral dimension of cooperation between the 5+5 Dialogue member countries, the existing difficulties in terms of security and migration flows are pushing them to advance towards a more ambitious subregional articulation. The 5+5 Dialogue offers the most standardised and flexible version of multilateral cooperation at



From left to right: Senén Florensa, Ildelfonso Castro, Augusto Santos Silva, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Taïeb Baccouche and Jorge Borrego

a subregional level, with shortcomings but also virtues. Some participants noted that its format should be replicated on a regional level.

In this respect, as a subregional forum, the 5+5 Dialogue forms part of a larger regional structure whose main institution is the Union for the Mediterranean. The two organisations are complementary because the UfM works according to the principle of variable geometry. There is agreement that the 5+5 Dialogue and the Union for the Mediterranean share a common objective: the promotion of a regional integration enabling a long-lasting development. The main challenge lies in integrating the Maghreb because its main weakness is, in fact, both in economic and security terms, its own division and fragmentation. The cooperation between these two multilateral formats, which already exists at an institutional level through the presence of the UfM in the meetings of Foreign Affairs ministers of the 5+5 Dialogue, is also visible at the level of the 5+5 Dialogue sectoral meetings (water, transport, tourism, research and innovation, and higher education).



From left to right: Ildefonso Castro, Augusto Santos Silva and Nuno Severiano Teixeira

The geographical reality of the 5+5 Dialogue, formed by the Maghreb and southern European states, makes it an ideal platform of contact between the two continents.

Thus, the 5+5 Dialogue should, following the example of what happens with the UfM, create further synergies with international institutions such as the Arab Maghreb Union or the European Union. Moreover, it was recommended to pay special attention to the 2063 horizon agenda, which will be implemented during the 5th Africa-EU Summit in September 2017, notably because this summit is preceded by the return in January 2017 of Morocco to the African Union as a full member.

The 5+5 Dialogue is a useful platform to foster greater understanding and cooperation between Africa and Europe

Therefore, the 5+5 Dialogue asserts itself as a partnership model between the south and the north. It channels values of tolerance and integration and it should further envisage working with civil society to confront major problems such as youth unemployment. In this respect, the best way would be to bring out a joint strategy for youth whose implementation would be effective based on common funds; hence the relevance of the launch of the Banque Maghrébine d'Investissement in 2015.

Indeed, the commitment of the MedThink 5+5 member states results in joint strategies such as the Water Strategy implemented by Algeria and Spain within the framework of the 1st Ministerial Meeting on Water of the 5+5 Dialogue in Algiers in 2015. It is through initiatives of this kind that the Western Mediterranean Forum proves to be useful: it brings its member states together. This realisation leads to another realisation: that the MedThink 5+5, as a new fruitful initiative, is here to stay.

First session “Prospects for (post) conflict stabilisation of Libya as a precondition for security and socio-economic development in the 5+5 countries”

This first session took into account the concerns of the subregion countries, where the conflicting situation that has taken root in Libya since 2011 has become an outstanding issue. The lack of a strong state in Libya is the open door for all kinds of trafficking and illicit activities. This lack of control is not only a scourge for Libya itself but also for its immediate neighbours and for the whole Mediterranean region.

Thus today more than ever it is necessary to support dialogue and consultation in the Libyan conflict. The country, a member state of the 5+5 Dialogue, has been experiencing a turbulent political transition since the 2011 revolution. As a sovereign state, Libya must find a solution by itself: its future Constitution must be shaped by Libyans themselves and without interferences. From the economic point of view, it has enough resources: the production of hydrocarbons is expected to increase from now to the end of the year and the frozen assets should be put at the country’s disposal. During the post-conflict reconstruction, the Libyan state should be able to make use of them without hindrance in order to guarantee the country’s self-sufficiency. This does not prevent the need for support and cooperation from the remaining countries in the interest of the whole Mediterranean. Moreover, the issue of migration flows is a strategic challenge. This phenomenon should be tackled by going to its source (the underdevelopment of the countries of origin of the refugees or migrants) but also to strengthen the controls.

The future Libyan Constitution must be shaped by Libyans themselves and without foreign interferences

It remains to be seen how a post-conflict Libya would achieve long-lasting stability. After the 2011 revolution the leaders found themselves at the head of a country characterised by a state apparatus incapable of redistributing the wealth derived from hydrocarbons and of making the rule of law respected. The redistribution logic according to loyalties implemented by Gaddafi and the lack of institutionalisation in the security sector are at the root of this situation. This revealed the chaos that emerged after the fall of the regime in 2011 while the

lack of control over its arsenals has resulted in the formation of endless armed groups.

One of the many factors that can help pacify the country by demobilising the combatants would be to favour a socioeconomic development that enables their reintegration. However, the years of the Jamahiriya regime have taken their toll on the country's economy, which was marked by a strong state control, a prevailing public sector, the inefficiency of the government institutions, corruption and a total dependency of the country's economic base on hydrocarbons.

Several recommendations were made with the aim of favouring a market economy enabling SME diversification and development. There is a particular interest supporting the creation of SMEs because it proves that they are a stabilising factor for a country that is coming out of a conflict. Thus, a favourable legislative framework and privatisation policies linked to reforms of the public administration and a guided education would be the first steps towards a change of economic model in Libya, in which the SMEs would be a tool at the service of pacification.

Albeit self-sufficient in terms of economic resources, to achieve this change Libya would need the assistance of its neighbours in several fields such as education, capacity-building and knowledge transfer. Partnerships between neighbouring SMEs and Libyan SMEs could greatly help in their development process, which would not be successful without the existence of funds and financial support programmes.

There is a particular interest supporting the creation of MSMEs because it proves that they are a stabilising factor for a country that is coming out of a conflict

Moreover, many diplomatic initiatives have been undertaken: either under the aegis of the United Nations with the Skhirat Agreement in December 2015 or at the initiative of neighbouring countries (Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia) in February 2017. The inclusiveness of the agreement is a condition sine qua non to achieve a dialogue that can lead to peace between the opposed factions. Thus, the Skhirat Agreement is not inclusive because it was not signed by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, the strongman in the east of the country and currently an essential part of

achieving a long-lasting peace. Several observations on the steps to be followed by the countries were made.

First, Fayed al-Serraj, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord, must continue to be supported in order to avoid a lack of power that would involve the total collapse of the entire state organisation – as virtual as it may be – in the country and especially in relation to the international community. Some voices have emerged claiming that the Arab countries should agree with Egypt, which supports Field Marshal Haftar (for domestic security reasons), on a political solution to the Libyan conflict. In this framework, the signatory states of the Tunis Agreement (Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia) should take the leadership and be supported by the international community.



The first session of the conference was devoted to discussing the current situation in Libya and its implications in the stability of the Western Mediterranean.

Despite all the international and regional initiatives, many factors still indicate a high possibility of resumption of the civil war in Libya. The government of national accord of Fayed al-Serraj is weak and in the country there is some mistrust of it because it is led by the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, supported by Qatar and Turkey (states currently also weakened at an international level). Against him there

is Field Marshall Haftar at the head of approximately 50,000 men, grouped within different militias and supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and Chad. However, this political and military bipolarisation of Libya is just one its problematic aspects because it must confront division of the armed forces that results in a large number of militias dominated by the warlords. Thus, legitimate violence, the monopoly of the state, is confined to a few areas of Tripolitania controlled by militias that have sworn allegiance to the government of national accord. The lack of a strong state in Libya has enabled the development of all kinds of trafficking: people, weapons, drugs, everyday consumer goods...

This situation is regarded with concern by Libya's neighbours. First, by its immediate neighbours: Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria. They suffer the Libyan conflict both in economic and security terms because the Libyan state is not capable of controlling the armed groups that evolve in its territory and venture into that of its neighbours to make attacks (hostage taking in 2013 in Amenas, Algeria, and the attack in Ben Guerdhane, Tunisia, in March 2016 are good examples). The European neighbours who are members of the 5+5 Dialogue are also concerned. Thus, Italy, which is the European country most affected by the power vacuum in Libya, sees the country's stabilisation as an emergency. French President Emmanuel Macron has also made the Libyan question one of his international priorities.

The United Nations peace process would improve if it was supported by the regional organisations concerned by the Libyan conflict, such as the African Union (AU), the EU or, discreetly but necessarily, by 5+5 Dialogue. Some participants in the conference noted that the latter would also gain a lot if it mobilises on the Libyan dossier, which could be seen as an opportunity to undertake the creation of its permanent secretariat. According to others, the role of the 5+5 Dialogue in relation to the Libyan conflict is to adopt a common position to lobby other actors, whether regional or international. They also pointed out the lack of commitment of the United States concerning the Libyan dossier. One of its possible solutions involves the formation of a strong and inclusive government in which the presence of Haftar is inevitable. This configuration also

means that the main international supporters of the opposed parties agree to back this government.

Certainly, the Libyan conflict is a challenge. First, for Libyans themselves, as a nation under construction that needs a strong state to exist as a community. Then, a challenge also for the Maghreb countries with shared interests, which should lead them to cooperate to help Libya find the road to peace. Finally, for Europeans too, notably those of the 5+5 Dialogue, which for the time being have not discovered how to jointly manage the externalities arising from the Libyan conflict, the most flagrant of which is the constant and growing flow of irregular immigration from the Libyan coasts.

Second session: “Cooperation in 5+5 Dialogue as a factor of reduction of economic risks and investment mobilisation between Southern Europe, the Maghreb and Western Africa”

The northern countries of the 5+5 Dialogue, which account for over 185 million inhabitants, are characterised by a strong economic integration as a result of the years of construction of the EU but are facing major economic problems such as financial risk. As for the southern countries, with 100 million inhabitants, their case involves a complex challenge because it is one of the least integrated regions in the world. The imports and exports figures in the 5+5 Dialogue subregion clearly illustrate this reality. While 90% of the trade in the region is between the 5+5 Dialogue European countries, only 9% corresponds to exchanges between northern and southern countries and the intra Maghreb trade exchanges only account for a tiny part of the total: 1%.

This asymmetrical situation at the level of integration is a challenge for the development of the region because it should enjoy an economic connection adapted to the daily realities of its inhabitants. One of the major obstacles for this integration in the south but also for the north of the 5+5 Dialogue is the situation in Libya, where the conflict latent since 2011 entails a lack of confidence of investors in the region.

Since 2011 some AMU countries have been subject to wider-ranging political changes in the region. Devastating for Libya, deep and fragile in Tunisia, they have similarly affected the other Maghreb countries. Certainly, there have been new movements in Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania but they have not led to a questioning of the prevailing powers. In fact, the whole of these countries suffer a structural situation that involves a high unemployment rate among the youth, who in these countries account for a large part of the population (around 30%). Consequently, they are in a situation in which many youths face frustration that, as we have seen in 2011, can create unexpected upheavals.

The state of financing and the economy are dependent on security. The fact that youth unemployment is three times higher than other older age groups is a sign

The countries belonging to the AMU face more difficulties in boosting economic development as they belong to one of the least integrated regions in the world

of high social risk. These youths lacking opportunities are blocked in their countries because their immigration is not seen as an opportunity but exclusively as a source of problems. There is also a problem with their employability: their skills are often not adapted to the labour market and many graduates are often unable to do the job for which they have studied. Equally problematic is informal work, which distorts the statistics, involves greater social risk and weakens the state revenues.

The fact that youth unemployment is three times higher than other older age groups is a sign of high social risk

Nevertheless, some of the aforementioned problems are not only limited to the southern 5+5 Dialogue countries. Undoubtedly, integration is far more developed in the northern 5+5 Dialogue countries and there is much more investment there. However, youth unemployment is also a problem for these countries, where in some of them it exceeds that of southern countries. Likewise, the percentage of unemployed graduates is also very high in some northern 5+5 Dialogue countries.

Along with this economic situation that has a major impact on the societies of the countries that suffer it, other risks to be considered in the whole of the region are: the lack of economic diversification, the negative externalities of climate change and the migrations and refugees that they will entail. Indeed, the rural poverty rate largely exceeds that of urban poverty and climate change tends to lower agricultural production in the long term.

Faced with all these challenges, headed by youth unemployment, several recommendations were made during this session. There is a need for an inclusive economic policy dealing with the distribution of wealth and structural problems, which result from these high unemployment rates, to avoid social risk. A marriage of growth and inclusion is therefore necessary. This approach should also be included in the diverse free trade agreements being negotiated with the EU.

Social and solidarity economy (SSE) also forms part of the recommendations to confront youth unemployment. It is a business model in which profits are not

necessarily at the core of its objectives and it is often based on the recovery of the know-how of traditional enterprises. The EU has created initiatives to back them but it lacks support and visibility to have a major impact on the problems mentioned. The 5+5 Dialogue can back these initiatives because it has the necessary expertise, network and human capital. Thus, the first SSE network in the Mediterranean is based in Barcelona and there is a real interest and will in these countries, such as Tunisia and Morocco, to open to up this type of economy.

As for the impact of climate change in agricultural productivity, turning towards sustainable agricultural models is recommended (this subject was addressed in the third session of the conference).

Finally, participants mentioned, through the notion of a triangular approach, that Western Africa is increasingly closer to Southern Europe through the Maghreb. In this respect, the return of Morocco as a member of the African Union is an additional opportunity to strengthen the link between these three regions whose future is closely interrelated.



The second session of the conference was focused on the situation of investments in the Western Mediterranean and the economic integration between the Member States.

Third session: “Replicating the model of the 5+5 Water Strategy in other 5+5 strategic fields: food security, the fight against climate change and energy”

Water and energy management will have a growing influence on the economic and social development of the 5+5 region countries in the next few years. These fields call for strengthened cooperation beyond the 5+5 Dialogue but it is very positive that the 5+5 format is capable of focusing on these issues. As seen in the previous sessions, the integration is minimal between 5+5 Dialogue southern countries and very low between the latter and northern countries. The 5+5 Dialogue and the Union for the Mediterranean can help build real integration of the subregion that can provide the instruments to meet the challenges it faces.

As we saw in the first and second sessions, the Western Mediterranean must challenge socioeconomic and security challenges and no one country is capable of tackling these difficulties alone. This is why the Water Strategy in the Western Mediterranean and its Action Plan are a remarkable initiative. Its existence is possible thanks to the exclusive features of the 5+5 Dialogue: informality and reduced size. Adopted in 2015 in Algiers during the first interministerial conference on water of the 5+5 Dialogue, it takes into consideration the specificities of each country but also reveals a common interest. It is an exemplary strategy because it makes cooperation its operational foundation, which is extremely important in terms of the water field.

This is important because today all the 5+5 Dialogue countries are under the effects of climate change and this inevitably has an impact on their water resources. Given the rise in population and tourism flows, the Water Strategy in the Western Mediterranean appears more than relevant: it is essential. Because of its increasing scarcity (only 0.7% of the water available is fresh water), water leads to questioning its ownership, supply and use as well as the resources yet to be discovered. Inevitably, the issue of water sharing leads to the conflict that it can engender. Agriculture also inevitably forms part of the water issue. Indeed, 80% of the fresh water consumed in human activities is

aimed at agriculture, and in the Mediterranean region this sector provides employment for between 20% and 30% of the labour force. Agriculture is a strategic sector to ensure food security faced with a world population that is increasing day after day and much of it is suffering malnutrition.



The third session of the conference considered how the 5+5 Water Strategy model and other multilateral tools can be used to face the challenges connected to climate change in the Western Mediterranean.

The main challenges of the 5+5 Water Strategy are clear, and addressing them in a cross-cutting approach is central to the human, natural and socioeconomic activities of the 5+5 countries.

The Water Strategy emerged in 2014 as a joint initiative of Algeria and Spain. In March 2015 there was already a strategy and during the holding of the COP22 in Marrakech its action plan was approved. The rapidity with which the Water Strategy was implemented was undoubtedly possible thanks to the lessons learnt from other 5+5 Dialogue strategies in other sectors (transport, energy, defence). However, MENBO (Mediterranean Network of Basin Organizations), which was elected as its Technical Secretary and had the participation of the three observer members of the process (European Commission, Arab Maghreb Union and Union for the Mediterranean), points out that the Water Strategy was an innovative

process within the 5+5 Dialogue given that its *modus operandi* has integrated the participation of civil society. Indeed, it is the first experience in the Western Mediterranean Forum in which the format was extended to enable NGOs and other civil society institutions to participate very actively.

The Water Strategy is a guiding document that helps the ten 5+5 Dialogue countries to confront the increasing water scarcity. It is structured into 13 main priorities and is complemented by specific processes to be implemented. These 13 priorities are divided into three main blocks: sustainable water resource policies, encouraging cooperation and improving water management. Also notable is the importance of agriculture and energy in these priorities, which have integrated the water-energy-food nexus into their approach.

The Water Strategy is an innovative process within the 5+5 Dialogue given that its *modus operandi* has integrated the participation of civil society

Under the Spanish presidency of the Water Strategy (2017-2018 following the operation regulations approved in the Action Plan by the water ministers of the 5+5 Dialogue that establishes a rotating presidency), the seventh meeting took place in Valencia this year to define the annual work plan to implement the Action Plan. The 60 projects it envisages are classified into two main large blocks: services, on the one hand, which include 54 projects, and infrastructures, on the other, with six projects, all chosen by consensus by the ten 5+5 Dialogue countries.

The conclusions on the Water Strategy indicate that this can be seen as a success given its rapid implementation but also because its members from the 5+5 Dialogue have participated on an equal basis in its creation. The importance for the process of the link between Foreign Affairs ministers and the ministers dealing with water resources was also emphasised. At present, the main challenge facing the Water Strategy secretariat is the mobilisation of financial means to implement the Water Strategy Action Plan.

As for agriculture, CIHEAM (International Center for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies), supported by all the member countries of the 5+5 Dialogue, coordinates the largest programme of support to agriculture in the

Mediterranean. It endeavours to resolve the many problems concerning the agricultural environment such as the efficiency of irrigation (estimated at 50%-70%) and food waste (estimated at one third). Another major problem, linked to the preceding ones, is the perception of agriculture as an unattractive activity, with antiquated techniques and whose generational replacement is far from assured.

In order to support cooperation in the improvement of agricultural techniques, the European programme PRIMA (Programme Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area) focuses on the efficiency of the use of water as well as on the training of farmers. Innovation and development are a priority to perpetuate farming activity, as they allow the durability of water resources and the improvement of working conditions.

These initiatives in the Western Mediterranean (Water Strategy, PRIMA) are responses to the climate effects of a new geological era marked by the human activity that gives it its name: the Anthropocene. The ecological effects of human beings as their development rate increases also show the main challenge of the 21st century: how to reduce the ecological effects by improving the living conditions of individuals. While in the north of the Western Mediterranean the aim is to limit and reduce the recourse to fossil fuels, in the south it is about improving the conditions of the populations without increasing the pressure on the available natural resources.

Innovation and development are a priority in order to perpetuate farming activity, as they allow the durability of water resources and the improvement of working conditions

To meet this challenge at the level of the 5+5 Dialogue, intensifying the synergies and complementarities between sectors as well as increasing the degree of cooperation in the sector of renewable energies is essential. These are recommendations that had been made in 2010 in the declaration of energy and environment ministers in Oran. They are still pertinent today because the forecasts are becoming gloomier.

Indeed, the forecasts for the horizon 2050 in the Mediterranean basin issued by the Euro-Mediterranean Centre on Climate Change (CMCC) indicate a rise

of an average of 2°C, a reduction of between 5% and 10% of precipitations and an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme meteorological events. Attenuation and adaptation strategies must be implemented, notably in the renewable energy sector, in which the complementarities between attenuation and adaptation are most notable. The aim, among others, is to perform a transition towards an economic model with low carbon emissions. In this respect, the Maghreb countries have a comparative advantage because of their high exposure to sunlight. Similarly, the agriculture sector, closely linked to water and energy, must adapt to the current changes caused by climate change. The Water Strategy in the Western Mediterranean, the PRIMA programme for water and food security and the goals indicated by the European policies and the COP22 are precious instruments to be used with the end of implementing these attenuation and adaptation strategies. The Western Mediterranean should be seen as an “energy district” in which the emerging demand for alternative energy can be met at the same time as the increasing thirst for unconventional water resources.

In order to support this energy, water and agriculture transition, in which a new conception of the relations of man with his natural environment is imperative, the 5+5 Dialogue therefore has instruments that are implemented at a regional and subregional level (Water Strategy, PRIMA, European policies), developed thanks to the specialised work of the European Commission, institutes such as CIHEAM and networks such as MENBO in collaboration with the member states. Other instruments resulting from a wider international cooperation should also be integrated in the subregion. A good example is the farmer field school approach developed within FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), which from the 1990s to the present has managed to establish them in 90 countries around the world. Based on a bottom-up approach of informal education for farmers, it was implemented in North Africa through the MENA programme (2004-2014), and the farmer field school network in the region was created in 2015 in Tunis.

The Water Strategy in the Western Mediterranean, the PRIMA programme for water and food security, targets set up by the European institutions and the COP22 are precious instruments to be used with the end of implementing these attenuation and adaptation strategies

Fourth session: “Joint responses to manage the challenges for youth in the 5+5 Dialogue: confronting violent extremism and radicalisation”

The responses to date against radicalisation are not appropriate. Although the participants in the conference agreed to state that the approach to violent extremism and youth radicalisation must be made from the state structure, it must not adopt a prevailing security logic that sees these youths exclusively as a threat.

Unemployment in the 5+5 Dialogue southern countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa impels youths to try to migrate towards countries where the labour market is more favourable and creates a situation of humiliation when these youths are confronted with the rigidity of European borders.

Entering professional life means for many youths a desired social ascent. These hopes are often truncated and create frustrations. These frustrated expectations are even more disconcerting because these youths compare their paths to that of their parents who often grew up in a world where the economic crisis and political instability were less virulent than today. This generational gap of opportunities causes among unemployed youths an inevitable negative comparison that often has repercussions on their self-esteem.

Education is a key factor to better understand the issue of radicalisation both from the point of view of the resulting job opportunities and the doctrine taught

Participants highlighted the issue of the concept of “youths” pointing out that it is necessary to avoid understanding them as a homogenous whole and to overcome the generalisations that undermine them by blurring reality and making the treatment of the problem less effective. It is essential to know and analyse their needs, their expectations and projects; in short: what they wish to do in life. This knowledge of youth should take into account two relevant factors such as the environment where they live (urban or rural youth) and the identity with which they are confronted (religious, cultural, backgrounds) in an increasingly interdependent world.

Education is a key factor to comprehend the issue of radicalisation both from the point of view of the resulting job opportunities and the doctrine taught. The

power of the media and Internet is also equally important when shaping minds and this is why it is paramount to teach good practices and have a critical and prudent mind faced with extremist contents. Everything from an inclusive perspective and treating the young peer-to-peer.